|
Post by mcaryf on Feb 28, 2008 10:29:36 GMT -6
Hi Fred
The idea of 4 or 500 Indians on the bluffs originates in Graham's Abstract of the RCOI it is quoted in Willert.
The comment in the Abstract is this:
"The Indians saw me about the same time I saw them and checked their pursuit. Four or five hundred came to the nearest point of land there; they were nearly a mile away. There were about nine hundred circling around in the bottom."
Thus they do not have to be on top of Weir Peaks but in that vicinity.
Regards
Mike
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Feb 28, 2008 12:05:53 GMT -6
From the on-line version of the COI
digicoll.library.wisc.edu
Benteen:
" . . . to my right I noticed 3 or 4 Indians, probably 4 or 500 yards from me . . ."
|
|
|
Post by fred on Feb 28, 2008 12:11:23 GMT -6
Mike--
"Crzhrs"'s version makes sense to me. That's probably what Benteen said, otherwise I think there would have been a lot more talk about it, both from the Indians' point of view and from men who had reached Reno Hill.
And thanks, Horse!
Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by conz on Feb 29, 2008 9:19:08 GMT -6
Here is some testimony concerning Indians chasing Reno going up to Weir hills...
"After soldiers stopped on hill, a bunch of Indians stopped on side of hill, and White Bull stopped there. From where we were standing on side of hill we saw another troops moving from the east toward the north, to where the fleeing camp was moving, and we charged; it was Custer. We went down the east side of the river and we rode straight to Custer. It was three miles from where we left Reno to Custer." – White Bull (Cheyenne)
"As we had finished with the Reno battle and were returning to camp we saw two men on the Reno Hills waving two blankets as hard as they could. Two of us rode over to where they were, and they yelled to us that the genuine stuff was coming, and they were going to get our women and children. I went over with the others and peeped over the hills and saw the soldiers advancing. As I looked along the line of the ridge they seemed to fill the whole hill. It looked as if there were thousands of them, and I thought we would surely be beaten. As I returned I saw hundreds of Sioux. I looked into their eyes and they looked different -- they were filled with fear." -- Runs The Enemy
"Just as I arrived where our men were, the report came to us that another party was coming to attack us. We could not see them from where we were. The report was that they were coming to head off the women and children from the way they were going, and so we turned around and went towards them. Our men moved around in the direction of a circle, but I cut across to a knoll and looked up the river and saw them coming down." Note: this elevation may have been Wier point. – Iron Thunder
"I did not get with the Reno Fight, being after my horse, but after it was over bands of Indians had crossed the river and were gathering around on the east side (probably going over to that side) I and another rode up Medicine Tail coulee and started east (parallel with the river) toward Reno Hill and discovered soldiers coming down the ravine…" - Shave Elk
“Then I looked a few moments at the battling Indians and soldiers across the river on the hills to the northeastward. More and more Indians were flocking from the camps to that direction. Some were yet coming along the hills from where the first soldiers had stopped. The soldiers now in view were spreading themselves into lines along a ridge. The Indians were on lower ridges in front of them, between them and the river, and were moving on around up a long coulee to get behind the white men.” – Wooden Leg, Cheyenne
“The Indians had crossed the Greasy Grass Creek (Little Bighorn) above where Custer tried to cross, in great numbers, and cut him off from Reno. They got around behind (east) him.” – Feather Earring
“When I got to the line of battle -- I thought I was quick, but I found a lot of Sioux already there -- they were rushing on up the hill. We were all naked, and the soldiers with their pack saddles and their uniforms on and their black horses looked like great big buffalo. The Sioux were all riding up the hill. We saw one lone Indian on the hill going down toward the soldiers, and the river. We could not see him as he came down the hill, but we could see the smoke coming from under his horse's head, and we all thought that he was going to make a charge on the soldiers, and we all charged. It seemed as though that one Indian had the attention of all the soldiers, and they were all firing at him. When we saw that the smoke was all going toward the soldiers that gave us a chance to charge from this side, and we all made a rush. When we made the charge we got them all stampeded. For smoke and dust we could not see the soldiers as they retreated toward the river. The Sioux were fresh, and we soon caught up with them.” – Runs The Enemy (Two Kettle)
I'm sure there are many more such stories, but I think plainly there were at least dozens, if not hundreds, of Warriors on the bluffs in the Weir Point area, and between Custer and Reno, at some time between when Custer's command moved down into the MTC and Reno's command arrived at the top of the bluffs in his retreat.
