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Post by ephriam on Mar 7, 2006 20:03:39 GMT -6
I have been thinking about an article I read by Joel R. Hyer, "Cowardice and the Hayfield Fight: Evidence Against Colonel Luther P. Bradley," published in Journal of the West, October 1998. Has anyone else read this piece?
In summary, Hyler argues that during the famous Hayfield fight between the Lakota and the army near Fort C.F. Smith in 1867, Col. Bradley refused to dispatch assistance to those beseiged. "The colonel acted slowly and too deliberately, which caused his men undue suffering. As the evidence reveals, Bradley's inaction was, without a doubt, an act of cowardice."
This characterization by a writer over a century removed from the challenges of the Bozeman Trail seems very harsh to me. In fact, you could argue that Bradley's action was completely appropriate. Given the small garrison and the overwhelming numbers of Lakota and Northern Cheyenne engaging the haying party, would it have been foolhardy to have sent in more men? Is it perhaps like the submarine commander who has to seal the hatch of a flooding compartment, knowing that there are still living men inside, or risk loosing the entire vessel and all men aboard?
I would love some opinions about this issue!
ephriam
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Post by Scout on Mar 8, 2006 8:28:39 GMT -6
ephriam,
Darn good question I would say. What is that quote about those that don't learn from history are doomed to repeat it. I would have to say Bradley's actions were, in my opinion, correct regardless of any criticisms he incurred. All to often we see actions like Fetterman's where commands ride straight into a very well planned ambush by the indians. The Fetterman fight had happened only six months before so I think that it was still fresh in the mind of Bradley. This was a ploy that worked a number of times that resulted in disaster for the army, particularly when led by hotheads. I think the men at the Hayfield and Wagonbox fights survived because they had a good defensive position. To attempt an attack on such a position was a disaster for the Sioux though. Bradley's rescue party would have been caught out in the open, which is where the Indians wanted it. I agree his actions were appropriate in not being going to the Hayfield relief. I can't imagine what 'evidence' writer Hyer has though.
Whenever I see the term 'new evidence' in regard to books or the History Channel it generally turns out to be the same information we all know just presented from a different angle. What is writer Hyer's 'evidence' against Bradley?
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Post by markland on Mar 8, 2006 11:09:18 GMT -6
You know, somewhere in Capt. & Mrs. Burk's Burt's book, there is a reference to officers at Ft. C. F. Smith being reticent to talk about that battle. Burk Burt arrived there after the battle was fought. I will try to find it tonight or tomorrow. Too much work now as I am fried from a 20 hour drive.
Best of wishes,
Billy
Edit: Ooops!
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Post by ephriam on Mar 8, 2006 23:15:28 GMT -6
Hyer cited several lines of evidence:
1. Bradley was not well-liked. Private Halloran remembered him as "a mean cuss" while Captain Hartz noted his "imperious manner and arrogant tone". Alvin Leighton described him as "an arbitrary self-important old bachelor that no one liked". [We should point out that he was forty-five years and engaged to be married]. Al Colvin described him as "pompous and swell-headed" that "no one liked."
2. Bradley had no experience fighting Indians. Leighton said "he knew nothing about fighting Indians," an assessment shared by Colvin, "knowing nothing about Indian fighting."
3. Bradley made bad decisions. Hyer cites a number of individuals present that day who disagreed with Bradley's decision not to send reinforcements. Captain Hartz wrote a month after the battle that Bradley was "constantly making military mistakes" though no details are given.
Hyer then concluded based on this evidence that Bradley did not send reinforcements because he was scared for his own life -- but it seems possible that there were other reasons for Bradley's actions.
The accounts were correct in noting that Bradley had no experience fighting Indians. He served in the Civil War, after which he was sent west. An important point that Hyer fails to mention is that Bradley's first assignment after arriving in the Department of the Platte was to serve on the Army's investigating board on the Fetterman massacre. He interviewed a number of officers about Fetterman's rash move and censored Carrington for being too friendly with the enlisted men and officers under his command, thus breaking down the chain of command. The parallels between what happened to Fetterman's command and the Hayfield fight cannot be ignored. More than any other officer at Fort C. F. Smith that day, he knew what could happen when young junior officers who wished to demonstrate their gallant bravery in the face of an overwhelming number of Indians.
Another important point to remember is that Bradley was new to the post, having arrived at Fort C. F. Smith just one week before the battle to reinforce the garrison. The soldiers who had been stationed at the fort were low on food and ammunition and their mounts were in very poor condition. Bradley arrived with reinforcements, but many of these were raw recruits. On the morning of the battle, his command was split in several directions, with one company accompanying the departing wagon train, a detail with the hay cutting party and another detail out cutting wood. He would have had to have left part of his command behind at the fort to protect the garrison, thus limiting how many men he could have dispatched to the field of engagement.
