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Post by Tricia on Apr 16, 2005 10:48:45 GMT -6
This is a subject where my knowledge is very sketchy-- but I've always thought Custer probably should have learned (almost the hard way) about the fighting prowess and determination of the Sioux during the Yellowstone Campaign of 1873.
We also see a clash with Colonel Stanley (which led to GAC's arrest) about unauthorized scouting missions--and an argument about Custer's stove--which took forever to cool down and according to Stanley, waiting for it to do so, slowed the progress of the Seventh on its mission. Of course, Stanley had a drinking problem that might have made everything worse, but GAC wasn't exactly willing to budge, either.
Is the Yellowstone Expedition a foreshadowing of things to come, say, three years later?
Regards, Leyton McLean
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Post by twomoons on Apr 16, 2005 14:06:25 GMT -6
Thanks rice, that's a good question. It's almost ironic to look back at something like this, and wonder, what he was thinking? He did have a proclivity for doing things in an unorthodox manner. And this showcases that! It took the military almost 3 score and 6 years to realize not to send family members together on the same mission. I am of course referring to the Sullivan Brothers in 1942. Look how many Custer family lives were lost at the LBH. The military undoubtedly played a greater role in this, but Custer pushed this to the max! And that darn stove, proved it. One wonders what else he had with him that didn't belong on the battlefield that day?
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Post by bigpond on Apr 16, 2005 15:19:44 GMT -6
"Mark Kellog" Custer was told by Sherman[through Terry] "Advise Custer to be prudent,not to take along any newspaper men,who always make mischief "
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Post by weir on Apr 17, 2005 7:09:51 GMT -6
This is a subject where my knowledge is very sketchy-- but I've always thought Custer probably should have learned (almost the hard way) about the fighting prowess and determination of the Sioux during the Yellowstone Campaign of 1873. And Edgerly heard Custer say on June 25th, that the field of LBH remind him the Yellowstone in 1873.
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Post by Tricia on Apr 17, 2005 8:08:41 GMT -6
And before it gets too late, it is the Yellowstone Expedition that gives birth to the entire Rain-In-The-Face "saga"--there's no other word for it--as it was supposedly he who confessed in the presence of Lonesome Charley to killing Dr. Honsinger, a close friend of Tom Custer, and Augustus Baliran.
Twomoons--I think Custer might have had his pelican with him on the campaign. I'm trying to find the cite for it. Don't know if birds of flight are against SOP!
Regards, Leyton McLean
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Post by crzhrs on Apr 17, 2005 13:55:26 GMT -6
It's hard to believe who and what went along on some of the campaigns to fight/scout/explore in Indian Territory.
Not only Custer and his carnival of characters and animals, but the Carrington Expedition to open up the Bozeman Road and build forts along it must have been ordered by a madman. Wives and children went along on the campaign into a virtually unexplored area and before negotiations with some of the fiercest Indians on the Continent were in place to open up the road.
The end result was Fetterman's Massacre experiened by women and children who were put in harm's way.
Some of the decisions made from 1860-1890 by government and military leaders must be questioned!
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Post by markland on Apr 20, 2005 13:06:28 GMT -6
Not only Custer and his carnival of characters and animals, but the Carrington Expedition to open up the Bozeman Road and build forts along it must have been ordered by a madman. Wives and children went along on the campaign into a virtually unexplored area and before negotiations with some of the fiercest Indians on the Continent were in place to open up the road. The end result was Fetterman's Massacre experiened by women and children who were put in harm's way. Some of the decisions made from 1860-1890 by government and military leaders must be questioned! Actually, the women & children were encouraged to go by none other than Gen. Sherman and also urged to keep diaries. For more information on what happened after the 18 Inf. left Ft. Kearney, Nebraska Territory, check out my Ft. Phil Kearny Resources at: freepages.history.rootsweb.com/~familyinformation/Best of wishes, Billy
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Post by crzhrs on Apr 21, 2005 17:23:45 GMT -6
<Actually, the women & children were encouraged to go by none other than Gen. Sherman and also urged to keep diaries>
Billy:
Yes . . . I heard it was one of the military commanders who recommended that. I thought it was Sheridan but you may be right.
Still hard to believe that the military leadership would allow women and children along on an expedition that had not even been negotiated with the Sioux. When Red Cloud found that the military was coming to build forts before negotiations even started he stormed out of the meeting and vowed to fight. And he did . . . Fetterman and his command paid for the arrogance of the military leadership.
As a side note . . . it turned out that the diary of the former Mrs. Grummond (who then married Carrington) was a highly detailed and important historical record of the events surrounding Red Cloud's War.
