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Post by wolfgang911 on Jul 23, 2009 16:35:06 GMT -6
marginot CRZHrs HEY GUYS DID YOU NEVER READ THAT LAKOTA AND CHEYENNE MADE SPORT ABOUT RIDING IN FRONT OF THE SKIRMISH LINE AND HARDLY EVER GET KILLED??? Like surfers on Jaws in front of killer waves, they hardly ever got hit (Ill make you a list) showing indians were sportsmen fighter and all us army soldiers poor shooters. REMEMBER SITTING BULL PUFFING HIS PIPE?? One of the best quotes ever of sitting bull during that 1872 fight at Arrow Creek : "Just shooting? this is boring"!!so he went out and smoked. The man ruled.  And Crazy horse watched.  |
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Post by wolfgang911 on Jul 23, 2009 16:36:17 GMT -6
eh I ment skirmish lines everywhere between 1860 and 1878 and not the skirmish line of LBh we are not sur of
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Post by conz on Jul 23, 2009 18:04:50 GMT -6
That is right, WG, and better marksmanship would cause those daredevils to do that further away.
You can tell how good a skirmish line's marksmanship is by how far away the Warriors feel safe enough to be brave. <g>
But the Warriors never won battles by shows of bravery, eh? It takes REAL fighting to win...
Clair
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Post by conz on Jul 23, 2009 18:23:55 GMT -6
On skirmish lines, out of CPT King's autobiography, concerning his cavalry Troopers in 1876:
"These men crouching along the ridge are Company 'F' of the Fifth. They and their captain (Payne) you have heard more of in the Ute campaign. One of them, a keen shot, has just succeeded in knocking an Indian out of his saddle and capturing his pony, and even while his comrades are shouting their congratulations, up comes Jack Finerty, who seeks his items on the skirmish line, and uses pencil and carbine with equal facility. Finerty wants the name of the man who killed the Indian, and, learning from the eager voices of the men that it is 'Paddy' Nihil, he delightedly heads a new paragraph of his despatch [sic] 'Nihil Fit,' shakes hands with his brother Patlander, and scurries off to take a hand in the uproar on the left."
or,
"Along our line there is a business-like taciturnity, an occasional brief, ringing word of command from some officer, or a half-repressed chuckle of delight as some Patlander sees an Indian reel in his saddle, and turns to mutter to his neighbor on the skirmish line that he'd 'softened the wax in that boy's ears."
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Post by conz on Jul 23, 2009 18:27:58 GMT -6
This is the quote I referred to earlier...it is probably posted in this LONG thread somewhere, but I'll highlight it again.
This is part of the description of the 5th Cavalry moving northeast down the Tongue river, following the villages trail as it turned east, a couple weeks after LBH...
"...we camped for the night, and, seeing what looked to be a little bunch of timber through the mist a few hundred yards away, I went to prospect for a lodging; found it to be one of the numerous aerial sepulchres of the Sioux, which we had been passing for the last four days - evidences that Custer's dying fight was not so utterly one-sided, after all."
Does this make anyone think that casualties were much greater than those stated by the Indians on that day?
Clair
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Post by conz on Jul 23, 2009 18:46:22 GMT -6
Don Rickey in Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay:
"It was in line-of-battle fighting that the regular rank and file proved their worth and showed to best advantage. Although they were usually less mobile than their Indian adversaries, their steadiness in pitched battles could seldom be matched by the savage warriors. 'The group formations of the army made a bigger target,' said Pawnee Scout Rush Roberts, 'but army marksmanship was better and steadier."
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 23, 2009 19:22:30 GMT -6
Don Rickey in Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay:
Most soldiers were not good enough riflemen to make optimum use of the Springfield's capabilities before the upsurge of interest in marksmanship in the eighties.