Evidence of the Lakota's strength and determination is evident later that day when a part of civilians attempted to mount a rescue but retreated back to the garrison when they were almost lured into another ambush.
Given these facts, the charge of cowardice seems to be overblown -- even the charge of making a bad military decision seems inaccurate. Rather, Bradley stood his ground while his junior officers pressured him into sending out a rescue party, perhaps convinced that such a resuce attempt, no matter how gallant, was foolhardy and put the men under his command at great risk.
What do you think?
ephriam
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Post by bubbabod on Mar 9, 2006 14:07:22 GMT -6
I haven't read the book you're talking about, but I have heard the allegations also. Isn't there something about him being in the hilll high above the fort looking for evidence of the fight and claimed he couldn't see anything, such as smoke, etc.? If you take the road up to the dam, you could see any sign of smoke from the fight. I'm out of state now and don't have any of my books with me so can't say more now, but I'll have to check this out when I get home. Good question.
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Post by Scout on Mar 10, 2006 20:21:42 GMT -6
Bradley was 'not well liked', had 'no experience fighting Indians' and made 'bad decisions'. AND from this Hyer concludes he was a coward! Was bizarre rationalizing! Bradley might have been all these things along with being 'pompous and swell-headed' but writer Hyer needs to come up with something better than that to support his charge of cowardice against Bradley. Since when did not being well liked and having no experience equal cowardice? This is evidence? This sounds like a badly written book or article that is not grounded in any kind of logic, reasoning or research. Bradley may have avoided a real tragedy that day. I'm sure the Sioux took into account the possibilty of a rescue mission from the fort and were prepared...or praying...it would come. They had had a little experience in that area, don't you think? It is a little riduculous to think that the Indians would have been caught off guard by troops coming from the fort. Anyway, I can't see where any evidence exists to warrant such a charge. I agree with you ephriam.
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Gumby
Full Member
Posts: 202
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Post by Gumby on Mar 11, 2006 9:23:00 GMT -6
A point that most people fail to consider, especially those who have never commanded or managed people, is that as the commander of the garrison at Fort C.F. Smith, Bradley was responsible for the whole garrison not just the hay cutting party. To a leader the mission almost always takes precedence over the troops. It sounds callous but it is the general rule. Bradley's job was to keep the fort secure first. The welfare of the hayfield detail was a secondary consideration.
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Post by markland on Mar 12, 2006 8:27:44 GMT -6
From Merrill Mattes book, Indians, Infants and Infantry: Andrew and Elizabeth Burt on the Frontier.
P. 135-137
The section leads off with the record of the Hayfield fight from the 27th Infantry's regimental return and then goes to Mattes' interpretation.
"An unofficial source of information on this engagement is participant Finn Burnett, a civilian in the employ of A. C. Leighton, the hay contractor. Young Finn was a veteran of the Powder River Expedition, and at Fort Phil Kearny he assisted in the grim job of bringing in the frozen remains of those who fell with Fetterman. He had come in with General Bradley's train to Fort C. F. Smith and, contrary to Bradley's report, claimed that there were Indian attacks on that train at Peno Creek and Tongue River, which were finally beaten off the by the use of 'a new type of rifled cannon.' Burnett and Bradley are even further apart on their respective accounts of the Hayfield Fight. As a matter of fact, Finn claimed that through a reconnaissance of Captain Hartz the General knew of the fighting but in a cowardly fashion refused to send aid until the Sioux had withdrawn. Furthermore, Finn asserted that this conduct was so disgraceful that it was a taboo subject in the army, and that no official reports of the affair were made, or at least preserved."
"Some credence to the idea that the subject was not discussed around the fort is given by the fact that it is not mentioned by Elizabeth Burt. This is indeed strange considering that she gave ample space in her memoirs to the fights around Fort Phil Kearny. It is not reasonable to suppose that she never heard of the Hayfield Fight, since she arrived only three months after it occurred. It is possible that she simply preferred not to discuss it, since it involved the reputation of an army officer whom she held in high esteem. Or this could have been an item in her missing diary which was pruned for family purposes."
