ResponsesRe « Reply #25 » by fredRegards. There are some who argue against your opening words, I'm as bright as anyone I know. That was robust and enjoyable critique. I'll come back at you on several points, grateful for your kinder words, peeved a li'l at accusation of falsehood.
To boot (or is it saddle) - Benteen's progress was slow, almost retrograde. It seems we share a mistrust of Gray, mine extends to W.A. Graham. Study of the narratives, testimonies, recollections, writings of 90% of the participants, led to my conclusions, which continue to develop and evolve. The good guy, bad guy, partisan aspects of discussing and studying the battle are a chore. Custer, Reno & Benteen each screwed up. Alfred Terry ran the show, he singled out none of the survivors for blame and that really should be good enough for anyone. Stepping into reverse, briefly, I consider all conclusion and insight originating from W.A. Graham to be entirely untrustworthy. That is actually a significant statement. His map and idea of the approach to battle is linked and commented in the previous reply.
The narratives each in their way, tell the many stories of the battle, it is a pastiche. What is there not to believe in a narrative of Benteen's own words given in 1876. By itself, it can be construed to suit any end but there is forever more, Alfred Terry's 27th June report, stating where Benteen was when Reno engaged. Terry went and had a chat with Reno, had a chat with Benteen, wandered about a bit, had his staff scour the battlefield and managed affairs as the C.O does. He sat down in the evening and wrote his report, what is there not to believe that Benteen was two miles left of Reno when the action commenced.
That report and Benteen's narrative tell the story. Benteen was two miles left of Reno and that puts him at the mouth of Water Rat Creek, sorry - Long Otter Creek. The journey back to Reno Creek is a good four or five miles. I believe the terrain to be rough. Two miles left of Reno is pretty fundemental and cannot be ignored, yet it features nowhere in battle study today. Correct me if I am wrong that a fundemental matter as Benteen's whereabouts, known and understood since 27th June 1876, is today entirely avoided or pooh poohed.
We could contemplate the Patterson Hughes map, drawn on the battlefield before the column moved the wounded to Far West, and showing Benteen's route of march. I suspect we would end up round in circles, like the other Fred in 1876.
Gall and Trumpeter Martin on the bluffs is interesting, were they reporting the same or different manouver by Custer, it is a truly awkward one to call.
Daniel Kanipe is one I would enjoy sharing a beer with, I have seen it mooted that he skeddaled the fight, everyone has a view. I spent some time considering and thinking through the pack train. Besides the issue of its rate of advance, it consisted of a dozen groups for each the companies, I never fathomed where the HQ kit was fitted in, and there was a thirteenth bunch of five mules carrying the scouts bits, pieces and ammunition. Whilst under a single officer, the officer was varied daily and almost a punishment detail. Each group of mules and handlers within the thirteen bunches remained the constituent of their company; hence Sgt. Hanley's Medal of Honor for trying to get through to Tom Custer. There was not a tately procession of mules advancing stedily in line astern across the plains, it was a collective of individual company groups each making their own progress. Hence some of the odder accounts of progress and arrival by that train can make sense, for example, off the top of my head Devoto's story.On of the accounts by Kanipe,
A part of the Will Aiken, Helena Independent account of Kanipe's battle, is the classic account: '"Go to Capt. McDougal. Tell him to bring pack train straight across the country. If any packs come loose, cut them and come on quick, a big Indian camp." "If you see Captain Benteen, tell him to come quick, a big Indian camp."
This is basically the last message prequel, rush, hurry up, just get here. T.W. Custer was aware that Benteen might be met or seen during Kanipe's march. Benteen turned back from his march to the left, on his own hook - ie, when it suited him and therefore, his presence on Custer's back trail was not certainty. It's more and less than than it seems. What struck me with that order, was instruction to bring the pack train across the country. Maj. Reno was across the river, not the country - so - the packs were ordered onto the bluffs. Which was my comment about high ground and not regurgitated as suggested.