Many, if not most, of these Warriors would have ridden towards Custer over Weir Point...some perhaps on the very trail Custer took...many probably taking a short cut over the ridge itself. I'm sure at least Keogh, if not Custer, saw these Natives approaching along their path, and visualized what must have happened to Reno accordingly.
Clair
|
|
|
Post by rootine4 on May 3, 2017 15:55:27 GMT -6
A thought here: Perhaps GAC in his original plan to go down Medicine Tail Coulee and cross ford B ran into a whole bunch of hostiles and could not get down MTC, so rather had to go up on the ridge. The fire line looks like it could be supressive fire against a bunch coming up MTC. Then in order to try it again he had some troops lay a base of fire toward ford B (Nye - Cartwright) but couldn't get down there with any force either--there is very little soldier evidence found anywhere in the ford B area. In otherwords, MTC and Luce Ridge was Custer's 'skirmish line' and 'timber fight'. And he ran into the same situation that Reno did...and reacted much the same way. Jas~ A thought from me. I am perhaps not as familiar as you with this phase of the battle as I do not know how many cartridge casings were found here but might not this firing line be the volley fire reported by men on Reno Hill. I have held it as a theory that the volley fire wasn't so much direct fire aimed at a particular detachment of Lakota or Cheyenne as much as it was a signal to Benteen and the pack train as to the whereabouts of Custer. Thoughts? Also, I am under the impression that U.S. Army procedures of the mid-19th century and later might entail commanders directing volley fire at a particularly concentrated target of opportunity before individual troops are permitted to "fire at will," wherever a target presents itself. The Lakota report that a fire fight broke out at the ford when troops feinted at or probed the village and that they were reinforced by a larger body at which point the troops withdrew to higher ground. Is it worth considering that part of GAC's command fired in support of troops retreating from the ford as the Lakota presented a relatively concentrated target, for a change, in MTC? I have not done any recent reading but stumbled across this thread in search of placing Sgt. Butler's marker on a map for a powerpoint I had prepared.
|
|
|
Post by fred on May 3, 2017 17:39:05 GMT -6
... I do not know how many cartridge casings were found here but might not this firing line be the volley fire reported by men on Reno Hill. I have held it as a theory that the volley fire wasn't so much direct fire aimed at a particular detachment of Lakota or Cheyenne as much as it was a signal to Benteen and the pack train as to the whereabouts of Custer. Thoughts? Also, I am under the impression that U.S. Army procedures of the mid-19th century and later might entail commanders directing volley fire at a particularly concentrated target of opportunity before individual troops are permitted to "fire at will," wherever a target presents itself. The Lakota report that a fire fight broke out at the ford when troops feinted at or probed the village and that they were reinforced by a larger body at which point the troops withdrew to higher ground. Is it worth considering that part of GAC's command fired in support of troops retreating from the ford as the Lakota presented a relatively concentrated target, for a change, in MTC? Over 100 cases were found on Luce Ridge and 214 were found on Nye-Cartwright, the adjacent ridge. The first part of your questions... yes, this was the volley firing reportedly heard on Reno Hill. As for a signal as opposed to directed fire, I reject that contention. If you do a full-scale timing study of the battle (you will find one in my book), you will see there was little need for signaling and considerably more need for directed fire: at least three distinct firing targets. Your comment regarding firing-at-will is correct. There was no feint at Ford B, but you could consider the movement there a probe. Firing took place and it was probably more concentrated from the Indian side than from the troops. The troops withdrew, but not because of increasing warrior numbers. Archaeological evidence found along the pullback route supports that contention. Some of the firing from Nye-Cartwright supports your thesis of supporting fires during a pullback from Ford B. Anything concerning MTC, however, had occurred a short while earlier. The supporting fire for the pullback was directed into Deep Coulee and its flats. And by the way, 1SG Butler's marker is currently misplaced. In all likelihood, he died in Deep Coulee, not on the bluffs where his marker is currently located. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by dave on May 4, 2017 9:14:44 GMT -6
Fred I realize you have many irons in the fire but miss your comments and informative posts. Regards Dave
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on May 8, 2017 11:15:27 GMT -6
Since when does the military use firing as a signal, during the Indians Wars or now? Back during the Indian Wars one would send a messenger like the two Sergeants Custer sent to Benteen and John Martini to Benteen. Kanipe is still an open question as whether he was an actual messenger or someone thinking the command was not going to come out of this and I'd better save my rear-end!