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Post by markland on Apr 21, 2005 20:39:50 GMT -6
Carrington struck gold in one respect. He was married to Margaret Carrington until she died, my apologies for not knonwing the year, who wrote the book Absoraka which Carrington kept updating well after Margaret's death. When Margaret died, Mrs. Grummond who lived in Kentucky saw the death notice and sent a note to Carrington. Mrs. Grummond and Margaret seemed to have been pretty tight, reading between lines, but whatever, Mrs. Grummond became Mrs. Carrington after Margaret's death. She then wrote a book of her Ft. Phil Kearny experiences which were, unfortunately, short and tragic.
Oh, and if you wonder why I call her Margaret, well, anyone that Jim Bridger respected automatically earns my respect. Plus, her book is excellent.
One thing that has always puzzled me is that the 18th U.S. Infantry was one of the best trained "new" regular Army regiments. They were commanded and trained from conception by Henry Carrington who, I believe, signed up Fetterman. Why did the standards go down, if they really went down, during the Red Cloud war? Was it overwork as laborers, carpenters, etc. rather than labor as soldiers?
Questions, questions, questions...
Don't you'all love this stuff?
Best of wishes,
Billy
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Post by billlp120 on Apr 22, 2005 21:51:04 GMT -6
Billy. That's a very nice collection of testimony and archive stuff from Kearny. Also you're building a nice set of GAC stuff. Thanks for showing it.
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Post by crzhrs on Apr 26, 2005 16:50:27 GMT -6
Billy:
I got the two women mixed up. Margaret, Carrington's first wife, wrote the book you mentioned. After her death, Francis Grummond, the widow of Fred Grummond who died with Fetterman, married Carrington.
Fred Grummond was one of several officers who ridiculed Carrington for not being more aggressive with the Indians. He may have been the one who disobeyed Carrington's orders not to follow the Indians and charged after them into the trap, instead of Fetterman, which resulted in the destruction of Fetterman's command. Fetterman too, may have disobeyed Carrington's orders, but there is some disagreement over that.
As for Carrington's training of his troops: He was a stickler for details and administration, but apparently did not have much combat experience. Thus Fetterman, Grummond, and other officer's disdain for his timidity.
Fetterman and Grummond ended up dead with their men due to over-confidence and lack of respect for the fighting ability of Indians. Neither of them had much Indian-fighting experience, yet they were so sure of the Indians being inferior. Carrington was chastised for his actions during the campaign but was later exonerated.
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Post by alfuso on May 15, 2005 7:57:56 GMT -6
Custer had obtained permission to take that stove. As Stanley got more and more lubricated, he obsessed on the stove.
Actually, I think as he lost more and more control to Custer to being drunk, he fixated on symbols of Custer's "insubordination."
The big blow-out came after Custer loaned a military horse to a civilian -- for which he had permission.
Stanely later apologized -- when he sobered up. He tended to forget things when he was drunk, so much so that Custer took to asking for his orders in writing.
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Post by George Armstrong Custer on May 26, 2005 7:18:36 GMT -6
QUOTE:Is the Yellowstone Expedition a foreshadowing of things to come, say, three years later?UNQUOTE
Well yes, we can read precursors of 1876 into the events of 1873. The question is though, how to we interpret these?
Applying this last question specifically to drawing analogies between '73 and '76 actually provides a very good illustration of how even professional historians, presented with the same set of facts, will draw different conclusions. The two historians I'll use for this example aren't even from different eras, but are two contemporary Custer scholars who are both highly regarded experts - Robert M. Utley and Brian W. Dippie. How these two scholars interpret the events of August 4 - 11 1873 is instructive, and is a good barometer in microcosm of the 'Custer debate'. Read their differing views and choose your side in what Utley earlier called 'Custer and the Great Controversy'!
Let's look at Brian W. Dippie's 'take' on the August '73 fights first, which appears in his essay 'Custer: The Indian Fighter', which was specially commissioned for 'The Custer Reader', edited by Paul A. Hutton (University of Nebraska, 1992), pp. 109-10:
'Two battles with the Sioux on the Yellowstone added to Custer's reputation as an Indian fighter, but worrisome tendencies were also in evidence........Custer's management of both battles has been praised. But he tempted fate on August 4 by reconnoitering on his own in the face of a concealed enemy and was almost cut off by the charging Sioux as he dashed for safety.'
