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Post by fred on Jan 18, 2011 13:52:52 GMT -6
The business about Reno being a coward-- or drunk, for that matter-- is sheer bunk. Yes, he could have-- and should have-- "retreated" better, but all that would have done in all likelihood would have been to less sully his name. You have pointed this out numerous times-- if I remember correctly-- that we would still have to determine if a "proper" withdrawal would have saved lives... and which ones... and where. That is an impossible task, and it is just as likely that Reno would have suffered even greater casualties had he pulled his men back company by company.
My rub with Reno is that he did not ensure all his men were with him. In reality, that is the company commander's task, i. e., Moylan, French, and McIntosh. In their defense, Reno may not have given them the time, so what we have here now is a, "he-said-she-said" conundrum.
I have written a 52-page monograph about Reno's crossing at "A," and his move down the valley, then the defensibility of the timber area. Since it was too long to go in a magazine, I decided to use it as a chapter in "Book II." Only "Montrose" has read it and I have had no feedback, so maybe the damn thing is fur schimmel (that's convoluted Yiddish), but one thing is for certain after basing virtually every word of the monograph on testimony, Reno performed very, very well. And it was impossible to defend that timber.
Some people say all he needed to have done was keep it for 20 minutes longer. That argument is as specious as all the others, especially if one considers that the vast majority of Indians fighting the man didn't leave the valley until a good 30 minutes after Benteen's arrival, meaning the volleys fired from Luce and Nye - Cartwright were long since past, and also when one considers the tactical situation at the time.
Some of us guys who have heard the "zing" go by have a tendency to evaluate the past in terms of the present. The experience is fine, but the analogy doesn't always work.
As you said-- and as I have said as well-- Reno was there... I wasn't.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by sfchemist on Jan 18, 2011 14:37:28 GMT -6
Fred,
I also can't find any credible evidence for Reno's alleged drunkenness. There was questionable testimony from two civilian packers that Reno was drinking, but other officers who rode with Reno, saw no evidence of Reno being drunk. Two were career officers (Lt. Edgerly and Capt. Mathey) who never heard any talk of this allegation until after they arrived in Chicago for their testimony---2+ years after the fact.
My first exposure to the LBH gave me the impression that Reno was a drunken coward, which I now thoroughly reject. However, when reading the RCOI the following testimony from Sgt. Culbertson (P. 324-325) gave me an inspiration on how things can be spun in different ways:
“I was called by Capt. Moylan and asked what men were wounded and how many were missing. I told him and then Lieut. Varnum asked me if I had any water. While speaking to him and giving him a drink of water, he asked me if I had seen anything of Lieut. Hodgson. I said I had, and gave him a description of where I had seen him last. He either called Maj. Reno or he come up about that time, and I told him I had seen Lieut. Hodgson in the river. Maj. Reno asked me if I thought I could find him. I said I thought I could. He said he was going for some water, and I should go along with him. 10 or 12 men and myself then went with Maj. Reno to the river. (.....................) We filled our canteens above where (a) man was lying in the river, and came up on a little bench again advancing up the hill, and a man of my Co. came across the body of Lieut. Hodgson and called Maj. Reno's attention to it, and he then came up to the body. We found that his watch and chain had been taken off except the little gold bar inside of his vest; and a plain gold ring, Maj. Reno took that off and said it was his class ring. We went up the hill and found a man of “G” company in the brush and took him out. He had lost his horse and had hid in there until he got an opportunity to get out. We then went on to the top of the hill.”
Now when I started reading about the LBH this event was described by an author, who unfortunately I can't remember, in something like the following manner:
….."a drunken and disheveled Reno, with blood on his face, shaken and unable to command, staggered down to the river for the sole purpose of looking for his dead friend."
After reading Sgt. Culbertson's testimony I came up with the following narrative :
…... "a brave and courageous Reno, risking his life, led a small group of men to the river to obtain much needed water for his injured soldiers. (An act for which many men later received the Medal of Honor). While obtaining water for his soldiers, he found the body of a good friend, Hodgson, who had been killed in action. Reno, in an act of kindness and mercy, removed Hodgson's class ring so one day this memento could be presented to his grieving widow. On his return Reno discovered a soldier hidden in the brush in fear for his life. Reno rescued this soldier and under fire helped him back to the top of the bluff, thus saving his life."
