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Post by gocav76 on Dec 2, 2007 23:39:39 GMT -6
Thanks Keogh.I have another question----In Charles Kuhlman's book he says that "Custer seems to have been on the ridge (LSH) and mounted some distance to the east..McClernand says he saw a dead horse on the ridge 100-150 feet east of the hill, and was told it was the horse Custer had ridden on the day of the battle. The way the horse had fallen gave him the impression that it was running westward when it was killed" If true, from what area would the deadly fire originate? Also does anyone have a photo of the area where "Vic" was found?
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Post by mwkeogh on Dec 2, 2007 23:52:01 GMT -6
Given that there seems to have been a general acceptance of a move to ford D over the last year or so, { I remain doubtful myself, } I have a couple of questions regarding such a move, which, not being a military man, are primarily aimed at those that might be. As we all know, there are a lot of figures bandied about, but even if we take the lower end of estimates for the number of warriors as being 1700, this would mean there must have been at least 5,000/6,000 non-coms, surely even he must have thought that it was highly unlikely he could hope to round up and contain such a large number of people with the small force he had with him, which would be what, about eighty odd men. Shan, if we accept the view that Custer was intent upon capturing the noncombatants, it is important to understand that this would not necessitate the capture of ALL, nor even most of the noncombatants in order to effect a major impact on the battle. Remember the example at the Washita. Custer only captured a mere 53 women and children and successfully used them as hostages to keep the much larger warrior force from firing into or attacking his position in the valley. He needed only to secure 50 to 100 noncombatants or so in order to fluster the warrior force closing in on his command, and this might well have been his objective. I think it logical to assume he would have thought nearly all the warriors to be off fighting the greater threat of Reno's attack rather than running off with the noncombatants. The resistence put up by the old men and children would not concern him too much. The family men who were warriors would go out to battle, not run away with the women and children. I think you bring up a great point that once the warriors realized he was threatening the women and children, they would break off their attack on Reno's battalion and concentrate their attention on his own battalions, which might well have been the support that he initially promised Reno in the valley. Whether Custer knew Reno was in the valley or had already retreated would have been irrelevant if his intention was to secure a number of noncombatant hostages. In either case, it would relieve the pressure off his other battalions and force the warriors to concentrate on him. This would then give both Benteen and Reno an opportunity to rejoin the rest of the command. Another good point here, Shan. I do not think any other Indian War commander would have pursued this extremely bold and risky venture. It was pure Custer. He is the only commander I can think of who had the audacity to pursue a strategy of this nature. But then, he acted in much a similar manner at the Washita 8 years earlier. John Stands In Timber should not be regarded as a single source for this information. He was regarded as a tribal historian of the norther Cheyenne and was relaying Cheyenne oral history that had been told to him by a number of warriors who had fought in the battle. His oral history has subsequently been supported by archeological evidence of fighting in the area of the north ford, and further support comes from original source maps produced by battle participants which indicate a movement by the Cavalry to a position far north of LSH in an attempt to cross the river. Plus, the location of the bodies of Mark Kellogg and Sgt Major Sharrow also suggest a movement and action north of the present day cemetery. There is more than just Indian oral history to support the move to the north ford, as I indicated above. However, you do bring up a number of good points here Shan. I would tend to agree with you that many of us like to cherry pick accounts that suit our own particular theories, and I would agree that those who dismiss the ford D model seem to be those who stubbornly cling to the notion that the battle ended much sooner than it actually did. Rather than accept new evidence that would destroy their previously held views, they find it easier to dismiss the new evidence without giving it much thought at all. Custer needed to round up only 50 to 100 noncombatants, not the whole kit and caboodle. In hindsight, this might have been his only chance to survive that day if Benteen and Reno made no effort to reach him. This is possible, but it would seem to disregard the Indian oral accounts that say he did move down to the ford area. If he was intent upon either an attack or a roundup of noncombatants, then sending a small detail to the ford would not accomplish this mission.
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Post by fred on Dec 3, 2007 8:28:21 GMT -6
Okay, one last time:
PVT JACOB ADAMS (H)—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEW CONDUCTED: 14OCT1910.
