|
Post by fred on Oct 20, 2007 17:50:42 GMT -6
A nice discussion has broken out on this thread in the "Battle Chronology" series. I would appreciate it if you would move those posts to this thread. All you have to do is to go into "modify," "cut" or "copy," then paste into a new post on this thread. If I do it, my name will show up on the left and I do not want that to happen. Then I would appreciate it if you would delete the original post from the chronology section.
|
|
|
Post by clw on Oct 21, 2007 14:19:58 GMT -6
His actions may have been cryptic, but Custer knew his scouts were right. He was an experienced plainsman. The trail was 300 yards wide! Custer never questioned IF a thing could be done, only HOW and his luck had always held. The predator thing, thinking on the fly......... and this is where he started the stalk.
Hunk replied..........
I don't think it's illogical to say his stalk began here and not when "he left the mouth of the Rosebud". There is a difference between a hunt and a stalk, not to put too fine a point on semantics. Horse said it best...... "After the previous night's officer's call the command headed out. There now seemed to be more of a pall over the command. No more horseplay with among the Custer relatives. The entire command seemed to be silent and was spread out to avoid kicking up too much dust." That officer's call was the seachange.
Hunk again....
I'm not saying that he had any other plan but to attack. Wasn't my point. What I'm suggesting is the point where he first knew this was going to be big. Very big. I've never believed the view that he miscalculated the strength of the enemy. From this point on, I believe he was in the mode that carried his cavalry charges, outnumbered 3-1, in the thick of those CW battles. If he discounted the signs, it was because it was a 'need to know' situation and most didn't 'need to know' what he thought. He'd scented the prey.
|
|
|
Post by pohanka on Jun 22, 2008 17:58:52 GMT -6
Hunk again.... I agree with you! It has become fashionable to paint a portrait of Custer being a glory seeking buffoon who foolishly threw the lives of his family, comrades, and himself away. A philosphy started by Grant, I believe. Not agreeing with that unproven and unsubstantiated allegation is to often subject yourself to personal innuendo and crowned a "Custerphile". Custer, himself, estimated the warriors to be at 1,800, a figure totally in line with actuality. The entire military hierarchy, above and below Custer, were convinced that the 7th. could defeat any band of Indians on the continent. When this did not occur, the scapegoating begin. Where better to start then with men who died and could no longer speak on their own behalf. He certainly had a " need to know" exactly the disposition of the village so that he could initiate the necessary military tactics required. It is possible that Custer had an intent to capture hostages ( as he did at the Washita) thus rendering the warriors ineffective. They would not attack if their women and children were captured. lastly, throughout his military career, rightly or wrongly, once Custer caught the " scent" he normally dashed forward!
|
|
tatanka
Full Member
Live for today like there was no tomorrow
Posts: 125
|
Post by tatanka on Jul 9, 2008 8:30:17 GMT -6
I don't know if Custer underestimated the strength of the Indians. What I think is that he underestimated the MOOD of the Indians. He expected them to run away. By the time he realised they weren't it was too late.
|
|
tatanka
Full Member
Live for today like there was no tomorrow
Posts: 125
|
Post by tatanka on Jul 9, 2008 11:54:04 GMT -6
It was no coincidence that this was the largest gathering of Plains Indians ever seen. They knew the clock was ticking. That was why so many agency Indians came out. They were determined to have one last hunt, to taste once again the old free way of life. They were in no mood to be shunted onto agencies, to lose their guns and ponies and subsist on haphazard agency supplies. They had fought Crook to a standstill on the Rosebud just days earlier with fewer warriors. Besides, Sitting Bulls' vision promised a great victory. It was the time of the sundance and they were confident of their strength. They were not going to run away.
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Jul 9, 2008 12:17:32 GMT -6
I don't know if Custer underestimated the strength of the Indians. What I think is that he underestimated the MOOD of the Indians. He expected them to run away. By the time he realised they weren't it was too late. Mitch Boyer told Godfrey they would have a "damn hard fight" . . . he also told Custer if he didn't find more Indians than he could handle Custer could hang him . . . apparently Boyer was fully conscious of the MOOD the Indians were in. Even some of the Indian scouts were wary of the signs they were seeing. Granted the military only took "advice" from scouts . . . however Custer must have had an inkling of what he could face . . . yet he divided the command (Benteen on his scout) even before sighting anything and Custer's orders to Reno was based on a small group of Indians running rather than any definite sight of the village. Sorta like a bear raiding a bee hive only to be swarmed on because he thought he was bigger & tougher than the bees.
|
|
tatanka
Full Member
Live for today like there was no tomorrow
Posts: 125
|
Post by tatanka on Jul 9, 2008 12:42:52 GMT -6
A good analogy, crzhrs. We can be sure the scouts knew exactly what they were riding into. Bloody Knife had already told Custer they wouldn't see the sun go down that day. They were both going home by a trail that was strange to both of them.
|
|
walkingstar
New Member
Life is but a dream...
