|
Post by montrose on Jul 4, 2011 4:53:39 GMT -6
Fred,
I do not agree with you on your analysis of Custer's decision making.
I understand your view that Custer did a recon of Ford B and consolidated his force on Calhoun Hill. Feeling no threat from the Indians, he split his force and went to recon Ford D. He then went to cemetery ridge to wait for Keough, Benteen, and the trains to arrive at his location. Meanwhile he blissfully expected Reno to hold off 1500 plus Indians on his own.
My own view is that as Custer moved north, his decisions became less and less rational. Hope became a method. His early decisions show him balancing risk with caution. But soon he starting assuming away risk. This became dangerous as his own intelligence started showing that his assumptions were wrong.
He ignored indications that the situation did not match his own hoped for situation. He assumed away the threat, which is a common mistake for students who fail evaluations in the military courses I used to administer.
Moving Keough forward from Nye Cartwright Ridge was a blunder. Custer's decisions from this point forward become very unsound. DC makes the point that this radical change from sound decisions to unsound is because Custer was killed at Ford B. This theory actually has great explanatory power. There is something un Custerlike in decisions after Ford B.
Except Custer's body location and wounds indicate to me that he died late in the battle. So the decline in situational awareness and decision making rests with GAC.
I am setting the conditions to explain why GAC screwed the pooch. By the way, I doubt anyone will like it.
Respectfully,
William
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Jul 4, 2011 6:23:31 GMT -6
Well, my feeling - I have nothing else - is worse than a dead Custer. I suspect a wounded Custer NOT ceding command, supported by what I reference as the actual command structure as opposed to the official command structure.
That actual structure had its paramount goal of safety for the wounded Custer and it had no need to inform Keogh right off with Cooke and TWC in synch. Nobody knows how bad the wound is and whether he should be relieved. I know it annoys regular army guys that such informal - and illegal - cliques might seize command or exert energy in a non-mission direction, but I suspect in those times and our own such things exist and happen.
I point again to Kevin Tillman, somehow present with his brother and disarmed by order when friendly fire killed Pat. Probably a wise, wise choice. Why would it be different in 1876, except there were three brothers, nephew, brothers in law, close friends in a not much larger unit? And who under those circumstances would stand up for The Manual or halt proceedings to discuss, much less contest?
I also don't think it was resented, per se, as it was the predictable and intended result of Custer's nepotism. And nepotism was the rage back then. I suspect TWC knew his bro well and spoke for him in some instances, and others listened because it became apparent, after a while, that TWC was correct. I point to the regiment being called forward that AM.
Although I've been lazily guilty of saying it, I don't think they reached Ford B, but only to the point where it broadens to include Deep Coulee. But I certainly think they all headed down MTC to attack. I think Keogh, ever sharp, noted the confusion of some sort ahead and smartly pulled his guys out. Not knowing where or why the Yates crew was heading where it was, he followed in parallel, providing covering fire until he came under his own. I don't think this was anything but a half hour of mounting horror with no surcease for Yates, and not much for Keogh.
The evidence for Ford D, both artifact and by account, can be explained, if needed, by the annoying cross dressed warriors.
I'm sorry that I cannot get enthused about ANY scenario that involves Custer proactively waiting, either for Benteen or Godot. They had to know, having seen the land, that once stopped they were clear targets from the numerous gullies and coulees which can be seen and dreaded from Weir Point or Sharpshooter. I really cannot imagine them being that bad assessors of ground. They were not. They could not be.
If only a photo existed to prove my point. Alas. Alackaday. Woe.......
I have small experience with horses, but some, and I recall they exert a momentum that's edgy when they move in bulk, even under tight control. "Tight control" is a term AZ might wish to illustrate or suggest is sometimes notional. I can well imagine that in combat, even combat with four wimpy but armed Indians somewhere in MTC as the command headed down it, your first inclination of changed direction with increased speed becomes virtual command once the following horses sense it. In close together in a gully where you do NOT want to stop under fire, I suspect once the move was blunted, someone wounded in the saddle, it was auto pilot reflex to nudge it away and following the draw and lay of the land, found themselves headed to LSH.