Custer was within a circle of dead horses on a flat area at the end of the ridge. [121]
1LT CHARLES DERUDIO—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEW CONDUCTED: 2FEB1910.
“Custer lay on top of a conical knoll.” [87] Five or 6 dead horses—all from C Company—lay there as if they had been shot to form a barricade.
2LT WINFIELD SCOTT EDGERLY—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEW CONDUCTED: UNDATED.
GAC, TWC, and Cooke lay at the highest point of the ridge. [58] a. Only a few dead on top of ridge. b. Only a few men scalped. c. Vic was killed; Dandy was with pack train.
PVT JOHN FOLEY (K)—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEW CONDUCTED: UNDATED.
Buried LT Cooke. No scalped men around Custer. [147]
FREDERIC FRANCIS GERARD—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED: 22JAN1909 AND 3APR1909
1. Verifies a “skirmish line”-type formation when the dead were being buried on the Custer field. 2. Claimed he was with a group of officers when George and Tom Custer were being buried. 3. Said Custer’s body was on the side of the hill, shot through the head behind the temple. [237] 4. Tom Custer was found on a level space at the highest point of a ridge, less than 20 feet from brother George. The back of his head was smashed and an arrow shot into the top of his skull. [237]
PVT GEORGE W. GLENN (H)—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEW CONDUCTED: 22JAN1914.
1. Custer lay just below the end of the ridge. [136] 2. Tom Tweed (L) lay less than 50 yards from Custer. He and Glenn had once been “bunk mates.”
1LT EDWARD SETTLE GODFREY—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEW CONDUCTED: UNDATED.
1. Buried Boston Custer “who lay down on side hill some distance below the General.” [77] 2. “Tom Custer lay on his face up on top of the ridge with arrows shot in his back and head and head all smashed in.” [77]
2LT LUTHER HARE—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEW CONDUCTED: 7FEB1910.
Dead horses near Custer. [68]
PVT DENNIS LYNCH (F)—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED: OCT1908 AND 8FEB1909.
1. Groesbeck (Vickory), Voss, and Donovan (there was no Donovan in the 7th Cavalry) lay near Custer. [139] Glenn claimed Voss was found nearest to the LBH. 2. He said the coulee lay “about 600-700 yards over the ridge from where the general was found.” [140, fn 4]
TMP JOHN MARTIN (GIOVANNI MARTINI) (H)—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED: 24OCT1908 AND 4MAY1910
1. He saw the “heap” of dead in the gully between Custer and the river. 2. Not half as many dead horses as men.
1LT EDWARD G. MATHEY—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEW CONDUCTED: 19OCT1910.
1. Buried Mark Kellogg’s body on 29Jun76. The last one buried. 2. Mathey said Kellogg’s body “lay near a ravine and between Custer and the river.” It had been overlooked. [79]
CPT THOMAS M. MCDOUGALL—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEW CONDUCTED: UNDATED.
1. “There were few or no dead cavalry horses between top of ridge and deep ravine where Company E men were found.” [72; Camp’s words, told by McDougall] 2. McDougall said there were only a few bodies between the deep gully and where Custer lay. He was sure there were less than 12 and might not have been more than 6.
PVT THOMAS F. O’NEILL (G)—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEW CONDUCTED: 12OCT1909 (?)
Claims he and CPL Hammon (G) personally dug the hole and lay GAC in it. [110]
2LT CHARLES F. ROE (F/ 2 CAVALRY)—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEW CONDUCTED: 8DEC1910.
1. Boyer’s body was found west or northwest of where the monument now stands. He claims it was near the river and the timberline. Roe did not actually see Boyer’s body. [250] 2. LT Bradley and 12 mounted soldiers first found Custer’s body. [250, fn 3] 3. Roe said the [Custer] ridge was level, originally, not rising to a peak. [250] 4. No grading had been done by 1878. Custer Ridge: “Veterans who assisted in burying the dead there on June 28, 1876, say that the top of the ridge at that time was much narrower, & that only a small level place then existed.” [252-253, fn 3]
2LT RICHARD E. THOMPSON (ACTING COMMISSARY OF SUBSISTENCE)—WALTER CAMP INTERVIEW CONDUCTED: 14FEB1911, PROBABLY AT FORT SNELLING, MN.
