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Post by fred on Nov 18, 2007 13:26:25 GMT -6
CPT Frederick Benteen was issued his orders off to the side and out of earshot of all but the HQ staff. If Benteen found “any Indians trying to escape up the valley of the LBH, he was to intercept them and drive them back in the direction the village was supposed to be.” [Darling, quoting Kuhlman, Legends, p. 90.]
Furthermore: he was to proceed to “a line of bluffs 4 or 5 miles away”; to send an officer and 6 men, in advance, ride rapidly, pitch into anything he might find and send back word at once. * These “bluffs” actually turned out to be hills, the “first line” of which was really only 1.3 miles away, a serious miscalculation of distance. This miscalculation was probably due to the visual distortion from being higher up on the divide. • Willert writes the reason Custer sent Benteen off to the left was to police up Indians who might try to flee up the valley. [LBH Diary, pp. 265-266] He makes no mention that Benteen’s mission may just be to see if there were Indians in the upper part of the valley. • Benteen asked Custer: “Hadn’t we better keep the regiment together, General? If this is as big a camp as they say, we’ll need every man we have.” Custer responded, “You have your orders.” [Connell, et al] * Benteen: “ ‘We had passed through immense villages the preceding days…. We knew there were 8 or 10,000 on that trail.’” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 265] * Benteen wrote to his wife on 2Jul76: “I was ordered… to the left for the purpose of hunting for the valley of the river—or anything I could find.” [Smalley, LBH Mysteries, p. 11-3] * In a second letter, dated 4Jul76, he wrote: “I was ordered… to the left, in search of the valley… and to inform Custer at once if I found anything worthy of same.” [Smalley, LBH Mysteries, p. 11-3] * In his official report of 4Jul76, Benteen wrote: “The directions I received from … Custer were, to move with my command to the left, to send well-mounted officers with about 6 men who would ride rapidly to a line of bluffs about 5 miles to our left and front, with instructions to report at once to me if anything of Indians could be seen from that point. I was to follow the movement of this detachment as rapidly as possible… the ground was terribly hard on horses, so I determined to carry out the other instructions, which were, that if in my judgment there was nothing to be seen of Indians, Valleys, etc., in the direction I was going, to return with the battalion to the trail the command was following.” [Overfield, The LBH, 1876, pp. 39-40] • As Benteen left on his mission, he passed by Reno and told him his orders were “to sweep everything before him.” * Bruce Liddic writes that by sending out an officer and 6 EM ahead of Benteen’s main column, Custer was showing his eagerness for timely intelligence. * The understanding of Custer’s orders and Benteen’s mission was clear and this understanding was re-iterated by Edgerly some time after the battle: “‘The idea I had was if they ran out of the village we would strike them on the left; and if to the right, then some other part of the command.’” • In addition, Benteen wrote to his wife on 2Jul76, “Custer divided the 7th Cavalry into 3 Battn’s—about 15 miles from an Indian village, the whereabouts of which he did not know exactly.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 34] • LT Gibson: “… wrote in recall that after Benteen had been ordered to scout ‘to the left about 5 miles to see if the Indians were trying to escape up the valley… we were to hurry and rejoin the command as quickly as possible.’” [FN in Willert: Fougera, With Custer’s Cavalry; LBH Diary, pp. 447-448]
* If Custer’s order to Benteen to scout to the left had any military legitimacy, then it was because Custer needed to know the precise location of the Indians and prevent them from fleeing south. * At this point, Jack Pennington somehow makes the assumption that Benteen was ordered by Custer to complete traversing the ridgelines and head into the LBH valley and then down the valley. Pennington does not say where he gets this info. * While Benteen was pleased at his initial assignment, he became miffed when Custer modified his orders by first sending Chief Trumpeter Voss and then SGM Sharrow after Benteen with orders to keep ridge hopping until he could see into the LBH valley. Benteen did not understand Custer’s rationale at the time. * On 8Aug76, Benteen wrote the New York Herald: “Before I had proceeded a mile in the direction of the bluffs I was overtaken by the Chief Trumpeter and the Sergeant Major with instructions from General Custer to use my own discretion, and in case I should find any trace of Indians at once to notify General Custer.” [Graham, The Custer Myth, p. 227] • By the time Benteen moved towards Ash Creek (Reno Creek) down Valley 3, he had already traversed 2 tough ridgelines, LT Gibson had mounted a 3rd (Ridge C), and there was at least another large ridgeline past C before Benteen’s command could enter the LBH valley.
