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Post by Melani on Jan 6, 2011 1:49:49 GMT -6
I just did a quick scan of your posts to check, and found one that did indeed refer to your discussions with dc on this board. Maybe he can specify what he is referring to that has been removed--I didn't find it, but didn't spend a lot of time searching.
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Post by fred on Jan 6, 2011 8:54:22 GMT -6
I didn't see anything missing, either. Look, "keogh" and I have had our differences, and I recognize the gap in the "love scale" between him and DC, but I don't think "keogh" is a crook by removing posts selectively and I would be disappointed if I found that to be the case. The fact that he allows pandering idiots like "calamityannie" to continue posting is a necessary evil that must be tolerated. It is up to targets-- like me, in this particular case-- to respond or ignore. I have now chosen the latter option; bloviating fools are not worth my time.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 6, 2011 10:28:17 GMT -6
It's possible my informant was incorrect; if so, apologies to all.
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Post by Melani on Jan 6, 2011 17:22:28 GMT -6
Generally when keogh removes or edits something, he makes a note of it. It's easy enough to lose track of individual posts in the huge mass of info that is on these boards, and think something is missing.
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Post by sfchemist on Jan 7, 2011 21:09:35 GMT -6
On the other board, it's fun to watch the sadder elements of the past try to reinvent themselves, ala Wiggs, and under new names suddenly find courage to take on fred, benteeneast, and others from what they hope is safety. (Confusing Kanipe with Keogh is just an added element of entertainment.) Just like those new posters who emerge here and there both to be nothing but shills for someone. A recent post illustrates the historical ignorance of those vectored in on detail and truth. It was was written by a Major Timothy Karcher, US Army, called “Understanding the Victory Disease from the Little Bighorn to Mogadishu and Beyond.” He states in his preface: “The disease, by definition, brings defeat to a previously victorious Nation or military due to three basic symptoms: arrogance, complacency, and the habit of using established patterns to solve military problems.”
I find it more than interesting that he used the LBH to help develop his thesis on his three key points: arrogance, complacency, and using established patterns. All three seem to apply to GAC on this particular day in June.
I would really appreciate hearing what the military veterans think about this, as it makes a lot of sense to me.This is from sfchemist, who is apparently a pharmacist as he says he was in the military. What bothers me is that he seems to find the concept of Victory Disease new to himself, unaware of its weathered and ancient use. It was used widely by the Japanese themselves to describe their overreach in WWII, and was applied to Napoleon and in variations way back. He says he finds it 'interesting' that LBH was utilized. I do as well, and although I have not read the paper he references, I do so for the opposite reason he finds it so. And this, because victory disease is not illustrated by battle but by war. I think the LBH was chosen because it is easy to use for the ill informed by the ill informed, as the term as applied to a mind set does not exclude the possibility of loss in battle, and it surely does it reference individual battles but war. The Japanese were rebuked at Wake for a bit, and then clobbered it. Kursk and Stalingrad, the collapse of the Schlieffen Plan and loss at sea did not alter the German strain of victory disease. Battle losses are entertained by those suffering from this disease. It bothers me that the soldier who is quoted seems to think he's inventing a term and applying it to individual battles without knowing it's an old term long in use to describe the strategic blunders of nations at war. In fact, such illness is often only felt as a form of racism or extreme cultural delusion, something the Nazis and Imperial Japanese were surely guilty of. They're just smarter and better in their own minds and, like 'class' in the cliche, this will tell out. Somehow. But, it doesn't. At all. This why the Schlieffen Plan of the Kaiser, based upon the heroic Hannibal's brilliance at Cannae, didn't seem to reflect that while he won the battle, he really lost the war badly due to that win. The US Army had lost not a few of the small skirmishes often elevated to the term 'battle' with the Native Americans. The Seminole War, Red Cloud, and the Minnesotta campaign all had bad moments, but the inevitability of 'victory' never left our collective minds. This made the fiascos in the Philippines and chasing Villa hard to take or understand, and why did not impress the Europeans in WWI as much as ourselves. "We won the War!" was a religion and totally nonsensical in the hard reality of history. Darkcloud, This is sfchemist (Wayne), pleased to meet you: I am a retired analytical chemist who spent his entire adult life working in an environmental