1. The ridge ended in a round top, higher than the rest of the ridge (Custer Hill). Dead horses formed a sort of barricade. a. TWC lay nearest the peak of this round hill. [247-248] b. He lay on his face; his head and face all hacked up with a hatchet. c. His abdomen had been cut open and his bowels were out. 2. Dr. Lord lay about 20 feet southeast of Custer (he doesn’t say which one) on side of the hill. [248] 3. Only 9-10 men between Custer and the gully. [248] 4. Thought there were about 34 bodies in the gully. [248] 5. Mark Kellogg’s body was found about 3/4 mile from Custer, down near the river on a hillside 100 yards from the river. [248]
2LT GEORGE D. WALLACE—RCOI, WEDNESDAY, 15JAN79; THURSDAY, 16JAN79; FRIDAY, 17JAN79; THURSDAY, 6FEB1879.
1. Men in the deep ravine were from E Company. [67] 2. Keogh’s men were lying “halfway down the northern side of the slope… appeared to me to have been killed running in file.” [67] This was actually the eastern side of Battle Ridge. 3. Around Custer, “[f]our or five of them [the men] were piled up in a heap beside a horse and the body of General Custer was lying rather across one of the men…. They had struggled but I do not think for any great length of time. They had apparently tried to lead the horses in a circle on the point of the ridge and had killed them there and apparently made an effort for a final stand.” [68] 4. There were 20 or 30 men near, but not right around Custer. [68]
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by erkki on Dec 3, 2007 10:22:18 GMT -6
I think Crazy Horse came up Deep Ravine, not Ford D. I think he cut threw that small basin area below Custer Hill, then maybe behind Custer Hill and up the ravine Custer took toward Ford D. I don't believe Crazy Horse knew Custer was behind him until much later. To me, all Crazy Horse knew was Keogh's command until Custer returned. Until he got back to Cemetery Ridge, Custer was clear to the north. It was only afterwards that he found himself boxed in and that's only after his foray to D. That's when the Indians realized Yates' battalion was that far north. To me, there is no other explanation for Custer's movements (i.e., to Ford D and back) and actions (i.e., the further splitting of his command on Calhoun Hill). Generally, I agree, but inasfar as the splitting of command is concerned, I reiterate that Keogh's function was dual: keep way clear for Benteen on NC (L Co.) and Luce (C Co.), but equally important, to guard Custer's flank on the northeast--vicinity of Hwy 212--as GAC moved north. Wolf Tooth's band had appeared from this direction. The flank guard had to maintain some visual contact with HQ/Yates during this foray. Margot Liberty's map (unfortunately not seen) was marked with lines showing Cheyenne positions above Hwy 212 according to Doerner? or Court? who did see her map. Kate Bighead said that by the time heavy fighting started the soldiers had taken position on a ridge a little lower down than the one on which they were first seen, i.e. Battle Ridge. I think this is a reference to the repositioning of Keogh's battalion to the inverted L on the southwestern section of the field which brought C Co. on a wide wheel near Ford B to Finley/Calhoun Ridge and L Co. to Calhoun Hill. I Co. moved into position on the eastern military crest of the ridge--"K" on Camp's map--and possibly/probably firing in the direction of highway as well as at Indians coming up from the valley.
Guarding the flank does not equate so much with a further splitting of his command--though GAC was good at that--as it does with assignment to separate functions while remaining in visual contact.