Examination of official post and regimental records, not available to or at least not searched by Finn Burnett or Dr. Hebard, clearly reveals that these authors were in error about the absence of official reports. And if General Bradley's own report is to be believed, he was not guilty of cowardice, and Finn's condemnation can only be attributed to the emotional reaction of one who was on the receiving end of a severe attack by a horde of Cheyennes. At any rate the General, crediting the hay party for a heroic defense, gave this version of his actions in a communication to Lieutenant Brown, A. A. A. G., Mt. District, Headquarters, Fort Phil Kearny, Dakota Territory, dated August 5, 1867:"
[skipping Gen. Bradley's report on the battle]
A couple of things: first, Bradley's report does not mention a messenger from the hay party and does specifically state: "I did not know of the fight until it had been going on some hours." Bradley states that he sent Lt. Shurly and twenty mounted men out to on a reconnaissance prior to dispatching a hay train to the fields. When that group was intercepted by a large body of Indians, he then sent out Capt.Burrowes with two companies of the 27th ("G" and "H") and a howitzer. He adds that Capt. Burrowe thinks that but for the howitzer, "he would have had all the fighting he wanted before he got back, and that the Indians had about 800 warriors within reach when he got to the stockade [hay stockade].
Darnit, tornado warning going off...gotta go see what is going on.
Best of wishes,
Billy
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Post by ephriam on Mar 15, 2006 0:02:39 GMT -6
Burrow's wrote the following in his report, enclosed in Bradley's report of Aug. 5: Fort C. F. Smith, M.T. Aug. 3rd 1867 Sir: I have the honor to report that at 4 o'clock P.M. Aug. 1st 1867 I was ordered with "G" Co 27 U.S. Inf to go to the relief of Lieut. E. R. P. Shirley 27 U.S. Inf. who was in charge of twenty mounted infantry and citizens (employees) and sharply engaged with Indians whiles recanortoring the ground between the garrison and the hay field. I proceeded with my force until I formed a junction with Lieut. Shirley, when the Indians with whome he was engaged retired out of range. When I had secured Lieut. Shirley from danger I was about to return to the Post when I received a reinforcement of a detachment of "H" Co. 27 U.S. Inf., 1st Lt. R. F. Fenton Comdg., one mountain howitzer and its gun squad, with orders from Bvt. Brig. General L. P. Bradley Lieut. Col. 27 U.S. Inf. Comdg Post to move forward with my command to the hay corral, relieve them, bring back the killed and wounded and do whatever I might deem best after I arrived there and discerned the exact status of affairs..."
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Post by markland on Mar 15, 2006 9:06:47 GMT -6
You know, one of the motives for the "cowardice" charges may be because of Leighton trying to obtain recompense for his haying machines which were burnt by the Indians when the soldiers and civilians were evacuated. It would behoove him to place the blame on the army to substantiate the claim.
Best of wishes,
Billy
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Post by willjcameron on Sept 7, 2008 16:45:22 GMT -6
It's been a while since I looked at the writings of both survivers of the battle in the Library of Congress. I do have copy of it. Finn and another man who's name escapes me.
Two eastern soldiers on picket sat up on the bluff and didn't do a dammed thing for a number of hours. They had to have heard teh gunfire.
The charges of cowardness was upon the relief coloum and not the Commandant of the fort. There is where the cover up was.
Does any one know the name of the very large Minniconjou chief who led the last charge on foot over the stream?
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Post by bubbabod on Sept 10, 2008 0:05:33 GMT -6
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Sept 11, 2008 7:11:12 GMT -6
It's been a while since I looked at the writings of both survivers of the battle in the Library of Congress. I do have copy of it. Finn and another man who's name escapes me. Two eastern soldiers on picket sat up on the bluff and didn't do a dammed thing for a number of hours. They had to have heard teh gunfire. The charges of cowardness was upon the relief coloum and not the Commandant of the fort. There is where the cover up was. Does any one know the name of the very large Minniconjou chief who led the last charge on foot over the stream?