testing laboratory in front of instruments with fancy whistles and bells---aka A Nerd. I was never a pharmacist in civilian life and never attended a civilian pharmacy school. I was on active duty in the Army from 1965-68 as an enlisted man---E5 or SP5 (Specialist 5th Grade). My MOS was 91Q20 which was a pharmacy specialist and while my military job had similarities to a civilian pharmacist my level of education at that time was not. After Basic Training the Army sent me to Ft. Sam Houston (San Antonio) for about 5 months of what they called Pharmacy School.....but it was not at the academic level of a civilian pharmacy school. My interest in the LBH is a recent acquisition and it is the only military battle I've ever studied in any detail. A visit to the battlefield last year kindled my interest and prior to that my only knowledge of it centered around such slogans as Custer's Last Stand, Custer's Massacre, etc. I shamefully admit that it was my understanding that there were no survivors of this battle. I didn't have the common sense to realize that there were thousands of survivors and had no idea that anyone from Custer's Regiment survived. I left the visit to the battlefield somewhat ashamed of myself for my biased and uninformed opinions and made a vow to study this battle in more detail. You seemed to infer that I might be a shill. Nothing could be further from the truth. Historical Ignorance: Guilty as charged. And I am making a honest effort to educate myself about this interesting battle. You said and I quote: “What bothers me is that he (sfchemist) seems to find the concept of Victory Disease new to himself, unaware of its weathered and ancient use. It was used widely by the Japanese themselves to describe their overreach in WWII, and was applied to Napoleon and in variations way back.” Why does this bother you at all? I've just never encountered this concept before, just as I've never studied military history or astrophysics. You are correct that I was totally unaware of it's “weathered and ancient use.” We all have our areas of expertise and military history is not one of mine. I respectfully disagree with your comment about victory disease not being illustrated by battle but by war. It is certainly possible that Custer may have lost that battle based upon the author's definition and use of “Disease of Victory.” Perhaps if you had read the article you may have had a better understanding of the author's thesis. I subsequently learned (on what I guess is called the 'other board') that the author is a combat veteran of several campaigns, including Afghanistan where he unfortunately lost both of his legs. Your following quote is mystifying: “I think the LBH was chosen because it is easy to use for the ill informed by the ill informed, as the term as applied to a mind set does not exclude the possibility of loss in battle, and it surely does it reference individual battles but war.” It is my understanding that you probably have the expertise to re-word this sentence in a more logical and coherent manner. Your website, articles, and radio broadcasts are most interesting, as are some of your postings on this forum. Wayne
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 8, 2011 10:36:32 GMT -6
sfchemist,
It is to be admitted I did consider you might be a shill or a plant, or just a rerun of a past poster. I stand corrected, and I apologize for that, with the caveat being my - once a concern, now an outright prejudice on my part, I realize after reading my post - attitude was formed by much precedent. No acceptable excuse, but an explanation.
Regarding historical ignorance, and 'victory disease' and my pilloring of you on that issue, the following.
We've had in the past on Custer boards a few supposed soldiers who have assumed or suggested (if not demanded) that their views and summations be accorded above the mean. This, despite blatant error and displayed ignorance of that which they purport to be authorities. The other board is saddled with one in particular. After a few of these through the years, and other issues, it has become apparent that many 'scholars', 'researchers', and seekers of truth about the LBH are anything but, and not only aren't read on the history of the time, but show no interest in it or appreciation of its value to understanding Custer, his officers, and their world.
For example, back in the days when best sellers lasted years if not decades, the mental landscape of the educated class - like Army officers - had many, many common frames of literary reference, a state that existed through the first World War. These references were known to the public and media and accepted. But they seem literal to the uninformed today, when they were often a form of code.
Those literary templates framed how the LBH was presented to the public and remembered, just like the Civil War had been. But most of those interested today in the LBH are blissfully ignorant of those myths, tales, and phrasings that reappear under the Custer name, starting with the Last Stand. Atop which, the Franco Prussian War of 1870 provided a last stand as well, and this influenced competitively how our media and Army chose to recall and explain the fiasco.
