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Post by fred on Oct 20, 2007 8:24:05 GMT -6
I have started this thread as a discussion forum for the events of June 24 that are posted in the battle chronology section.
For those of you who have posted "opinion" pieces in that section I would greatly appreciate it if you would them to here. Thanks.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by mcaryf on Oct 20, 2007 12:39:09 GMT -6
I do not know how to move threads so I will just repost George Mabry's last post here and then comment on it.
Mike,
If the scouts brought back positive information from the Crows Nest, I think any Commander is going to go up there and take a look for himself if at all possible. This isn’t the same as accompanying the scouts on their daily routines. If the hostiles were in the valley, the Crows Nest would be the point from which he would make most of his initial attack plans. He needs to take a look for himself. Also, if Custer planned on laying low one day, he’s going to keep that valley under constant surveillance until he strikes. There will be messengers coming and going from the Crows Nest to the camp all day long on the 25th and probably into the night. You would want that distance to be kept to a minimum. All else being equal, distance is the deciding point on where to conceal your command.
If I misunderstood you on the Tullock’s part, my mistake. I thought it was your belief that Tullock’s still needed to be scouted. I agree that Herendeen should have been released. Unlike some I don’t see any sinister motive in his not doing so. In any event, this failure hardly rates a footnote in a mistakes-made study.
I think you’re much too early in your estimates of when Herendeen should have been sent to Terry. The message Herendeen took to Terry would be drafted by Custer, not Varnum. So there is no point in sending him up to the Crows Nest with the Varnum party. There was also no point in Custer taking Herendeen with him when he visited the Crows Nest early that morning. There was not that kind of urgency and Custer still had not formulated a plan of action. Had Custer released Herendeen from the Crows Nest, what would his message to Terry have been? It might have read that “the village may or may not be on the LBH but if it’s there I’m going to attack on the 26th.” I have no answer as to why Custer didn’t release Herendeen, but had he been so inclined, I don’t see Herendeen leaving any sooner than the time at which Custer ordered the command to prepare to move out across the divide.
George
Hi George
The whole point of Terry's plan was that he expected the Indians to be in the LBH valley moving South and that Custer should get South of them and drive them down the valley towards his blocking force. Thus if they were moving South as expected there would have been no question of surveying prior to an attack because the attack would have happened later and somewhere else.
Personally I do read a sinister motive into Custer's failure to provide Terry with the information that he was directed to deliver. Terry did not ask Custer to send him his plan of attack he asked him to send him information to determine which route he Terry should follow. Custer failed to do this and so Terry travelled by the wrong route and was later than he might have been. Custer was at perfect liberty to send other messengers to update Terry with his plans once they were formulated but that was not why he was given Herendeen. If Custer had done as he intended, and hidden his command for a day then Terry would still have been too late to be a factor if Custer had delayed, as he did, the potential departure of Herendeen by at least 5 hours.
Regards
Mike
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Post by fred on Oct 20, 2007 17:27:26 GMT -6
Mike--
Nice job! Thank you.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by George Mabry on Oct 20, 2007 17:37:46 GMT -6
Mike,
Terry might have expected the Indians to move south after crossing the divide but somebody needed to check. After being informed of a high lookout point, it would have been gross negligence for Custer to continue plodding up the Rosebud without having a look-see into that valley from a high vantage point. Agreed? We’ve already discussed Custer’s decision to move into the foothills instead of remaining along the Rosebud. You apparently do not agree but I have no problem with Custer’s decision in that regard.
Since it is dark by the time Custer gets his regiment concealed, he did the only thing he could do at that time. He sends some scouts to the Crows Nest to wait dawn and report back to him. It is still too early to send Herendeen back because he doesn’t have the information on Tulloch’s. What Custer would have done if the scouts reported back after sun-up that the trail had turned south and there is no evidence of villages on Tulloch’s Forks is anybodies guess. He might very well have released Herendeen.
As it were, the scouts brought back word that the trail didn’t turn south but went west and the village was in sight. I seriously doubt that Custer viewed his subsequent actions as a violation of Terry’s orders. Custer knew the success or failure of this expedition was riding on his shoulders. Why else would Terry offer him all his cavalry and the Gatlings which would in effect reduce Terry’s own command to not much more than a mobile aid station? Besides, in military circles, a successful operation has a huge built-in forgiveness factor. Therefore I doubt he spent much time justifying his actions in his own mind or worrying over what Terry might think.