* Liddic writes, “Custer didn’t have a complete plan. The strategic part of his plan was complete. … urprise the village, capture it, and prevent as many Indians as possible from fleeing.” [Vanishing Victory, p. 34] * Benteen even agreed that Custer was correct in not having a formal plan at this point because he did not know the Indians’ precise location or their size. * Benteen, at the Reno inquiry stated, “When I received my orders from Custer to separate myself from the command, I had no instructions to unite at any time with Reno or anyone else. There was no plan at all. My orders were valley hunting ad infinitum.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 34] * Benteen: “… I received orders through the sergeant-major of the regiment that if I saw nothing from the second line of bluffs, to go on into the valley, and if there was nothing in the valley, to go on to the next valley.” [Nichols, Reno Court of Inquiry, p. 403]
* Custer paid continuous attention to Benteen’s movements and tried not to outdistance him. He would want as much immediate intelligence as possible so he could get on with formulating his plans. Indians to the west (Benteen’s front) would be critical to any plans Custer would develop on the run. No word from Benteen, no firing, would give Custer some modicum of intelligence by simply telling him Benteen had found nothing.
Liddic, like so many others, takes issue with Benteen’s attitude toward Custer and the comments Benteen made at the Reno Inquiry regarding his mission. Benteen had apparently written, “ ‘as I was anxious to rejoin the command, as there was no sign of Indians, I decided to rejoin the main trail.’” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 38] Liddic goes on, “[Benteen] stated he scarcely knew himself ‘what I had to do.’ In addition, Benteen swore he had no orders to unite with anyone; the reason he returned was because he thought he might be needed, and he was separated from the command by possibly 15 miles or more.” Liddic considers this self-serving and deceptive. At the inquiry, the Recorder asked Benteen “if there was anything in Custer’s orders to him that would lead the captain to believe he wasn’t to rejoin or come up with the column if he found no Indians?… Benteen let his guard down and revealed [Custer’s] tacit trust in him and replied: ‘I don’t think General Custer would have told me that. He would have known that I would have come up.’”
* Benteen leaves halt on an off-trail to left. Moves at a trot, but because of the difficulty of the low-lying terrain, his rate of advance is only about 3.4 mph. [Darling, Benteen’s Scout, p. 12]
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Nov 18, 2007 13:58:55 GMT -6
Chief Trumpeter Voss reaches Benteen on the lower slope of the first “bluff.” Benteen had gone about 1 mile when Voss overtook him. Ascending these hills, Benteen and many of his men see the Custer column about 1/2-mile away. [Darling] Benteen reaches the forward part of the plateau (Plateau A) formed beyond the hills of the “first line of bluffs,” 1.8 miles from the separation point with Custer. * Pack train now about 2 miles behind Custer
* Benteen, now with Gibson and the 6 troopers at the far edge of the first plateau (A), receives a message from SGM Sharrow, again from Custer: if he saw nothing from the 2nd line of bluffs, proceed into the valley and if nothing was there, proceed to the next valley. Benteen now waits while the rest of his battalion catches up, then proceeds to obey his orders. * The terrain past this first plateau became more difficult—the west side was a near vertical descent—but only because his orders gave him no discretion in detouring from this direction or speed, i.e., there were easier ways to go other than those necessarily taken by Benteen. The difficulty of the terrain was beginning to take a severe toll on the horses.
