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Post by Walt Cross on Nov 1, 2004 9:48:07 GMT -6
Correct my thinking here if I'm off base. As I understand it, each trooper carried 24 rounds for his 1873 Colt revolver and 100 rounds for his carbine. 50 of those carbine rounds and all twenty four revolver rounds were at hand in cartridge belts with the other 50 in his saddle pockets.
Once the horses were led away, he would then only have what rounds were available in his cartridge belts. Now, a well trained trooper could fire 12 to 15 rounds per minute from his carbine. That means he could keep up steady rifle fire for only 3 to 4 minutes! Pulling out his trusty revolver, already loaded, he popped off six rounds in what, one minute? Another two minutes to reload and fire and his pistol ammo is gone in as little as 8 minutes?
A soldier in hot combat could actually shoot up his basic load in less than a quarter hour? And then, he would have to abandon the firing line to find a horse to get more ammo. Could this be right? And if it is, no wonder they were so readily defeated! Math was never my strong suit, what's wrong with my calculations? Even if he had stuffed his pockets with additional cartridges, he would be effective in combat at the most 25 to 30 minutes. Isn't that about how long the Indians claim the "real" fighting took?
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Post by Steve Wilk on Nov 1, 2004 22:49:49 GMT -6
the key phrase here is "well trained"...how many cavalry troopers in 1876 fit that description? A soldier could very well shoot away his entire belt in fifteen minutes. This I recall ocurred on Reno's skirmish line in the valley. Men had to go back to their horses for more ammo even though they were on the line but a short time. This indicates poor fire control, which was the responsiblity of the NCOs. I recall reading that cavalry training focused on tactics, whereas infantry focused on marksmenship. One reason Indians did not like to mess with the Long Toms of the doughboys. I think the Custer portion of the battle lasted a couple hours; the Last Stand portion may have been over in a half hour. Or perhaps the dispatching of the wounded was over in half an hour. I wonder how much ammo was expended...a trooper could take ammo from a dead or wounded comrade as well as dead horses. With the Sioux and Cheyenne warriors using cover and concealment, there were few if any targets for the troopers to fire at!
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Post by Walt Cross on Nov 4, 2004 22:53:24 GMT -6
I agree with you. Even if you slow them down to the Civil War level of 3 rounds per minute, and you give them the other 50 rounds in their saddlepockets (they weren't called saddlebags until later), Company L would deplete their ammo in approximately 33 minutes. I doubt they ever got the rest of their ammo. Keogh had his hands full with warriors attacking from the East, I don't think there were any runners he could send. The horses, with the extra ammo had been "led" behind Calhoun Hill.
Walt
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Post by Steve Wilk on Nov 5, 2004 10:03:02 GMT -6
Just a footnote to this...the case has been made that if Custer's men had had repeating rifles the outcome may have been different. Can you imagine how fast an excited trooper could have expended fifty some rounds firing a Winchester? We're talking five to ten minutes and you're out of ammo!
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Post by ART UNGER on Nov 5, 2004 14:36:12 GMT -6
The following is an excerpt from ABC, in the Chapter titled "Ammuniction Enigma" discussing the depletion of the ammunition allotted to Reno's Battalion:
"Reno's charge into the Sioux village was much more short lived, it commenced approximately 3:00 PM and ended approximately 4:00 PM when Reno reached siege hill. Based upon testimony at the Reno Court of Inquiry and various time motion studies it, appears that Reno deployed to a skirmish line approximately 3:20 PM and commenced his retreat by 3:45 PM. This equates to approximately 25 minutes for actual fighting time, fifteen minutes on the skirmish line and ten minutes in the timber. When Benteen's column arrived on siege hill by 4:10 PM he found Reno's troops virtually devoid of ammunition. Reno's command consisted of 11 Officers and 140 Enlisted Men, each allotted 125 rounds of ammunition, or 18,875 rounds in the aggregate. Virtually this entire supply of ammunition, was entirely expended in an rather light fire fight, with poor fire control, lasting 15 to 20 minutes. Some of this ammunition was either lost or abandoned to the hostiles during the rout.