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Post by shan on Dec 3, 2007 15:22:02 GMT -6
Fred,
My reason for thinking Custer probably knew that Reno's attack had failed, failed in the sense that he hadn't yet entered the village, is, I would suggest, because he could see this for himself from the high ridges. Assuming that several of the officers at the very least had some sort of field glasses, if I remember rightly Custer himself had borrowed DeRudio's glasses, one would assume that as they traversed along the various ridges, they would have been constantly looking back, both up the river towards the scene of Reno's attack, as well as in the general direction of Weir Point to try and assess what was going on. Now I suspect that you may feel that Custer was content that Reno was at least tying down the warriors, even though he hadn't got into the camp, but there seems to be a deal of anecdotal evidence to the effect that close to half of the warriors never even got to engage Reno, and had instead, crossed at various points to try and keep Custer from crossing and entering the camp. No doubt those glasses were also being used to constantly sweep the area in order to try and ascertain just where those warriors were deploying, and what they were up to. If he was aware that there were a considerable number of warriors preparing to try and deal with him, and it's hard to imagine he wasn't, I have to ask once again, why on earth would the man risk stretching his small force beyond visual contact, leaving the individual elements extremely vulnerable to being surrounded and dealt with piecemeal, which is pretty much what happened.
Keogh,
without plowing through my books, if I remember rightly Sharrow was found a few hundred yards North East-ish of LSH, not much further from the main group than say Boston and Auntie Reed were in the other direction, in which case I would argue that he could well have been killed fleeing at the very end of the fight, rather than as any part of a move to ford D. With regard to Kellogg, from what we know; I have to confess I have never seen a map that pin pointed the exact spot where he fell, he was indeed killed somewhere close to one of the proposed ford Ds, and I can't offer any explanations beyond the reported finds of a couple of troopers whose bodies were found close to the mouth of Deep Ravine, and one I think, found on the opposite bank, finds that may indicate that some men at least, managed to flee quite a distance. My other question to you is what is this archeological evidence of fighting in the area of the north ford? Can you tell me exactly what does it consist of? Lastly, without reaching for that proverbial book, I'm not sure just how many people John Stands in Timber actually speaks for when it comes to the Ford D incident, beyond Wolf Tooth, and are we seriously to believe the notion that Custer waited nearly half an hour in and around Cemetery ridge after being what, repulsed, deterred, deflected, from crossing at ford D? Half an hour, what, were the Indians wearing watches? Who put that figure in their heads I wonder. Shan
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Post by fred on Dec 3, 2007 17:21:54 GMT -6
I reiterate that Keogh's function was dual: keep way clear for Benteen on NC (L Co.) and Luce (C Co.), but equally important, to guard Custer's flank on the northeast--vicinity of Hwy 212--as GAC moved north. Wolf Tooth's band had appeared from this direction. The flank guard had to maintain some visual contact with HQ/Yates during this foray. ... Kate Bighead said that by the time heavy fighting started the soldiers had taken position on a ridge a little lower down than the one on which they were first seen, i.e. Battle Ridge. I think this is a reference to the repositioning of Keogh's battalion to the inverted L on the southwestern section of the field which brought C Co. on a wide wheel near Ford B to Finley/Calhoun Ridge and L Co. to Calhoun Hill. I Co. moved into position on the eastern military crest of the ridge--"K" on Camp's map--and possibly/probably firing in the direction of highway as well as at Indians coming up from the valley.erkki-- I think we almost totally agree here, though we may be couching our ideas in slightly different terms. Your assessment of Keogh's function is completely correct as far as I am concerned with the exception of the visual contact with the Yates battalion. I think that was lost as Custer rounded Last Stand Hill on his way to Ford D. I also would not argue too strenuously with your C Company concept, except for one thing. I do not believe the inital placement of C Company was on Calhoun/Finley Ridge. That, to me, is extremely bad tactics. It's like dangling the worm at the end of the line, just begging for it to be lopped off. Finley Ridge (I call it "Fishline" Ridge) is a dreadful place for any defensive position, maybe the worst spot on the entire Reno-Custer battlefield. First of all, you would wind up stringing out the command. That would