|
Post by Rabble on Jan 30, 2006 22:10:22 GMT -6
I thought that the following report by Marcus Reno would be interesting, considering his later problems!
Ron
FEBRUARY 3, 1865.--Affair near Harper's Ferry, W. Va. Report of Col. Marcus A. Reno, Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry
HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY, Charlestown, W. Va., February 4, 1865.
SIR: I have the honor to report that the party which ran the train off the track on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad crossed at or near Keyes' Ford. I had timely information of their crossing and their whereabouts, and would have succeeded in capturing some of them had my orders been obeyed. About 10 p.m. I sent out two parties under command of Lieutenants Guild and Chase. These parties were about fifty strong. Lieutenant Chase was ordered, with his command, to cover the roads leading to the different fords through Bloomery. Lieutenant Guild was ordered to overtake and head oft the party, attack them, and drive them back. [glow=red,2,300]After he left camp, instead of following them up, he thought he had better move toward the river, the diametrically opposite direction from his orders. Lieutenant Chase (with good reason) did not expect our own men in that direction, and fired into Lieutenant G.'s command. I regret to say that one man, Private Hogeland, Company D, was wounded. I have placed Lieutenant Guild in arrest and now report him for immediate dismissal, as he is solely responsible for the miscarriage of my plans. I do not design that he be court-martialed, as that would occupy more time than he is worth. He is entirely unfit for a commission, inasmuch as he takes no pains to improve himself, nor does he study to render himself worthy of his position. He, although never what you could charge as drunkenness, is always full, and when not stupefied with whisky he is with opium. His performance last night is sufficient evidence against him to hang him.[/glow] The scouting party which brought the information lost cue of their number. He was taken prisoner by the rebels, but in returning over the same ground his dead body was found in the road, evidently murdered after capture. Upon receiving Lieutenant Guild's report I immediately dispatched parties to Duffield's and Smithfield, as it was evident to me they had gone in that direction. They report that, after throwing off the train, the enemy separated into small parties and made toward the Shenandoah. They were unable to come up with them. As far as I can learn they numbered about thirty men. Very respectfully, M. A. RENO, Colonel, Commanding Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry. Capt. J. P. ROCKWELL, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Harper's Ferry, Va.
|
|
|
Post by elisabeth on Jan 31, 2006 12:31:44 GMT -6
Wonderful piece!
|
|
jc
Junior Member
Posts: 60
|
Post by jc on Feb 1, 2006 2:32:06 GMT -6
I'm certain that many have read the April 30, 1936 article written by W. J. Ghent, titled, "Varnum, Reno and the Little Big Horn". Perhaps some here nevertheless have not and might gain beneficial insights into Reno, and his military career, from comments made by those who were associated with him. In whole it's a rather long article therefore what follows below is merely that written in regard to Reno. jc
Reno's Military Record For one who was inconsequential in himself and who has been generally used by his professed admirers merely as a stalking horse for the assault on Custer, Reno has had extravagant praise. Even the purely defensive attitude sometimes takes fantastic forms. A recent Renophile pamphlet assures the world that there was nothing blameable in the conduct of Reno in the valley except that at the critical moment he "lost his head." One wonders what was left that was of any service to his frightened and distracted followers. But the direct praise out-soars all bounds. A fatuous scribbler has published somewhere this amazing tribute: "No officer in the Civil War won a more brilliant record than Reno, he being brevetted by grades from a first lieutenant to a colonel for gallant and meritorious service." There is no truth in the statement, and even if the reference to his brevetting were true, the fact would have none of the significance implied. Military ability in the Civil War was not shown by brevets, but by promotion and assignment to command. The brevet was a mere distinction, given loosely and lavishly to capable men and to incompetents, to fighting men at the front and to ease-loving men in Washington bureaus. The brevet system broke to pieces because of its injustice and its absurdity. Even so, excepting for the customary brevet of lieutenant given at that time to