Reddirt
Full Member
Life is But a Dream...
Posts: 208
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Post by Reddirt on May 7, 2010 18:32:11 GMT -6
Yes. But then, I think everyone is squalid and inconsequential when they play victim beyond the facts and claim or imply a non-existent importance or stature to themselves as tribe or individuals through hoped for genetic connection. The unbelievable arrogance of the original post is exceeded only by the unmitigated gall of the response!
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Post by benteen on May 8, 2010 23:23:27 GMT -6
Just like to see someone talking about Custer and the little big horn again.Although I dont disagree with you Reddirt.By the way happy Mothers day to you and Melani
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Post by AZ Ranger on May 9, 2010 8:17:01 GMT -6
Yes. But then, I think everyone is squalid and inconsequential when they play victim beyond the facts and claim or imply a non-existent importance or stature to themselves as tribe or individuals through hoped for genetic connection. The unbelievable arrogance of the original post is exceeded only by the unmitigated gall of the response! Sounds like Joe to me.
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Reddirt
Full Member
Life is But a Dream...
Posts: 208
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Post by Reddirt on May 9, 2010 9:01:18 GMT -6
Thank you so very much Benteen! I just had breakfast in bed and am feeling like a Queen! ;D
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Post by Melani on May 9, 2010 10:35:16 GMT -6
Thanks , benteen!
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Post by scottbono on Aug 16, 2013 22:25:05 GMT -6
Anyone that does not belive that Custer was a brave and courageous soldier shouldnt be in this conversation. However no book I have read about Custer (many) do they state that he was a tactical genious. Custer charged, and he did it as well as anyone.At the LBG after a poor battle plan to begin with,when faced with a situation which called for tactics in setting up a defense, I believe Custer was clueless. Some time back I read "A Sad and Terrible Blunder" by Roger Darling and it seems Darling's essential conclusion was, indeed, GAC entered this foray, essentially clueless. He had no real idea of the terrain, there's no information (as I know) that Benteen's scout to the left was anything but that - a scout - Benteen would have no idea where GAC was to report to him, Reno may have been the most surprised man in the world when he realized the band of Lakota he was pursuing turned into such a massive village...I dunno...seems GAC went 'wallowing in there' figuring to do things 'ad hoc' and it cost a lot of lives.
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Post by fred on Aug 17, 2013 12:27:12 GMT -6
Some time back I read "A Sad and Terrible Blunder" by Roger Darling and it seems Darling's essential conclusion was, indeed, GAC entered this foray, essentially clueless. He had no real idea of the terrain, there's no information (as I know) that Benteen's scout to the left was anything but that - a scout - Benteen would have no idea where GAC was to report to him, Reno may have been the most surprised man in the world when he realized the band of Lakota he was pursuing turned into such a massive village...I dunno...seems GAC went 'wallowing in there' figuring to do things 'ad hoc' and it cost a lot of lives. Not that it matters, but Darling's depiction of the battle of the LBH-- beginning and ending in Chapter 11, I believe-- is the worst I have ever read. I dislike this kind of seemingly ad hominem criticism, but I found it awful... rife with errors, ludicrous assumptions, and outright lies... or else really bad research. It is a shame, for if you deleted that one chapter, the book is excellent and Darling's photo/map combinations are superb, the best I have ever seen. Also, his straight maps are excellent. My opinion here, however, does not diminish my enthusiasm for Darling's book on Benteen's scout, also a very fine work, though I disagree with some of his conclusions and virtually all of his stated times. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by scottbono on Aug 17, 2013 15:04:54 GMT -6
Some time back I read "A Sad and Terrible Blunder" by Roger Darling and it seems Darling's essential conclusion was, indeed, GAC entered this foray, essentially clueless. He had no real idea of the terrain, there's no information (as I know) that Benteen's scout to the left was anything but that - a scout - Benteen would have no idea where GAC was to report to him, Reno may have been the most surprised man in the world when he realized the band of Lakota he was pursuing turned into such a massive village...I dunno...seems GAC went 'wallowing in there' figuring to do things 'ad hoc' and it cost a lot of lives. Not that it matters, but Darling's depiction of the battle of the LBH-- beginning and ending in Chapter 11, I believe-- is the worst I have ever read. I dislike this kind of seemingly ad hominem criticism, but I found it awful... rife with errors, ludicrous assumptions, and outright lies... or else really bad research. It is a shame, for if you deleted that one chapter, the book is excellent and Darling's photo/map combinations are superb, the best I have ever seen. Also, his straight maps are excellent. My opinion here, however, does not diminish my enthusiasm for Darling's book on Benteen's scout, also a very fine work, though I disagree with some of his conclusions and virtually all of his stated times. Best wishes, Fred. Thank you, Fred! I tend to enjoy reading and always hold the caveat the author may not be 100% correct, which is why I ask questions about an author's veracity. And, in turn, that makes this forum that much more valuable to me.
