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Post by AZ Ranger on Nov 7, 2008 7:57:01 GMT -6
Before we beat use of manuals to death. I don't believe they were ever meant to be text books for classroom instruction rather a guidebook of the current thinking, suggested training standards, use of weapon systems. The manual are the basics which everyone should know. There was a lot more training and I have my stenobook with my hand written notes also. I don't believe the instructors ad libbed each day. There had to be a lesson plan of some kind.
Looking at my Marine Corps manual which I received from an NCO it reflects the weapon systems, formations and training at the time I served.
The NCO's did most of the instruction but the weapon system were not their choice. The uniforms and which to wear was not thier choice. The formations and locations of persons in the formations were not their choice. We followed what I observed in the manual. The rifle teams in a squad are in the manual. We learned the use of the compass it is in the manual. I bet todays manuals have GPS. My manual has the M14 and M16A1 and that is the weapon system we used. Patrolling, scouting, recon, are in the manual along with squad tactics.
I don't remember anyone saying turn to page 24 of the manual but I do remember standing in formation and asked my GENERAL ORDERS, and a description of the weapon that I presented at inspection arms. I studied the manual to answer those questions. I was second squad leader in boot camp and made sure my squad studied or else I suffered.
So I believe the manuals are indicators of current thinking of the and some standards and equipment usage of the time period. Whether they were used, adhered too, or ignored is not as important since some may have and others did not in the 1870s. Of course the to fix to that is basic training in a more of controlled environment. The Marine Corps has two the Swamp and Disneyland.
The bottom line is that to say someone is trained is the expectation to demonstrate the training in real life conditions. It is not acceptable to say they met standards if they set their own and ignored whatever they felt like.
What indications are there that anyone fought as cavalry rather then mounted carbines? Where was the recon? Where was the fighting from horseback in Reno's retrograde? That is something that should have been trained for and does not require a command to implement. If someone is riding up next to you to kill you do something. I can not find anything that says a properly trained cavalryman does not defend himself at the true gallop under any condition. The fact that some of the NCOs stated they engaged in fierce one-on-one fighting in the retrograde indicates to me some were better trained but in general the Indians were not impressed.
AZ Ranger
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Post by conz on Nov 7, 2008 12:51:02 GMT -6
Just because you enlist in the army and they put you in the cavalry does not make you a cavalryman does it? If you are a proficient cavalryman then you would not need training. I think you miss the whole point here...Regular Army units are rarely (never?), formed from scratch...all recruits. They have NCOs. These NCOs may not even be able to read, back in that day (some not so well today either, by modern standards). But they know their craft like the back of their hand...and this is how Soldiers REALLY get trained. Those are the men being trained, for Pete's sake...NOT the men doing the training! He will be after six months on the prairie under an old, grizzled, NCO! And neither he, nor the NCO, will have ever cracked open ANY manual. Clair |
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Post by conz on Nov 7, 2008 12:57:02 GMT -6
AZ,
Modern Soldiers have access to technical manuals...normally about their equipment. Most privates, though, don't get tactical manuals...those are reserved for higher ranking NCOs and officers.
Back then, I doubt many Soldiers even got these, nor did NCOs. I believe that a regiment only had a couple copies of manuals. West Point officers may have some manuals from their classes they they brought out West with them in their allotted "professional libraries" every officer was supposed to have, but I'm betting not many could keep those current as the years went by.
Us modern Soldiers had SQT manuals, etc., thanks to the luxury of our society, but I don't think the cash-strapped Army of the post-Civil War era had many. Even in the Civil War, each company was lucky to get any manual to drill by...often entire regiments had to share a couple just to learn the manual of arms, and they had few Regulars to teach them. Civil War training was a real mess and challenge...our post-Civil War Army was MUCH, MUCH better trained than any of our Civil War regiments were.
The manuals the Army did produce in the late 19th-C were very valuable, but only to the officer trainers. They learned the manuals, especially any new doctrine or equipment coming out, and these couple officers per regiment taught the rest of the officers in daily officer's classes, and then these company officers went out and tried to convince their Sergeants that this new way of doing things was an improvement. It usually was an "item-by-item" change in methods.