the cadet on his graduation, I find no record of a single brevet given to Reno before or during the war. On February 23, 1863, he was nominated for a brevet of major, to date from March 5, 1862, but the Senate Executive Journal shows that the nomination was not confirmed. Nearly a year after Lee's surrender - that is, in March, 1866, three boards were formed by the War Department, to award these distinctions. There was one board to hand out the honors to brigadier and major generals, one for the infantry and another for the cavalry, artillery and staff. The volunteer officers had been liberally treated to honors, and it was not the turn of the regulars. Everybody understood that the awards were to be scattered with a prodigal hand. Lieut. Eugene Carter, recorder of the infantry board, told his brother, the late Capt. Robert G. Carter, that he himself could have had anything up and including a brevet of colonel, the highest rank the board could confer. Amused at the spectacle, he declined to accept anything. More than 1,900 individuals in the regular army were then made the recipients of these honors. Some got five brevets, many got four, and three was probably the average, making the total of not less than 5,700. Some of the older officers, who had a couple of brevets left over from the Mexican War, could proudly claim as many as seven. In the report of the "miscellaneous" board, among hundreds of others, Reno was named for three: Major, to date from March 17, 1863. Lieutenant Colonel, to date from Oct. 19, 1864. Colonel, to date from March 13, 1865. In long lists these hundreds of names went from the War Department to the President and from the President to the Senate. Here they were presumably were read aloud, the Solons listening to names of persons most of whom they had never heard of before. Then the lists were referred to a committee and after a merely perfunctory hearing were brought back again to the chamber. But the weary Senators had heard enough. There was no second (even if there had been a first) reading of the names. The lists were chopped up into sections, and each of those presented in the form, "Capt. P.Q. Smith and others," : Lieut. A.B. Jones and others," and so on. Confirmation was by groups on one of these lists, among a number acted upon in the lump, on July 27, 1866, Reno got his brevets. Cullum, in his "Biographical Register," gives him also a brevet of brigadier-general, but I find no reference to this, either in General James B. Fry's supposedly complete list or in the Senate Executive Journal. As a matter of fact, Reno came out of the Civil War with no particular distinction. Graduating from West Point in 1857, he had the advantage of three years over Wesley Merritt, four years over George Custer and five years over Ronald MacKenzie. To paraphrase a saying of Napoleon's day, every West Point graduate of the time carried a general's epaulets in his knapsack. All that he had to do was to show, by conspicuous daring and ability, his right to wear them. Merritt, Custer, MacKenzie and a score or more of others early proved their worth and rose to high command and to world-wide fame. Reno at the end of the conflict was an undistinguished colonel of the 12th Pennsylvania cavalry and temporarily in command of a brigade, in Northern Virginia, far from the seat of war. He had only Mosby to deal with - Mosby the poor old tiger whose claws had been clipped - while the others, with desperate onslaught night and day were pushing Lee's veterans to their last stand. Merritt, under whom for a time Reno served, had a poor opinion of the man. To his onetime adjutant, Eben Swift, he told an incident of his having ordered Reno to make a personal reconnaissance of a part of the company's line. Reno neither went near the line nor returned to report. Merritt then sent another officer, who did his work with such a gallant disregard of danger as to draw the cheers of his enemies. When Swift asked how the Court of Inquiry could have rendered so astounding a verdict, Merritt replied: "Well, the officers wouldn't tell us anything, and we could do nothing more than damn Reno with faint praise." The Man Reno Reno, as said before, is not a happy figure to "heroize," and his professed admirers more or less recognize the fact. When, in falsetto, they praise Reno, they are striving to damn Custer. The Custerphobian frenzy is a strange thing. It stops at nothing. It drags Reno from oblivion, though realizing that the result is likely to prove disastrous to the memory of one they profess to honor. Within the brief period of three years he was twice dismissed from the army - at St. Paul, on May 1, 1877, and at Fort Meade, on April 1, 1880. Wire-pullers induced President Hayes to modify