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Post by lew on Jun 18, 2011 13:53:49 GMT -6
I have always felt that when Custer sent Reno in, he had in his mind to follow directly behind Reno's advance. Sort of a mini-3rd Winchester type charge. For some reason Custer decides to alter the plan, but Reno was still under the impression that Custer would be following behind, his command. Once Custer turned away, Reno was on his own. Custer had to have known that Reno would need immediate support, yet seemed not to care. If I'm Reno-and 30 minutes later I've heard nothing from Custer, I've got to be thinking of my options.
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Post by benteen on Jun 18, 2011 14:06:18 GMT -6
Custer had to have known that Reno would need immediate support, yet seemed not to care. If I'm Reno-and 30 minutes later I've heard nothing from Custer, I've got to be thinking of my options. lew, Exactly. You said it better in 2 sentences than I did in my whole post PS- As to your first sentence, does the name Major Joel Elliot ring a bell. Be well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Jun 18, 2011 14:17:46 GMT -6
Lew & Dan: Turning right onto the bluffs was the very moment the battle was lost. Custer left Reno out there hanging on a limb, which in Reno's view was about to get chopped off. I don't blame Reno for his retreat from the timber one damned bit. One can be critical of the execution and still agree with the basic premise.
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Post by benteen on Jun 18, 2011 14:45:03 GMT -6
Lew & Dan: Turning right onto the bluffs was the very moment the battle was lost. Custer left Reno out there hanging on a limb, which in Reno's view was about to get chopped off. I don't blame Reno for his retreat from the timber one damned bit. One can be critical of the execution and still agree with the basic premise. Sgt Quincannon, Well said sir. Well said Be well Dan
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Post by lew on Jun 18, 2011 15:29:34 GMT -6
I know there has been a lot of talk about Reno being an advance guard, and should have known his mission was only to hold and amuse the enemy. If this was the case-why advance almost to the village? Could he not have attracted the warriors from a distance? If they refused to journey out to him, he had the option of advancing-thus forcing his attention on them. If all he was to do was to buy time and create a diversion, I'm sure he would have used methods different from what he chose. Which leads me to believe that when he advanced-he felt the lines would only go forward from where he dismounted. As he was confident Custer was following directly behind him. Am I way off mark?
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Post by quincannon on Jun 18, 2011 15:58:08 GMT -6
Lew: Chesty Puller once commented that there is no place for fancy tactics at the regimental level and below. A lot of people have criticized him for that remark, assuming that it was the statement of a knuckle dragger. Hogwash. There is no substitute on a conventional battlefield for raw brute force. Taking into consideration all the factors present at LBH, particularly the terrain, I think it is a mistake to conclude that baiting a trap with Reno's small force, and maneuvering to the flank to catch the hostiles while there attention was so fixed, only invited disaster. Had for instance Custer moved in a left echelon with Reno in the van with a full four company battalion, with Custer to the left rear with two four company battalions, the most likely outcome would have been the hostiles jumping at Reno and attempting to flank him (as they did) and Custer meeting that flanking attack driving it back upon itself and then continuing into the village with a lot of then broken hostiles getting out of Dodge fast.