* The packs had gone a little over a mile when LT Cooke came back to tell LT Mathey to keep the mules off the trail as they were creating too much dust. [Did this occur here or when they were moving up Davis Creek, as Willert suggests? Or maybe both?] • Cooke came back a little while later to tell Mathey he was doing a good job keeping the dust down. * Benteen, having descended the first line of bluffs was now ascending the steep, winding sides of the 2nd plateau (Ridge B) when he and some of his men observed, once again, Custer’s column and Smith’s Gray Horse Troop (E) at the gallop. Men in Benteen’s column heard cheering and shots being fired. The order of march was H, D, K. The speed of movement was rapid, Godfrey recalling, “that many of their horses were getting exhausted by the climbing and descending.” [Smalley, LBH Mysteries, p. 11-7] * This puts Custer on Reno Creek, about 3 1/2 miles from the separation point, because Benteen would only have been able to see up the valley he had, or was traversing, about a mile of Reno Creek from near the top of the 2nd plateau. • Distance from Benteen’s first stop to the 2nd ridge: 1.2 miles (3 miles, total, from the separation point). * At the top of this 2nd ridge/plateau, Benteen and Gibson observed a 3rd ridge, just as high, with a rugged west slope of broken peaks and cliffs. They still could not see the LBH valley. At this point, Benteen and some of his officers were extremely irritated with the increasingly fruitless assignment. (Benteen appeared fine until Sharrow gave him Custer’s 2nd set of instructions; now he thought they were on a wild goose chase.) Benteen now orders Gibson and the 6 troopers to the next ridge across the valley, while he himself decides to take the remainder of the battalion into the valley, heading slowly north, awaiting Gibson’s report. • Benteen has figured Gibson might now be able to see the LBH; he was correct. LT Edgerly recalled Gibson went to the tops of various bluffs 4 times in 6 miles.
* Benteen arrives at upper No-Name Creek—in the valley—and begins his turn down it, 3.75 miles from the divide halt. * Gibson reaches a high promontory on the 3rd ridge (Ridge C) [Darling] and finds the upper reaches of the LBH valley empty. Benteen realizes Custer had been correct: the view of the LBH was invaluable and proved the Indians were down the valley, not up. • Benteen: “I knew the Indians had too much sense to go any place over such a rugged country—that if they had to go in that direction they had a much better way to go…. I had an idea that General Custer was mistaken as to there being… Indians in that vicinity; and as there were no Indians there… I thought my duty was to go back to the trail and join the command.” [Willert, LBH Diary, RCOI testimony, p. 269] • Benteen, in a letter to his wife: “I went up and down those hills for 10 miles… the horses were fast giving out from steady climbing—and as my orders had been fulfilled, I struck diagonally for the trail the command had marched on.” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 269] The distance mentioned is obviously an exaggeration, probably because of all the up and down the battalion was doing in traversing the hills. • Gibson ascended 4 different bluffs [according to Liddic], scanned the upper LBH valley with his field glasses and signaled Benteen that there were no Indians in that direction. • PVT Windolph remembered the country as quite rugged and very hard on the horses. [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 38] * Benteen’s ride down No-Name Creek was along its right bank and was quite easy. * Vern Smalley writes that Benteen’s move down No-Name Creek was actually in defiance of Custer’s orders to “search all the valleys to the river.” [LBH Mysteries, p. 11-8] I do not agree with Smalley here, though he only states a belief, adding NO CRITICISM. I think Benteen exercised his discretion, realizing nothing further would be gained by continuing on. I also believe this is precisely what Custer wanted, once Benteen was certain no Indians were to be found in any of the intervening valleys or the LBH valley.
*[Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 382, citing the New York Herald, 8Aug1876; Godfrey’s Diary, no page given; and the Official Transcript, p. 846] Stewart felt Benteen reached the morass about the same time Reno was crossing Ford A.
* Benteen arrives at Reno Creek, 1/4 mile above mouth of No-Name Creek. This is an additional 4.2 miles of marching. This is approximately 5.4 miles east of Ford A. He sights pack train, 3/4 miles above, along Reno Creek. * Boston Custer meets Benteen. [• Willert has this time at 2pm and says Boston did not stop, but hurried on. McDougall was about 2 1/2 miles back. {LBH Diary, p. 296}] * At this point, LT Mathey estimated that the pack train was spread out 2 to 3 miles from front to rear and fairly well scattered. [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p.40] Benteen arrives at the morass and stops to water horses; this is another 1/2 mile.