Posts: 39
|
Post by walkingstar on Jul 26, 2008 9:38:09 GMT -6
"Custer asked Gerard how many Indians he thought they might find. Not less than 1,500 to 2,000 fighting men, the interpreter told him."
(Davis and Davis, The Reno Court of Inquiry, p.53
|
|
|
Post by runaheap on Aug 15, 2008 15:26:12 GMT -6
The trail of indians heading into LBH was immense, any and all descriptions are available. This marks the beggining of this fiasco. Why he didn't heed this information will always remain a mystery. The only thing that we are certain of, is Custer's conviction that they will more than likely run. This is where conjecture begins to run rampant. His instuctions from Terry were explicit, it rings down thru the ages, "Feel to your left(West) don't let them escape". I have always wondered why he didn't search westward to Tullock's creek as instructed and enter the LBH from the western side. If he get's there on the 26th and keeps his command together, it's a different story. Ah! but then we wouldn't be on this thread either.
|
|
|
Post by clw on Aug 15, 2008 15:33:38 GMT -6
Probably because Tullock's Creek in on the eastern side.
|
|
|
Post by bc on Aug 15, 2008 21:35:01 GMT -6
clw: U da (wo)man!!
|
|
|
Post by biggordie on Aug 15, 2008 22:42:19 GMT -6
Picky, picky, picky.....................
Gordie
|
|
walkingstar
New Member
Life is but a dream...
Posts: 39
|
Post by walkingstar on Aug 17, 2008 14:05:04 GMT -6
I have always wondered why he didn't search westward to Tullock's creek as instructed and enter the LBH from the western side. If he get's there on the 26th and keeps his command together, it's a different story. Ah! but then we wouldn't be on this thread either. Hi Runaheap, On June 24, Custer requested Herendeen (accompanied by Charley Reynolds) to scout the head of Tullock's Creek. The scout, instead, informed Custer that it was too early and called out to Mitch Boyer for confirmation. Boyer said, "yes, further up on the Rosebud we come opposite a gap, and there we could cut across and strike Tullock's in about fifteen minutes'ride." Custer allowed him to wait. At about 4 0'Clock, the scouts reported a fresh Indian campsite about twelve miles ahead, at the forks of the Rosebud where a creek joined the stream from the divide to the west. All of the signs indicated that "a massive camp" was no more than thirty miles away. At this point, Herendeen returns to Custer and advises, "General, here is where I leave you to go to the other command." Custer just stared at him and looked away. My thought is this, in the first scenario Custer was uncertain of the "signs" as was willing to allow Herendeen to make a "scout" as Terry requested. In the second scenario, Custer discovered the "Intelligence" he needed (massive camp) and, was only concerned with closing the gap between his command and the village; informing Terry became a secondary issue. I think Custer stared at Herendeen, without making comment, because he believed that the scout knew ( as well as he) that the scouting of the headwaters was no longer necessary. Also, Custer was aware that Herendeen wished to make an unnecessary trip (intelligence wise) simply to earn his $200.00 extra, hazardous duty pay. As for the division of his command, scouting or no scouting of Tullocks would not have affected this decision. The overwhelming fear that the village would scatter is what prompted Custer to do this. It is difficult, knowing the fatalistic result of the battle, to remember that every soldier was convinced that the Indians would run.
|
|
|
Post by biggordie on Aug 17, 2008 15:28:13 GMT -6
walkingstar:
"Fifteen minutes' ride?"
Gordie
|
|
walkingstar
New Member
Life is but a dream...
Posts: 39
|
Post by walkingstar on Aug 17, 2008 16:07:41 GMT -6
You are right. From that position on the Rosebud opposite a gap was about fifteen miles to the head of Tullock's Fork. The question is why go there at all when the location of the camp has been discovered in front of you? When Herendeen arrived at the head, he would have discovered that the camp was not there. Something he and Custer already knew.
|
|