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Post by markland on Jun 18, 2011 17:02:59 GMT -6
Lew & Dan: Turning right onto the bluffs was the very moment the battle was lost. Custer left Reno out there hanging on a limb, which in Reno's view was about to get chopped off. I don't blame Reno for his retreat from the timber one damned bit. One can be critical of the execution and still agree with the basic premise. While I'm not a LBH data-cruncher, parsing every nuance of every statment for meaning other than what was meant by the speaker at the time, in this case all I can say is that THANK GOD someone finally agrees with me! Best of wishes, Billy
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Post by markland on Jun 18, 2011 17:10:44 GMT -6
Fred: I agree. I can see no good in rushing to the aid of Custer when, as you say, Benteen/Reno had to get their commands sorted out and prepared for what lay ahead. Taking sides in this debate, one against the other, serves only to cloud the search for truth. Something that ammuses me is the on-going debate about Reno in the timber on the other site. It is evident to me that none of these guys know B from a bull's ass about establishing a defensive position. Primary, alternate and suplemental positions, counterattack plans, field of interlocking fire, and finally rally points if things go very wrong do not seem to enter these folks minds. Some of them say the timber could be held for (fill in the blank) hours. They never stop to ask themselves what if you choose to do so and you are wrong. What is Plan B? Was a Plan B possible to execute? No, they assume that all would go their way. That is not realistic, nor would it be to the commander charged with such a defense. Case in point, the retreat from the timber was bad enough. Could you envision that retreat if it had been tried by survivors flushed from the timber that was being over run? Oh Mighty Quinn...as distasteful as it for me to type this, at the time we are talking about there was no way that the typical officer used anything but tried and true methods as Hussar and Keogh propose on the other site. The "science" of the military art (notice the lower-case capitalization) was not a gospel as it is during modern times. The existing science during that time was what had worked previously for the operational officers and perhaps what they had picked up from conversations or in the Army-Navy Times. Best, Billy
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Post by markland on Jun 18, 2011 17:18:34 GMT -6
Fred: The only reason that I can see Company C (all or part) on FF is to delay to enable I and L to have some little time to get eastablished in the Keogh sector. Of course that is not the only reason they would be there, but it seems to me the most logical. Quincannon, I agree with you and your rationale here is highly plausible. I have no issue with C Company troops being on Finley - Finckle, but to my way of thinking, only after they were routed out of Calhoun Coulee. The higher ridge represented safety and was the more plausible of the two ridge choices confronting panicking men. When that higher ground failed to provide the necessary safety, those men retreated toward the additional perceived safety of Calhoun Hill. I have no issue with someone disagreeing with me, but I do ask for some modicum of "historical" support before being bombarded with "theory," proclaimed as fact. And while we are at it, if one wants to play soldier or theoretician, then please, enter the arena with some idea of what one is talking about or express a willingness to learn. This is why I have come over so far to Dark Cloud's side... and I must mention "Wild," too, for he and I have not always had a good relationship. What I like so much about both of them is that even though they are always at one another's throats, they are able to back up their arguments with well thought-out ripostes and their knowledge is extraordinary. There may never be a DC-Wild Love Fest to Save the Historical World, but these guys would make sterling pub partners. It couldn't get any better. If I could get those two guys, Bob Anderson (also of Colorado), Will "Montrose," and a retired colonel I know of in Kansas (he used to go by the name "RA-O" on the other boards), we would have a time of it. Throw in a few others-- "RCH" and Steve come to mind-- add "benteen" for flavor... and wow! The issue I have with those two clowns next door is their continued coloring of everything in the shade of "custer." Benteen is a perfect example. John Gray skewed the Benteen arrival on Reno Hill by digging for any innuendo he could attach that would portray Benteen as a malingerer. He succeeded by twisting Godfrey's obscure 4:20 time reference and the continued cajoling of Godfrey by W. A. Graham until finally, some 50+ years after the fact, the old worn-out K Company CO flipped the dog a bone and said, "Yes, OK, Benteen arrived at that 4:20 time." Hardly the stuff of judicially vetted evidence. Once Benteen arrived on Reno Hill, however, the detractors shift from that timing exercise to a hesitancy of Benteen to move forward and sacrifice himself and the remaining seven companies for the greater glory and good of America's Golden Boy. What people fail to realize and refuse to accept-- though the military amongst us see otherwise-- was that the "horns of a dilemma" Benteen referred to earlier, should have been the dilemma that greeted him once atop the hills. First of all, Benteen