* Benteen leaves morass just as the pack train arrives [Gray, Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 251]. * Benteen claimed this halt was less than 15 minutes. [Overfield, The LBH, 1876, p. 40] • Godfrey claimed the delay at the morass was between 20 and 30 minutes. • Edgerly testified they were there only 8 to 10 minutes. * Smalley says CPT Weir led out from the morass. [LBH Mysteries, p. 7-9] Benteen—with his orderly—raced ahead and retook the lead. He would now be a few hundred yards ahead of his battalion.
• Gray estimates an overall speed of 4.5 mph (with the halt-time subtracted) for Benteen. * Firing was heard in the valley. * Windolph (H) heard firing before they left the morass. PVT Morris (M) said PVT Moller (H) told him they heard heavy firing as they were watering the horses. [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 51; citing Hammer/Camp, Custer in 76, p. 75, and Brady, Indian Fights and Fighters, p. 404] * Godfrey: “After we watered we continued our march very leisurely.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 51] * PVT Windolph: Godfrey’s statement is not supported by comments from PVT Windolph, who, after hearing firing in the valley, said, “We all knew we’d be in a fight before long.” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 296] “We were trotting briskly now, and there was a good deal of excitement. Horses seem to know when they are heading into trouble the same as men do and some of the mounts were anxious to run away, tired as they were.” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 298] * Benteen: “I pushed rapidly on, soon getting out of sight of the advance of the train, until reaching a morass, I halted to water the animals, who had been without water since about 8pm of the day before. This watering did not occasion the loss of 15 minutes, and when I was moving out, the advance of the train commenced watering from that morass. I went at a slow trot until I came to a burning tepee…. We did not stop.” [Gray, Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 263] * The order of march was now D, H, K. * Godfrey: “We heard occasional shots and I concluded the fight was over—that [we] had nothing to do but go up and congratulate the others and help destroy the plunder.” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 298]
* Benteen, at a walk, passes “lone tepee,” another 3/4 mile down [Gray]. * Benteen: “I went at a slow trot [after he watered at the morass] until I came to a burning lodge with a dead body of an Indian in it on a scaffold. We did not halt.” [Smalley, LBH Mysteries, p. 7-6]
* A little over a mile south of the top of Reno Hill, the Crows spot Benteen. Benteen sees the Crows about 400-500 yards to his right. * Half Yellow Face and White Swan spotted Benteen’s battalion and as Godfrey neared Ford A, he saw one of the Crows. Half Yellow Face now rounded up some stray Sioux ponies and he and White Swan followed the soldiers to Reno Hill. [Smalley, More LBH Mysteries, p. 1-17]
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Nov 18, 2007 14:30:20 GMT -6
* Benteen meets Rees driving Sioux ponies (1.42 miles). * Next, Benteen meets SGT Kanipe with Custer’s message (.08 miles). Smalley claims this was one to two miles west of the morass. [More LBH Mysteries, p. 25-13] * For Kanipe: a trip of 3 3/8 miles in 27 minutes (7.5 mph). • Liddic writes Kanipe first saw “Benteen’s detachment… watering their horses. Kanipe was riding along the North Fork of Reno Creek when he first noticed the battalion which was over on Reno Creek.” [Vanishing Victory, pp. 69-70] * Some of Benteen’s men heard Kanipe yell, “We’ve got them, boys,” as he rode for the pack train. * LT Godfrey: the battalion stopped to water their horses again just after passing the “lone tepee.” * Liddic: “[Benteen] … had marched two hot, dusty miles since the morass, and they surely would have welcomed a second break, as water had been scarce and of poor quality over the last 24 hours. Kanipe said he met Benteen soon after he had left the place where… (Benteen) was watering his horses…. It was from this point that firing was heard from the direction of the LBH River.” [Vanishing Victory, p. 70] • Most accounts state that this firing was heard while Benteen was watering at the morass. These accounts—according to Liddic—are incorrect. • Willert, quoting LT Godfrey: “[T]he gunfire from beyond the hills and ridges…’became more distinct…’ and the column ‘…increased gait….’ [F]rom the sound of the firing—sporadic, sometimes sharp, but no longer heavy and furious—the engagement rendered impression of ending rather than of beginning or continuing. LT Godfrey wrote in recall: ‘… I thought all was over and that it could only have been a small village to be over so soon.’” [LBH Diary, p. 304] * Kanipe remembered he was not in sight of the pack train when he met Benteen. * Benteen told Kanipe he made a mistake delivering Custer’s orders to him and that he should head for the packs and CPT McDougall. • Liddic claims Kanipe knew of Benteen’s sarcasm and that Benteen wasn’t in command of the packs, but that Kanipe told him to hurry anyway as they had struck a big village. [Vanishing Victory, p.71] * Kanipe rode down the column shouting, “We’ve got ’em boys!” and “the Indians [are] on the run!” Euphoria, all around! Godfrey also heard Kanipe shouting these words. * “From this and other remarks the command justly ‘inferred Custer had attacked and captured the village.’” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 71] * Pack train meets Rees driving Sioux ponies.
* Benteen meets TMP Martin on the flats with Cooke’s note; hears firing (1 1/4 miles at a speed of about 4.7 mph). Smalley writes that this meeting was 1 1/4 miles from the Little Big Horn. [LBH Mysteries, p. 7-7] * According to Liddic, “Martin saw Benteen, with his orderly, riding ‘two or three hundred yards’ in front of his battalion. That Martin was dispatched about 10 minutes and a mile after Kanipe, is confirmed by the fact that Benteen only advanced about a mile from his meeting with Kanipe before meeting the second messenger.” [Vanishing Victory, p. 90] Willert concurs with this, adding that Benteen was with his trumpeter, William Ramell, and that Weir was the nearest officer, riding with his command. [LBH Diary, p. 305] • Smalley: Benteen stated he met Kanipe about 1 mile from the burning tepee, and then in another 1 mile, he met Martin. [LBH Mysteries, p. 7-6]
N.B.—Willert elucidates Benteen’s quandary. 1. Where was Custer? Martin didn’t precisely know. 2. Was Custer at the sound of the gun firing? 3. Had the charge already been executed? 4. If so, why the need for the packs? 5. Which packs; ammo, supplies, both? 6. If the Indians were on the run (as per Kanipe, if not Martini, possibly both), why the need for the packs? 7. Was Cooke’s message written before the action? 8. In light of the diminished firing, was the urgency of the message still valid? There was no time scrawled on the message. [LBH Diary, p. 305]
• “Martin said [Custer] was about 3 miles from them and he supposed the Indians were running and Custer had charged through the village.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 90] * “[Martin] did tell the men in Benteen’s column that Reno was driving Indians ahead of him and killing them right and left, but that was a fabrication. He saw no such thing.” [Smalley, LBH Mysteries, p. 8-9] • Martin denied ever having used the word “skidaddling.” • As Martin now rode past Company D to rejoin his company, LT Edgerly (D) “heard Martin telling the troopers that Reno had attacked the village and was ‘killing Indians and squaws right and left.’” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 90] * Smalley claims Edgerly got part of this sequencing confused when he stated the command first watered at the morass, then met Martin, then passed the burning “lone tepee.” [LBH Mysteries, p. 7-7] • Benteen: “ ‘Well, if he wants me to hurry to him, how does he expect that I can bring the packs? If I am going to be of service to him, I think I had better not wait for the packs.’” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 91]
N.B.—Liddic makes an interesting point here [p. 91]. Cooke’s note emphasized bringing the packs and a former cavalryman, General Hawkins, told Kuhlman that “packs” always referred to the pack train and not specifically ammunition, as some students of the battle assume. Benteen thought this and so did Edgerly, when shown the note. Liddic, however, feels Benteen missed the primary intent of the message, that Custer wanted the additional troops: Benteen’s battalion and McDougall and the packs. This would have added 269 men to Custer’s battalions.