Which Spin is correct? Neither, because they both describe behavior without evidence. It demonstrates how easy one can describe an event in different manners enabling an author to twist a narrative to fit some preconceived theory.
Wayne
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Post by benteen on Jan 18, 2011 14:59:29 GMT -6
Fred,
Capt I believe that both yours and Dark Clouds statement are spot on. In addition I believe that some that knock Reno's decision do so with a cup of coffee sitting at a computer screen. Pretty easy to criticize someone 130 years later from the comfort of your home
Reno had to make his decisions in a hellish nightmare that I cant even imagine. There was confusion, noise,dust wounded animals and men screaming from being hit,rounds and arrows coming in some men no doubt starting to panic, thousands of warriors yelling and advancing,with all that Reno had to make a decision. He decided to leave the timber and I believe to second guess that opinion is unjust
Be Well Dan
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Post by fred on Jan 18, 2011 15:55:21 GMT -6
Dan,
As always, thank you.
Wayne,
That is precisely how people like Reno get their reputations, written by some idiot who justifies everything by way of his own prejudices. And that is the problem I have with almost everyone who writes about this stuff.
I have no doubt that Marcus Reno had a nip or two. In fact, by 10 PM of the 25th, he may have even been feeling little pain. That does not make him as drunken coward and the last I remember, booze wears off. Plus, he wasn't the only one drinking: Hodgson had his nip, as did Varnum, and how about the interpreters and guides, Gerard and Herendeen. I would also venture to say that Doc Porter whacked one or two back amidst all that blood, and no one said a bad word about him.
And please... no one tell me old Frett and Churchill were stone cold sober, either.
From a purely military perspective, a panicked retreat to me is disgraceful and it is enough for me to extend criticism. That criticism, however, must also be viewed in the light of the circumstances and the results. That is the issue I wrestle with every time I discuss the man. Up until that "Charge!" the man's actions were excellent.
Going after Hodgson is not something the commanding officer should be doing and so you can criticize him for that, as well. In fact, that may be his most egregious offense once you can reconcile the charge.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by zekesgirl on Jan 18, 2011 16:13:37 GMT -6
I look at his going after Hodgson as a regret-driven action. Reno regretted that his actions cost Hodgson's life and Benny was one of Reno's few friends.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 18, 2011 19:22:47 GMT -6
sfchemist, exactly. It's all in the spin, and these guys deserve benefit of the doubt. I still claim that changing nothing else and exchanging Reno for Custer, you can write the thing where the existing prejudices against or for both can be made to work.
Also, don't forget that Hodgson was the adjutant, who along with personal stuff, might have paperwork or things that should be retrieved, like copies of written orders from Custer. If nobody had gone for him, the plantlife would be complaining that the written orders Custer sent to Reno by Golden or whoever are now lost, deliberately, and the fact that he didn't go is proof of conspiratorial something or other. As is, it can be said Reno went to Hodgson to get and destroy evidence that would damn him. Odd that hasn't happened. Time it out to first mention in seriousness elsewhere.
Also, the point was the corpse was relatively near and they COULD get to it rather than leave it to be hacked apart in full view.
We cannot know, but there are reasons other than demented or irrational thinking that might justify it.
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Post by montrose on Jan 18, 2011 19:56:11 GMT -6
Fog and Friction. Fog and friction are terms referring to the inherent confusion of military operations. It is normal then and now.
DC asked about modern examples. I have participated in exercises in National Training Center, Hohenfels, JRTC, REFORGER and too many training exercises to count. As best as I can recall, every single exercise I ever did at Bn or higher had similar miscues.
Organization. A modern battalion is a permanent organization. It has a staff. A BN HHC is 100 people.
The Bn structure in 1876 was ad hoc. It could and did change daily.
Now let's look at Reno's Bn. He started out with 3 companies, a Ree detachment, and a civilian scout element. Then an M CO detachment went to the right. And a horse holder detachment (likely HQ, A, and G) went into the woods. The Rees split into a fighting element and a horse raid element. The civ scouts scattered. Then Reno led a G Co detachment into the woods to protect the horses. So now we have 10 or more moving parts.
