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Post by Dark Cloud on Jul 2, 2011 11:17:22 GMT -6
Seems to me Crab is correct: these sweeping assertions of "must have's" leave people defending the implausible because they've nailed it to their theory.
Custer could NOT have attacked at MTC ford because of the lack of bodies to support it. Ok. Custer MUST HAVE attacked at this notional Ford D because of the ....... lack of bodies to support it.
But that still obscures the main point: an empty village is just as valuable as one defended to the teeth. They'd still have to spend the entire summer replacing stuff to be ready for winter, which they would have to split up to accomplish.
Once inside the village the panicking civvies work WITH the Army and against the defense. The momentum of proactive shock carries a ways.
But I still claim that it was not a proactive gesture by the 7th that brought them where it did to the East; and that Custer wasn't waiting; and even if he were waiting, he would not choose such dangerous land far from target, far from help. I also doubt that anyone thought once stopped for a 'temporary' defensive battle, the mounts and men that survive would swiftly become offensive again.
Once stopped under fire in the open, cavalry is toast.
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Post by fred on Jul 2, 2011 13:02:56 GMT -6
Custer attacked at neither ford... and I agree with Crab, as well: a village is an important thing and a viable objective. Only in this case it wasn't. Tactically, it was too big; second, too many Indians were running from it and no one knew where or when they would stop. Indians had lost villages before and survived... and under much more "seasonal" duress than a warm summer's day. Reynolds' Powder River foray on March 17 is a case in point. Indians would have abandoned their possessions for safety, just as any of us would do the same. When they left the LBH area, the place was littered from one end to the other with valuable and useful possessions. Objects have less relevance to a nomadic people who wind up making everything themselves.
So while I do agree that an empty village can be a viable objective, this was not an example of one. The people fleeing were fleeing to protect families, not tepees. And if Custer struck across Ford B, he risked his flanks unless he made a turn. If he made a turn, he risked his rear. It is not a sound tactical principle and if you were on the ground, you would feel the same way. An attack like that defies the law of "simplicity," because it offers too many choices, and each one fraught with uncertainty and danger.
Plus, again, attacking tepees in the (upper) middle of the camp, was not the objective of the campaign, nor would it have led to the objective of the campaign. The tepees had been abandoned already.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Jul 2, 2011 13:54:45 GMT -6
God forgive me but I agree with his eminence,The village was everything both materially and symbolically.What a grand prize to present to Terry, and the tribes would come scurrying back to the reservations after the first wet night. The aguement as to open flanks preventing an attack on the village is somewhat weakened by having Custer indulge in an equally unsound maneuver involving the further dispersal of his command. "Custer is under no pressure"Possibly, but he was in great danger.Is it being suggested that Custer did not recognise the danger?A massive village,maybe a couple o thusand warriors chopping up one of his battalions and Custer takes himself off to look for a ford?For how long would this recce take?If it takes him 15 minutes to find a crossing it will take him 15 minutes to return.He's drawing 30 minutes from the time bank.A time bank in which he has nothing deposited. Nothing that is suggested for Custer beyond MTC is militarily sound. So we have a choice a stupid Custer or a bleeding Custer.A choice between a possibility and a probability.
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Post by fred on Jul 2, 2011 14:19:15 GMT -6
God forgive me but I agree with his eminence,The village was everything both materially and symbolically.What a grand prize to present to Terry... Again, I do not disagree with this, but it is hindsight and does not fit within the context of the campaign. Tepees were not the objective and the conditions during the ongoing event when Custer arrived at Ford B were not conducive to any such tepee-gathering operation. I also tend to doubt Terry would have been overly pleased, although I don't believe he was as blood-thirsty as some others. The whole idea of this thing was to ensure the winter roamers were cooked as a way of living. Stealing their tents wasn't going to do it. The Cheyenne who were active on the Powder River when Reynolds burnt their tepees were just as active at the LBH. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 2, 2011 15:26:44 GMT -6
There is only one way I know for a little guy (Custer) to go against a big guy (the hostiles) and win. You must muster every bit of power at your disposal and hit him with a devestating blow in the vitals. When he goes down, you kick him and kick him until he does not get up. If he manages somehow to crawl away, repeat steps one and two. You must always be careful in this process not to loose your concentration and get in too close where he can reach out for you and hug you. If he does the best you can hope for is a draw.
Custer was tinkering around the edges. He was being too cute. It was a simple tactical problem to one schooled, as I presume him to be, in the value of shock effect. He was doing a waltz in a situation that called for something completely different.
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Post by fred on Jul 2, 2011 15:51:02 GMT -6
I agree with you, wholeheartedly.