There is very much of interest in the accounts left by Company C's sergeant, the very next words from that account are interesting stuff. 'On my route back to Capt. McDougal I saw Capt. Benteen about half way between where I left Gen. Custer and the pack train. He and his men were watering their horses when first seen. Capt. McDougal and the pack train were found about four miles from the Indian camp. The pack train went directly to the bluff where I left Custer's five troops.
'About four miles from the Indian camp', is one and a half miles from Ford A, and thus Kanipe saying 'I saw Capt. Benteen about half way between where I left Gen. Custer and the pack train'. Requires some consideration before it makes any sense.
In terms of delay by Custer's companies, that is more and more where head tells me some truths lay. Nothing today, can convince me the man and his troops were dawdling about on the bluffs after the water halt. Full 'stream' ahead into Medicine Tale and contact with with Cheyennes east of the river while Reno deployed and fought his fight. I have some queries on where Kanipe rode back from and it is an interesting puzzle with snippets left all over by other Company C men, Thompson's progress from 'The Black Hills Trails' in partcular. Could Kanipe be Curley's young man on the Roan Sorrel. That involves a written messag but Curley was eternally, translated, translatable and trans-trashed.
Cheers.
Re « Reply #26 » by montrose Your point is fundemental to thought about Custer's attack and writ large over study of the battle. The best and earliest to put the argument fully was Lt. Patterson Hughes in his letter from the battlefield, dated the 30th June. He puts that argument convingingly and succinctly, I'm sure it was 'the' discussion amongst Terry's staff.
The argument is back to front and naive. Custer's companies all over the battlefield - when the battle was ended. He would have understood that his strength had to be concentrated. That is what didn't happen. That it was not intened to happen, is just not on. Reno halted, Custer stalled and Benteen didn't know what was going on, apparently. Yet, what ever situation Custer found, and found developing, he understood the principle of concentration of force on the objective. One should assume that was his intention, aging boy general or not. His tactics were understood - by Cheyennes and Lacota who had fought him and the 7th Cavalry previously and who countered his tactics with a single large village, rather than stringing camps for miles along the river as at Washita.
The 1873 fight at Pease Bottom gives insight to Custer's tactical deployment and methods of defence. It might be that he held back a while for Benteen to 'Come on!' and counter threat posed by Wolf Tooth and his party of Cheyennes. Warriors began to cross the river into his front, and never really stopped coming after that. More, and more and more of them. They rode down east of the river along the bluffs Custer had followed. That his companies were scattered was down to his enemy, who out-thought and outfought him.
His carbines didn't work as advertised and by the time that was realised, I guess, when Sgt Kanipe was sent back, perhaps for clean ammunition, it was all but over bar the shouting. His horses were run off, this at the time that John Martin looked back on his journet to Benteen. Custer intended to concentrate forces, the message to Benteen proves that. His adversaries prevented it and overwhelmed him, which is a very different story to Custer didn't have a clue. If Trumpeter Martin can be believed, then Custer was suckered into what he believed to be a quiet village. He was outsmarted.
Who knows what would have happened if Custer had seen Reno in the village being overwhelmed?
I don't believe the day could have been won by that regiment alone. Unless.... they had managed to take significant hostages. That was actually the truth of victory at Washita, the hostages taken and who they were. The hounding of Cheyennes by troops during the winter of '76 and capture of Lame White Mans widow, brought the Cheyennes to surrender.
Re « Reply #27-29 » by wildHi Wild - Benteen was ordered to attack the village. Reno already was, when the message was sent to Benteen. So Benteen was to march four miles past Ford A to attack a place Custer was intending to himself.
I wonder what you make of Gen. Terry's report written on the 27th June, and particularly the details of where Benteen's battalion were when the action commenced?
According to both Brig. Gen N.A. Miles and E.S. Curtis, it takes galloping cavalry ten minutes to make two miles, as Reno did down the LBH valley from Ford A. Custer was a little under two miles from Reno when the fighting began. Benteen also.
It is impossible to ignore Alfred Terry's report of the battle. No one in Washington, Chicago, even St. Paul, had a clue about the terrain or distances at LBH in 1876, save those who were there. Today the information is very easily available in scaled map and photograph.