It is no surprise that effective command and control was lost.
One of the reasons Reno had problems disseminating the retreat order was that he had sent both of his staff enlisted members to Custer with messages for support. Support he never received.
Now I believe Reno could have done a better job in the retreat. All I can say what I would (and in exercises have) done. Sent the senior company commander to lead the charge and go myself to check/clean up the rear guard. Or vice versa.
The other issue is this is what Sergeant Majors do. These ad hoc Bns had no NCO senior leadership.
So I believe there were structural and situational issues beyond Reno.
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Post by sfchemist on Jan 18, 2011 20:42:21 GMT -6
dc,
I think it may have been your observation that if Custer had been the one in the timber, making the same decisions as Reno, then Custer would have been praised for his decisive leadership in saving his embattled battalion on the verge of annihilation.....etc.
Don't mean to be repetitive here, as I can't always remember what I've posted where, but I'm also having issues with the so called dawdling by Benteen. It was on another post by either benteen or benteeneast showing the topographical profile that really caused me to wake up and look at things a little differently. Benteen's route for his scouting mission was over terrain very different and far more difficult than what either Custer or Reno traversed up to the point of Custer making a right turn toward the bluffs. And I'm also beginning to think his right turn might have been a mistake. Of course, in hindsight that is a very easy thing for me to say. I just find it odd that he placed a river between his battalion and the Indian encampment. A river that, if crossed, would be a real bottleneck for 5 companies of mounted soldiers. Not having studied military history or tactics, I have no knowledge if this is considered acceptable or whether it was a poor tactical decision.
It may not have been anyone's finest hour, but I find it very difficult to blame either Reno or Benteen for the defeat at the LBH.
Wayne
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 18, 2011 20:48:46 GMT -6
Montrose,
When it's phrased like that, it makes all the sense in the world. Not a for sure solution, but certainly reasonable based on military examples that sound rather common.
Suppose Reno KNEW all that. How does just getting everyone paying attention mounted, moving, and out sound contrasted to procedures for which the units were not currently likely to perform well?
Benteen seemed to know or sense all that. Benteen said something like he just didn't think the 7th had momentum on their side and it wasn't their day and it surely was the Indians', so it sounds like he had the situation pretty well pegged.
In short, if the Indians didn't run, the 7th wasn't trained well enough to make a go of it.
sfchemist,
Custer, thinking outside the box, heroically saved a majority of his men by charging - he always did - out and to safety. Poor, mutton headed Reno - an unthinking cypher - followed totally inapplicable procedure for which his men were not capable and continually divided his command in the face of the enemy to no known understood point.
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Post by sfchemist on Jan 18, 2011 21:02:34 GMT -6
Montrose,
You brought up some excellent points and also reminded me of some of my own training exercises. Fred, correct me if I'm wrong, but I think they may have been in a place called Grafenwoehr? Anyway, as an enlisted man in the medical corps, zero tactical decisions were ever made by me and that is why Montrose's descriptions were appreciated so much. Montrose, you made Reno's ordeal in the timber come to life. Not easy for anyone to go through which is why I always salute you guys who have had real pieces of lead aimed in your direction.
Wayne
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Post by montrose on Jan 18, 2011 21:45:55 GMT -6
Graf is where you shoot, Hohenfels is where you maneuver. Training space in Germany is tight. So a normal green cycle training in Germany starts at Graf to do your shooting. For armor units this means the dreaded gunnery tables. After Graf, you go to Hohenfels for force on force exercises with MILES gear. This is laser tag, kinda.
Here is my best story. We were at the BN live fire range at Graf (Range 75? Can't remember name, probably remember most of fire lanes). We were watching sun go down. The Corps Commander was due in to watch the exercise. The range had popup and moving targets, it measured our ability to fire as a Bn on multiple targets.
General was late, and we were all in firing positions, doing hurry up and wait. As sun fell, boar came out and started feeding down range.
Then came a single shot. And then all hell came loose. Rifles, LMGs and even 50 cals . I distictly remember a tank firing a main gun round at a group of 3 boars. I was watching targets through our primitive 1980s optics and saw a boar just disappear.
The BN operations officer was probably yelling for everyone to cut it out. I was on Bn net, and don't remember this. Finally sanity was restored, and we ceased fire.
