1) Here is how I see it. If the trail were to cross over to the LBH as Terry guessed could only mean that he thought they were closer to the mouth of the LBH than to the Bighorn Mountains in Wyoming. 2) If not why not send Custer up the Tongue and Terry could cross over to the LBH on Reno Creek. There would be no need to explore Tullocks since it is north and east of the Rosebud.
3) The distance that Custer would have to travel to the headwaters of the Tongue is 60 miles in a straight line from his crossing over to LBH which he could not travel and I believe it would be closer to 80 miles than to the 60 miles of a straight line. From the headwaters of the Tongue to the LBH is around 10 miles.
4) So Custer if he followed the orders would have traveled 80 to 90 miles to be on the LBH at its headwaters. He would have traveled south and east of the Rosebud battlefield. He would travel close to Sheridan Wyoming and on into the Bighorns.
5) Since Gibbons is only to travel as far as the junction of the LBH and the BH, I would guess he thought the Indians were somewhat closer to his position than than the 50 miles it would be from the junction where Gibbon was to stop at.
6) So back to Wiggs' 40 miles further up the from where the village was actually located which is 50 miles from the junction of LBH and BH. 40 miles up the LBH from the village is either close to the headwaters in the Bighorn mountains or past it.
7) If Custer was to meet Terry at the junction of LBH and BH he would have traveled close to 140 miles from the Busby location on the Rosebud.
8) "
The supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks if the river is navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon,
desires you to report to him there no later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the meantime you receive further orders."
I may be wrong but its how I view it now. Both Gibbon and the steamer if it could make it would be at the junction of the forks with Terry.
Regards
AZ Ranger
Steve, thanks for the very helpful summary of your views on this matter. It makes it so much easier to discuss than a scattergun series of points and counterpoints.
In my opinion it is imprudent to rely solely on the wording of Terry's letter to Custer as a basis for reaching any conclusion. There are a few pre-battle documents written by others that I will refer to later but there was also Terry's dispatch of June 21st to Sheridan in which he states that Custer is meant to enter the LBH valley from the south, "Custer will go up the Rosebud tomorrow with his whole regiment and thence to the headwaters of the Little Horn, thence down the Little Horn." In addition, there was a 2 hour conference on June 20th involving Terry, Custer, Reno and Bouyer, then the much longer conference of June 21st lasting from about 1300 hours until after dark. Clearly all details, both large and small, were covered at these conferences.
I think too, that it is necessary to try and understand what information Terry was working from pre-battle, information untainted by any subsequent distortions. Taking events in sequence, at the
Far West conference on June 20th Hughes tells us that Terry formulated his plan of campaign. Bouyer would have told him where the large game herds were likely to be at that time of year and where therefore, the Indians were also likely to be. The favourite hunting grounds were considered to be near the headwaters of the Tongue, the Rosebud, the LBH or the Rotten Grass, with the upper LBH the best guess as surmised by Gibbon in his June 19th note to Terry, "I presume the only chance of finding Indians now is in the direction of the Rosebud or Little Big Horn."
Terry planned accordingly but without the ability to be specific. His uncertainty is shown in his dispatch to Sheridan and in his letter to Custer. To Sheridan he says, "...Gibbon's column will move...for the mouth of the Big Horn, where it will be ferried across...and whence it will proceed to the mouth of the Little Horn,
and so on." He adds, "...I only
hope that one of the two columns
will find the Indians." To Custer, after giving his ideas on how he would like matters to proceed, he says of the Montana column, "...it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course,
its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise,..."In both cases then he is saying that once at the BH/LBH junction, what happens to Gibbon's command cannot be specified. "And so on" and "controlled by circumstances as they arise" make that clear, yet his wording tells us that "future movements" are possible. Those movements will depend on fresh intelligence, especially the direction taken by the Indians and where they are ultimately located. That being said, how do the actions of Custer impact on Gibbon? Though unspecified in the written record, there is no doubt such matters would have been discussed at the conferences. For example, in his orders for the Reno scout Terry makes no mention of locating either Indians or some signs of them, yet that was the main purpose of Reno's mission. It follows then that although not mentioned in the letter to Custer, it is required that whatever direction the Indians had taken and their exact location must be relayed to the other command by whichever column finds them first.
Custer was expected to find them first but it was by no means a certainty. In the event that he did, the wording in Terry's letter can only be confirmation of what had been communicated to his subordinates at the two conferences:-
"Should it be found (as it appears
almost certain it will be found) to turn toward the Little Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward,
perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn etc." This confirm that the LBH to the west was the best guess but also that the trail could split or diverge to the south or south east. Custer would need to send a messenger through to Terry if that happened but it would signify the end of Gibbon's involvement. This was the weakness of Terry's plan. It did not, indeed could not, cover every eventually as Gibbon was unable to move far from the BH/LBH forks and his base of supply,
the Far West. Terry had placed all his eggs in the basket that was the LBH. To some extent, he got lucky.