Will, I cannot find any reference to the chief you mention in any of my books. The Cheyenne histories have very little detail of the fight and I do not know of a Minneconjou written history. The white accounts of the fight only describe the chief's appearance as they would not have known his name. "The Bozeman Trail" Volume II, by Hebard & Brinistool contains an account by Finn Burnett which reads in part as follows:- "And now comes he almost unbelievable part of my story: Instead of granting Captain Hartz's request [to go to their aid], the commander immediately ordered the gates of the fort to be locked, and refused to allow a man to leave while the battle was in progress! We were thus left to fight it out as best we could. The commander of Fort C.F. Smith disgraced himself that day, and that is the reason there never has been any official report made by the military authorities of the hayfield fight near the fort." At the end of Burnett's account is reprinted part of a letter from Brinistool to the publisher in 1922: "Of the Hayfield fight, there never was ANY account of it printed at any time. General King told me personally that it was a forbidden topic in army circles (for the plain reason that the commander, Gen. Bradley, played the coward in refusing to allow a relief party to leave the fort to aid the 19 men in the hayfield). I was asked by Gen. King to please not mention Bradley's name, as they had always been close friends. So I withheld it. Burnett insisted that I flay Bradley good and hard and give the public his name, but we both (Dr. Hebard and myself) decided not to do it." J.W. Vaughn has a good account of the fight in "Indian Fights: New Facts on Seven Encounters" and Jerome A. Greene wrote a splendid article about it in the Winter 1974 issue of Montana The Magazine of Western History. Hunk
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Post by rangersmith1867 on Jun 23, 2012 16:57:39 GMT -6
I know this is an old thread, but as stated in my introduction I am obsessed with the Hayfield fight.
To shed some light on research I have done about the fight, the issue of Bradley being a coward or not, is really something one cannot prove, but one can speculate. I will give you this much, the man knew about the fight as early as An hour after it started, and recalled all the units in the area back to Fort C.F. Smith.
Lt. George H. Palmer of the 27th Infantry (E Coy) recalled the event in his diary, and enclosed with it a message he received from Bradley.
"On the 1st of August, I was sent out with 40 men and a number of teams to the mountains south of post to bring in timbers. On reaching the mountains I discovered Indians riding around on the hulls and I sent men out to watch their movements. On going to the top of a hill I saw Lieut. Sterburg's camp which was on the north side of the post and under a bluff. His camp could not be seen from the post. I saw a large number of Indians, which I estimated at 800 surrounding Sternburg. This was at about 12M. At the same time quite a large number left the main body and came towards me,...I collected my men and made my way to the wagons where I met a courier from Col. Bradley telling me to hasten to the post."
'Mr. Palmer, I do not think you have anything to apprehend from Indians but, keep your men well together and come in as soon as you can load up your teams. I did not intend to have any teams go out today, and I prefer to have them returned as soon as possible. Respectfully yours, LP Bradley Lt. Col. Comdg.'
At around 1pm Lt. Palmer and his party returned to Fort C.F. Smith and he reported to Lt.Col. Bradley that Sterburg was engaged with over 800 hostiles...possibly 1,000. Bradley suggested that the number was not an accurate estimate, and that Lt. Sterburg could take care of them.
Bradley knew as early as 1pm that Sterburg was surrounded by close to 1,000 indians, and he did not act on that intelligence until around 3:30pm when he sent out 20 men commanded by 2nd. Lt. Edward Shurly, and about a mile after they left were surrounded by hostiles and forced to fall back to the Fort.
At the later stages in the fight, the men in the hayfield corral drew straws to see who would ride back, Pvt Brogen of G Coy drew the short straw but claimed to be to weak to make the trip and Pvt. Bradley of E Coy volunteered to go.
Bradley road like hell to Fort C.F. Smith and ran into a party of about 4 Sioux who were determined to ride him down to lay Coup blows on them, they knocked Pvt. Bradley from his horse, and just as he remounted, the 20 scouts lead by Shurly saw the Sioux, fired a volley and the Sioix bugged out. Bradley then made his way to the post and delivered his message about the attack on their posistion at the Hayfield corral.
Most of this comes from Lt.Col. LP Bradley's Diary and letters, and Lt. Palmers Diary. Which I tracked down with the help of the book by Barry J. Hagan, "Exactly in the Right Place" : A history of Fort C.F. Smith, Montana Territory, 1866-1868.
I have drawn my own conclusions having read the journal entries from LP Bradley that he may not have been a coward, but he was not the greatest leader, in his entire time at Fort C.F. Smith, he left the fortification maybe 3 times. So draw your own conclusions...he was a fine officer in the Civil war and that is why you do not hear much about the Hayfield Fight, in fact the Army sat on it for years because the serving line officers at the time did not want to tarnish the Service record of Bradley, and it is noted by many journalists of the time that when they spoke of the Hayfield fight, the officers simply did not want to speak of it. The reason cited...they did not want to have their fellow officer branded a coward.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 23, 2012 20:51:09 GMT -6
Reply number three by ephriam pretty much sums it up well.
The Army sat on this because it was barely much of an incident at all. What, exactly, was to be made of it? If indeed there were 1000 warriors, the 400 men were needed to save the fort, which was the mission's point and all, and not be defeated piecemeal. How, in fact, could it be posited to have concluded better, given all?
Lotta Bradleys out there, seems like.
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