* Benteen is now 2 1/4 miles below the “lone tepee.” * Martin’s ride from the bend in Cedar Coulee to the point he met Benteen, was about 3 miles and took him 24 minutes at a speed of 7.5 mph. [Gray, Custer’s Last Campaign] * In response to Martin’s message from Cooke—and spurred on by the sound of heavy firing—Benteen now moves out at a pace of 7.5 mph, covering the next 1/2 mile to the North Fork in about 4 minutes. • Not a single officer ever questioned Benteen’s decision to move forward without the packs. • Willert claims Benteen decided not to go back for the packs—with concurrence from his officers—because McDougall was already bringing them down the trail and there was probably no danger from behind. While some claim Benteen moved forward at the sound of the heavy firing after Martini delivered the message, Willert says the firing had already diminished by this time, yet Benteen still moved out at a trot. [LBH Diary, p. 305] • This new, heavy firing is now confirmed by Willert: “As the command proceeded, they, too, heard the gunfire from beyond the bluffs increase suddenly to ferocious intensity.” [LBH Diary, p. 315] • LT Godfrey: “ ‘The column had been marching at a trot and walk, according as the ground was smooth or broken. We now heard firing, first straggling shots, and as we advanced, the engagement became more and more pronounced and appeared to be coming toward us.’” Benteen now veered from the main trail and led the command up a slope at a gallop. Godfrey continued: “ ‘The column took the gallop with pistols drawn, expecting to meet the enemy which we thought Custer was driving before him in his effort to communicate with the pack train.’” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 315] * This had to be before Benteen crossed North Fork, because he then headed toward Ford A. • As they reached the first crest along the bluffs and could see into the valley, they saw a tremendous amount of smoke and dust, and remembering what Kanipe had said, assumed Custer was burning the village. Edgerly saw men running from the village and crossing the river, disappearing into the ravines at the foot of the bluffs. He assumed they were Indians.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by mwkeogh on Nov 18, 2007 21:03:30 GMT -6
There is great debate over whether Benteen actually crossed the north fork or instead followed the main cavalry trail to the south side of lower Ash Creek across the Echleman Ford, thus leading to the split where Custer's Battalions left Reno at Benteen's "two horns of a dilemma" about 1/4 mile from ford A and right behind the Girard/Cooke knoll. He would then have followed the Custer trail north from there up to Reno Hill. Edgerly claimed they were heading directly for Ford A, which would not be the case if they crossed earlier at the north fork.
It is also interesting to note that some researchers (in particular, Robert Doran in his recent book) claims that the actual morass site is located at the Hartung Morass, which is about 2 1/2 miles from Ford A. If this location is correct, then it would certainly account for how a number of witnesses claimed they could hear shots being fired up ahead in the valley. This could simply not be physically possible if the morass was located several miles further to the east. It would also account for Kanipe's claims that when he first spotted Benteen's battalion they were watering their horses....just something to consider.
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Post by fred on Nov 19, 2007 5:55:04 GMT -6
It is also interesting to note that some researchers (in particular, Robert Doran in his recent book) claims that the actual morass site is located at the Hartung Morass, which is about 2 1/2 miles from Ford A. If this location is correct, then it would certainly account for how a number of witnesses claimed they could hear shots being fired up ahead in the valley. This could simply not be physically possible if the morass was located several miles further to the east. It would also account for Kanipe's claims that when he first spotted Benteen's battalion they were watering their horses....just something to consider. Bill-- Now, you're talking! Now, this makes more sense. This bears looking into. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by blaque on Nov 19, 2007 12:58:13 GMT -6
Sometime ago I corresponded with Mike about the possibility of a second watering. Here are some of my speculations, for what they may be worth.