Utley, on the other hand, has this to say of Custer's performance in the August 4 fight in 'Cavalier in Buckskin', (University of Oklahoma, 1988), p. 120:
'Custer had shown that he could still fight Indians. Badly outnumbered by some three hundred warriors, his two companies, in the hands of less cool and spontaneous leadership, might well have been overrun in the first rush. Instead, in more than three hours of hard fighting, they drove their assailants from the field.'
Of the fight on August 11, Utley states (ibid, p. 122):
'Once more Custer had won an Indian battle. In this fight he had commanded about 450 cavalrymen against Sioux warriors in excess of 500 (some participants estimated enemy strength at more than double that figure). Indian losses, in Custer's reckoning, totaled about 40 in the fights of August 4 and 11. In the second action, besides Lieutenant Braden badly injured, he had lost 4 men killed, 3 wounded, and 8 horses hit. Again Custer had handled his command with calm deliberation and sound tactical instinct.'
Now, if we apply Dippie and Utley's respective conclusions - 'worrisome tendencies.....he tempted fate' or '...handled his command with calm deliberation and sound tactical instinct' - to Leyton's original question of 'is the Yellowstone Expedition a foreshadowing of thinhs to come, say, three years later?', then we can see that they offer the ammunition of academic opinion to both the Custerophile and Custerophobe camps amongst us!
Apply Dippie's view of Yellowstone to Little Bighorn and it supports the view of Custer's rashness and tendency to regard fighting Indians as akin to a sporting lark, in which family and friends come along in a picnic atmosphere.
Utley's Yellowstone Custer, a commander of 'cool and spontaneous leadership' in the face of superior numbers, who 'handled his command with calm deliberation and sound tactical instinct' is difficult to reconcile with the accusations of Custer at Little Bighorn as a commander of tactical incompetence, which led to a chaotic disintegration of his immediate command.
Walt, isn't it interesting to regard the ammunition depletion/time factor question at Little Bighorn in the light of Utley's Custer of August 4 1873? Faced with a possibly overwhelming initial assault from far superior numbers, Utley's Custer 'formed a skirmish line completely around the led horses and slowly retreated to the protection of the timber downstream. Here the troops spread out behind the natural parapet of an old riverbank and held the Sioux at bay throughout the hot afternoon.........in more than three hours of hard fighting they drove their assailants from the field.'
Writing this post, it's occurred to me just how sceptical I've become of the 'rapid panicked implosion', with 'little or no attempt to organize a defense' theory of Custer's command at Little Bighorn. Generated initially by the post-1983 battlefield archaeology of Robin Allan Fox and others, I find the physical foundations of the 'chaos' theory shaky, primarily because it's based on what battle debris was left on the field post 1983. Further, it just doesn't gell with what we know of Custer's behaviour under fire - i.e. during the Civil War and at Yellowstone. Whatever else he may have been , he wasn't a man who went to pieces under incoming. What do others think the lessons of Yellowstone are in relation to Little Bighorn?
Ciao, GAC
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Post by Walt Cross on May 26, 2005 7:55:36 GMT -6
George; Thanks for a well thought out piece! I find your reasoning quite compelling and I too have doubted the "implosion" theory. Harrington was at these skirmishes as were many if not most of the officers who were also at the LBH battle. I have no doubt they all learned from these fights. I do indeed think there were organized and disciplined resistance at LBH especially by Calhoun's Co L (until they ran out of ammunition) and Harrington's Co C. The Indian narrative is rife with references to "stands" and skirmish lines forming during the withdrawal toward Custer Hill. In my mind Keogh too made a disciplined stand and was directing the action as he sent Co C down Finley Ridge to assault the warriors on Greasy Grass Ridge. It was the collapse of Co L that allowed the Indians to attack Keogh in the flank and roll up his line. The key to the defeat of the right wing and consequently the defeat of the entire battalion, hinged on the ammunition depletion of Co L. I just can't understand why that is not apparent to anyone who can do the simple math of firing rates and time lapse. Custer relied on Benteen and the ammunition arriving in time to resupply and support Co L. Until Co L ran out of ammunition, a well directed resistance was in existence.
Utley is right on, Dippie I'm afraid is quilty of 20/20 hindsight.
Walt
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Post by Tricia on May 26, 2005 9:02:36 GMT -6
GAC and Walt--
These responses were exactly the kind I had hoped for when I started this thread! Both were eye-opening, enjoyable, and well-reasoned. Like you, I don't particularly believe in an implosion kind of theory when it comes to LBH--there were certainly examples of tactical methodology .... But at the same time, I do kind of think Custer should have gleamed something about the determination of the Sioux and taken that with him on the LBH stage three years later.
Great posts! Leyton McLean
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