The mathematics of this scenario is analyzed, fairly easily. The average trooper was trained to fire one round every six seconds from a carbine and six rounds per minute from a revolver. There were minimal losses until the rout commenced. It can be assumed that 130 men on the skirmish line might have dispensed approximately 11,700 rounds [130 x 6 x 15 = 11,700] of carbine ammunition, from an available supply of 13,000 rounds. This constitutes a fair estimate of the rate of consumption of ammunition of Reno’s Battalion, on the skirmish line, considering the fire control was very lax and the shooting wild. With approximately 30 horses lost in the rout, it can be assumed that the saddle bag ammunition of 50 rounds of carbine and 25 rounds of revolver ammunition, per horse, was lost too. Another 2250 rounds in the aggregate, is lost in the saddle bags. The remaining 110 men wildly fired their revolvers during the rout, consuming another 660 rounds. All together, during the valley fight and rout, Reno’s battalion may have consumed or lost approximately 16,000 rounds of combined carbine and revolver ammunition. On the hill, more shots were fired, leaving very little of the possible 2,875 rounds, that could have remained, available, by the time Benteen and his battalion arrived."
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Post by Walt Cross on Nov 5, 2004 15:29:27 GMT -6
Art; I think you've made my case for me. Some very notable researchers have given little attention to the role ammunition depletion played in Custer's defeat. It didn't require all the units to run out of ammo, just the lynchpin company, namely Company L. This company was "holding the door open" for Benteen's expected arrival with the ammo packs. But when their rate of fire died down the Indians, in particular the Cheyenne, moved in quickly. With Company L lost, Company C out on Finley Ridge to the west and south, had no option but to withdraw toward Last Stand Hill. Despite a spirited defense led by Lieutenant Henry Moore Harrington, Company C was rolled up. Meantime Co I, the last of the right wing was also under heavy assault from the East, then from the South as Company L caved. The only Company that arrived at Last Stand Hill in any appreciable number from the Right Wing was Company C.
Reno would surely have perished like Custer had Benteen not arrived with more ammunition. Thanks.
Walt
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Post by Steve Wilk on Nov 5, 2004 23:17:52 GMT -6
if this is true and Reno's men shot away 16,000 rounds, then why do I recall reading (forgive me I can't quote the source, so many books..) that when the packs arrived only one case of ammo was opened. Or did one crate contain that much??
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Post by Walt Cross on Nov 6, 2004 22:37:09 GMT -6
I can't recall ever reading that. Of couse the pace of the fight with Reno after arrival of the ammunition packs was a siege rather than a firefight. I wouldn't expect the same high rate of fire.
Walt
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Post by Art Unger on Nov 8, 2004 9:20:07 GMT -6
What you are referring to is an initial act in a series of actions. Hare was sent to bring one ammunition pack mule up, immediately and on an urgent basis, which carried two cases each containing 2000 rounds. Benteen's men were ordered to "share" their ammunition with Reno's and finally when MacDougall came up with the rest of the pack train addtional ammunition requisitions were filled.
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Post by Art Unger on Nov 8, 2004 9:32:02 GMT -6
The significance of what I call the "Ammunition Enigma" is that it is proof, the alleged Reno-Benteen siege was a farce and a coverup. They did not have sufficient ammunition to withstand an attack, the magnitiude of which Custer faced, for more than one hour. That Reno was not under attack or siege by large numbers of warriors, beyond June 25 and that he refused to move forward even when there was no resistence in his front. He just waited on the hill to be rescued by Terry and Gibbon's smaller force without fulfilling his duty to seek out Custer and report to his commanding officer.
