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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 18, 2009 6:53:33 GMT -6
Ronald Reagan
"Some people spend an entire lifetime wondering if they made a difference. The Marines don't have that problem."
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Post by Diane Merkel on Jul 18, 2009 10:40:38 GMT -6
From a website visitor: What I find hard to imagine about the last stand is how the two hundred or so troops were able to inflict so little casualties on the warriors. I realize that the troops were vastly outnumbered but did they not have superior firepower with which they could have taken more than the usual estimated amount of warriors down before they were butchered?
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jul 18, 2009 11:48:59 GMT -6
This is why it's important to ride herd on how things like the History Channel and general interest books present these stories, and not just of the LBH. They find comfort in the misleading cliches and repeat them because it makes them feel soldier-like and implies they actually did research rather than merely ask some enthusiast of dubious competence.
Underlying this message is the assumption that the 7th was a well trained outfit as one with their weapons. They were not. "Superior firepower" means nothing if you can't hit anything with it.
The LBH was not an abberation compared with other Indian battles, but rather slips comfortably in regarding per capita casualties. Also, it's worse than he thinks, since Indian casualties were accrued elsewhere on the field as well, so not just 200, but about 650 possible shooters for the lousy body count.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 18, 2009 13:27:45 GMT -6
There is difference between capacity and ability both are part of firepower.
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Post by conz on Jul 18, 2009 19:04:19 GMT -6
I'm still waiting for any physical evidence of "inadequate" cavalry firepower, or any lack of it due to insufficient training.
The proof is in the pudding, as they say, and I don't see any Warriors challenging ANY standing cavalry skirmish lines here, or anywhere.
Cavalry skirmish lines were absolutely deadly...no number of Warriors EVERY overran one, and most never seriously tried. They respected the deadliness of a line of Troopers on the ground firing.
What better would you have these Army guys do?
The whole discussion of marksmanship and training records and new recruits is silly and irrelevant if you can't show anywhere that skirmish lines could be defeated.
Certainly at LBH, every skirmish line in this battle that we KNOW about...Reno's in the valley, Godfrey's at the end, and perhaps Calhoun Hill towards MTC...NONE were overrun by Warriors through their fields of fire.
THAT is effective fire.
Now as to "Where Indian Forces Superior," I think it can be acknowledged by all that Cavalry forces were superior in marksmanship, ammunition, firepower and range to any Warrior force on the Plains, no matter what the numbers. Nowhere can it be shown that the Warriors ever achieved "firepower superiority" over any Army force, meaning that the Army hunkered down and couldn't fire at an enemy approaching them...i.e., the Soldiers simply could not be "suppressed."
So Soldier firepower is clearly superior to Indian firepower, right?
Clair
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Post by Mike Powell on Jul 18, 2009 19:33:45 GMT -6
I think there may be a tendency to underestimate the benefit of superior numbers. The advantage to the larger side is exponential, as was previously pawed over: lbha.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=basics&action=display&thread=1078&page=1I recently bumped into Lanchester again in a Rand Corp paper on US air defense of Taiwan which pointed out that the a force outnumbered 3 to 1 must theoretically be 9 times as effective to offset the quantitative advantage of the larger force. That increased effectiveness to be achieved by maneuver, lethality, morale, training, whatever. As always there are numerous caveats, a prime example from Rand being the space too crowded for the larger force to employ all it's numbers (Mcaryf, whose postings I miss greatly, raised this one in the earlier discussion). At any rate, I don't believe the NA's required parity, let alone superiority, of tactics , weapons or individual prowess. The numeric advantage sufficed.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jul 18, 2009 20:04:43 GMT -6
You have to prove there were actually firing lines with Custer before demanding to know if they were effective. If he or his captains actually established them, apparently - given the result - them thar firing lines failed somewhat, and that's assuming his group ever had had it together enough under pressure to form them. Indians had no 'command' structure, and attacked or sat where they were at individual inclination. They certainly weren't humbled by Reno, and pleasantly engaged in an afternoon activity of surrounding and collapsing his lines into cover. Obviously, so terrified were they of the mighty Army firing line.