It was because you served and then didn't recognize the 'victory disease' phrasing that I unloaded. That was unfair and wrong to do.
Regarding the author, my regard is limited to - but highly appreciative of - his service and his wounds. Nevertheless, 'victory disease' is a near cliche and has been for centuries. My impression of his paper, which I have now read, is not high despite his service, and the LBH is a lazy example requiring little but web level research.
That was the basis of what must be assumed to have been a sentence in my mind albeit a horrendoplasty on paper. In it's general usage, victory disease has been applied to top brass decisions that result in strategic overreach, starting with bare minimum logistical support based on arrogance followed by the undeserved assumption that support of that level really isn't needed after all in future efforts. When the inevitable happens, the attitude is found to have metastasized vertically through the military, and cannot be removed without a machete, and it's too late. Napoleon, Kaiserine Germany (well, Germany in general), and Imperial Japan are routinely diagnosed with this, by themselves and the victors of the war.
I've never heard it applied to a single battle because, as a disease, it needs a system to infect. No sane military would claim they'd never lose a battle, but some chortle that should it happen it doesn't matter in the medium and long run because of this and that. The Schlieffen Plan, for example, assumed there'd be lost engagements and delays and prepared for them: but the disease was there.
It's become a cliche now that the US won every engagement in Vietnam, but lost the war. The Vietnamese were convinced all they had to do was stay functional and they could lose constantly till we pulled out. Victory is not only a disease, sometime, it's a chimera and, perhaps, sorta irrelevant to the point of militaries, which is to win wars, not just the battles.
Anyway, you have been most gracious. I'll fester for a while and plot petty revenge. As everyone here can tell you, I'm NEVER WRONG. Right?
Right?
Hello?
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Post by fred on Jan 8, 2011 13:29:31 GMT -6
Darkcloud,
I for one forgive you all your past sins and must tell you you have not been wrong all the time. I have noticed once or twice where you were very, very close to being correct. [That, of course, is a poor stab at being humorous.]
"Sfchemist" is one of the really good guys on these boards and I am glad you understand what he was driving at. He and I have e-mailed one another a couple of times and he is articulate, smart, savvy, experienced, and extremely inquisitive with a very open mind. [Wayne: I accept certified checks or money orders only and I will send my fee schedule later.] And unlike myself, a notorious "shill," "chemist" is not. Also, he is well grounded.
Anyway, I am delighted to see your post and I am even more delighted to see Wayne's inquisitiveness and growing knowledge over here. Help to guide him well; he will reach his own conclusions, but you can be assured they will be very well thought-out.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 8, 2011 14:53:17 GMT -6
Still odd. After I hit post, it tells me it took too long and has been shut down. But when I reset, it's there on my copy of the thread but NOT there in the collection of my posts.
Mumble.............
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 8, 2011 14:54:57 GMT -6
Re: They Wish They'd Said That...(and they will) « Reply #49 on Jan 2, 2011, 2:45pm »
So, I went to the paper and read it. As with previous papers offered up by the military, it is full of error and certainty where none COULD exist, and even though he draws valuable conclusions I again call attention to the habit of providing detail as intimidation rather than fact. He has a fair amount wrong, and since it's an official paper that should not be tolerated.
1. "Thus, the winter roamers were believed to be composed of only 800 warriors spread across a variety of smaller villages since feeding a large village was difficult during the winter." Page 8. Is that remotely true? I remember 1500 being tossed about a lot. Is this just referencing the pre-Reynolds mindset?
2. "Although this engagement was not extremely consequential, Crook failed significantly by not informing Terry and Gibbon of his battle, the aggressiveness of the Indians, or of the large force of warriors encountered."
How? Why? That it wasn't expected is shown by the fact Terry did not immediately attempt to inform Crook - whose status could not be known - of Custer's defeat except by the same roundabout method. The land between the two was the object of the campaign and not likely to allow communication.