the first sentence to a two-years suspension. He was still serving his term during the sessions of the Court of Inquiry, but an indulgent War Department authorized him to wear his uniform. In the second case, efforts to save him were futile. Both instances though the fact was kept from the records were "women cases." The fact has nothing to do with his conduct at the Little Big Horn though obviously it had much to do with the opinions of his fellow officers. He was a hard drinker. At the battle he had a stock of whiskey in the packs and a flask in his pocket. A minister of high standing asserts that Reno confessed to him that he was drunk during the valley fight, but the confession is unconfirmed. Two packers, John Frett and B.F. Churchill, both reputable men, testified that on the night of June 25 he was in a dangerous mood, under the influence of liquor. Recorder Lee with honest indignation over Attorney Gilbert's effort to discredit these men, said that "the evidence even of mule-packers as to matters of fact, such as words or blows, threats to kill and the presence of whiskey, is as good as that of any one, however exalted until it is contradicted. There is no material contradiction in this case, even by the testimony of Major Reno, who gives evidence in his own behalf." Benteen's denial of the packers' testimony was obviously false and was disregarded by Lee. The case of Reno is a case for pity rather than condemnation. He was a natural weakling, in capable of conquering his weaknesses or of rising to his opportunities. The Custerphobes, in their passion for defaming Custer should let him rest in peace."
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Feb 1, 2006 10:13:36 GMT -6
Good info on Reno's character. However, Custer praised him prior to the LBH (I forget what incident) and still believed in him enough to send him to attack "fleeing Indians" at the LBH, rather than Benteen who was far more experienced and had a stronger personality.
What can we assume from this?
Was Custer a bad judge of character? Or did Custer have no choice but to use what he had for officers?
Remember also, many officers of the 7th were on assigned duty elsewhere.
|
|
|
Post by Tricia on Feb 1, 2006 10:14:40 GMT -6
JC--
Wonderful, wonderful excerpt. If you didn't like Reno before ... quite a character assassination, really; more deft than Van de Water!
When, in falsetto, they praise Reno ... Don't get Ghent angry!
LMC
|
|
|
Post by El Crab on Feb 1, 2006 16:31:14 GMT -6
Custer likely didn't have a choice. He had to give Reno a command, and likely gave Reno the attack to give him a chance to make up for his botched scout.
But on the other hand, keeping Reno and sending Benteen might point to Custer's lack of confidence in Reno. He gave Benteen a mission that included discretion and independence in action, while Reno was given explicit and simple orders.
And Custer really wanted another major in the field. He tried to get Merrill in the field, and Merrill was released from his duty back east, only to be blocked by Grant. Merrill had Indian War experience. This can all be found in Custer's Luck.
|
|
|
Post by elisabeth on Feb 2, 2006 6:43:04 GMT -6
Also, Custer gave Reno the mission on the assumption the Indians were running. All Reno had to do was chase them. How could he botch that?
It all changed when it turned out they weren't running, but counter-attacking in force. Hmmm ... Would Custer have been wiser to split off one battalion of his own command to reinforce Reno when he discovered that? If he had, Reno mightn't have folded so quickly, and it might have bought Custer the time to find a crossing further downstream.
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Feb 2, 2006 10:22:49 GMT -6
Elisabeth:
Good point about the possibility of Custer sending reinforcements to assist Reno. There is some evidence Custer was aware of Reno's situation and by sending 1-2 companies he may have averted Reno's rout, thereby holding warriors there while Custer attacked further down river.
|
|
|
Post by elisabeth on Feb 2, 2006 10:53:49 GMT -6
Yes, he had the opportunity as soon as the fight started -- the moment Cooke reported the situation to him (assuming he did). That would have been the time to do it.
Possibly not feasible once he got up on the bluffs; by then, it must have looked as if only the planned flank attack would do the trick.
|
|
|
Post by conz on Dec 14, 2007 13:56:14 GMT -6
Re-read Sgt White's testimony in Hardoff's book, and thought it ought to be posted somewhere that Reno students should see it:
"The ten men killed in the valley were only wounded when they fell from their horses and were finished up by about fifty Indian arrows when the Indians were making for Custer's column.