Much as they later did with Godfrey, the West Point officer who proudly announced and retold his inclination to shoot any soldier who failed in their walking retreat (showing the great training and elite status of the 7th, because elite officers nearly always threaten to shoot their own elite men as they enter combat, we're to assume), and so was not advancing on the Indians, but puttering back towards a grouping the Indians were not totally cognizant of hidden in dust. Why rush and risk death pointlessly when they're going away?
In any case, despite not having a West Point education PLUS laboring under the humiliations of having lots of relevant combat experience themselves, the Indians managed to shove these supposedly perilous firing lines pretty much where they wanted them. That they didn't stupidly form their own firing lines, with 25% ponyholders correctly knotting the reins for immediate arm loss when the first pony got hit, and periodically try to puncture the enemy firing line by dramatic and moronic cavalry-like charge, speaks highly to their field sense and might suggest a hint as to why they won that day.
And despite never having read an Army manual. The mind boggles.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 18, 2009 23:13:22 GMT -6
William O Taylor who enlisted in 1872 and placed in the 7th.
"Out of the clouds of dust, anxious to be in at the death, came hundreds of others, shouting and racing toward the soldiers, most of whom were seeing their first battle, and many of whom I am one, had never fired a shot from a horse's back."
If never firing a shot horse back is training it fits in with Taylor's horsemanship training when he dropped his revolver grabbing the pommel. A independent seat such as the Indians used would allow the use of both hands.
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Post by conz on Jul 19, 2009 12:02:48 GMT -6
I think there may be a tendency to underestimate the benefit of superior numbers. The advantage to the larger side is exponential, as was previously pawed over: lbha.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=basics&action=display&thread=1078&page=1I recently bumped into Lanchester again in a Rand Corp paper on US air defense of Taiwan which pointed out that the a force outnumbered 3 to 1 must theoretically be 9 times as effective to offset the quantitative advantage of the larger force. That increased effectiveness to be achieved by maneuver, lethality, morale, training, whatever. As always there are numerous caveats, a prime example from Rand being the space too crowded for the larger force to employ all it's numbers (Mcaryf, whose postings I miss greatly, raised this one in the earlier discussion). At any rate, I don't believe the NA's required parity, let alone superiority, of tactics , weapons or individual prowess. The numeric advantage sufficed. Mike, That's ORSA thinking. <g> Military sims say this all the time, but they always overlook the psychological factor. What REALLY happens, is that it only takes a finite amount of damage to make an attacking force back off, no matter how big it is. A bigger force gets some confidence benefit, and can keep trying over and over, but if a given attacker is going to back off after taking 100 casualties, lets say (each is different), that force is going to back off from the defender. So if 1000 men are attacking 100, and it only takes hitting one hundred of them to make them back off, that is as good as the small force needs to be, and it is irrelevant if there are 500 or 10,000 attacking...just killing 100 of them each charge is going to keep the defender safe. Clair
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Post by conz on Jul 19, 2009 12:12:03 GMT -6
You have to prove there were actually firing lines with Custer before demanding to know if they were effective. No, I do not, because that is not my argument. YOU have to prove that there were firing lines, and that the Warriors overwhelmed them, to prove that Army marksmanship was insufficient, you see. This is no proof of marksmanship at all...if the firing lines were destroyed around their fields of fire, how well the Soldiers shoot is irrelevant. The outcome in such a case proves nothing. The Warriors were SCARED TO DEATH. They were just as frightened and stressed out as the Soldiers...no discernible difference, I must say. Why do you believe the Warriors were not afraid? And we have PROOF POSITIVE that they respected Army skirmish lines here...they were unable to break Reno's line in the valley, they were unable to overrun Godfrey's line on the retreat, and they were unable to overcome Reno's perimeter. All are complete and absolute proof, I