The 99% of daily training every Soldier got each year was mostly the stuff experienced NCOs knew by just being Soldiers for so long, and they passed their craft on to their junior NCOs and Soldiers...both in garrison and whilst on patrols.
Clair
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Post by conz on Nov 7, 2008 13:09:40 GMT -6
One thing to keep in mind about these Regular units...none of them were created totally from scratch, like Civil War volunteer regiments were. Except for the initial creation of the new cavalry regiments, which still had a lot of experienced Civil War, and Regular Army, officers and NCOs in them, the unit was never "scratch" again.
So for every year after that initial forming, most of the men were the same from the year before. Typically only 20-30% of the men turned over each year, either by resigning, failing to re-enlist, deserting, or medically disabled. The bulk of the men, and especially the bulk of the NCOs and officers, remained stable.
So you never get a case where lots of men need to learn anything from scratch. And what's more, you have some very experienced officers and NCOs that know their craft very well...all you do with them is continuous improvement of their training methods and teach them new doctrine or equipment now and then.
So the level of training of any company in the Regular Army is normally very high all the time...it's not like they need to be trained in particular for any given mission. They do some "sprucing up" normally before going out on a big operation...often because such units are suddenly given training time and resources (ammo) to go on such above their peacetime allotments, and they take full advantage of that.
But the 7th was well trained in 1868, and in '72, and in '76, and in '85, '98, '18, '44, and 2003...all about the same. There is no reason to believe that there was a significant difference between any of these periods, relative to the standards of that time.
Clair
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Nov 7, 2008 16:27:47 GMT -6
Hunk, All that about the post-Civil War army is fine, but what do you think it is really saying? Does it mean the Army of the late 19th Century was no better trained than militia? That is was nothing more than a social club? That it was a disgrace to the American military? Do you think the officers and NCOs of that army were not doing their jobs? BTW, we say even WORSE things about the post-Vietnam War army...so how bad was THAT? And the post-WWII army...remember "Task Force Smith?" Yet I recall that we won all the wars that those "bad" armies later went into, eh? And all our enemies lost...so how good do you HAVE to be? The great Gen'l Pershing was class of '86, after all. Couldn't have been too bad an army...even in our "darkest days." Soldiers learn to deal with the dark. Clair
Clair, What it is saying is that the period in question was not the finest in the history of U.S. Army standards. Whoever peopled the army, including the 7th Cavalry at that time, may well have been trying to do their best, but the evidence suggests that most of the officers, NCO's and enlisted men of the period were not of the same calibre as those who had mustered out at the end of the CW. It is not surprising that after the slaughter of the CW, most Americans, including CW vets, were sick and tired of death and warfare, or that those who did enlist in the post-war Regular Army did so in the main for far more mundane reasons than fighting for a cause or pride in their regiment. You can dress up your arguments with generalities such as 'grizzled sergeants' who would have been drilling the men in their charge etc., but the reality is that most of the sergeants and other NCO's were relatively young men who nearly always found their Companies undermanned, suffering from constant desertions and engaged in non-martial activities. Not a scenario to promote zeal, especially when the majority did not have it in the first place. There is no doubt that you will always try and convince the rest of us that the 7th was as well trained as it needed to be, but the great weight of evidence dictates otherwise. Hunk |
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Post by BrokenSword on Nov 7, 2008 17:45:39 GMT -6
Hunk is exactly right. And it doesn’t stop with the Civil War vs. Indian War armies. People get a belly full of the casualty lists, maimed returnees, empty chairs at tables and the seemingly endless nature of most conflicts. When any great war effort concludes, this society (at least) always wants to turn to other endeavors. The military invariably suffers budget reduction affecting its numbers, equipment and training. All, usually, are allowed to slip below what should be mimimums of strength and preparedness.
The Korean Conflict began only about five years after the conclusion of WWII but the numbers, and quality of the troops initially tasked with fighting that war were not comparable to what they were five years before, and those who had fought WWII to the conclusion were vastly better in September 1945 than they had been on December 7th, 1941.