When Custer returns to camp from the Crows Nest, events start moving quickly. In a short time Custer shifts from waiting to attacking. Once he gets things moving in that direction, it would have been the time to release Herendeen. Not before. I think you’re way off base on your estimate of the earliest time Custer should have dispatched Herendeen. This is a very minor matter in my opinion and Custer’s failure to perform that task doesn’t indicate anything to me. I can easily understand that in Custer’s mind, sending Herendeen back to Terry would accomplish nothing in light of his decision to attack immediately. The events of that day were going to be decided in a relatively few hours. Terry would not be a factor. As it turned out, it could be argued that Custer’s neglect might have delayed succor for Reno’s entrenched troops. Whoda thuk it?
George
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Post by mcaryf on Oct 21, 2007 0:50:00 GMT -6
Hi George
Perhaps I am not being clear so I will try again.
The timing of sending information to Terry related to where and what Terry was doing rather than what Custer was doing. Terry needed the information to decide his movement on the 25th, by not sending the designated person to scout Tullock and advise Terry Custer caused Terry to be later than he might otherwise have been. In the actual event this did matter because it delayed the relief for Reno's command. In the context of Custer laying up for a day and attacking on the 26th it would have mattered a great deal. It is rather hard to come up with a scenario where Terry taking the wrong route would have been unimportant. If the Indians had turned South as expected Terry would be a further day behind and would be in a poorer position to either block the Indian's escape or even participate in the battle.
Effectively Herendeen was Terry's scout, who for convenience and security accompanied Custer so Herendeen could view the upper reaches of Tullock and then travel back to Terry to advise him of the optimum route.
Custer had no shortage of scouts or men with him who could carry further messages to Terry, there was no excuse for this failure by Custer and the only reasonable explanation for it was that Custer did not want Terry close enough to share in the glory.
Regards
Mike
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Post by George Mabry on Oct 21, 2007 9:39:00 GMT -6
Mike, We might be talking at cross purposes here. Maybe I don’t understand your point but I think I do. I just disagree with it. Let me take your last response sentence for sentence. We’re not that far apart on most of your comments. The timing of sending information to Terry related to where and what Terry was doing rather than what Custer was doing. I can understand that. Terry needed the information to decide his movement on the 25th, by not sending the designated person to scout Tullock and advise Terry Custer caused Terry to be later than he might otherwise have been. In the actual event this did matter because it delayed the relief for Reno's command. I agree here too but we’ll probably disagree as to the importance or impact it had. In the context of Custer laying up for a day and attacking on the 26th it would have mattered a great deal. I agree It is rather hard to come up with a scenario where Terry taking the wrong route would have been unimportant. Disagree. It’s not hard at all to come up with that scenario. Have Custer attack on the 25th and Terry is pretty much out of the picture. If the Indians had turned South as expected Terry would be a further day behind and would be in a poorer position to either block the Indian's escape or even participate in the battle. I agree Effectively Herendeen was Terry's scout, who for convenience and security accompanied Custer so Herendeen could view the upper reaches of Tullock and then travel back to Terry to advise him of the optimum route. Agreed Custer had no shortage of scouts or men with him who could carry further messages to Terry… Disagree. We’ve got some good examples of Custer’s messengers and I don’t believe they would have measured up to the task. Gerard, Herendeen, Bouyer, and Dorman are the only scouts that come to mind that I believe could have acted in that capacity. With the exception of Herendeen, I doubt Custer would have been reluctant to give up their services unless the need was very great. …there was no excuse for this failure by Custer and the only reasonable explanation for it was that Custer did not want Terry close enough to share in the glory. I agree with you that there is no excuse but I suppose we’ll just have to stay in disagreement over its meaning. You may be correct in your supposition. I just don’t think there is enough “evidence” to support it. George
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Post by George Mabry on Oct 21, 2007 14:54:33 GMT -6
Gordie, I've never heard of this notch in the divide mentioned by Herendeen. Any idea of where you saw that?
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Post by George Mabry on Oct 21, 2007 16:52:12 GMT -6
Gordie, I found that same quote in Gray's CLC. Didn't recognize it as being what you were referring to. Since Herendeen and Reynolds didn't leave the column when they came to the gap, I take it that the gap they are referring to is the same gap, or there abouts, that Custer used to cross the divide. Is this they way you see it?
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Post by elisabeth on Oct 22, 2007 2:16:47 GMT -6
That's a very good point, about the $300. You'd think it would have been explored at the RCOI, to cast doubt on the motivation behind his testimony -- just as Gerard's firing/rehiring was. Wonder if Terry had privately reimbursed him. If not, and yet he made no complaint about being that much out of pocket, maybe his "here's where I leave you, General" story isn't entirely true. There were no living witnesses to the exchange, after all.