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Post by fred on Aug 18, 2013 6:37:39 GMT -6
Scott,
Do not get me wrong... Darling's work, in my opinion, is extremely good. We are all going to disagree with one another on some things some of the time. Quincannon is one of the savviest people on these boards and when it comes to military matters, he's probably the best there is. Yet he and I get into it once in awhile. Darling's timing work is bogus, but then he never did the work on that specific issue and he makes no allusions to having done so, so you cannot take him to task on it. No one, anywhere has done a better or more thorough job on Benteen's scout than Darling; definitive work... except for timing. Same with Terry and Tullock's Creek... A Sad and Terrible Blunder... except for the Custer battle part of it.
I mentioned "lies." Let me clear that up. In that chapter on the LBH fight, Darling refers to DeRudio's sighting of the three men on the bluffs, and Darling made the claim-- along with positive ID-- that at the RCOI DeRudio named all three. And Darling, I believe, mentions the three names. (Obviously Custer and Cooke, but I forget the third.) That is patently false. To me, you read two books and that becomes basic knowledge. So it is either bogus to prove a point-- a guy named "wild" on these boards is a master at it-- or just really sloppy research, denigrating some really solid work.
For my two cents, both of those Darling books are "must haves." And again, Darling is a pilot and his maps/charts are the best. I copy them and use them whenever I refer to different areas. Great stuff!
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by scottbono on Aug 18, 2013 14:01:38 GMT -6
Just out of curiosity borne of a myriad of scenarios put forth by as many writers/historians/theorists, What was Custer's "Zero-Point Moment", that is, at what point was the battle totally and irretrievably lost? I am aware many believe Custer was on the verge of 'vistory' and everything collapsed, others state Custer was on the offensive until everything collapsed )perhaps that can be seen as 'victory' also) but I would like to get the thoughts of those here who have studied the battle far more intensely than I have been able and see what their views may be.
There are those who might argue the battle was lost the moment Custer decided to attack a day early; others may say when he divided his commands while a few may argue the battle was already lost before a shot was fired because of Custer's plan or lack thereof. But, regardless of GAC's supreme confidence in himself and abilities, there had to come a moment when things were just too far gone to correct.
Thanks, Scott
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Post by fred on Aug 18, 2013 14:15:51 GMT -6
What was Custer's "Zero-Point Moment", that is, at what point was the battle totally and irretrievably lost? You need to get Quincannon's and Montrose's opinions on this, as well, but in my opinion I would say once the command left Nye-Cartwright Ridge and Deep Coulee. That move alone created a vacuum filled by Indians and split Custer off completely from any hope of support. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 18, 2013 15:18:39 GMT -6
Agreed. That was the point of no return. That does not mean Custer could still not move away. He probably had that opportunity for another half hour at least. The point is any wedge in strength, great numbers, inserted between Custer and the rest of the regiment meant any hope of uniting was a pipe dream.
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Post by wild on Aug 19, 2013 5:09:23 GMT -6
Hi Scottbono What was Custer's "Zero-Point Moment", that is, at what point was the battle totally and irretrievably lost? Custer bever got beyond zero point. Rather as the Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton the battle of the LBH was lost on the battle field of the Rosebud. Cheers
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Post by Mulligan on Aug 28, 2014 4:22:27 GMT -6
Fred,
Let me reject, for a moment, my freshman college ideas (1970's) about the flow of battle -- that Custer's entire command suddenly met unexpected and overwhelming force while within yards of MTC and then fled in a notoriously disorganized retreat up Deep Coulee, across Greasy Grass Ridge, and finally to Battle Ridge. Every historian before 1984 and virtually every movie depicts events this way. Let me endeavor to replace this scenario with a couple of modern interpretations of the action.
