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Post by crzhrs on May 17, 2018 14:59:36 GMT -6
<We see a brilliant command and control environment at Rosebud, fought by the same army, in the same environment. The only difference between the outcome at r\Rosebud and outcome at LBH is officer leadership.>
Actually . . . it wasn't brilliant command and control at the Rosebud . . . it was Crow and Shoshoni warriors who took the brunt of the Lakota Attack and gave the command enough time to get over coffee-and-bacon-for-breakfast to at the very most bring the battle to at most draw . . . but on the other hand . . . a tactical defeat for the US Cavalry under George Crook who rather than contacting superiors about the strength and ferocity of the Lakota Attack . . . withdrew to go hunting and fishing.
That's Brilliant?!?!?
Let's make a few things obvious about the Winter-Spring-Summer tactics of the US Military . . . they failed to take advantage of an attack on a Winter Camp in March thought to be Crazy Horse but ended up being someone else who then countered and recaptured all their horses. Crook ended up claiming a victory at the Rosebud but failed to contact superiors about the strength, determination and unconventional frontal attack on a standing US command, then left the scene and went limping off to catch as much trout and shoot as many elk/deer as possible.
Custer . . . we know how that worked out. Nothing brilliant about the 1876 Winter-Spring-Summer Campaign resulting in defeat and humiliation at the hands of near Stone-Age People. Congrats to the Indians and shame on the US Military.
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Post by herosrest on May 17, 2018 17:09:48 GMT -6
HR What are you calling Benteen today? There is train marker called Benteen but there is no town or city there. Regards AZ Ranger The mouth of Long Otter Ck.
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Post by AZ Ranger on May 27, 2018 5:57:36 GMT -6
Steve; The main infiltration route to LBH area was from the Northwest. Let's say that is best route for 50% of Indians (I would say based on historical data should be 70). And lets say the other end of valley 10%. So this means LTC Custer was chasing no better than 40% or less of Indian routes. Whatever his estimate of trail he was following, he knew it was a fraction of total force. He ignored orders to check main route to see numbers coming in. This isn't wrong, he assumed responsibility for these numbers, he knew they were there. The Indian accounts clearly show he knew what was there. LBH was not an intelligence failure. Intelligence Estimate was sound. Strategy was sound. Operations (campaign plan) was sound. Battle failed at tactics, regiment and company officer incompetence. Thanks William I guess I was thinking that if Custer knew there were more Indians and they were willing to fight that he might have changed tactics. But as you point out we are still dealing with the same regiment and company officer's. Regards Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on May 27, 2018 5:59:23 GMT -6
HR What are you calling Benteen today? There is train marker called Benteen but there is no town or city there. Regards AZ Ranger The mouth of Long Otter Ck. You certainly are holding to your belief that Benteen followed Long Otter Creek to the LBH. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by herosrest on May 27, 2018 14:19:54 GMT -6
As with most matters LBH there is opportunity to examine and expand collective knowledge. Crow accounts detail the scout of Tullock's head on the afternoon of the 24th and the Hunkpapa had moved their camp north from the mouth of Long Otter Creek that morning. There are participant accounts which indicate Benteen seperating from the regiment at 7-8 miles from the river or village and Benteen himself knew of the creek, described it and stated that he was in it. So...... it helps me in developing my theory of and for Ford Z. The river crossings two miles above Ford A.Check out Deeds and Lone Horn (One Horn).
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