The Crows' helpful news would have left Terry with the impression that there were hostiles active in Tulloch's, something which Herendeen could have disabused him of ... True that normal practice would have been to travel by night, but their visual sweep of Tulloch's had already convinced Custer's command that there were no Indians there. So in the circumstances, he might well have felt confident about doing it in daylight. (The old saw about one man alone being able to get through, when twenty men couldn't.)
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Post by mcaryf on Oct 22, 2007 5:40:44 GMT -6
Hi Gordie
Tullocks is mentioned in the context of Herendeen coming down it to both scout it and meet with Terry. This appears on page 261 of "The Custer Myth". Herendeen also reports that he discussed with Brisbin where his cavalry was likely to be and was told around the mouth of the Little Big Horn so whether he would actually have met them is plainly a moot point
The earliest logical time to despatch Herendeen was with the Crows when they first went to the Crows Nest during the afternoon of the 24th. Whilst the light was difficult to see into LBH it would have been better to see down Tullocks as that was not into the setting sun . That would have enabled Herendeen to travel down Tullocks during the night of the 24th if he wished or starting at first light on the 25th. Either way he could have reached Terry's command before it took the fateful decision to get embroiled in a very slow march along the divide between Tullocks and the Big Horn. Quite what difference this could have made is hard to calculate but Herendeen reputedly knew the terrain so possibly Terry could have relieved Reno earlier.
Hi George
The impact of Herendeen being sent earlier if Custer had attacked successfully on the 25th was that if Custer had achieved some sort of victory then large quantities of the Indians might well have fled down the LBH. As it was, Terry split up his command with a night march on the 25th and could easily have been overwhelmed in detail by the fleeing Indians without prior knowledge of the proximity of the village.
With respect to Custer sending further messengers once his own plans were formulated there would have been no problem in sending any of the Crows with a written message. They were familiar with the country and well used to being used as couriers. Really I cannot see any good reason why Herendeen was not sent earlier. Although I guess Herendeen himself might have been having second thoughts having seen so many signs of a very large hostile presence.
Regards
Mike
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Post by George Mabry on Oct 22, 2007 17:18:24 GMT -6
Mike,
I’ve wondered about that myself. According to Herendeen (as cited in Gordie’s post # 8), don’t you think that Custer just about gave Herendeen carte blanche to leave when he saw fit?
Here is another interesting statement to Camp by Herendeen: “Early on June 25, I told Custer that Tullock’s Fork was just over the divide, but he replied rather impatiently that there was no occasion to send me through, as the Indians were known to be in his front and that his command had been discovered by them. He said the only thing he could do was to charge their village as soon as possible…It appeared to me at the time that Custer was right and there really was no use in scouting Tullock’s Fork.”
I thought this was interesting because when approached by Herendeen about his leaving, Custer replies in terms of sending him “through” whom I suppose is back to Terry. Yet when Herendeen gives his opinion of that observation, Herendeen speaks in terms of scouting the forks.
Maybe there is something to the previously mentioned possibility that Herendeen didn’t think the risk of returning to Terry was worth the reward. Speaking from my perspective alone, I would have thought it a good time to send word to Terry as to my location and the fact that I was moving to attack. But I can also see one thinking “What the heck. It’ll all be over in a few hours and I’ll send him a full report this afternoon.” It is a difference in perspectives and priorities, not motives.
George
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Post by mcaryf on Oct 23, 2007 5:35:39 GMT -6
It re ally is very difficult to avoid hindsight in thinking about what Custer should have done. However, if we try to think what Custer knew it is hard to avoid a conclusion that some sort of message to Terry should have been a priority. Custer was aware that the Indian trail was very fresh and therefore if they had gone over towards the valley of the LBH as expected they might either be still on Reno Creek or very near the junction of Reno Creek and the LBH. If they had still been in their camp on Reno Creek or just opposite its junction then there might well be a stalemate type battle as that terrain was not good for sweeping cavalry manoeuvres. Thus the Indians would retain the ability to manoeuvre away either up river or down.
There really was quite a good possibility that some at least of the village and warrior force would go down river whatever the battle's outcome. Thus a messenger to Terry at the earliest possible time would seem to be appropriate to advise him of the proximity of the Indians to his planned line of advance.
