Post by fred on Nov 18, 2007 16:11:21 GMT -6
Benteen reaches North Fork (1/2 mile) where he finds the shod trail dividing, and providing him with a dilemma: “Here we have the horns of a dilemma,” Benteen said [Gray]. As CPT Weir (D) heads down the left trail (Reno’s), Benteen takes the right one (Custer’s trail).
• TMP Martin may have corrected this for Benteen. Benteen rode ahead, the remainder of the battalion trailing.
• Liddic also believes the command divided, but with Company D taking the right fork-- Custer’s trail—when the trail split, and Companies H and K taking the left trail (Reno’s). Benteen rode somewhere in the middle. [Vanishing Victory, p. 92]
*Pack train overtaken by Rees returning to Reno Hill.
* Benteen went almost to the river and saw the unmistakable signs of a battle through the dust and smoke. On a knoll about 1/2 mile from the mouth of the North Fork, Benteen spots Reno’s retreat and halts (7.5 mph), his column still behind him.
* Benteen estimates 900 Indians attacking Reno. On the northern bluffs he could see soldiers (east side of the LBH).
* LT Godfrey: “The firing became more pronounced and appeared to be coming toward us. The column took the gallop with pistols drawn. We were forming in line... when we came in full view of the valley and saw it full of horsemen in dust and smoke.” [Gray]
* Godfrey also said that at this time the “Crows” (error: Rees) rode past them driving Sioux ponies and motioning for the soldiers to move to the bluffs east of the river.
* Edgerly told the same story: Half Yellow Face, as well, appeared to the right front near the ford and motioned for them to move to their right.
* Benteen saw the last of Reno’s retreat and 3 years later at the Reno Court, testified that at that time, he thought the whole command—Reno and Custer—had been defeated.
* Benteen’s battalion rode swiftly (Windolph) up the bluffs to the soldiers on the hill. PVT Morris, however, said they rode slowly, cautiously.
Three Crows—Goes Ahead, White Man Runs Him, and Hairy Moccasin—and the Ree—Black Fox—who were driving a small herd of ponies, meet and join Benteen. Benteen leaves halt.
Benteen reaches Reno Hill; 1 mile. Company K brought up the rear of Benteen’s column. Benteen estimates 900 warriors in the valley.
* The timing here is generally verified by Varnum’s RCOI testimony. (Not the “time,” but the “timing.”) Varnum says that when he reached the hilltop, he spent 2 or 3 minutes with several wounded men, a couple from his company. A few “moments” afterwards, a column (Benteen) was sighted and 10 to 15 minutes later, Benteen arrived. [Varnum, I, Varnum, p. 115]
* Varnum: “Q: How long after retiring from the timber did Captain Benteen unite with [Reno]? A: I would say 20 or 25 minutes.” [RCOI testimony, Varnum, I, Varnum, p. 173]
• Willert claims the Indians stopped pursuit of Reno’s command when they spotted Benteen’s column approach Ford A. Furthermore, he says that DeRudio and Gerard—both stranded in the timber—said they saw Indians pointing up the valley. DeRudio claims to have seen Benteen’s men turn to their right before reaching the river.
* LT Godfrey, arriving on Reno Hill with Benteen, estimates 600-700 Indians in the bottoms. [Graham, Reno Court (Abstract), pp. 176-177, as quoted in Willert, LBH Diary, p. 338]
* Benteen asks Reno where Custer was, still believing the battalions were still all together. Reno replies that he did not know; that Custer went off downstream and had obviously not supported him.
• Benteen shows Reno Cooke’s note. Reno makes no comment other than he didn’t know Custer’s whereabouts and that he had to fend for himself.
* Bruce Liddic points out that many students of the battle hold that Custer’s order in “come on, be quick,” was not subject to override by Reno. He cites Gen. Nelson Miles: “‘It was Benteen’s duty to strike out straight for Custer. They saw clouds of dust… where Custer was fighting, they knew his location, but no move was made in his direction.’” [Vanishing Victory, p. 119, citing Merrington, The Custer Story]
* Liddic also points out that a number of military officers have said that once Benteen reported to Reno and showed him the note, Benteen was now fully under Reno’s command. “Interestingly, it has been suggested that Custer’s own organization of the regiment had dictated that in any combination of the 2 forces, Benteen would become second in command of the left wing headed by Reno. This would effectively transfer any responsibility to ‘come on, be quick’ to Major Reno.” [Vanishing Victory, p. 119]
* Benteen said, “I supposed General Custer was able to take care of himself.” [Reno Court] Benteen also felt if he did move to help Custer, “we would have all been there yet.”
* CPT Thomas McDougall felt Benteen did not want to push it with Reno because Reno was highly jealous of his position and Benteen didn’t want to face the ramifications of possibly disobeying a direct order from Reno. A number of others—including Dr. Porter—felt Reno had lost control and that the de facto commander on the hill now became Benteen. Apparently, Moylan was also “whipped” and had lost control.
* Godfrey, Moylan, and several other officers gathered on the hilltop to observe the Indians in the valley. According to Godfrey, Moylan said: “‘Gentlemen, in my opinion, General Custer has made the biggest mistake in his life, by not taking the whole regiment in at once in the first attack.’” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 339; quoting Graham, The Custer Myth, p. 141]
Best wishes,
Fred.