expose not only its front-- which is OK-- but its rear, as well, and the far end, the end closest to Greasy Grass Ridge is too far out to be properly supported, which now means that you have three flanks exposed and not enough manpower to successfully defend. I wouldn't be surprised if C ended up there, but only if forced. My thoughts are that C moved into Calhoun Coulee to displace the encroaching Indians, and possibly spread out, anchoring its flanks on Calhoun/Finley and the next ridge north. Bodies were found there, in a linear formation which tends to support that theory. Unless they moved too far down, that position could also be supported from either Battle Ridge (I) or Calhoun Hill (L). And it would be supported in breadth, unlike any position you could take on Calhoun/Finley Ridge. Calhoun/Finley is an absolutely untenable position, as far as I am concerned, though, again, I wouldn't be the least bit surprised if you were correct and C Company eventually wound up there. It's hard for me to believe that either Custer or Keogh would have ordered that ridge occupied, especially, too, since it would string out Keogh's command ridiculously thin. And I believe you to be correct regarding the eastern facing of Keogh's own company, especially as time wore on. I think that's a complete given. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by bc on Dec 3, 2007 18:45:51 GMT -6
Shan wrote: "Fred,
My reason for thinking Custer probably knew that Reno's attack had failed, failed in the sense that he hadn't yet entered the village, is, I would suggest, because he could see this for himself from the high ridges. "
I don't think that Custer necessarily thought Reno's attack was a "fail". Custer didn't care and it didn't matter whether Reno charged through the camp, stayed on the plain, or moved into the timber. The main thing was that Reno was still at the south end of the camp and blocking the Indians from packing up and moving south. After all, Custer did not say anything in his order but to attack the camp. When that order was given, Custer didn't know how much of a plain was there or how much timber was there or any other detail of the terrain. Custer knew that Reno's attack would effectively block the south end of the village and keep them from escaping to the South. That combined with his flanking move to the north would stop the Indians.
Custer's move to ford D, really had a two fold affect. 1. He saw squaws and non-coms escaping to the north and to capture our stop them would effectively stop the Indians from fighting. 2. Custer's attack at ford D and the north end of the camp would also effectively block the Indians from packing up and moving North.
Keough's battalion was held in reserve not to sit out the fight but to block the Indians from moving to the east and attack them when the time was right. First Keough was holding the ara in the middle of the camp and Keough was also waiting for Benteen to join up with him which would give them basically 7 companies to keep block the Indians from moving to the east as this was a very long camp. This placement of Keough also served the purpose of protecting Reno's and Custer's rears and flanks from attack. If Custer or Reno, either one, sent back for help, Keough along with Benteen could send a troop or two to their aid in necessary.
Basically Custer was encircling the camp and blocking it from three sides. As I recall, the terrain to the west of the camp was not inducive to the Indians running to the West but no matter what the best Custer could do is surround the camp from three sides to force them to stop fighting and surrender.
Custer and the Indians knew that if Custer controlled the squaws and controlled/burned their lodges with all their robes, food, cooking items, etc. (even if some warriors escaped) then there was just a matter of time before they had to return to the reservation by winter. This action of being surrounded and not wanting to be pinned in from three sides by cavalry and the west by terrain is one of the reasons the Indians stayed and fought along with the confidence they gained from fighting Crook and beating him.
Auguendo it can be said that once Custer saw the size of the camp and sent for Benteen(his scout to the south wasn't necessary anymore), he was not dividing his forces anymore, but actually uniting them in a three prong attack against the village!! It was just the size of the village that created gaps in his lines which were then filled by Indians before Keough and Benteen could hold the middle. Unfortunately, Custer couldn't effectively move across Ford D and Keough couldn't hold the Indians moving from the middle of the camp by himself which ended up their demise.
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Post by bc on Dec 3, 2007 18:49:06 GMT -6
By the way, does anyone have Benteen's map they can post where he indicated about 25 bodies were found (ford D?)? Also what did he say at the RCOI about it? Finally, what did the burial party say about it?