3. "Custer, with the 7th Cavalry, was to move south up Rosebud Creek, cut west to the headwaters of the Little Bighorn River, and then move north down the river to strike the village from the south."
I don't think cutting west brings you to the headwaters of the LBH, but going way the hell southwest into Wyoming does. I understand what he means, but he exhibits the same breezy attitude of knowledge of which his very paper is supposed to warn.
4. "Again controversy arises since accounts vary about whether Custer’s Indian scouts actually saw the village or simply identified indicators of a village (a pony herd, or smoke from cooking fires)."
There can be no such controversy. We know where exactly the village was and it is physically impossible for it to have been seen virtually anywhere from the Wolf Mountains. They are not remotely visible to this day from the campsite. The bluffs block them.
5. "At approximately noon on Sunday, 25 June 1876, the 7th Cavalry crossed the divide and started the opening stages of the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Just west of the divide, Custer halted the command and gave orders for the upcoming battle’s troop dispositions. Since Custer did not know the exact location and disposition of the enemy, he assembled his forces in a dispersed formation that would allow him to identify the enemy force and then maneuver his element against the village. This formation would also allow the 7th Cavalry to strike the village from more than one direction simultaneously, another commonly believed recipe for success when attacking an Indian encampment."
No, he did not. Reno had no such clue until way after Benteen had left what his command was, if anything. Benteen was not given instructions for an attack on the village, nor was Reno, nor any officer. Custer may have formulated a plan, but he did not share it at that time and it is wrong to imply he had.
6. "Since Custer did not know the exact location and disposition of the enemy, he assembled his forces in a dispersed formation that would allow him to identify the enemy force and then maneuver his element against the village. This formation would also allow the 7th Cavalry to strike the village from more than one direction simultaneously, another commonly believed recipe for success when attacking an Indian encampment."
It did? He sent Benteen well away disregarding the scout's reading of the herd and the smoke as solid indicators of where the village would lie, but that was better than sending Reno to attack it without a clue as to its size or his own ability to support Reno.
7. "Company B and the regimental supply trains were to follow approximately 20 minutes behind the main body. As the mule train was slow and difficult to move, Custer must have known that this 20-minute separation would increase over the necessary 15-mile movement to the Little Bighorn valley. Thus, with his forces divided and limited orders given to his subordinates, Custer moved toward the Indian village."
The train was 'to follow.....20 minutes behind the main body....?' As in it was ordered to do so?
8. "Instead of following Reno’s advance, however, Custer maneuvered his larger battalion along the eastern bank of the Little Bighorn, concealing his movement by traveling along the bluffs east of the river."
Okay, you do not conceal by travelling "along the bluffs", being high ground. You do not conceal by waving to the valley or leading cheers, either, but he doesn't mention those.
9. "Along his route of march, Custer sent two messages back to the pack trains and Benteen’s command to quickly move up and reinforce him."
One, anyway.
10. "During the destruction of Custer’s command, members of Reno’s command attempted to aid their commander. Captain Thomas Weir led his Company D toward the “sound of the guns” and out of the defensive perimeter Reno had established on the bluffs east of the Little Bighorn River."
Again, Reno Hill had not been decided upon as their residence, and Weir may just as likely been hoping to get in on the action and reward as much as 'saving' his commander with the larger force. In any case, Weir's enthusiasm went away, and Custer's command gone by that time.
11. "The surviving two other 7th Cavalry companies spent a fitful night on a hilltop (Reno Hill) east of the Little Bighorn."
Understandable. There had been 7 companies just a bit ago.
12. "In the case of the Little Bighorn, arrogance was evident across all levels of war. A feeling of invincibility that existed at the national level filtered down to the ranks of the 7th Cavalry Regiment and created disdain for its Indian adversary."
Starting with Whitaker, that wasn't true. The soldiers were scared of the Indians. The command was described as morose alternating with enthusiams before the battle. People gave away stuff, wrote wills, did not display surety of victory.
13, "At the tactical level, the 7th Cavalry displayed remarkable overconfidence, clearly demonstrated by how Custer viewed his Indian adversary."