I must still consider how a charging battalion of two hundred mounted soldiers, led by a controversial but otherwise experienced commander, could be stopped in its tracks and annihilated within minutes.
Although not a military strategist I will cling to my instinct that neither Calhoun's Company C, nor Keogh's Company I, were ever deployed in any type of "Rear Guard" action. I will insist on seeing Custer's columns operating cohesively and parallel to one another at all times. All for one, and one for all.
Two hundred charging cavalrymen, on the verge of what they think will be the greatest victory in the history of Plains Indian warfare, will not be brought to dismount by a band of thirty or forty NA snipers, IMHO. They will change course toward the firing and run the bastards over.
If, in fact, the charging columns have been brought to dismount at the top of Luce Ridge, and begin to form skirmish lines there, then they have encountered overwhelming force at that point. I think 500 or so mobile NAs, armed with repeating firearms, could emerge from the surrounding ravines and become that force.
Custer's command remounts and charges toward Battle Ridge, leaving the NAs behind briefly. Custer orders his soldiers to encircle the entire ridgeline, from Calhoun Hill to Last Stand Hill, and a holding battle ensues while they await reinforcement. Only when additional groups of NAs join the fighting from various areas is the encirclement of Battle Ridge broken and the survivors scatter in all directions, only to be run down like so many buffalo. Later, Benteen reports that corpses are strewn about in a pattern resembling kernels of corn thrown on a floor.
An alternate scenario, assuming Custer's columns move through whatever resistance is encountered atop Luce Ridge, is that a three-pronged attack maneuver begins as the battalion crests the area of Calhoun Hill. Yates to the left with two companies down toward MTC, Calhoun and Keogh down the middle toward Ford C, Custer and the Headquarters Group descending Cemetery Ridge to Ford D as a right wing. Trumpets blow.
Things deteriorate instantly as they meet a thousand NAs coming straight up at them from the river bottom. Yates gets the worst of it, E and F companies folded up northward into Deep Ravine and killed there. Calhoun and Keogh (who have skirted Deep Ravine) withdraw back up the center, firing defensively as skirmishers. Ditto for Headquarters Group, heading up to the northern end of the ridge. As the soldiers reach the ridgeline they're quickly surrounded on all sides. On the southern end Calhoun and Keogh fight until overwhelmed. Headquarters group shoots horses for breastworks, but to no avail. It's over in minutes. 210 troopers are dead and 160 NAs are killed outright or die later from their wounds.
These two "modern" versions of the battle flow no doubt reveal my vast ignorance of many currently accepted theories of troop and NA movement around the battlefield. They are suggested as a basis to consider less complex manuevering than shown on some of the incoherent, multi-colored maps I have seen lately.
I have read Greg Michno's "Lakota Noon". I don't think any of Michno's Indians were ever on the battlefield and I wouldn't believe their accounts even if they were. It's a generalization, but Native American culture operates from a collective memory that can supercede direct experience.
I developed these two possible battle scenarios after hiking around the battlefield for an entire day observing terrain, taking notes, and just thinking. They don't exactly come out of my behind.
Pillory me if you wish. We can all agree that no one knows for sure.
Mulligan
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Post by montrose on Aug 28, 2014 5:25:14 GMT -6
Mulligan,
Welcome to the boards.
Neither of your two theories are probable. Their are too many facts that get in the way, including body locations, battle debris such as bullets and casings, testimonies, and the terrain itself.
The challenge is that there are hundreds of threads and thousands of posts discussing this.
The northern sector has enough reasonable doubt to fit in any theory. Heck there is an outlier theory that the battle started on the north end of battle ridge, with LTC Custer attacking to the south.
I recommend looing at the threads in the battle theory folder, look around.
Then ask, we have a variety of opinions here.
Good luck,
Respectfully,
William
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