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Post by fred on Dec 3, 2007 19:01:33 GMT -6
My reason for thinking Custer probably knew that Reno's attack had failed, failed in the sense that he hadn't yet entered the village, is, I would suggest, because he could see this for himself from the high ridges. Assuming that several of the officers at the very least had some sort of field glasses, if I remember rightly Custer himself had borrowed DeRudio's glasses, one would assume that as they traversed along the various ridges, they would have been constantly looking back, both up the river towards the scene of Reno's attack, as well as in the general direction of Weir Point to try and assess what was going on. Now I suspect that you may feel that Custer was content that Reno was at least tying down the warriors, even though he hadn't got into the camp, but there seems to be a deal of anecdotal evidence to the effect that close to half of the warriors never even got to engage Reno, and had instead, crossed at various points to try and keep Custer from crossing and entering the camp. No doubt those glasses were also being used to constantly sweep the area in order to try and ascertain just where those warriors were deploying, and what they were up to. If he was aware that there were a considerable number of warriors preparing to try and deal with him, and it's hard to imagine he wasn't, I have to ask once again, why on earth would the man risk stretching his small force beyond visual contact, leaving the individual elements extremely vulnerable to being surrounded and dealt with piecemeal, which is pretty much what happened. Shan-- I feel strongly that Custer knew Reno was not in the village. I don't think there's any question of that. If you believe DeRudio-- and I do-- Custer watched either as Reno entered the timber or was already in the timber. I also feel-- like so many others, including some of those at the battle, military and civilian alike-- that Custer thought Reno could hold that position until relieved or maybe even indefinitely. Now, I think you are giving the Indians a little too much credit regarding their tactics as an organized group. I don't think the Indians "deployed." I don't think they "massed." And there may be some small exceptions to that; Crazy Horse comes to mind, but what did he have, 50 warriors with him? The Indians, prior to the arrival of some of those fighting Reno, entered the battle piecemeal. They moved from place to place, crevice to crevice, ravine to ravine, bush to bush, the same way. If you look at one of the pictures I posted on one of these threads, you will see that Deep Coulee is all but invisible from any of the ridges to the north. The coulee has a cutbank and any infiltrating warriors could hug the north side of that wall and never be seen until they moved into the more open ground bordering "Fishline" Ridge (that's Calhoun/Finley Ridge) and Calhoun Hill. And... you can get around to the east without being spotted. I think you are assuming there was heavy pressure confronting Custer when I think he dropped off the Keogh battalion. If there was, then you are correct; he would be foolish to lose visual contact with the rest of his command. If you look, however, at the so-called Keogh Sector, you will see that Last Stand Hill is not visible from most of the markers. You have to move much farther north and higher up on the ridge. (That was one of the things that surprised me and my friends when we were there in June.) Also, unless you are standing on the eastern side of Last Stand Hill, the Keogh Sector is not visible. But there were no bodies found on the east side of LSH and I might certainly think that if visual contact had been maintained throughout, there would be some sort of correlation between the two general areas. There isn't. One post-battle eye-witness (PVT Jacob Adams [H]) claimed that bodies from all 5 companies were found in the Keogh Sector, but he was wrong. No E, F, or HQ personnel were ever identified there; only men from C, I, and L. Men from all 5 companies were found on the river side of Battle Ridge, meaning LSHill, the SSL, and Deep Ravine. (Only C Company men were identified in Calhoun Coulee and on Calhoun/Finley Ridge and only L Company personnel were identified on Calhoun Hill.) So again, I am sure as time wore on, the Keogh people saw more and more Indians infiltrating, moving from place to place, but this was after Custer had left and when Custer left, there was little of that kind of movement. Or if there was, the numbers seen didn't amount to much in the troopers' eyes. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Dec 3, 2007 19:10:03 GMT -6