After the Vietnam War, the US military was allowed to again fall to scandalous levels in many areas, comparable to, perhaps, the state of the army of the Indian Wars. Beginning in 1981, a rare emphasis (in the absence of a ‘hot’ war) was focused on the US military in the form of budget increases resulting in building its strength of numbers, training and equipage resulting in the impressive Desert Storm liberation of Kuwait.
But after that, a so called ‘peace dividend’ was declared, and monies were directed elsewhere. Numbers were reduced to the point that we now hear those that oversaw the reductions, offering loud criticism that we do not now have enough soldiers to do what we need to do.
None of that is to the discredit of the soldiers in any of those conflicts. The dedication of those who stuck with the services in the lean and neglectful times, speaks volumes to their character, and they need no defending. Right or wrong, and for better or worse that is how we choose to be and what we, as a nation, consider to be our priorities. The troops have always done the best they could do, with what they were given in the way of support. I again refer all to Kipling’s ‘Tommy Atkins.’
M
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Post by Dark Cloud on Nov 7, 2008 18:25:46 GMT -6
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Post by BrokenSword on Nov 7, 2008 19:17:43 GMT -6
Thank you, DC. Your entry is now the front runner in the funniest thing I've seen all week contest. Don't become excited - no cash award is involved.
I am not, and will not be afraid. The worm will turn. The day approaches when sanity returns, and whites from the red states shall dominate once more. White males, that is - naturally.
BS
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Post by Dark Cloud on Nov 9, 2008 10:37:18 GMT -6
Red states now often - not always - conform to the obese states also housing the most demented religious groupings, so don't get your hopes up.
Also, you might research the military budget a great deal more and track out the time between concept, approval, and appearence in the arsenal. The military was redoing itself during and immediately after the Vietnam War, being their job and all. Carter had many faults but he was military elite himself (nuclear subs). In any case, if you want to discuss all that start a new thread.
Back to the notional 1870's cavalry training.
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Post by BrokenSword on Nov 9, 2008 15:49:20 GMT -6
No need for a new thread or any further discussions, other than to say that I have a vague awareness of budgeting processes (no doubt coming as a great relief to you), and was careful not to name names or point at any particular administrations. Approval of, and funding for, are sometimes two different things. As you and I both understand, presidents are often credited for those things they deserve no credit for, just as they are often unfairly condemned for those things for which they are not at fault. Generals as well. That’s simply politics. Always has been, and always will be.
The predictably cyclic nature of wartime and post-war attentions to the needs of a military structure was my point to Clair. The examples previously outlined are valid, in my opinion, when examining and considering what the state of preparedness the Seventh Cavalry (and all other branches of the Service) was - in 1876.
The 1945 (World War II) to 1950 (Korean Conflict) era may cast some light, and be comparable to the attitudes that gained sway in the 1865-’76 time frame. In very many things, we today are not so far removed from the Roman Republic’s citizenry and the methodologies employed to deal with its demands and desires. In short, people separated by even 2,000 years still act in the same general and basic ways. That may go double for politicians.
The transitory national mood of any country in any time period, will affect the priorities of its politicians. Appeasing the mob is the name of the game and an art, and their practice and application are not always in the best interests of mob, but rather to the best interests of those lawmakers who do the appeasing. There is never enough money for Congress to do all that it wants to do, or maybe needs to do, and a postwar military is usually the first fertile ground surveyed for the harvesting of additional funds.
Peacetime allows for justifiably reduced military spending, but problems occur when spending falls beneath the line of actual need to foster preparedness for the next time. Again, the soldiers make do with what they have, and their commanders do the best they can with what they are handed when that next time comes. If they fall short, cases can be made that the old rule of, ‘You get what you pay for,’ has been proven yet one more time. The fingers of blame and shame will be quickly pointed in the Army’s direction, just the same, but the restored funds will follow the spin. Politics again.
Soooo… there is not a doubt in my mind that the Seventh Cavalry was not what it should have been in 1876. What ever veterans of the Civil War were still in its ranks, and especially the lawmakers in Congress, had forgotten the lessons their Union Army had learned early in that previous war, about becoming slack. Glorious military achievements of an earlier day are not transferable, and neither do they accrue as credits for any future need.