Continuum «Reply #15» links George Herndon's 1876 New York Tribune narrative, the last three thumbnails.
F. Whittaker capitalized this to proposition dereliction of duty on the parts of M.A. Reno & F.W. Benteen. Marcus gave pointed dismissal during testimony at his Inquiry on the February 8, 1879. Quote; 'Well, Sir, ten men can be ordered to charge a million. There is some discretion left in the hands of the commanding officer. l can give you a very brilliant illustration of that in the Battle of Balaclava.'
That inquiry into Reno's conduct was a convoluted affair of trivia, bluster, humour and the most basic of human desires. Even today, insight to its complications twists and nuances, is a thoroughly challenging procedure. A real game took place. A single aspect of Herndon's (I shall call him George, George II for clarity) narrative was seized upon by Whittaker; the three hours and is wothy of contemplation.
Whether by transcription, simple confusion, or the rising price of banana's, the comment is less than the sum of its parts. T'was one way or t'other, a misunderstanding and the type of conundrum that a writer and intellect such as Whittaker was, would have realised. It figures into estimates of time constructed by the biographer and so let's consider the value of the mans deductions. During questioning at his Inquiry, Maj. Reno was asked for his knowledge of F.W. Benteens whereabouts. The reply is most telling, - 'l did not know where he was. l never saw him after he left the column. He might have gone to the mouth of the Rosebud for all l knew.' The retort to that information, was perhaps the inquiries most incisive moment. "Had you any reason to believe that Capt. Benteen might have gone to the mouth of the Rosebud?"
Herndon's text thus, 'We stayed in the bush about three hours", is central to the case made by Whittaker. What George II was actually referring to the total time absent from the command after the retreat from the jungle, whoops - timber. Apo's.. (I have this Charlie Mopic thing going on, I watched the film one time too many). What Goerge II was referring to was his total time absent from the command, after the retreat from the timber until reaching Reno in safety.
Working it loosely for time data goes a li'l like this, work it backwards, then start again forwards and see what is in the middle. They had not been with Reno more than 15 minutes when I saw the Indians coming up the valley from Custer's fight. The command was moving towards Custer. After skirmishing Reno went back to his old position, one of the highest points along the bluffs. It was now about five o'clock. 15 minutes, skirmish, retreat to Reno Hill.
We moved forward on foot deployed as skirmishers, exchanged shots with five Indians, forded the river and heade for Reno' command which was drawn up on the bluffs about a mile distant. Time to organise and advance to the river, fight and cross and then climb, what are very steep hillsides on foot, journeying one mile.
The fight with Custer lasted about one hour, when the heavy firing ceased.
As The retreat from the timber got underway, Herndon reports a soldier killed and orders to dismount and remount, thus he refers to the main retreat which occured from the timber. A seperate breakout by men of Company G, led to a majority being killed. Lt. Egerley's account of his platoon's approach towards Ford A and the valley fight, is interesting for detail of the number of cavalrymen he saw fighting in the valley, how ever - on with the scout's narrative thing. That activity fell within three hours of time Retreat from timber to the retreat onto Reno Hill.
Approaching the problem from convetionally, beginning to end, adds nothing to the sequence. Herdon's party seems to have carried wounded, was affot and covered upto two miles of terrain to reach Reno near or beyond Weir's Peak. Interestingly, this would be about the time that Company C's privates Thompson and Watson, joined that same advance by climbing the bluffs from the valley floor.
Was Frederick Whittaker justified in his deductions based on George II's 1876 account? On foot, Herndon's party took over an hour to reach Reno's advance. The obviousisity
, is that party crossed the river at the retreat ford.
Thus working backwards with time, it is entirely the fact that retreat from the timber took place around 14:00's, the two o'clock of Maj. Reno's report and several letters and news articles of 1876. 5pm, 2pm, 12.30pm. Shipley Gray, eat yer heart out. So, where's my slide rule, It is definately here somewhere.