I don't think that Custer necessarily thought Reno's attack was a "fail". Custer didn't care and it didn't matter whether Reno charged through the camp, stayed on the plain, or moved into the timber. The main thing was that Reno was still at the south end of the camp and blocking the Indians from packing up and moving south. After all, Custer did not say anything in his order but to attack the camp. When that order was given, Custer didn't know how much of a plain was there or how much timber was there or any other detail of the terrain. Custer knew that Reno's attack would effectively block the south end of the village and keep them from escaping to the South. That combined with his flanking move to the north would stop the Indians. That's a slightly different twist than what I would have given, but I completely agree with it. Completely! Actually, it is probably a more clever and detailed interpretation of what I think, than even what I have posted. Very, very nice. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Dec 3, 2007 19:38:01 GMT -6
bc--
Benteen, at the RCOI:
1. The bodies in [Deep] the ravine were within 50 to 75 yards of the river. [418] • Benteen thought there were 22 bodies in there. [418] • Very interesting: “They could not shoot out of the ravine and they certainly did not go into it to shoot out of it.” [418] 2. Benteen counted 70 dead cavalry horses and 2 Indian ponies on the field. [419] • He put a lot of stock in the fact only 3 officers—Keogh, Calhoun, and Crittenden—were found with their companies and all the rest were found near Custer. To Benteen, that indicated a rout. [437] • “I mean to say on that field there were 3 officers killed with their companies, the others were together on the hill. If they had lines the officers would have died with the men.” [438]
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by bc on Dec 4, 2007 0:31:57 GMT -6
Thanks Fred, 1. I guess I was under the impression from someone, somewhere that Benteen identified or his map indicated that the group of bodies was in the ford D area and not deep ravine. So I'll scratch that idea.
2. I'm not sure how Benteen associated the officers with Custer as being part of a rout instead of dying with their men on line. I'll have to think about that for a while. It ended up being a rout but it seems like Benteen is suggesting that the officers left their companies to run for cover with Custer which doesn't seem likely to me. I tend to think that the officers and particularly TWC and the rest of the Custer clan were riding with Custer because they "thought at the time" they were headed to the Indian camp for a big attack to achieve a grrrrreat victory for which they wanted to be part of. Keough and the others could handle their positions and they expected to be reinforced by Benteen. This may suggest that those officers (assuming they stopped to talk about it) weren't sure they would see much action staying on the ridge with Keough and their own companies and further suggests they also thought that Custer's move to the ford to attack would basically bring about the end of the battle. They didn't want to miss that for the world. (In regards to the rout issue, I know there was the one trooper who thought I troop was running in file and killed in file but the spacing of troopers is too close for that . I think I troop was part of a skirmish line.)
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Post by elisabeth on Dec 4, 2007 3:20:06 GMT -6
bc,
1. Re Benteen's map: he's in fact got two different lots of bodies in two different ravines. One is the usual Deep Ravine quota, clearly marked on the map in the correct position; the other lot -- from memory, I think he gives the number as 30 -- he shows as due north of LSH, well back from the river. So if they existed at all, they could prove only that a party went north of the hill. Whether killed advancing to Ford D, retreating from same, defending LSH, or fleeing the field would be anyone's guess. It's quite a big "if", though. No-one else seems to have seen them; they appear to be surplus to the generally-agreed head count; and Benteen himself -- so far as we know, at any rate -- never mentioned them again.
2. The only officer absent from his company in Keogh's battalion, apart from Harrington and Porter who were not found/identified, was TWC; and as you'll know, many argue that he was serving as ADC to Custer in any case, and thus would naturally have been with the HQ party. (There's considerable debate as to whether this is true.) Benteen's observation was directed towards the officers of E & F, plus possibly TWC. He found it unseemly that they were clustered around Custer while their men had died some distance away. We can't be sure that, say, Smith's presence here wasn't because he'd been wounded earlier, or that the officers weren't responding to an officers' call. But Benteen's reading was that it showed a breakdown of unit cohesion. Either the men of these companies had deserted the officers, or the officers had deserted the men; whichever, to him this said a rout.