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Post by conz on Jul 23, 2009 20:10:47 GMT -6
Don Rickey in Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay: Most soldiers were not good enough riflemen to make optimum use if the Springfield's capabilities before the upsurge of interest in marksmanship in the eighties. I basically agree with that, except that I'm not sure you can say "most." I'll go so far as to say that "many" Soldiers were not good enough riflemen to make optimum use of the Springfield's capabilities. Most policemen today are not good enough to make "optimum" use of their 9mm or 45 cals, either. Most Army Soldiers today I can CERTAINLY say are not good enough with their M4 carbines to make "optimal" use of that excellent weapon. So I'm not sure if anything definitive is said, here. I would like our Soldiers, in 1876 and in 2009, to be able to make better use of their weapons. I also think that the majority of them do just fine by them, even if they aren't all "snipers," eh? They stopped Lakota, and they stop Taliban...that's all I'm saying. The real value of this discussion is how marksmanship may have affected the outcome at LBH in '76. Clair |
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 24, 2009 6:32:09 GMT -6
You missed before the upsurge of interest in marksmanship in the eighties. So the standard before the upsurge was low and the one met in the 1880s is not the grandiose one you attempt to make the author stating in your following posts:
Most policemen today are not good enough to make "optimum" use of their 9mm or 45 cals, either
Most Army Soldiers today I can CERTAINLY say are not good enough with their M4 carbines to make "optimal" use of that excellent weapon.
It is apparent the standard he referred to was met in the 1880s and is met today by police and soldiers. The standards are the marksmanship tests. In Arizona AZPOST determines those standards with day and night courses of fire and minimum score to pass.
Most policeman today do not use firearms. Their mission is much different and the weapons carried are for a force continuum.
Verbal, open hand, OC spray, batons, Tazer, 40 S&W, Remington 870, AR-15, and Remington M24 SWS.
To demonstrate making optimum use of your weapon system you must pass the test with sufficient hits according to the established standards.
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 24, 2009 6:48:50 GMT -6
Don Rickey in Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay:
The Army’s emphasis in the late 1870’s and the 1880’s on training soldiers for field service was inspired in large part from painful experiences in hard-fought Indian skirmishes and battles. Untrained regulars suffered heavily because they were not proficient riflemen and had not been schooled and conditioned to think for themselves in unexpected combat situations.
I think this pretty well nails it. Not enough marksmanship to keep them ducking down and at a distance. Not enough enough individual skill training to survive CQB.
AZ Ranger
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Post by conz on Jul 24, 2009 7:32:20 GMT -6
It is apparent the standard he referred to was met in the 1880s and is met today by police and soldiers. The standards are the marksmanship tests. In Arizona AZPOST determines those standards with day and night courses of fire and minimum score to pass. I don't agree that passing minimum standards on ANY of these tests means the shooter is able to make OPTIMUM use of their weapons. I think that they make MINIMUM use of the full capabilities of their weapons, when they pass those tests, eh? I agree that marksmanship improved every year the Army has been in existance from 1776 to 2009. I think the Soldiers in 1876 were better marksman, on average, than the Continental Soldiers of 1779, don't you? What I disagree with, again, is that poor marksmanship contributed in any way to the 7th Cavalry's defeat at LBH, or even to the low number of casualties amongst the Warriors. Most Soldiers today do not use their firearms, either. Yet they are better trained to use them than the average Soldier of 1876. So today we train better, and use them less. In 1876 they trained less, but used them more. And BOTH armies are just as deadly to their opponents, and win the same percentage of their firefights. So what difference does marksmanship really make? I disagree very much that you MUST pass a test to demonstrate you can make full use of the capabilities of your weapon. SGT Ryan, using a telescopic rifle to pick off Indian snipers at 1,000 yards or more demonstrated this just fine, and probably never took a test. <g> I'll also say that the ONLY test result that indicates the shooter can make "optimum" use of the full capabilities of his/her weapon is a near perfect score...certainly the top standard of any test...not just "passing." This is a good professional discussion of the use of arms, but it has little to do with the ability of skirmish lines to stop their attackers, in an war. Clair |
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Post by conz on Jul 24, 2009 7:38:17 GMT -6