That is why I believe Custer was so consumed with speed. He used speed to buy him time... a good policy. Reno bought him time. The lack of opposition and the amount of time it took the Indians to muster their forces bought him time. This is why he was able to divide his five-company command and leave Keogh on the southern edges of those ridges and hills. Keogh, dealing with any Indians crossing at MTC ford, would buy him time. And he didn't walk to Ford D; he ran. He would be hoping Benteen would be not far behind (remember the note: "come quick"). Linking up the eight companies, he could attack across Ford D, right in the midst of the refugees. Can you imagine the havoc that would have wrought?
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 2, 2011 15:59:20 GMT -6
Fred: In this particular instance you and I are dancing on a entirely different piece of hardwood. I was thinking the south, you are talking north. As long as you hit him to the point he can't get up it matters little though.
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Post by fred on Jul 2, 2011 17:11:22 GMT -6
I was thinking the south, you are talking north. As long as you hit him to the point he can't get up it matters little though. Queeny, By "south," do you mean Reno? If so, I agree with you. If you mean Ford B, then no, it doesn't work for me... for the reasons I have explained. Somebody... maybe it was you... mentioned not too long along, something I have been preaching for years... (and this is not my idea, I first read it in a superb book titled, Eisenhower's Lieutenants by Russell F. Weigley, a late professor at Temple University in Philadelphia; brilliant historian) that American tactics are nothing but the continuation of those developed and designed by U. S. Grant during the Civil War, namely tactics of attrition. Even Bill DePuy subscribed to this methodology, though he took it to new levels and refined its basics so they could apply to more modern warfare. If you study the breakout battles from June 6, 1944, onward, you will see exactly how these ideas morphed into our plans. (The Germans did things differently, but that is irrelevant here.) A similar idea could very well have worked at the LBH, but only if the element of surprise had been complete... and it was not. It would have been even better had it occurred coming out of the western foothills, but that didn't happen either. An attack from there could have been across a broad front-- much more broad than what Reno faced-- and it would have pinned the Indians against the river. In addition, an attack of that nature could have had two unforeseen allies: it would have deprived the Indians of their mobility (something Custer lost) and it could have driven the pony herds into the village, almost acting like a German Schwerpunkt (did I spell that right?), "armor" piercing the enemy's front. Even a concentrated attack at the village's upper end may have worked providing the element of surprise was there; but it wasn't, and Custer's plans went awry because of it. To my way of thinking-- and it would be interesting to get "montrose's" opinion here-- Custer was almost forced to do what he did. Surprise would have precluded flight... at least en masse flight... and of course it would have blunted any resistance, something I think Custer still tried to do by circling to the north. The problem with a "broad front" attack on the village's upper end is that it would have dissipated much of its momentum because of the narrowness of the village... sort of like attacking a battleship's bow. That is also why I believe Custer sent Reno out first-- a perfect-sized force-- with a plan to follow-up in a second wave. Reno's attack would have created havoc in a surprise village, driving warriors into the open toward the foothills and their horses. Those unmounted warriors would have been mincemeat for a wider-fronted cavalry command barreling full-bore down the valley. Think of it. This also goes back to a comment I made many moons ago, and that is that Custer's plan on the 25th must be considered, not by itself, but in light of his overall orders from Terry and whether or not he violated the intent-- not the caveat, the intent-- of those orders. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Jul 2, 2011 18:09:57 GMT -6
There is only one way I know for a little guy (Custer) to go against a big guy (the hostiles) and win. You must muster every bit of power at your disposal and hit him with a devestating blow in the vitals. Right on Cathal.There was no reason why Custer could not have attacked with 12 troops over the same ground as Reno's aborted attack.
Fred and confederates Reno bought him time. The price was 130 men.Could he afford that?
the amount of time it took the Indians to muster their forces bought him time Because of his initial mistake of an uncordinated right flanking movement he allowed the Indians to muster.A fatal error. His attempt to recover the situation by a process which further splits his command is his third division and a division too many.
Linking up the eight companies, he could attack across Ford D For this he needs 2 things.A ford and Benteen.Without either of them he is snookered.Can he make the situation more fraught.Sure he can,he splits his command one more time,one unit to look for the ford the other to await Benteen.But the clock is ticking and the Indians arrive before Benteen and while the command is split. If this is what happened the man took out no insurance.Everything was in the air.Reno is getting the chop unsupported,Benteen in transit is not clear about his orders.Custer is looking for a ford and Keogh is waiting. It is not kinder to have our hero hors de combat rather than have him committ every sin in the book?
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Post by quincannon on Jul 2, 2011 18:11:06 GMT -6
Fred: Yes I mentioned it but I think others did as well.