Unfortunately there was no mention of bugle calls by George II and I wipe the tear, baby tear, from my eyeie. This data does suggest the Custer fight was concluded by 3pm-ish and Reno concluded his advance by 4pm because of the duration of the march by Herndon to reach his column. It's loose, needs some refining in regards time and distance uphill and arcross water with wounded, but hangs together in relation to time data available from 1876 to F. Whittaker.
It's neat one to pick holes in, fire away. Developing scenarios with the five Sioux who briefly barred the route to the river is interesting in a broader context. Where did they go, to raise the alarm that troops were in the valley? Less than 15 minutes after joining Reno, George II saw Indians coming up the valley from Custer's fight. There is record from both Gall and Sitting Bull of a false alarm involving 14 soldiers in the valley, although Gall told they were killed. Warriors Herndon saw were coming up the valley.Peter Thmpson left record in The Black Hills Trails of another warrior party in the valley below Reno's advancing column.
There was also the break out from the timber by some 20 men of Company G, which crossed and recrossed river loops to escape, upto 15 of their number being killed.
No bugle calls relevant to Gerard in the timber with Charley Reynolds before the retreat though. Ho hum.
SonataDA TAIn the same way that Whittaker ran a li'l loose with George II's words, such applies to Benteen's Narrative, though not the official report by Alfred Terry.
'Having marched rapidly and passed the line of bluffs on the left bank of a branch of the Little Big Horn which made into the Little Big Horn about two and a half miles above the ford crossed by Col. Reno's command, as ordered, I continued my march in the same direction.There is obviously leeway in interpretting where Fred marched his men to, in this account - that though is not the case with Gen. Terry's report of the 27th June, '
Captain Benteen, who, with three companies, D, H, and K, was some two (2) miles to the left of Reno when the action commenced, but who had been ordered by General Custer to return, came to the river, and rightly concluding that it was useless for his force to attempt to renew the fight in the valley, he joined Reno on the bluffs.
Some two (2) miles to the left of Reno when the action commenced, is some two miles to the left of Reno when the action commenced. Benteen was either at the mouth of Long Otter Creek, or in the foothills west across the valley. The latter would have killed his mounts. Hmmmm........
Fred did possess a rather fine pair of binoculars and apparently, Lt. Gibson had use of them at that time. All curiosity is easily resolved next time you are at the mouth of Long Otter Creek, how far into the valley, around the big bend in the river which runs towards the Big Horn, can you see. Return from there towards Custer's trail in Reno Creek and Ford A, is anything up to five, maybe six miles. I think that Marcus had it just about right at the Inquiry, whether he knew it or not. That is only a thought..... anyone fancy suicide? Fred, Fred - Get over here!
Alfred Terry had no problem with either officer's performance during that battle, that really should be enough.
DA TA TOO E - RCOIIt is difficult today to realise what was at stake for both M.A. Reno & F.W. Benteen, once F. Whittaker donned his batman cape. I imagine that Reno found the situation insufferable and hence what was a very high risk strategy of requesting the Inquiry that took place into his conduct at Little Big Horn. Linked is the letter that really got everything cooking. The stakes for Benteen and Reno were high, colleagues and the military pulled in their favour., from early on.
Shortly after that letter was written, N.A. Miles visited the Crow tribe, conducted extensive inquiry into the events of Custer's battle, published the details eventually in memoirs and gave Curley the third degree aboard Capt. Marsh Grant's river boat 'Y.F. Batchelor. Very little, in fact nothing of those interviews with Curley became public and I sometimes wonder why that might be so. Miles proved to be mildly critical of Reno, but was ardently pro-Custer. His book is a very good but copious read. What ever Miles learnt from Curley, remained with him and well done that man. Look what it has spawned.
Miles did introduce considerable controversy to the battle with views that eventually developed into Kulhman's SSL obsession, and yet the year previously it was reported that remains of at least fourteen horses lay with the dead. Significant to those who know the history of the SSL's history. The animal's bones were not present when Miles conducted his investigation of the battle the following year. Another minor battle myth and mystery.