Bn net was dead silent.
About a minute later, there came a lone voice on the net.
Can I get a (Ammo) resupply before the general arrives? May not make sense to civilians, but I laughed myself sick.
The general we were waiting for was Colin Powell, btw. He was a 2 star at the time.
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Post by sfchemist on Jan 18, 2011 22:13:17 GMT -6
Montrose that is a funny story....And Colin Powell was a great warrior and commander. I was in West Germany in the mid 60's: 1965-1968 and spent most of my time saying yes sir, no sir.
I do remember an incident with the Commanding General of the 3rd ID (I was a pharmacy specialist - 91Q20- stationed in Wurtzburg at the 33rd Field Hosp). This general's wife came to the pharmacy with 3 prescriptions which I filled and handed to her. She and her husband, the General, were traveling somewhere and in order to save space she poured all the prescriptions into one container and then forgot what was what and couldn't remember any of the instructions. She originally told the General that the Pharmacy Specialist (me) put all the pills into one container and guess who got call a one day from a pissed off General? I damn near had to change my pants. Between me and the Pharmacy Officer, a Lt. who was also changing his pants, we got everything straightened out. Our CO, a full bird, got wind of the problem and he came flying down to the pharmacy having a hissy fit. Quite a scene and that is where I first learned how much power and authority Generals command.
But check this out: The General actually offered something that might be considered an apology as he eventually realized what his wife had done. (A wife btw, who I once saw give a soldier a direct order). Can't remember the General's exact words but do remember after my duty shift I went straight to the NCO Club.
Wayne
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Post by montrose on Jan 19, 2011 11:50:21 GMT -6
Hmmmm,
Fred mentioned he sent me some data, and had no response from me. At the time of that post I had sent him 6 emails. I feel like Reno after sending my two personal staff EM folks to my boss.
One of the challenges of widely separating the regiment is the challenge of communications. Distance means reliance on messengers. Messengers can relay false messages due to misunderstanding (Martini, Kanipe).
Messengers also provide feedback. Custer kept both of Reno's messengers, which was a horrible error.
So at LBH, understanding why Custer split his command into so many small parts widely scattered, involves understanding how he planned to provide effective command and control.
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Post by fred on Jan 19, 2011 12:33:51 GMT -6
Fred mentioned he sent me some data, and had no response from me. At the time of that post I had sent him 6 emails. I feel like Reno after sending my two personal staff EM folks to my boss. Will, I only meant that you had not yet responded to Chapter 15. You now have and I thank you greatly. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Jan 19, 2011 22:32:03 GMT -6
Wayne raises the issue of spin. So let's look at Reno's advance to Weir Peaks.
Consolidation. The Benteen/Reno force formed a hasty defense. They then waited for the trains to arrive. Any move north would be foolish until the regiment massed.
This is yet another LBH paradox. Reno was massing force in the south. Custer was dividing force in the north.
It should be noted that Reno started moving north once B CO and the pack train arrived. There was a delay since they had litter patients that had to be carried.
Weir. Weir went off half cocked. He had no contingency plan if his company ran into enemy forces. He had to move his company towards Weir Peak when he saw they were heading into a vastly superior force.
If Benteen had not moved to his support, he would be in serious trouble.
Being bold is fine, but so is sound judgment. After Reno's defeat, Weir has no excuse for not understanding that they faced a large Indian force, at least 1.500 warriors. So what exactly did he plan to do when he set off with just an orderly? Even when his company followed what did he expect to do?
The 7th main body was limited in speed by the litters. They had lost horses in the valley, and I am not sure if they had enough remounts to cover their losses. Any battle would be constrained by the need to protect their wounded.
Custer force. The Custer force fought poorly. The companies were scattered out of supporting distance of each other. FOur of these companies were overrun without signs that they ever organized a defensive position.
The issue is not that the Custer force was destroyed, it is the manner in which it was destroyed. If the companies had massed and formed an all round defense, they would have inflicted far more casualties.
The Indians were averse to casualties, and this is the only real hope the command had of survival. Problem is that Battle Ridge is very poor for a defense. I do not see much hope of survival in any scenario that moves north of L/C/N ridge.
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