South: On an axis southwest to northeast into the area on a direct line to the western side of MTC Ford with three full battalions (four companies) in right echelon about one to two minutes apart. It would take a good recon, fairly quick planning cycle, and violent execution, and I think it would work. Pin them against the river and thump them and if need be withdraw due west.
Surprise, a soldiers best friend sometimes is patience. Do the recon on Sunday afternoon basing yourself in the vacinity of No Name Creek, about where Benteen started to march back and rejoin the 7th. Move at night over the hills to that middle ground between Nest - Sand and Shavings Creeks. To throw some crap in the game wait until two hours after dawn, after their little tummies are full, when they will not expect an attack if it did not come at dawn. STRIKE
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Post by fred on Jul 2, 2011 21:33:09 GMT -6
Hi, back to an earlier point, if Custer falls back in good order an meets up with the remains of Keogh's wing, they must have defended an area together on the Custer Battle field, reports about Troopers, some on horse back and some on foot attempted something, weather it was just a mad panic flee for your life sort of mission or it was a push the hostiles back and get some riders out to Benteen mission, this area of resistance by the remains of Custer's Battalion, now was it South Skirmish line spreading around to the west of Custer Ridge? Ian, Let me try to address some of this before I fall on my face in exhaustion. Let's put on our thinking caps and try to reason this through. I believe Custer went to Ford D, ostensibly to determine where the Indians were going and where had they reached. He also needed to find a crossing ford and many times that could be found where a creek entered the main stream. So let's say he found his ford and at the same time determined where the Indian refugees were gathering. Since he now has fewer than 90 men, he needs to turn, head back to some high ground, and wait a few minutes for Keogh and Benteen... and if Custer has calculated correctly, Benteen should be reaching Keogh-- seeing him on high ground-- shortly. So Custer turns and heads back, along the river, and begins to mount a higher ridgeline we call Cemetery Ridge today. All of this make sense so far? He reaches Cemetery Ridge and spreads his command into something akin to a mounted skirmish line. Off to his south he spots a another ford and watches as mounted warriors begin pouring across and disappearing into a wide, vast, and deep ravine. He follows the ravine (with his eyes) and sees that it headcuts well east and south of where he is sitting. There is a shallow basin area near this headcut, so he orders Yates and F Company to head to that basin area and cut off the flow of Indians heading toward the ridgeline above. After all, if enough Indians mount that ridge, they will threaten the advance of Keogh and Benteen for that is the route they would be taking. There is, by the way, several Indian accounts that allude to this whole thing so far. [Shudder, shudder!... but it is all we have and so far, at least, this makes sense... it is not unreasonable.] At some time in here, pressure begins to mount because Indians who had tailed Custer from Ford D are beginning to harass him from the north and east and Indians who spotted him while they were crossing at Deep Ravine ford are now moving into the flats to Custer's south. Some narratives claim the "suicide boys" now attacked and either overran Custer meager command or forced him, through sheer dint of numbers, up the ridgeline toward LSH. Since the modern day visitors' center and parking lot-- not to mention the graveyard-- have been built on this ridge, we have absolutely no clue what transpired there. I tend to doubt the stories of Custer being "overrun" on Cemetery Ridge, but who knows? In the meantime, Yates is unable to stem the tide of Indians coming out of the ravine and is himself coming under severe pressure. He sees Custer's burgeoning plight and heads up to the high ground to re-join his boss. Now... figure this. Is any of this unreasonable? I do not think so, and its timing works very well. In addition, we have some indication of its veracity through some narratives... more than one. Also... it was determined by the rest of the Seventh Cavalry that about 28 men from E Company died in or near Deep Ravine. Think about that. What are the chances of 28 men from one company all being found in one location. Sounds like a planned move to me, right? But E Company had 38 men, not 28, and since the only other E Company body identified was LT Smith and he was found on LSH, where are those other 10? My guess is that they were buried on Cemetery Ridge, then re-interred with the rest when the monument was erected. That should keep you busy for a while, don't you think? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Diane Merkel on Jul 2, 2011 23:29:32 GMT -6
. . . I first read it in a superb book titled, Eisenhower's Lieutenants by Russell F. Weigley, a late professor at Temple University in Philadelphia; brilliant historian) . . . . Fred, Excuse this interruption, but I want to thank you for mentioning Prof. Weigley in such a complimentary manner. Chuck took classes from him many moons ago and would echo your assessment. We still hear from Mrs. Weigley each Christmas. Diane
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Post by wild on Jul 3, 2011 1:12:15 GMT -6
The scenario suggested by Fred is one of high risk.The Indians are closer and faster than Benteen.Custer's line of communication to Benteen is 5 miles long [?]and totally exposed,flanking as it does the entire village.Could Keogh hold it open? If Fred is correct then Custer is motivated by desperation and his own agenda.A commander with less of a personal stake depending on the outcome could have with no loss of face retreated,fallen back on his reserves and have won a draw.