We do know that Benteen’s morass was not the only watering place along the trail. It would be not a strange thing that in that hot day some men and horses took the opportunity of watering again, specially since the morass was described as a small, boggy place, which didn’t allow watering many horses at a time. Besides, Godfrey witnessed how the pack mules ran into the morass and a few got mired, so it’s likely that his company (in the rear) made a less than satisfactory watering. Even Edgerly testified that in the morass they watered “hurriedly”, and that they left as soon as the packs started to arrive.
Two watering places would explain that Benteen (even a few hundred yards in advance of his men) heard no firing during the first watering, but that Godfrey and others did hear it… in the second one. It would also explain Edgerly’s mistake when he testified that they met Kanipe “before we got to the watering place” (OK if it were the “second” place!). It would also help to understand Weir’s insubordination when he left his second position in the column and started out in advance of H co. Why such undiscipline when they were over 7 miles from the Reno battlefield, and did not know yet if there was any fighting in course (probably firing couldn’t be heard at such distance), or even if there was an Indian village at all? However, Weir’s impatience would be understandable during a second watering: now they knew, thanks to Kanipe, that there was a big village and a large victory in prospect, the firing of which could be heard about 3 miles away (Benteen testified that, after meeting Martini, he did hear some firing about 2 miles away).
I also suspect that, when Kanipe met Benteen (as we know, after watering in the morass) D was still second in the column. Neither in his narratives or testimony gives Edgerly so many details about Kanipe’s meeting as about the meeting with Martini (when we do know D was already at the van). And his testifying that the meeting with Kanipe took place before watering, may be based in his certainty that D company was not yet at the head of the column.
All this mess could be explained by the existance of two different waterings, a likely fact because there were at least two watering places along the trail and it was a very hot day. Kanipe’s message was not alarming at all, quite the contrary, everybody thought that the battle was almost over, so the pace of the column continued to be a walk; the disappointed cavalrymen could have indulged in some extra and much needed watering, while the “custerite” Weir would have got impatient to join his friends and take some share of the victory. Let’s not forget either that Godfrey wrote in his Diary that they watered AFTER passing the Lone Tepee (“old village camp”). According to his diary (and also to Benteen’s testimony) “after watered we continued our march very leisurely. Not long after watering the trumpeter brought the note […] and we increased our gait”. Until then it had been a leisure walk, so why could not some men water again if they struck a better place than the morass?
That the participants had faulty recollections of times and events is, of course, the most likely explanation to all of the above. But what a boring explanation!
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Post by fred on Nov 19, 2007 14:41:35 GMT -6
blaque and keogh--
You may really be on to something here. Both of your arguments make very good sense. It will be worth looking into.
Bill, where precisely is this second morass? Can you pinpoint it?
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by harpskiddie on Nov 19, 2007 19:55:11 GMT -6
blaque:
Did Mike tell you that there were two watering places in the Chapter on Benteen's March I wrote back in the 90s [prior to 1996, 1992 or 3, perhaps] and sent to him at his request when he was doing his Benteen thing last year [or earlier this - I can't recall the exact date]?
I think there is no doubt that Benteen stopped to water twice, and that you have covered it pretty well. I would disagree with a couple of your points only. That we agree will hardly stop the debate. People still argue about where THE morass was, never mind ANOTHER watering place.
Gordie, MC
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Post by fred on Nov 19, 2007 20:53:40 GMT -6
Y'all--
I am assuming this second watering place is closer to the LBH than the first. Again, can anyone place its location from the flats?