And they were met there upon cresting the hill, officers leading, which explains much of the body locations by account, as opposed to marker.
|
|
|
Post by fred on Jul 4, 2011 6:23:33 GMT -6
I do not agree with you on your analysis of Custer's decision making. Will, Actually... I may very well be wrong... as to his "decision-making"... to me that is less of an issue than what happened, when it happened, and how it happened. I am ambivalent about the packs; I believe that would have been a serious miscalculation... and Custer would have had to make allowances for the packs being dropped off and somehow barricaded. "1,500" is an over-statement, in my opinion; 900 to 1,000 is more like it. And yes, that was part of the problem. Custer no longer cared about Reno. It is my opinion that once committed, Reno was to be on his own, fending for himself. If this is part of your criticism, I agree with you. You will see where I am going with this in a moment. I do not disagree with any of this... not at all. This is all part of his overall breakdown. I agree with this assessment. Actually, moving anything forward-- my definition of "forward" being, "northward"-- from this point on, was, and proved to be a blunder. I agree completely. I do. My issue with George Custer-- as I alluded to above-- lies more with his tactical plans than his decision to employ those plans. When taken under normal circumstances these plans were quite sound. That always goes back to the "division of force," the "division of command." To me, that was not unsound tactics. Custer's problem-- and this is where you mis-read me and where we actually do agree-- is that he assumed entirely too much risk, not being flexible enough to assess the threat properly-- for whatever reason. While his plans were sound in general, they were not sound for this situation because of the numbers of warriors and their intentions to stand and fight. Your assessment of Custer's assumption of too much risk is spot-on. I agree. Moving beyond MTC was a serious blunder and caused the defeat of the regiment. Custer's problem was interesting and we can speculate of whether or not he realized it. When he was at Ford B, did he realize what was happening or did he assume the exodus he was witnessing was the breakup of the village, not only physically, but emotionally? The latter never occurred, and that was what killed Custer. Have I elucidated this properly? Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 4, 2011 8:56:15 GMT -6
Fred, you are probably at work now, so you will catch this later, about the program on the Discovery channel I seen on Saturday Night, when it said about not finding many shell cases were Custer's body was found, surely they have not took into account the hundreds of souvenir hunters who have raped the area over the years, there might have been a lot more found if it would have been excavated earlier. Regards and don't work too hard, Ian.
|
|
|
Post by fred on Jul 4, 2011 9:03:40 GMT -6
Ian,
Today is a big holiday here... our Independence Day, the day we declared ourselves rid of the oppression of the English yoke. That is a joke, my friend!, but it is a big holiday for us Yanks.
When the archaeologists excavated the field and wrote several books about it, they considered that "picking over" in their estimates and conclusions. The only allowances they made were in estimating that an equal amount of picking over occurred in each location, thereby diminishing the total, but not the proportion. I would believe that has to be standard practice in all such sites.
Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 4, 2011 9:33:26 GMT -6
Happy Independence Fred and to the rest of you folks over there (King George was an ass any way, only you could get rid of him, we were stuck AH AH), one question you might know the answer to. the two riders sent out by Reno to Custer, would they have stayed with the HQ or would they have joined up with one of the Companies. Regards Ian.
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 4, 2011 9:53:46 GMT -6
Hi Fred, just me again, I ask the question above because I have this for the HQ, Co Lieutenant G Custer Lieutenant (Adjutant) W Cook 1st Lieutenant (Assistant Surgeon) Dr E Lord Mr. M Kellogg (Civilian) Autie Reed (Civilian) Sgt Major M Sharrow (H.Q. Staff) Sgt M Hughes (K Coy, Transferred to Custer as standard-bearer) Chief Bugler Sgt H Voss (H.Q. Staff) Corporal J Callahan (Orderly to Dr Lord, transferred From K Coy) Bugler H Dose (transferred from G Coy, Custer’s orderly) Boston Custer (Quarter master scout, came forward from pack train) M Boyer (Quarter master scout) So that makes a total of 12, now if those two Messengers stayed with the HQ it would total 14. Sorry to interrupt your celebrations. Regards Ian.
|
|
|
Post by fred on Jul 4, 2011 10:41:06 GMT -6
Co Lieutenant G Custer Lieutenant (Adjutant) W Cook 1st Lieutenant (Assistant Surgeon) Dr E Lord Mr. M Kellogg (Civilian) Autie Reed (Civilian) Sgt Major M Sharrow (H.Q. Staff) Sgt M Hughes (K Coy, Transferred to Custer as standard-bearer) Chief Bugler Sgt H Voss (H.Q. Staff) Corporal J Callahan (Orderly to Dr Lord, transferred From K Coy) Bugler H Dose (transferred from G Coy, Custer’s orderly) Boston Custer (Quarter master scout, came forward from pack train) M Boyer (Quarter master scout) So that makes a total of 12, now if those two Messengers stayed with the HQ it would total 14. Ian, You are not interrupting anything. McIlhargey and Mitchell were the two I Company messengers sent by Reno. While their bodies were identified on Last Stand Hill, for simplicity sake, I carry them as casualties of I Company and therefore include them in the I Company rosters. HQ consisted of Custer, Cooke, and Lord... and even though Tom Custer was with his brother it is still more simple to keep him with the C Company personnel for casualty counts... similar to what I have done with McIlhargey and Mitchell. The enlisted personnel with HQ were Sharrow, Voss, Callahan, Hughes, and Dose... five, total. Add to that the four civilians... Autie Reed, Boston Custer, Mitch Boyer, and Marc Kellogg, and you have the full HQ contingent. You can tinker with it as much as you want and change it to your better liking by including the two Reno orderlies and even TWC. I have simply chosen not to. So, yes, 14 is the number with those two. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by shan on Jul 4, 2011 10:54:09 GMT -6
Fred,
the notch in your photo; are you saying that men with experience of this type of landscape would know that that indicated that there must be a ford below it? Or, that you could actually see riders moving around in that area?