It does seem very strange that Custer did not cause this to happen. He was of course planning to contravene Terry's wishes by moving across to the LBH but Terry would find this out eventually anyway.
It is possible, as some surmise, that Custer just forgot about Herendeen whilst Herendeen was having second thoughts, so it just did not happen. On the other hand it is also possible that now Custer thought there might be an imminent fight he did not want to do anything to assist Terry et al to have any part in it. I guess we will never know, but whether it was a sin of ommission or of commission it was certainly one of the things that Custer did wrong that day.
Regards
Mike
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Oct 24, 2007 16:11:47 GMT -6
The Crows' helpful news would have left Terry with the impression that there were hostiles active in Tulloch's, something which Herendeen could have disabused him of ... True that normal practice would have been to travel by night, but their visual sweep of Tulloch's had already convinced Custer's command that there were no Indians there. So in the circumstances, he might well have felt confident about doing it in daylight. (The old saw about one man alone being able to get through, when twenty men couldn't.) I am not quite sure what you mean by 'helpful news' as Lt. Bradley in his Journal for this day says "Just before dark the twelve Crows came whooping down the valley, behaving in an extravagant fashion that all expected some startling disclosure; but it turned out they had merely seen, six miles up the valley, a buffalo that had been recently wounded with arrows." and "It really amounted to nothing, as the buffalo might have been wounded by a small war or scouting party a hundred miles from any camp..." In his Diary Terry merely notes "At about 8.45 (p.m.) Indian scouts returned bringing intelligence that they had seen a buffalo running about six miles up the valley. One of them wounded by an arrow. Afraid to go further." It is clear that Terry and his officers placed little store in the news brought back by the Crows and there is no evidence that they thought it indicated that there were hostiles active in Tullock's Creek. Even if there were, why should it have affected Terry's thinking other than to be extra cautious in case of ambush as the Montana Column moved up Tullock's, as from Sheridan on down the belief was that each column was more than capable of any Indians they came across. Furthermore, both columns were actively looking for the Indians, the non-appearance of Herendeen could have been for any number of reasons so in the absence of any specific new intelligence, Terry should have had no reason not to adhere to his original plan. On a personal note, I shall be posting off the books to you on Friday 27th so they should reach you by Monday or Tuesday next week. Hunk
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Oct 24, 2007 16:47:11 GMT -6
Herendeen did not know the specific country nearly as well as the Crows did, so he might not have made good time during the night. Gordie, and we will face the music together, dancing in the dark...................................... As the area they were in was the Crows own country they would naturally have a greater knowledge of it than most. Nevertheless, Herendeen had been in this area before, had worked on and off at the Crow agency and was with the Yellowstone Wagon Road and Prospecting Expedition in 1874. In April of that year after a fight with some Sioux, the Expedition force were in the vicinity of the Rosebud Forks where they turned south-west and moved along the western flank of the Wolf Mountains and camped on a hill above the south fork of Reno (then Ash) creek, then later crossed the LBH before camping close to present Lodge Grass. [All taken from 'George Herendeen: The Life of a Montana Scout' by Barry C. Johnson, published by the English Westerners' Society in 2004] And from his letter to the New York Herald written some 18 months later "Terry showed me the map and asked me for information about the country on Tullock's Fork [my emphasis] and the Little Big Horn. .....I had been over the ground and told the General all I knew about it." [same source] Unless he is a great liar, I believe that he knew the area very well. Hunk
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Oct 24, 2007 17:41:53 GMT -6
Gordie, I should have known you would have known and I couldn't agree more with the rest of what you say. I have hinted as much in my previous post to Elisabeth. Yes it is all a smokescreen, created by post-battle backside protecting and the clever, but fallacious arguments made by Hughes in his 1896 article. To me, there is one phrase in Custer's orders/instructions that is constantly overlooked and that is "The lower part of this creek [Tullock's] will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon's command." All the pre-battle documents and newspaper dispatches and some post-battle too, demonstrate to me that Terry had planned for the Montana Column to march up the BIg Horn valley and not Tullock's. The phrase I have quoted above is the clincher for me, because it means that the rest of the Montana Column would be some place else and that place was the Big Horn valley. I also think that from what Custer passed on to Kellogg for his Herald dispatch, from what he himself wrote to that newspaper and from his 'orders', he would not have expected Gibbon's command to be anywhere else but the Big Horn valley, so sending a messenger down Tullock's, just to confirm there were no Indians there, would have seemed to him a total waste of time until he had firm intel on the location of the village.
Hunk
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