Former US Constabulary soldier

[Carl]

Jul 17, 2011 20:17:18 GMT -6 quincannon said:

Carl: Those first two guys look like they are wearing a WWI dishpan, and maybe a few others. Some seen to be wearing the later steel pot.

What weapon was he 517th equiped with? Having a battery up on the border makes all kinds of sense, just as having one in an ACR squadron, if for nothing more than a means to break contact.

What unit in the Iowa ARNG?

The 517th became Armored in 1951 (105's), however the
howitzers remained towed; the other vehicles were as
per TO&E (half tracks, etc). It was the Bn who would be
the direct support for the 14th ACR.

In the Iowa ARNG, I was in the 554th FA, 4th and 3rd How
Bn of 185th Artillery - generally the same except changed in
the 1959-1961 reorganizations.

[quincannon]

Yes Carl, I think that each of the two battalions of the 185th were DS battalions in the 34th ID, each supporting a battle group of that division.

[Carl]

In May 1959, the short lived "Pentomic" organization hit the 34th Division.
The 3rd How Bn 185th was a DS Battalion.
That was the organization with 2 firing batteries, 1 105 and 1 155.
Both firing batteries were converted from Infantry companies.
The previous 3 Firing Batteries of the 554th were converted to
either Tank or Infantry companies.
Never made much sense to me.

In 1961, the 34th Division was eliminated as such, altho
the Iowa units continued wearing the SSI.
I believe Iowa ended up with 3 or 4 FA Bns
and a FA Group HQ.
The Hq of 3rd How Bn was eliminated, and
Btry A 3rd became Btry C 4th. I think Btry B
converted back to Infantry.

[quincannon]

Carl: Having worked at the Guard Bureau and the DA Staff in the force struture business I can tell you that there were a hell of a lot of things that made no sense, about how we constructed, re-contructed, re-aligned, and re-configured.

A lot of it had to do with the fact that after WWII, the Guard with DA approval, tried to field far to many divisions in the strategic reserve, repeating the same mistake they made after WWI. The idea of course was that the divisions in being with just enough equipment for very basic levels of training and readiness, could be fleshed out with both men and equipment in time of war by the draft and metoric increases in weapons production. Along came Korea, the Guard was partially mobilized and the system as planned seemed to work.

Later would come Berlin where two Guard divisions and some non-divisional elements were mobilized, and things became less certain. Again in Vietnam the Guard was partially mobilized (3 brigades I believe) and the system showed even more cracks in the basic theory.

All during this period from Korea until 1980's the Guard continued to shrink in terms of numbers of major units, favoring instead fewer units, but much stronger in authorized strength and equipment. These moves were the foundation stones set twenty or more years in advance of the Guard emerging from its strategic reserve role to that of the role they have today as an operational reserve. Even recently the Guard has taken a lot of big hits in numbers of units while at the same time the authorized strength has remained fairly constant.

As an example Maryland during the days of the 29th ID (pre 68) had at first 2 regiments (6 battalions). The Pentomic structure took them to 3 Battle Groups. ROAD gave them four infantry battalions and a tank battalion. The 29th was inactivated in 68 leaving Maryland with a divisional brigade (of the 28th) and later a Seperate Brigade (the 58th) both containing three infantry battalions. When the 29th was re-activated in 85 the total went up to four infantry battalions (smaller in the light battalion configuration). Over the years the number of battalions was reduced first to three, then two, and now only one (again now a part of the 28th ID) The difference is that this one remaining battalion is at or very near full wartime strength in both men and equipment.

Now you take this short story and expand it nation wide and you have a primer on Guard force structure for the last 70 years. It is far from perfect and each re-organization brings with it the need for a massive amount of retraining, but upon close examination of what you have to work with defined by what each of the states can furnish in terms of manpower and facilities, it is probably the best that can be done with what you have to work with.

[Rabble]

Hi Lew
thanks for the Website, there are some interesting photos there.

Regards

Ron