With regards to your other assertion that the Indians may have been using Deep Ravine for some 6 minutes before Custer arrived on Cemetery Ridge, if we then add on your estimate of Yates not being in position in the Basin for a further 20--25 minutes, we then have the Indians using this as an unhindered highway for the best part of 30 minutes. This in turn begs the question, was this Crazy horse and his group cutting the ridge and coming down on Keogh like wolves from the hills? If so, then Keogh was already in deep trouble fighting on two fronts, and one would have thought the smoke, dust and noise would have alerted Custer to this.
If it wasn't Crazy horse and his followers---and I'm not altogether persuaded that he actually used Deep ravine ford---then one would presume that those Indians who were in the ravine would have had a nice skyline target up on Cemetery ridge to lie down and practice their bad marksmanship on. Even bad shots can be annoying; besides you run the risk that some of them are going to get lucky sooner or later, the type of situation one assumes, that Custer wouldn't have been very happy with.
On a separate matter, I've posted this several times on both boards, but people seem to want to go with the more romantic Hollywood version of what a man with the type of wounds Custer had had, would still mange to get up to before gloriously fading away to the sound of swelling music.
I have a long time friend who works for several West coast police departments, but mainly for the Seattle police department, as a Pathologist. Thus, every day he has to examine, and assess a least three or four people who died from fatal gunshot wounds; has done for the last twenty years. Knowing my interest in the subject we naturally talk about it whenever he comes over, and having read and re-read what evidence there is for Custers wounds, in his professional opinion, Custer wouldn't have survived either wound for more than 10 minutes, and that he feels, is being very generous.
If one thinks about this for a moment, if true---and why would he lie-- those around Custer being army men, many of whom had fought in the civil war and had witnessed a great deal of death and dying, would have known immediately what they were looking at. This surely would have influenced their thinking. Ten minutes isn't very long, and had this happened down at ford B, most of them would have realised that he was dead by the time they picked him up and managed to get him back on a horse. And remember, all this while being under fire. In that case, why would they keep on going North?
Personally I'm of the opinion that he was hit sometime between ford D and Cemetery ridge, but I have no evidence, and I know that hunches will get me nowhere.
best wishes Shan
|
|
|
Post by shan on Jul 4, 2011 10:56:11 GMT -6
Whoops,
keeps happening, how long is too long to write out a post?
shan
|
|
|
Post by fred on Jul 4, 2011 12:21:45 GMT -6
... the notch in your photo; are you saying that men with experience of this type of landscape would know that that indicated that there must be a ford below it? Or, that you could actually see riders moving around in that area? Shan... certainly the latter. Remember, this photo was taken much farther up the ridge than I believe those men were. I guess I am going to have to scrounge around for a better one-- if I have one. That is correct. My estimates are that Crazy Horse was the first-- or close to the first-- to cross there and mount the ravine. It is that movement that led to the Keogh Sector debacle, too late for Custer or Yates to interfere, but quite possibly the first serious indication to both of those officers that things were becoming untenable. To my way of thinking, that was a thunderbolt to them. Yep. Yep. The only question remaining was, How serious was Keogh's problem. Remember this very well, Shan, and others: based on testimonies from the troopers downstream and from Indian narratives-- as well as the archaeological evidence-- most of the damage was done not by guns and firing, but by bows and arrows and war clubs. If the fighting became close-in-- and we know it did-- carbines were no longer of use and pistols had to be the troops' primary weapon. Indians used war clubs. The lack of gunfire may have given Custer and Yates a different impression of what was going on, despite the dust. I believe it wasn't until men started coming toward LSH from that area, that Custer realized the extent of the damage to Keogh. Best guesses are only 20 men survived the C, I, and L carnage, and were able to reach LS Hill. Yep. That was part of the problem. That, and Indians crossing Deep Ravine ford and realizing Custer was there, and moving into that flats area you see to the right in the photo. Add some fairly mad Indians having tailed Custer from Ford D and closing off any retreat to the north; possibly Wolf Tooth or Big Foot now ensconced either on or just to the east of LSH, and you have the makings of a dilemma. The Wolf Tooth/Big Foot thing is interesting, because he/they are specifically mentioned, and as Custer moved up toward LSH, any Indians there