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Post by shatonska on Nov 8, 2004 10:07:40 GMT -6
The significance of what I call the "Ammunition Enigma" is that it is proof, the alleged Reno-Benteen siege was a farce and a coverup. They did not have sufficient ammunition to withstand an attack, the magnitiude of which Custer faced, for more than one hour. That Reno was not under attack or siege by large numbers of warriors, beyond June 25 and that he refused to move forward even when there was no resistence in his front. He just waited on the hill to be rescued by Terry and Gibbon's smaller force without fulfilling his duty to seek out Custer and report to his commanding officer. it so obvious what you say !!! i add that i like the reconstruction of John Gray until Weir companies on "weir point" then i shift to micno , from weir point they could only see cahloun hill , only there the battle was finished and the indians where shooting grace shots and steeling things from deadsoldiers , in all that noise and smoke from weir point custer hill was invisible !! because of the lack of ammunition Weir could not hear many shots from custer hill , remember that custer companies deployed a series of volley from nye cartridge hill and luce ridge , infact many reno survivors after the battle on custer hill noted the lack of spended cartridges , battle was not finished when weir arrived on weir point ! a move from benteen half an hour previous could save calhoun hill from pressure and change the faith on this fight , it's also possible a complete disaster !!
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Post by Walt Cross on Nov 8, 2004 20:15:55 GMT -6
There is merit in what you say regarding Benteen not obeying his orders.
Bear in mind that Custer's battalion was formed into two wings with Co L holding the rear most guard, supported to his south and west by Co C on Finley Ridge and Co I forming the right wing's reserve. This wing was under the command of Captain Keogh, he was senior to 1st Lt. Calhoun commanding Co L and 2nd Lt. Harrington commanding Co C (Capt Tom Custer, commander of Co C, was serving as aide-de-camp to George Custer). Company L expended the most ammunition, probably their entire basic load. Co C expended the next highest total with Co I coming under direct attack later and not firing much before being overwhelmed. Co L ran out of ammo and the Indians were able to roll the entire right wing up, despite Co C making "three stands" while withdrawing from an untenable position as told by the Indian narrative.
The left wing was with custer but under the command of Captain Yates. Co E, the Grey Horse Company, expended the most ammo of the left wing. Co F was held in reserve and like Co I, fired few rounds before being overwhelmed.
The Indians captured a large amount of ammunition from the soldiers of the two reserve companies as well as another large amount from the horses they captured. Added to the ammunition taken from Reno's dead troopers and it appears Custer had all the ammunition in the world.
Interviews with the Indians put forth the idea that there was a great deal of ammunition captured, therefore the soldiers didn't put up much of a fight. But this is an oversimplification. Some companies shot up a good deal of ammo in a brave resistance, so much so by Co L that it was one of the factors that led to Custer's defeat.
Walt Cross
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Post by Steve Wilk on Nov 8, 2004 23:51:15 GMT -6
Walt--I'm curious as to how you determine that Co. F fired only a few rounds before being "overwhelmed". This terms implies swarms of Sioux charging up Custer Hill. If this were the case the warrior death count would have been much higher. Unless the troopers were such awful marksmen. Co. F basically anchored the last stand,no? Most of the men left on that hill were from Yates' F troop. I would think they would have shot away most if not all their ammo. After all their commander was on that hill with them, and they witnessed the demise of their comrades....would this not induce them to fight all the harder, especially knowing Benteen was supposed to be on his way?
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Post by Walt Cross on Nov 11, 2004 15:22:01 GMT -6
I admit to making an assumption based on the fact that it was the "Gray Horse Company" mostly engaged at LSH and Co F in reserve. The reason so many of them were at LSH at the end is because they were not engaged earlier. By the time they moved to LSH from their reserve position the right wing was in almost total disintegration. They arrived at LSH just in time to receive attacks from nearly every direction, there was little time for them to engage with their primary weapon, the 1873 Springfield Carbine. Co F is virtually "invisible" in the Indian narrative. The narrative talks about the soldiers engaging them with "little guns" (revolvers). Thus there was a good deal of ammunition left by Co F as well as Co I whose experience was almost identical. Quick engagement and destruction.
Walt
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Post by Walt Cross on Apr 1, 2005 11:19:16 GMT -6
Thought I would make a comment here and get this subject back on the main page. Some of you were looking for it.
Walt
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