The volley fire was exactly that . . . volley fire to keep warriors at bay . . . not a message to Reno and/or Benteen that were a good 4 miles away or more.
Custer was facing a force of warriors far stronger than anticipated and he along with other officers were trying to keep them as far away from the command as possible.
we know how that ended up!
|
|
|
Post by montrose on May 8, 2017 17:38:19 GMT -6
1. Signals are preplanned and are part of the operations order. A random gun or cannon shot is meaningless.
2. Signals are also designed to be distinct and not an accident. You want to fail a patrol in Ranger school; initiate an ambush with a rifle. The cadre will have an accidental discharge early, blow your ambush and flunk you.
3. A volley is extremely unreliable. The Indians liked rushes and bravery charges. Tis causes a burst of firing indistinguishable from a volley.
4. Volley firing likely did occur on LCN, as a fire control measure. They were shooting at targets ridiculously out of range 800 plus meters with a weapon with a max effective range of 300. I assume they were trying to keep stray Indians on the east side of river away from LTC Custer's leader's recon patrol.
5. The only signal the northern element sent to the rest of the regiments was sent with Martini, and it was badly written gibberish, unworthy of being called a fragmentary order (FRAGO).
|
|
|
Post by wild on May 18, 2017 16:58:26 GMT -6
4. Volley firing likely did occur on LCN, as a fire control measure Unless a volley is directed it's a waste of time and ammo. And I doubt if officers could give fire control orders such as we have today.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on May 19, 2017 5:36:00 GMT -6
4. Volley firing likely did occur on LCN, as a fire control measureUnless a volley is directed it's a waste of time and ammo. And I doubt if officers could give fire control orders such as we have today. 1. My point for years has been that officers and NCOs at LBH allowed excessive firing at ridiculous range. They didn't waste time, they wasted ammo. The individual cartridge box held 20 rounds. Twenty. Think about that. 2. You are wrong with respect to fire control orders. Drill manuals and training procedures from this era prove this. I know you are a trained soldier, so you lose me here. I have posted manuals from this era before, I can not find the links at the moment.
|
|
|
Post by benteen on May 19, 2017 13:03:59 GMT -6
Colonel/ Richard
Just a thought. I believe the concept of volley fire was created because among other things, the muskets were smooth bore an very inaccurate. So rather than have a soldier try to hit a target they simply sent a wall of lead down range and figured they would get some hits on the enemy
I realize that the 7th rifles were rifled and more accurate, but in the hands of untrained men, what difference would it make. They couldnt hit anything anyway. Is it possible that the Officers knew this and by the same reasoning just had them fire a wall of lead down range and figuring that they would get some hits, just as they felt in the smooth bore era,
As to firing at 8oo yards, I cant even come close to a reason for that.
Be Well Dan
|
|
|
Post by wild on May 19, 2017 16:30:32 GMT -6
Good points Dan. The era of a lot of lead being flung down range was probably the order of the day. Musketry was in transition with rates of fire and effective ranges increasing with every passing year. My guess [and it is only a guess] is that fire power was outstripping fire control and tactics. The 7th not knowing if they were flesh or fowl , caught between a musket and a sabre made do with compromise to wit the free firing ineffective skermish line. But I'm really not equipted to engage this subject and would bow to whatever the good Colonel opined, Best Regards Richard
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on May 20, 2017 6:10:04 GMT -6
The rifled barrel was also the end of the horse mounted cavalry. With the muzzle loader smoothbores the volley would be at approximately 50 yards. The horse after that volley could close the distance before a reload so it was effective. With a rifled barrel you could engage at greater distances and fire more than one shot.
Regards
AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Feb 6, 2022 19:58:10 GMT -6
|
|