would be moving off and onto the eastern ridge. I agree. That and the fact many people have this historically-driven vision of him, and you have this vehement opposition to Richard Fox' claim that there was no "last stand," per se. Others have said the same thing and while I discount the claims of writers and historians as being no more knowledgeable about that subject than I am, if I am not mistaken Doctor Porter claimed the same thing. Or someone who knew the extent of the wounds said the same thing. In Vietnam, I had a young man shot in roughly the same place as Custer's chest wound. It struck me as so the moment I read of Custer's wounds. This young fellow was incapacitated almost immediately, stumbling out of the cab of his truck, getting to the rear, and then collapsing behind it. It took us 15 or 20 minutes to call in the med-evac (dust-off, we called it), and he died five minutes after we loaded him aboard. Impossible to say the wounds were identical, but the entry points were quite similar-- it turns out to be a lung-shot in that vicinity. I agree with this completely. That is my whole point about Custer being shot there. Besides, I do not believe Custer was closer than 100 yards from the ford and those drawing the fire of the Indians were the E Company men arrayed along the river's edge. Best wishes, Fred. PS-- By the way, Shan, when you run into that posting problem, you usually get a white screen telling you that you have timed-out or some such nonsense. Just hit the back arrow and re-post. That will dupe your post, but go into the thread and delete the first of the two identical posts. FCW PPS-- It just happened to me twice and I had to delete two posts. Pro-Boards is the pits! FCW
|
|
|
Post by shan on Jul 4, 2011 13:49:59 GMT -6
general query,
when I came on sight and clicked the last 30? or is it 25 posts, there was no sign of my last post to which Fred was replying. But, when I logged in, and then clicked the Topic, which in this case is Re-Uniting there it is.
makes one a little nervous of taking to long to reply, or indeed, having much too much to say.
Shan
|
|
|
Post by wild on Jul 4, 2011 14:40:16 GMT -6
Although disagreeing with Fred I have to grant him this.If Custer was in control and on the offensive his forray in search of ford D is the only "offensive"option available to him.And the manner in which he carried it out would deliver the required carnage. Fred's scenario requires Custer to totally misread the situation. As our friend Montrose might state it in his glorious clinical prose. To design a creditable offensive action [beyond MTC]such that it ends in disaster. Dan confesses to stuborness.It's stuborn's big ugly sister "cynical" who has me in her grasp.
A very pleasant 4th to all my American friends.
|
|
|
Post by wild on Jul 4, 2011 15:24:10 GMT -6
Moving beyond MTC was a serious blunder and caused the defeat of the regiment Moving up the right bank was the blunder. To do a uturn is to admitt that he has blundered.Moral will drop like a lead balloon if the battalion must retrace its steps.If he meets Reno will it be a Maxwell Smart like Sorry about that Chief? If he retreats he can snatch humilitation from the jaws of annihilation. Custer was indeed wounded at MTC but it may not have been physical.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Jul 4, 2011 16:04:49 GMT -6
Fred wrote, "1,500" is an over-statement, in my opinion; 900 to 1,000 is more like it. And yes, that was part of the problem. Custer no longer cared about Reno. It is my opinion that once committed, Reno was to be on his own, fending for himself.
Let me explain myself.
Custer expected that the Indians would focus on Reno, giving him free rein east of the river. Custer's estimate of Indian strength on 24 Jun 76 was 1500. I believe intelligence received from scouts and his own observations indicated a force larger than 1,500.
Your reference to 900-1000 refers to the Indian force that actually defeated Reno's advance guard. I am making a point on what Custer assumed the Indians would do.
If the 600 plus warriors still in the village went east, then the whole ford D excursion becomes an act of madness.
This leads to Indian capabilities. Many posters have stated as "fact" that the Indians were incapable of reacting to two threats at once. This is nonsense. Indians were very capable of executing what we now call swarm tactics. Their decentralized command structure allowed them a very rapid response to diverse threats.
The weakness of their system was achieving mass and unity of effort. Small unit leaders reacted to what they saw in their local area, not big picture. (Remarkably like LTC Custer throughout his career).
The Plains Indians were experts at decentralized operations on multiple targets, which is why they gave the US Army so many problems in their raiding strategy.
Bottom line. Custer expected Indians to remain focused on Reno. As Custer continued to delay taking action, this created a high threat environment for Reno. Yet there were many indicators that Reno was in trouble, and that Indians were responding to CUster's force and maneuvers.
|
|