A bit different for the Battle Ridge companies. There's a lot of evidence for Co. L presenting far more the sort of picture Benteen looked for: the men dying in line, Calhoun and Crittenden dying in their rightful positions with them. Co. C is more problematic. As Fred said, a number of them in Calhoun Coulee and Calhoun/Finley Ridge, and current theory puts them there as the result of an unfortunate sortie. Benteen, on the other hand, read their presence as more evidence of rout -- "flying in great disorder" in retreat from the village, and killed as they went. It's noticeable that the earliest battle maps place Co. C with Custer, slightly to the west of LSH, so there's still a bit of a question-mark over their role. As for Co. I: interpretations run the gamut from total disintegration to gallantly forming "a hollow square" around their stricken commander. Myself, I'd tend to agree with your skirmish line interpretation. The straggling trickle of markers between Keogh's final position and LSH supports the "buffalo hunt" notion to some extent, but once Keogh and the bulk of Co. I were dead there'd be no point in the few survivors doing anything but try to make a run for LSH; it doesn't necessarily prove a rout throughout.
Benteen and the other observers at the time were, of course, operating without the benefit of the Indian accounts. Easy for them to read "rout" from what they saw, whereas Indians talk about a long period of stand-off (and the infiltration Fred describes) before things started to happen. Benteen was, I think, sincere in his belief at the time; after all, he'd just seen how easily a rout could happen, first with Reno's valley fight and then with the retreat from Weir Point. Afterwards, when the finger-pointing began, it became all the more vital to uphold that idea: the shorter and messier the fight, the less chance they could have intervened. But initially, it was a reasonable conclusion to draw from the evidence, I think.
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Post by shan on Dec 4, 2007 4:47:17 GMT -6
Fred,
I knew the moment I saw that word deploy sit up and stare me in the eye that I had made a mistake, but eager to press on with my points I left it there behind me, hidden away like those dam Indians waiting their chance cut me down. No, of course I didn't mean deploy, given less haste; why do I always feel in a hurry when I decide to post, I too would have used infiltrate.
But having now used a word that better describes what was going on, I still think that there was a good deal to see from that high ground. After all, it would be quite natural during that relatively quiet period; yes, even I accept there may have been such a thing, although I doubt it lasted as long as some of you think, for those with glasses to pass the time watching the various scurryings that were going on hither and dither, and who can doubt that excitable Indians would pop up in various positions from time to time to take a pop shot at those distant blue figures, thus indicating the progress of those doing the infiltrating.
Then again, as we know from Indian testimony, not all of them choose to remain hidden, there were always a few, those bolshy, cantankourous men who simply couldn't bear to dismount and crawl around, warriors who had a need to ride around showing just how brave they were, who also indicated the extent of some of this infiltration.
Between these various sightings, there must been those amongst those watching who began to get uneasy about the fact that they were being gradually encircled, however, I think this may not have been true in Custers case, for if one is to believe the ford D trip, I doubt he will have seen too much evidence of warrior activity East of the river at this particular stage.
bc,
I think you make some valid points about Custers perception of the role Reno was was now forced to play given that his attack had stuttered to a halt. The phrase best of a bad job comes to mind. Whicheverway, it is always good to have to rethink something, and its amazing how obvious it all seems when you do.
Having said that, I'm not too sure of your assessment of the country off to the West of the Indian camp being too difficult should the Indians choose to cut and run is correct. I would have thought that compared to trying to cross the river and attempting to haul all your belongings up steeply rising, chopped up terrain which is being held by the enemy,it would be the first option you might go for.
Lastly, and this is not meant to be a criticism, I believe that many of us on this board unwittingly find ourselves planning out the battle as if A. we were the general that day, and B. as if we had all the time in the world to think through the various options. Personally I don't think Custer had that luxury, I think he was having to think on the hoof, trying to adapt to things that generally weren't going to plan, either on his side of things, or indeed the way the enemy was reacting. This was a very fluid, developing situation spinning out of control, and as we all know, ultimately, he got it completely wrong.
Shan
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Post by fred on Dec 4, 2007 6:21:44 GMT -6
Fred, I knew the moment I saw that word deploy sit up and stare me in the eye that I had made a mistake... Shan-- You are a heck of a good man and you make me laugh. I will address the whole thing later today, but I just wanted to tell you this early. (I have to put my wife on a plane; another close relative is hours away from dying and we've put off our emergency drive to NY for an even more "emergency flight" for her). I needed that laugh. Thanks. Best wishes, Fred.
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