"Sgt. Thomas McLaughlin, of Co. H, told Maj. Reno that there should be some one sent to rescue the wounded, and Reno remarked that the Sergeant might get a detail and rescue them himself, if he wanted to. The poor wounded were butchered in sight of the seven companies, and there was no officer brave enough to go to help them. This had a discouraging effect on the men. If Col. Benteen had been in command there would have been a different tale to tell." -- SGT White, Co M
Clair
|
|
|
Post by mwkeogh on Dec 14, 2007 18:28:31 GMT -6
Good info on Reno's character. However, Custer praised him prior to the LBH (I forget what incident) and still believed in him enough to send him to attack "fleeing Indians" at the LBH, rather than Benteen who was far more experienced and had a stronger personality. What can we assume from this? I think you point out Custer's most serious blunder at LBH. Had he known that Reno would have 'folded his tent' so soon, he would have certainly sent Benteen in his place, or short of that, send Keogh's battalion of I and C into the valley to stiffen his spine and hold his position until Yates could cross at MTF and strike from the opposite side. Custer was not basing his decisions on his officer's character or abilities. He was going strictly in accordance to their seniority. As senior Battalion Commander, Reno was entitled to open the dance...a signal honor.
|
|
|
Post by elisabeth on Dec 15, 2007 7:44:53 GMT -6
Good point. If Reno had seen anything in the way of support coming from the expected direction, he'd probably have held his nerve.
There's another apparently small thing that may have had an effect, too: withdrawing Keogh himself. (Assuming he was, as Edgerly said Reno's officers had told him, just there for the fun of it rather than tasked with reporting back.) OK, it's just one individual ... but (a) it's one Reno knows well, (b) one with a great battle record, and (c) one who's actually looking forward to getting into the fight. A very reassuring presence. He'd have been second-in-command on Reno's scout; Reno could be depending on him to act as de facto second-in-command here too. Suddenly Reno looks around and finds he's vanished. He's left with three companies he's never worked with before, the capabilities of whose officers and NCOs he knows nothing about, and the best he's got as a right-hand-man is little Benny Hodgson ... His comfort zone has been stripped away to practically nothing. If Keogh had gone in with him, even without his two companies, it's hard to imagine things turning out the way they did. Reno would have had a grown-up to lean on, which could have made all the difference.
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 21, 2007 7:31:54 GMT -6
He could have gave him Benteen's mission.
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 21, 2007 7:38:52 GMT -6
Good point. If Reno had seen anything in the way of support coming from the expected direction, he'd probably have held his nerve. There's another apparently small thing that may have had an effect, too: withdrawing Keogh himself. (Assuming he was, as Edgerly said Reno's officers had told him, just there for the fun of it rather than tasked with reporting back.) OK, it's just one individual ... but (a) it's one Reno knows well, (b) one with a great battle record, and (c) one who's actually looking forward to getting into the fight. A very reassuring presence. He'd have been second-in-command on Reno's scout; Reno could be depending on him to act as de facto second-in-command here too. Suddenly Reno looks around and finds he's vanished. He's left with three companies he's never worked with before, the capabilities of whose officers and NCOs he knows nothing about, and the best he's got as a right-hand-man is little Benny Hodgson ... His comfort zone has been stripped away to practically nothing. If Keogh had gone in with him, even without his two companies, it's hard to imagine things turning out the way they did. Reno would have had a grown-up to lean on, which could have made all the difference. Can't agree more Elisabeth. There is a dynamic going on in the valley that goes beyond military protocol and tactics and occurs in real time to be second guessed by others forever. AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by harpskiddie on Dec 21, 2007 9:40:38 GMT -6
One thing is for sure - Keogh would not have led the line off the prairie without authority, or have been at Reno's shoulder, whispering "The Indians are getting all around us. We've got to get out of here."
Gordie MC
|
|