How Custer SAID he viewed it and how he and his men actually did so are not guaranteed the same.
14. "Typically, if the Indians believed the Army was attempting to bring them to battle they would disperse and lead US forces on a fruitless, drawn-out pursuit. This time, instead of following their normal pattern the Indians united, forming an enormous village for protection. At the tactical level, Custer dispersed his forces for two reasons that were grounded in already established patterns of combat formed on previous battlefields, such as the Washita and the Powder River."
First, the battle of Killdeer Mt. exhibited exactly the same mindset, being much the same Indians, as at LBH. He may have based his plan on far too few previous battles and deliberately ignored the one most likely to occur. That's the arrogance, but it's also willing stupidity.
That this was produced by the Army will give it pizazz with those like conz who credit it with all good things. conz himself is the illustrative example for the thesis. It's depressing that something this iffy is issued as authoritative. It isn't.
« Last Edit: Jan 2, 2011, 2:50pm by darkcloud »
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Post by montrose on Jan 8, 2011 19:21:58 GMT -6
Darkcloud,
Officers attend some type of intermediate education as captains heading towards major. During this process services have several programs that lead to a graduate degree. About half of Army officers get a Masters. Air Force is at 100%. Navy was close to AF, I don't remember USMC.
The purpose of a thesis is to have the student demonstrate proficiency in how to develop and defend a theory. The idea is to challenge the officer's ability to think. Given the nature of war since WW2, I think it is completely necessary.
So I understand that you can criticize Tim's thesis. It is not an historical study, but military science. No thesis is fool proof.
Steve Ambrose is far more flawed, and he and his publishers claim that he was a professional historian.
I may see if I can find my first thesis. No doubt you can blow holes in that. Just sitting here, I can't remember all of my case studies. Malaya, Ireland, and something else. Vietnam maybe. (Sorry AZ, Fred, and other Nam vets).
I understand your points with respect to Tim's historical accuracy. Fair enough.
And I think Wade is an excellent new poster. He asks questions, he listens (well, reads), and he is willing to lay out an opinion with his sources.
I make no claim to know as much of this battle as the long time posters. Sometimes you smart guys have to give us newbies a break. I may blow a quote or misremember something I though I knew. I don't mind being corrected. Any error I make is not mailicious, just clueless.
So give us new guys a chance. We will make errors on the way, but we will give you our best shot.
Respectfully,
Wild Will
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Post by sfchemist on Jan 9, 2011 9:58:32 GMT -6
darkcloud,
Thank you for your excellent presentation on the Disease of Victory. I had originally thought that since wars are a collective result of one or more battles an equality between the two was established in my mind. If I correctly understand your position: the disease originates in the war making entities of a Nation/Culture with the symptoms manifesting themselves in individual battles.
My primary goal in my posting was to not only introduce myself but to establish that I am not a shill---in any way, shape or form. I appreciate your comments and understand how you may have come to that conclusion. Although there is some military experience in my background, I have no understanding of battle tactics or their respective definitions. I also have no 'pet theories' on the LBH: and must rely on my scientific background that if a=b and if b=c then a=c. Some theories just make sense and have a natural flow to them, others take one on a journey reminiscent of the theater of the absurd.
I'm grinning here <g>......when you are plotting your petty revenge (another <g>), remember I am a student making an effort to understand. I have learned a great deal by reading your comments and look forward to my continuing education of this interesting battle.
Thank you for your gracious reply, Wayne (Fred, I'll need your address to send the check) <g>
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 10, 2011 11:04:31 GMT -6
Montrose,
I guess my objection is to this appearing on Leavenworth stationary, and in general the appearence that this is approved Army opinion from class or think tank. The layman isn't going to think that the US Army puts up papers on websites of that which it does not approve.