• TMP Martin may have corrected this for Benteen. Benteen rode ahead, the remainder of the battalion trailing.
• Liddic also believes the command divided, but with Company D taking the right fork-- Custer’s trail—when the trail split, and Companies H and K taking the left trail (Reno’s). Benteen rode somewhere in the middle. [Vanishing Victory, p. 92]
*Pack train overtaken by Rees returning to Reno Hill.
* Benteen went almost to the river and saw the unmistakable signs of a battle through the dust and smoke. On a knoll about 1/2 mile from the mouth of the North Fork, Benteen spots Reno’s retreat and halts (7.5 mph), his column still behind him.
* Benteen estimates 900 Indians attacking Reno. On the northern bluffs he could see soldiers (east side of the LBH).
* LT Godfrey: “The firing became more pronounced and appeared to be coming toward us. The column took the gallop with pistols drawn. We were forming in line... when we came in full view of the valley and saw it full of horsemen in dust and smoke.” [Gray]
* Godfrey also said that at this time the “Crows” (error: Rees) rode past them driving Sioux ponies and motioning for the soldiers to move to the bluffs east of the river.
* Edgerly told the same story: Half Yellow Face, as well, appeared to the right front near the ford and motioned for them to move to their right.
* Benteen saw the last of Reno’s retreat and 3 years later at the Reno Court, testified that at that time, he thought the whole command—Reno and Custer—had been defeated.
* Benteen’s battalion rode swiftly (Windolph) up the bluffs to the soldiers on the hill. PVT Morris, however, said they rode slowly, cautiously.
Three Crows—Goes Ahead, White Man Runs Him, and Hairy Moccasin—and the Ree—Black Fox—who were driving a small herd of ponies, meet and join Benteen. Benteen leaves halt.
Benteen reaches Reno Hill; 1 mile. Company K brought up the rear of Benteen’s column. Benteen estimates 900 warriors in the valley.
* The timing here is generally verified by Varnum’s RCOI testimony. (Not the “time,” but the “timing.”) Varnum says that when he reached the hilltop, he spent 2 or 3 minutes with several wounded men, a couple from his company. A few “moments” afterwards, a column (Benteen) was sighted and 10 to 15 minutes later, Benteen arrived. [Varnum, I, Varnum, p. 115]
* Varnum: “Q: How long after retiring from the timber did Captain Benteen unite with [Reno]? A: I would say 20 or 25 minutes.” [RCOI testimony, Varnum, I, Varnum, p. 173]
• Willert claims the Indians stopped pursuit of Reno’s command when they spotted Benteen’s column approach Ford A. Furthermore, he says that DeRudio and Gerard—both stranded in the timber—said they saw Indians pointing up the valley. DeRudio claims to have seen Benteen’s men turn to their right before reaching the river.
* LT Godfrey, arriving on Reno Hill with Benteen, estimates 600-700 Indians in the bottoms. [Graham, Reno Court (Abstract), pp. 176-177, as quoted in Willert, LBH Diary, p. 338]
* Benteen asks Reno where Custer was, still believing the battalions were still all together. Reno replies that he did not know; that Custer went off downstream and had obviously not supported him.
• Benteen shows Reno Cooke’s note. Reno makes no comment other than he didn’t know Custer’s whereabouts and that he had to fend for himself.
* Bruce Liddic points out that many students of the battle hold that Custer’s order in “come on, be quick,” was not subject to override by Reno. He cites Gen. Nelson Miles: “‘It was Benteen’s duty to strike out straight for Custer. They saw clouds of dust… where Custer was fighting, they knew his location, but no move was made in his direction.’” [Vanishing Victory, p. 119, citing Merrington, The Custer Story]
* Liddic also points out that a number of military officers have said that once Benteen reported to Reno and showed him the note, Benteen was now fully under Reno’s command. “Interestingly, it has been suggested that Custer’s own organization of the regiment had dictated that in any combination of the 2 forces, Benteen would become second in command of the left wing headed by Reno. This would effectively transfer any responsibility to ‘come on, be quick’ to Major Reno.” [Vanishing Victory, p. 119]
* Benteen said, “I supposed General Custer was able to take care of himself.” [Reno Court] Benteen also felt if he did move to help Custer, “we would have all been there yet.”
* CPT Thomas McDougall felt Benteen did not want to push it with Reno because Reno was highly jealous of his position and Benteen didn’t want to face the ramifications of possibly disobeying a direct order from Reno. A number of others—including Dr. Porter—felt Reno had lost control and that the de facto commander on the hill now became Benteen. Apparently, Moylan was also “whipped” and had lost control.
* Godfrey, Moylan, and several other officers gathered on the hilltop to observe the Indians in the valley. According to Godfrey, Moylan said: “‘Gentlemen, in my opinion, General Custer has made the biggest mistake in his life, by not taking the whole regiment in at once in the first attack.’” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 339; quoting Graham, The Custer Myth, p. 141]
Best wishes,
Fred.