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Post by shan on Jul 3, 2011 2:58:28 GMT -6
Fred,
as always good sound, well argued posts, ahh me, if only I been blessed with the logical gene rather than the wishy washy dreaming one.
One question though. I've been to the battlefield and walked a good part of it, but I wonder could Custer have really seen the ford at Deep ravine from Cemetery ridge? My memory of that area is that the river runs well below some fairly high bluffs in which case I would have thought the ford itself would be out of sight.
One other point, whilst he would have been aware of the long slash in the ground which was made by Deep ravine, the Indians passing up the lower portion would surely have been out of sight, although I'll conceded that if they were mounted he may well have seen their dust. By the way I've always had a problem working out how mounted warriors would have managed to exit such a deep, sheer ravine, especially if: as you surmise, F company was waiting for them at the Basin end.
With regards to what opposition Custer was facing at this point, if I remember rightly there is some kind of hint in Cheyenne memories that Wolf Tooth and his group, having followed Custers move Northish movement at a respectful distance, fired at them as they moved off towards ford D, and that he and others then fired down at him from behind LSH when they returned to Cemetery Ridge. Like much Indian testimony it's hard to pin down exactly where this may have happened as no landscape features are mentioned, so, it's just possible that this is actually happening back at Luce. But; and I hope DC will accept that this is a big BUT! If we conjecture that this was happening up at LSH end of the ridge, was this A. irritating enough for Custer to have sent part of E company up to deal with the problem and B. as I've read elsewhere, was it in the course of this movement that the so called suicide boys crashed through these men and drove off their horses?
If so, would this have caused Yates and F troop to abandon their mission in the Basin and go to their aid, and if not, why would Yate's take it on himself to abandon the mission he'd been given? Surely Indians struggling to exit Deep ravine could have been fairly easily contained by men stationed at it's head delivering fire down into it?
Ahh, questions questions, however, Fred I think you've come as near to unravelling many of these issues as anyone else at the moment. That said, whether we will see it or not, the next bunch of puzzled, nerdy fanatisists; many of whom haven't even left school yet, are waiting in the wings pick up the baton and probably toss all our achaic ideas into the rubbish bin, and if that seems improbable, we only have to think back to how many people thought Kuhlman's legend into history had cracked the mystery once and for all.
best wishes Shan
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Post by shan on Jul 3, 2011 2:59:21 GMT -6
Fred,
as always good sound, well argued posts, ahh me, if only I been blessed with the logical gene rather than the wishy washy dreaming one.
One question though. I've been to the battlefield and walked a good part of it, but I wonder could Custer have really seen the ford at Deep ravine from Cemetery ridge? My memory of that area is that the river runs well below some fairly high bluffs in which case I would have thought the ford itself would be out of sight.
One other point, whilst he would have been aware of the long slash in the ground which was made by Deep ravine, the Indians passing up the lower portion would surely have been out of sight, although I'll conceded that if they were mounted he may well have seen their dust. By the way I've always had a problem working out how mounted warriors would have managed to exit such a deep, sheer ravine, especially if: as you surmise, F company was waiting for them at the Basin end.
With regards to what opposition Custer was facing at this point, if I remember rightly there is some kind of hint in Cheyenne memories that Wolf Tooth and his group, having followed Custers move Northish movement at a respectful distance, fired at them as they moved off towards ford D, and that he and others then fired down at him from behind LSH when they returned to Cemetery Ridge. Like much Indian testimony it's hard to pin down exactly where this may have happened as no landscape features are mentioned, so, it's just possible that this is actually happening back at Luce. But; and I hope DC will accept that this is a big BUT! If we conjecture that this was happening up at LSH end of the ridge, was this A. irritating enough for Custer to have sent part of E company up to deal with the problem and B. as I've read elsewhere, was it in the course of this movement that the so called suicide boys crashed through these men and drove off their horses?
If so, would this have caused Yates and F troop to abandon their mission in the Basin and go to their aid, and if not, why would Yate's take it on himself to abandon the mission he'd been given? Surely Indians struggling to exit Deep ravine could have been fairly easily contained by men stationed at it's head delivering fire down into it?
Ahh, questions questions, however, Fred I think you've come as near to unravelling many of these issues as anyone else at the moment. That said, whether we will see it or not, the next bunch of puzzled, nerdy fanatisists; many of whom haven't even left school yet, are waiting in the wings pick up the baton and probably toss all our achaic ideas into the rubbish bin, and if that seems improbable, we only have to think back to how many people thought Kuhlman's legend into history had cracked the mystery once and for all.
best wishes Shan
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