M
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Post by biggordie on Nov 9, 2008 18:39:27 GMT -6
They also forgot to pass the budget that included pay for the military. One wonders why there were any officers or soldiers left. If memory serves, the officers were not paid for about a year. Methinks the details are on these boards somewhere and could be searched for.
Said frugality , plus the fact that the frontier troops were used more as construction battalions than anything else would, one thinks, not contribute to a highly-motivated or well-trained group, whatever one might want to think.
One thinks.
Gordie
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Post by Dark Cloud on Nov 10, 2008 10:13:46 GMT -6
The restrictions Jeb Stuart's Father in Law put on Ft. Phil Kearny would be hysterically funny if it hadn't unnecessarily killed people, red and white.
In order to placate the South, broke and destitute and angry about being occupied, the military was greatly reduced in exchange for Southern votes, and the far away frontier be damned. Nobody east of the Mississippi lived in fear of the Indians and the vast majority had never seen one.
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Post by conz on Nov 10, 2008 11:24:23 GMT -6
What it is saying is that the period in question was not the finest in the history of U.S. Army standards. Whoever peopled the army, including the 7th Cavalry at that time, may well have been trying to do their best, but the evidence suggests that most of the officers, NCO's and enlisted men of the period were not of the same calibre as those who had mustered out at the end of the CW. I very much disagree with that. What was the difference between the officers and NCOs of the Plains Wars and those of the Civil War? NOTHING. If anything, the young officers who went to West Point during the Civil War and just after, with instructors who were combat veterans from that war, should have had every advantage in training and preparation for combat. The Regular Army NCOs coming out of the Civil War would pass their vast experience onto the younger NCOs promoted after the war, and so on. I find it incredible that we could believe that the NCOs of through the rest of the 1800s could be any less qualified and professional as those going into our Civil War. Why would that be? What sense would that make? I've read over and over that just the opposite was true...that many civilians, having gone through the Civil War as NCO's, found Army life so exciting compared to the mundane world of civilian trades that they reenlisted in droves to get into the Regular Army. That was certainly true of officers, as we all know...why wouldn't it be true of NCO's as well? Men LIKE being Soldiers...all the more so for suffering through a war. So they tend to stay Soldiers, regardless of the hardship. These are great, tough, no-nonsense, experienced NCOs. That rather typifies the Regular Army of any age. I think you have a very distorted view of the Army NCO. Where did you get such an image? Other than some people complaining that they can't get enough training, which is ALWAYS the case, even in TODAY's army, where in any combat action do you see problems caused by inadequate training? That is the real key, I think. I very much dispute your implication that this was not a well-trained, very deadly, very determined, and very competent professional military outfit. The Warriors here defeated one of America's best fighting organizations...I wouldn't take anything away from them. Clair |
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Post by conz on Nov 10, 2008 11:28:08 GMT -6
Soooo… there is not a doubt in my mind that the Seventh Cavalry was not what it should have been in 1876. What ever veterans of the Civil War were still in its ranks, and especially the lawmakers in Congress, had forgotten the lessons their Union Army had learned early in that previous war, about becoming slack. Glorious military achievements of an earlier day are not transferable, and neither do they accrue as credits for any future need. M Haven't much faith in our professional Soldiers, do you? And here we are at Veteran's day....sigh. These guys are Regular Army, people...not a bunch of ragamuffin militia in for the duration of the conflict, only. These NCOs and officers have dedicated their lives to creating the best combat outfits they can, with the resources at hand. And in times of tight budgets it is incredible the resourcefulness they use in making the companies ready to fight. These men were on a mission, and it was a life they loved to lead. If you think otherwise, then you don't have a very high opinion of professional American Soldiers. It wasn't a job for most of them...it was a calling and way of life. Clair |
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Post by clansman on Nov 10, 2008 12:39:20 GMT -6
No matter how young the NCOs are, they are dedicated professional soldiers. They take pride in their careers, they take pride in their units. Zeal is not an issue, pride and dedication are. If you are watching any of the WW1 footage you will see true dedication and heroism, spurred on by officers and NCOs.
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