The paper was recommended to read, yet it has numerous errors. These include but are not limited to somewhat minor fact issues (location of LBH origin)and long standing assumptions that have little ballast behind them (did they or did they not see the village from the Crow's Nest, which is impossible, anyway). It's those breezy assumptions of actuality that isn't which can mould minds easily impressed.
sfchemist,
Please do not mistake me for an authority, but I can support that contention. Interestingly, it is the Japanese who, early on, began to have severe doubts about a prolonged war and their ability to adapt (they knew they could not: they hardly laid a keel during the war while the US squittered out carriers in a year beyond which the rest of the world in aggregate had yet to produce). Reading their reports, the term Victory Disease is used often. It was based upon their racism, religion, precedent in China, and augmented by their early and ridiculously easy victories over European and American forces in the first few months of 1942. Yamamoto had to inform the Emperor of the IJN's first loss at Midway. First loss in history, not just that war.
But again: winning battles doesn't work if the enemy is there again stronger than ever a bit later when he can afford it and you cannot.
It's why I find it amusing that so much attention is paid to individual battles like Cannae and the LBH which were Pyrrhic victories and only hastened the end. If Hannabal was such a genius, why did he lose the war?
Because he's great copy and easy to write about, and the Romans discovered that fluffing their enemy made them look so much better when their own armies inevitably won. Britain did that to Napoleon, and we do it to Southern Generals and Yamamoto and Rommel, whose reputations really don't stand up under even casual glance. Not that they were bad, but not the genius level enemy the media needs.
The press thought Sitting Bull of West Point, and we accord 'mastermind' status to cud chewing sexually frustrated Arabs who took advantage of our then laughable security and could point an airplane. And of course Jessica Lynch fought to the last bullet, don't you know. It goes on, and it shouldn't. We should be better educated and recognize these old templates.
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Post by fred on Jan 10, 2011 15:33:14 GMT -6
I guess my objection is to this appearing on Leavenworth stationary, and in general the appearence that this is approved Army opinion from class or think tank. The layman isn't going to think that the US Army puts up papers on websites of that which it does not approve.... ... And of course Jessica Lynch fought to the last bullet, don't you know. There it is, in a nutshell. You have no friggin' idea how that pisses me off! Pardon the language, but if you want to hear invective.... In the stroke of a pen, the army cheapened every medal they gave out since 1917. I might add, the American football icon killed by friendly fire. A terrible tragedy... but why the medal? You don't earn Bronze Stars by being hit by your own mortars or doing the female flail, your tail disappearing from the enemy's hysterical laughter. At least that's what the general told me. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Jan 10, 2011 16:52:13 GMT -6
Political medals are not new to the Army, nor to LBH. Goldin's medal stinks. During the original medal board Goldin's case had no merit and was denied. Years later he used his political influence to overturn his dishonorable discharge and award himself the MoH.
There is a book called Stolen Valor that I think is a must read for everyone. Explains a lot about military culture, poseur culture and the use and abuse of statistics and history.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 10, 2011 17:28:36 GMT -6
I cannot pretend to understand medals.
In Lynch's defense - and I recommend everyone reading her Wiki page - it seems the Pentagon and her Congressman made a big deal out of it and given her injuries - broken thigh, arm, ankle - and the fact she had zero control over initial reports, and that Pat Tillman was later revealed part of her 'rescue', it all melded together. She may have been awarded the medal for things she never said she did or endured, and rather distinctly said she hadn't - bullet wounds and rape - so that those who inflated the incident wouldn't be embarrassed. She doesn't come off as a publicity hound to me.
The rape thing is interesting. Easy to say when it's not yourself, I realize.
There was that woman who was captured by the Indians and later returned who made a big deal of the fact that they never sexually assaulted her, and she praised them for that. On the other hand, given the day, if she HAD been raped she'd say the same thing so that maybe her husband would keep her about or she could get a new one without the stigma. Perhaps with Lynch as well, given the report. The medical report suggests she had been, she says she doesn't recall it and asked it not be included. In the US, that would have been a money maker for her, but it would play into the hands of those trying to keep women out of combat and there may be an understanding about this. Or not.
Don't know.
The MOH of 1876 was given for less reason than the Bronze Star today, falling somewhere between a star on the forehead for attendance and a free beer for good shooting; it annoys me that people who got it at the LBH are expected to be accorded the same respect as today's winners. The reality does not add to Thompson's believability, nor Goldin's.
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