Expecting the Indians to be closer to the LBH headwaters than the forks, Terry's suggestion that even if the trail was found to turn toward the LBH valley, Custer should still proceed south shows us two things. Firstly, his dispatch to Sheridan sent before the
Far West conference of the same day is a clear indication of what he had discussed with Custer the previous day. Secondly, on the basis that the Indians were up river near to the LBH headwaters, then by not going west into the LBH valley from the Rosebud, Custer would not be north of them and thus between them and Gibbon, allowing them an escape route south even though Terry believed Crook was there. Custer's approach from the south and with the expectation that the Indians would flee and scatter when he appeared would allow him to destroy property, capture horses and send the non-combatants toward the waiting Gibbon. All this would force the warriors to go to the reservations after their familes and the mission would be accomplished.
In the event, when the Indians entered the LBH valley their scouts had sighted game herds to the north so they turned in that direction. When Custer also moved there, he was nevertheless south of them as required. That the Indians located their village where it was found was used by Hughes as evidence that Terry knew all along that it would be there but what he wrote to Sheridan and to Custer shows that to be untrue. Post battle CYA postures have muddied the waters, but the dearth of pre-battle up to date intelligence says otherwise.
My responses to your specific points are:-
1) Terry did not send Custer 'up the Tongue' as such. There was a possibility that an Indian trail could diverge in that direction but in any case, as I understand it, by marching south from the Rosebud he would pass by the Tongue headwaters before he turned west to reach the LBH headwaters.
2) There was therefore no need for Terry to cross over to the LBH on Reno Creek. The need, or rather the precaution to 'explore' Tullock's would remain, as there was some small concern that the Indians might have moved in that direction. Personally I attach no great importance to Tullock's Creek especially as only 'detachment' from Gibbon's command would check its lower reaches.
3) According to Gibbon, Terry had a pretty accurate idea of all the distances involved so it is hardly likely that he expected Custer to make the journey you lay out as I hope to clarify.
4) Custer's letter says, "...perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn..." which takes into consideration the understanding that the Indian trail or a large part of it could veer south or east. Nevertheless the best guess remained 'somewhere on the LBH' to quote Gibbon's article and the mileage you give means that if Custer was obliged to follow the Indians that far, the Montana Column was out of the equation.
5) The role of Gibbon's command at the BH/LBH forks was as a blocking force as already demonstrated. This is endorsed by three different reports. Firstly in Kellogg's June 21st
NY Herald dispatch referring to Gibbon, "This part of the command marches up the Big Horn valley to intercept the Indians if they should attempt to escape from General Custer down that avenue." Secondly Brisbin in his June 28th dispatch to the same newspaper, "It was believed that the Indians were on the head of the Rosebud, or over on the Little Big Horn, a divide of about fifteen miles separating the two streams" and "The Montana column felt disappointed when they learned that they were not to be present at the final capture of the great village." Finally, Terry's Adjutant Captain E.W. Smith in his July 1st dispatch, "At the same time, General Terry, with Colonel Gibbon's command...started to ascend the Big Horn, aiming to assail the enemy in the rear." So Gibbon did not have to move toward the Indians because they would be coming to him.
6) The LBH is 90 miles long from its source to its junction with the Big Horn. There roughly 10 miles of it located in the Big Horn Mountains leaving 80 miles availlable to the Indians for camping purposes. Assuming that they would not camp close to the mountains let us say they had 60-70 miles to play with. As they actually camped 15 miles from the forks, there were still 45-55 miles between that location and where they could have sited the village so the 40 mile figure is feasible. I would however, like to know the source for it.
7) As already outlined, it is my contention that Custer was not meant to make the enormous circle that you describe. He would only need to deviate to the Tongue if the trail went that way in which case the whole plan was scuppered. If all went well he would cause the Indians to flee toward Gibbon and the two commands would meet up when the 7th came up.
8) Custer only had rations for 15 days so he had to locate the Indians within a given time span or abandon the search and reach Terry before that rations gave out and that is what Terry means. His wording also makes it clear that Gibbon was NOT expected to stray far from the junction. Also of course, there was no certainty that the
Far West could navigate as far as the forks as it had never been tried before. If it could not, then Gibbon would be even more restricted as he needed to be within an acceptable distance from his supply base.
I am sorry for such a long reply, but your views merit a detailed response and I hope you will accept my reply in that spirit.
Best wishes.
"Hunk"