Don Rickey in Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay: The Army’s emphasis in the late 1870’s and the 1880’s on training soldiers for field service was inspired in large part from painful experiences in hard-fought Indian skirmishes and battles. Untrained regulars suffered heavily because they were not proficient riflemen and had not been schooled and conditioned to think for themselves in unexpected combat situations. I think this pretty well nails it. Not enough marksmanship to keep them ducking down and at a distance. Not enough enough individual skill training to survive CQB. AZ Ranger This emphasis came mainly from our experiences with the excellent Nez Perce and Modoc Warriors that were very proficient marksmen. We had some engagements where we wanted to attack their dug-in defenses, and couldn't overcome their superior firepower. In NONE...NOT ONE, of these battles was there any problem repelling Warrior mass attacks on our skirmish lines. This was a different problem...a "sniper's fight," and improved marksmanship was required for this type of warfare. It has nothing to do with anything that happened at LBH. In fact, we rather won the "sniper fight" against the Lakota/Cheyenne snipers on SSR, and we were never at risk. Their standards of marksmanship were so low it didn't matter at LBH. So you have identified the type of fight where marksmanship DOES make a difference...when you want to attack and need to eliminate enemy snipers, and you don't have artillery to do it (the preferred method). But it doesn't apply to any Army skirmish lines ability to defend itself from being overrun by hordes of mounted (or dismounted) Warriors attacking them. We didn't need any improvements to marksmanship to do that. Clair |
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jul 24, 2009 9:25:29 GMT -6
Just nonsense, conz, of the first water.
Trying to blend the terms used for large engagements to the relatively petty small fights of these Indian wars is deceptive in itself, although unhammered it allows you to apply deflective reference to stuff you've read, however inaccurately processed, however irrelevant.
Not being able to compensate for supposed superior enemy accuracy (even by the units you called 'elite') is not quite the same thing as unintended failure to "overcome firepower." In the very few and arguable examples possible, a more accurate statement would be that the decision was reached NOT to overcome that supposed firepower because a temporary goal wasn't worth the casualties, or often any casualties. They certainly could have.
The number of "Warrior mass attacks" on our skirmish lines throughout the Indian Wars can probably be counted on the toes of a missohippus.
Although you apparently once got a grade you're proud of when instruction touched on 'skirmish lines,' the desperation to recompose every possible fight as exhibiting skirmish lines and contending it was the line rather than any other possible resistence formation that did the trick isn't plausible.
Your Fan Fiction tendencies bloom again chatting up a sniper fight for which only the most dubious and late appearing accounts offer support.
It's the Bevo Officer contending that likely notional skirmish lines in an unmitagated disaster and slaughter of Custer's troops somehow - without actual evidence - proves that skirmish lines were never broken. If Custer had time or inclination to set up skirmish lines he could only have intended to sequentially abandon as he made his escape, the LBH alone stuffs the contention.
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Post by crzhrs on Jul 24, 2009 9:58:03 GMT -6
The fights you mentioned took place in the 1866-68 period when warriors were still "new" at fighting soldiers and when soldiers were newly supplied with rapid fire weapons which the Indians didn't realize.
They learned that mass charges were not going to be effective and would cause heavy casualties.
After that I believe their tactics at fighting soldiers improved and by the time of the Rosebud & LBH had become effective enough to counter most soldier tactics in open combat.
As for poor marksmanship at the LBH: I believe one account stated Reno's skirmishers were firing so rapidly and wildly that many had to fall back to get more ammo.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 24, 2009 10:13:36 GMT -6
I think there is a difference between maximum capability of a weapon system and an individuals ability to make optimum use of his/her weapon system that is what I believe Rickey was referring too and what I am referring to. Maybe that helps in what we are stating. The individual trooper did not receive enough training and practice to make optimum use of their individual Springfield.
Locking a weapon in a vice and firing it might establish minimum group size for a given distance but it has nothing to do with individual making optimum use of their weapon. Training and practice can enable each individual to reach that optimum for them but it can not make everyone a perfect shooter.
There is a plateau above which more training and practice does not improve individual shooters. So they can reach their optimum without being the top shooter. Those that can not qualify lose their jobs in Law Enforcement.
Is it your belief that every person can shoot as well as the best sniper given enough training and practice? They don't even among the sniper ranks.
AZ Ranger
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