was greeted by a broken command whose men were not all up on the hilltop yet. Then, there were some Indians up the as well, a little farther downstream, and Benteen sent out a foray to dispatch those guys. Next, he distributed ammo from his men and sent Hare back to the packs to cut out a couple of ammo mules. Next, he had to check on his wounded. Then, Reno deserted him for several minutes. At this time, Benteen is still cognizant of Cooke's note, and while I believe Benteen fulfilled part of that order-- "come quick"-- by hustling ahead to Reno on the hilltop, there was now the second part that trumped the first-- "bring packs." The dichotomy-- if not recognized at first, or ignored by "coming quickly"-- was now clearly apparent and urgent. The situation as Benteen originally thought, i. e., and as portrayed by Kanipe and Martini, was different and his initial impressions were wrong. What made Benteen's actions on Reno Hill so imponderable to the idiots who condemn him, is the action of Tom Weir in heading downstream. This is further compounded by a diversity of opinion as to what occurred between Benteen, Reno, and Weir. The Reno and Benteen detractors all hop on the "loud disagreement" between the three men, yet Weir himself told Edgerly he had not spoken to either Benteen or Reno, and when Weir moved downstream he made no effort to signal or tell Edgerly to follow, taking only his striker with him. Of course, the detractors counter that by saying Edgerly claimed Weir often allowed Edgerly to command the troops, but it is my opinion that does not apply to this situation because the conditions at the time would have clearly dictated a commander to either stop or signal his troops to move forward. Weir did neither. Based on the studies I have done, Weir took some 28 minutes from the time they heard the volley firing to when he began his move downstream. And he went on his own hook. It took Benteen 53 minutes to move and only then, after he saw the packs within a mile of reaching Reno Hill. I would estimate that it took some 6 minutes from the time the commanders deemed the packs safe or close enough, to organize the movement downstream. That is reasonable considering the number of wounded, the lack of materials to transport those wounded, the screwed-up organization of some commands, e. g., Wallace's G Company, and the fact that there were still men missing, and others-- namely Varnum and his burial/retrieval party-- part way down the bluffs. The detractors, of course-- and they number many of my best friends, not some of the fly-by-nights over yonder-- don't want to hear any of this or will cherry-pick the testimonies to fit their own so-called "models." There is no convincing anyone. My dear friend, "RCH," claimed to "detest" Benteen, though for the life of me, I cannot understand his degree of hatred. These men have become historical figures, all of them fighting for our country. I can understand why someone who is Jewish, or someone who survived the Holocaust would "detest" Hitler, Himmler, and their gang-- or for that matter, as I do, detest those guys simply because they were the personification of evil-- but "detest" Benteen? C'mon! Best wishes, Fred. Fred. I'm not as conversant on LBH as you but I will dispute the word "panicked" when referring to Co. C on its choice of FF or somewhere else. The only reason I do this is that if they were panicked, there would have been a string of bodies (see Keogh sector) leading to the perceived zone of safety. My preferred term for C is that they were rattled but still in an organizational group rather than every man for himself as "panicked" implies. And by the way, if you want to read about another real bastard, read Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. Be good, Billy
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Post by quincannon on Jun 18, 2011 19:29:26 GMT -6
Billy: In #37 you are saying that by in large the U S Army was led by an officer corps that was not up to the professional standards of contemporary armies. It was a pretty poor system we had. Frankly it is a wonder they accomplished what they did.
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Post by fred on Jun 18, 2011 19:43:44 GMT -6
I have always felt that when Custer sent Reno in, he had in his mind to follow directly behind Reno's advance. I agree with this statement totally. Totally agree. Yep and yep! No question about it. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jun 18, 2011 19:47:23 GMT -6
Turning right onto the bluffs was the very moment the battle was lost. This statement is the key to solving the entire puzzle. No truer words about the LBH can be spoken. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jun 18, 2011 19:53:04 GMT -6
I know there has been a lot of talk about Reno being an advance guard, and should have known his mission was only to hold and amuse the enemy. If this was the case-why advance almost to the village? Could he not have attracted the warriors from a distance? If they refused to journey out to him, he had the option of advancing-thus forcing his attention on them. If all he was to do was to buy time and create a diversion, I'm sure he would have used methods different from what he chose. Which leads me to believe that when he advanced-he felt the lines would only go forward from where he dismounted. As he was confident Custer was following directly behind him. lew, Again, in my opinion, you have touched the nerve; you have a perfect grasp of the situation... certainly as I view it. Your comment throws a dagger right into the fatuous argument about Reno being an "advance guard." Initially, even Reno felt that was his role, but when Custer turned off, Reno became an entirely different force. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jun 18, 2011 20:28:04 GMT -6