must say, of the superiority of the Army skirmisher line's firepower. The Warriors could NEVER match it, or overcome it. So where is the marksmanship argument? This is routine Regular Army discipline. Good units experience such an event in all our wars, even today in Iraq and Afghanistan. So what's your point?! Silly... Such a sophisticated argument. These Warriors aren't that calculating. They would LOVE to have Godfrey's scalps if they could. The ONLY reason they didn't get them was superior Army firepower. That is right...by going around them. That is how we usually deal with firing lines, even in today's Army. But note that just the need to do this PROVES the efficacy of those firing lines. Probably indicates more why they lost most all their battles, and all their wars, and their independence. Above is a pretty good summary of why they LOST, not why they won that one action. Well, the Troopers never read any manual either, and they won most all the battles and wars, so what is your point, again? Clair
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Post by wolfgang911 on Jul 19, 2009 17:24:57 GMT -6
yes the psychological factor counts indeed : like here: Conz is overwhelmed with superior argument power on any post and is outnumbered 10 to 1 most of the time but he still keeps his skirmish line together and never ever retreats! that's the spirit they needed in june 76, LBH was lost because Conz wasn' t there that's for sure. ;D
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Post by wolfgang911 on Jul 19, 2009 17:28:07 GMT -6
[Probably indicates more why they lost most all their battles, and all their wars, and their independence. Clair well marklandbillyboy see here how Conz tries to highjack this post again and demands Wolf and CRHRS to intervene with futile arguments about smallpox, buffalo, treacherous treaties and sleepy wintercamp attacks. Conz resumes the indian's loss of land and rights : skirmish lines! Off course
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Post by conz on Jul 19, 2009 19:35:04 GMT -6
yes the psychological factor counts indeed : like here: Conz is overwhelmed with superior argument power on any post and is outnumbered 10 to 1 most of the time but he still keeps his skirmish line together and never ever retreats! that's the spirit they needed in june 76, LBH was lost because Conz wasn' t there that's for sure. ;D That is actually a good point, WG, because American Soldiers are a very optimistic lot. When we lose a fight, and we so rarely do, we are extremely surprised and upset about it. We tackle the same problem with renewed vigor, then, and overwhelm our enemy. Good ol' Yankee stick-t0-it-iveness, I guess. <g> You just can't beat a Yankee...eventually he WILL win... Most of our enemies should learn to never try. Clair
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 20, 2009 7:54:50 GMT -6
Seems to me that a skirmish line is very basic in training. Deploying it correctly requires more skills and is an officers duty. Its effectiveness depends on both along with effective fire.
So how do you defeat a skirmish line? The Indians have sufficient accounts that one knows that the cavalry used them.
How to defeat them: Flank them Attack from the rear Drive off the horses Long range shooting Massive close quarter attacks from nearby cover
How do you know when a skirmish line is defeated in it current location: It moves It loses it horses Sufficient casualties to be effective All the troopers are killed
What are some of the causes of an ineffective skirmish line: Lack of hits by weapons upon the enemy with sufficient casualties to stop the enemy attack Not enough firepower Inadequate fields of fire Leaving the skirmish line Not maintaining proper spacing
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 20, 2009 8:13:57 GMT -6
I use an evaluation tool in law enforcement which is basic but helps to determine what action need to be taken:
Ability-- training, practice, experience
Opportunity-- is the situation there that would require one having the training to only be limited by desire
Desire-- of the individual, leader, or group to perform the task
This explains most positions taken by posters also. If you believe Reno and his troops had the ability and the opportunity then it must be is desire that failed. If you believe his desire was adequate you must look at the opportunity or the ability of the battalion to complete the task. Some say it is Benteen's desire that wasn't up to the task of the day others the opportunity.
So looking at Custer his desire was there and so was the opportunity for his battalion.
AZ Ranger
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