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by mwkeogh on Nov 20, 2007 2:08:43 GMT -6
Y'all-- I am assuming this second watering place is closer to the LBH than the first. Again, can anyone place its location from the flats? Best wishes, Fred. Perhaps there were two morasses! (hey, why not? It seems very likely that there was more than one "lone tepee" site passed that day!) In any event, Robert Doran, in his research, claims that the morass that Benteen stopped to water at just before meeting Kanipe is known today as the Hartung Morass, as it was on the property of the Hartung Ranch. He describes it as a natural depression where artesian water has created a large morass just across a ford of Ash Creek. He has the regiment crossing Ash Creek here from south to north which then put them on the "Big Flat" where they would soon discover Lt. Lee's "lone tepee".(the burning lodge). On a geological survey map, it is located in the southeast quarter section of Township Section 12 on lower Ash Creek. He dismisses the theory that Benteen watered his horses in Ash Creek as he claims the water in Ash Creek is both alkaline and coal-tar flavored. However, he describes the Hartung Morass as being not a particularly good place to water horses due to the narrow shaped neck at the southern end of the morass there. He identifies Girard's knoll as being just north of this morass site. It is located about 2 1/2 miles east of Ford A. He claims that Weir took his company off in the direction of the valley when he heard the opening shots of Reno's engagement. Benteen follows about 5 minutes later. In the next 10 minutes, Benteen meets Kanipe who has just crossed the north fork shortcut from the bluffs to deliver his message.
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Post by blaque on Nov 20, 2007 7:00:46 GMT -6
Did Mike tell you that there were two watering places in the Chapter on Benteen's March I wrote back in the 90s [prior to 1996, 1992 or 3, perhaps] and sent to him at his request when he was doing his Benteen thing last year [or earlier this - I can't recall the exact date]? I think there is no doubt that Benteen stopped to water twice, and that you have covered it pretty well. I would disagree with a couple of your points only. That we agree will hardly stop the debate. People still argue about where THE morass was, never mind ANOTHER watering place. Gordie, We exchanged messages on the watering topic between the 8th and 14th of May, and no, Mike did not mention you. The discussion was prompted by a reference from Fred to the possibility that Benteen made two watering halts, as purported in Liddic’s Vanishing Victory. It’s not strange that you disagree with a couple of points, since I was just thinking aloud, without any thorough study of sources and known facts. Anyway I’m a bit reluctant to believe in this hypothesis, if only because of my wish to resolve at least one LBH puzzle without resorting to the “duplicating formula”, e.g.: Not one, but two Crow’s Nest Not one, but two Custer’s trips to the look out Not one, but two Lone Tepees Not one, but two fords attacked by Custer Not one, but two Custer btns. acting independently Not one, but two contiguous sites for the village Not one, but two time sets Not three, but six Custer messages to Benteen (after R. Doran) Not 1.500 warriors, but 3.000 Not…
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Post by harpskiddie on Nov 20, 2007 10:22:38 GMT -6
Thanks.
Gordie, MC
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Post by erkki on Nov 20, 2007 17:07:10 GMT -6
The traditional morass sited somewhere east of the lone tepee(s) is nowhere visible from anywhere on the North Fork of Reno Creek. Wells suggested that the horses Knipe saw watering were stealing a drink while crossing Reno Creek ("Kanipe, Martin, Benteen." Research Review 2.1 (June 1988): 10-15+).
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Post by mwkeogh on Nov 21, 2007 1:37:33 GMT -6
The traditional morass sited somewhere east of the lone tepee(s) is nowhere visible from anywhere on the North Fork of Reno Creek. Wells suggested that the horses Knipe saw watering were stealing a drink while crossing Reno Creek ("Kanipe, Martin, Benteen." Research Review 2.1 (June 1988): 10-15+). Of course, anything is possible here. Doran claims the water in Reno Creek is alkaline and coal-tar flavored, thus less likely to be used as a watering source for the horses. It is interesting to note tho, that the location of this ford across Reno Creek where Kanipe was purported to have spotted Benteen's column is at the exact location of the Hartung Morass, the site of an artesian well providing pure drinking water. It would seem to me then that the horses would be more inclined to stop for a drink at this location than in the foul tasting waters of Reno Creek. In any event, I think most are agreed that this was the general location where Kanipe spotted Benteen's Battalion.
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Post by blaque on Nov 21, 2007 4:38:09 GMT -6
Since most witnesses agree that Benteen watered shortly after returning to the main trail, I don’t put this in doubt (the actual whereabouts of his morass is another question). But if several miles down the trail there was water of better quality in another water hole (Hartung?), I find Wayne Wells’ vision of “horses stealing a drink” quite believable.
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