I'm not as conversant on LBH as you but I will dispute the word "panicked" when referring to Co. C on its choice of FF or somewhere else. The only reason I do this is that if they were panicked, there would have been a string of bodies (see Keogh sector) leading to the perceived zone of safety. Okay, my friend. Let's take this from the top. Last things first... there was a string of bodies... or at least several bodies found in the coulee. Check the page and thread that deals with "Markers." Now... to continue our little "texting" conversation. Let me try to be brief, yet explain what I believe happened. My convictions come from several sources: Richard Fox' book; the marker discoveries-- and there were several-- and Indian narratives. We all know Keogh "fortified" Calhoun Hill, placing L Company there. We know-- or can assume-- from Indian comments, that other troops were strung across Battle Ridge, though we are not sure for how far north. I believe-- just by the sheer study of tactics-- that C Company occupied this position and Keogh kept I Company in something of an administrative reserve. I believe this because of a couple of reasons. One, I do not believe these troops were under any sort of pressure and no Indians were near them, none within effective carbine range... certainly not many; certainly not identifiable. Therefore, there was no reason to deploy I Company, and if you did... where? There was no threat-- yet!-- out of Deep Ravine, no Indians between Custer (who was moving north toward Ford D) and these troops... so where would you place I Company... and why? A tactical reserve makes the most sense to me. Plus, there is more than enough historical precedent for such dispositions. We all know where the horses were held... certainly the L and C horses... and after a number of minutes, the immediacy of the threat started becoming real. Look at arrows lofted into the air as small, pin-prick howitzers, rising high, then falling precipitously into men and horses. This was an untenable situation and something had to be done about it. Keogh-- or Harrington-- ordered C Company to mount and they charged into the coulee, scattering Indians all about. At this time, most of the threat was coming from Indians crossing at Ford B, but as time wore on, more and more were crossing at the Deep Ravine ford, some of those Indians moving toward their right and into Calhoun Coulee (most, of course, continued up Deep Ravine). C Company charged, but I do not believe they went too far, not wanting to fall out of the fire support from L. Harrington either dismounted his men (most likely) or they merely stopped and formed a mounted skirmish line (less effective and therefore less likely). With less than 40 men, Harrington was strung out too much and the warriors turned and attacked. Any Indian attack of this sort had to be violent in the extreme and it had to have a profound effect on the troops. A couple were killed in the coulee while the rest ran for any perception of safety. Most of them managed to reach Finley - Finckle Ridge, but there were a few who moved in the opposite direction, maybe because there seemed to be less opposition to these men coming from those directions, i. e., toward GGR and toward Deep Ravine. Bodies were found in those areas (see the marker thread). There is no way these men did not panic. That is an argument I can never buy. There was absolutely no signs of any defense other than a man-to-man effort, and that is no defense at all. The fact that C Company bodies were identified all along FFR and more were found strung along the Keogh Sector... and even others found on LSH... tells me clearly that these guys did not die in place, defending their two-by-four piece of the battlefield. These troops ran for dear life. I call that panic. In addition, there is not a single shred of Indian narrative-- at least that I can remember-- telling us any of these soldiers formed any sort of defensive position. Yes, I agree. He may have been the worst of all. And let's not forget about Dear Comrade Pol Pot. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by markland on Jun 19, 2011 15:45:49 GMT -6
Billy: In #37 you are saying that by in large the U S Army was led by an officer corps that was not up to the professional standards of contemporary armies. It was a pretty poor system we had. Frankly it is a wonder they accomplished what they did. Quinn, to be blunt, the answer is yes and no. The officers (and Army regiments when able) were being trained for European-type conflicts at West Point and with the various European service that officers were sent on detached service. However, as regards the war they had at the time, the Indian Wars, there wasn't any central repository for lessons learned, etc. That is the basis of my statement that officers learned from others rather than a book. Throw in the constabulary duties of Reconstruction and you have a force grasping to find their raison d' etre. Best of wishes & Happy Father's Day....I hope your wife didn't miscontrue the date as a day for Dad to catch up on the Honey-Do list as mine did. Billy
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