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Post by clw on Oct 24, 2008 11:54:05 GMT -6
The attack on that camp caused a literal explosion similar to kicking over an ant nest. I won't buy for a moment warriors bugging out with no regard for the families -- in the chaos many warriors died doing just what you say they didn't. Within minutes of the assault, the troops controlled the village. The only chance was to escape and try to regroup. We know of many family groups, defended by their warriors, trying to fight or hide or run --in other words survive in any way possible.
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Post by conz on Oct 24, 2008 11:55:03 GMT -6
In the Big Book of Bevo Officer Pretend, maybe, or in the latest Miniver Cheevy Report! (the subscription is free). If the US cavalry was so trained, of course, it would explain the painful results through the years of the Indian Wars. Indians had no flanks, no front. They didn't fight that way. They didn't utilize "indirect fire" either, because they weren't organized to do so. They were little better organized than a street gang defending their turf. They didn't react like an actual army would because they could only know what they, as individuals, were seeing, which wasn't much however less dense the dust became in memory, helped by translators and less than objective chroniclers. There was no command keeping units working together, primarily because there were no actual units, either, except by situational coincidence. If the US Army was trained to nail that to the ground and attack from all sides, it was as stupid as nailing water to the ground and splashing in the puddle. It only made sense against a similar trained army. For proof, look at the Washita, where absolutely everything was in the 7th's favor and remarkably few warriors were killed. That was because the warriors - despite all the hysterical NA claims - did NOT hang around to defend the women and children, many of whom became captive. They booted out of there right quick. Capitalize warriors all you want. This insistence upon viewing this battle of the LBH within the straightjacket of military formations and procedures makes no sense, given there's tender evidence it was that organized by either side and the sure evidence of the result. LOL...I DARE you to go over to the Native Americans Forum and say that! Clair |
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Post by conz on Oct 24, 2008 11:59:38 GMT -6
The attack on that camp caused a literal explosion similar to kicking over an ant nest. I won't buy for a moment warriors bugging out with no regard for the families -- in the chaos many warriors died doing just what you say they didn't. Within minutes of the assault, the troops controlled the village. The only chance was to escape and try to regroup. We know of many family groups, defended by their warriors, trying to fight or hide or run --in other words survive in any way possible. It shouldn't be hard to believe that the Native American Warriors were like most human groups...you have your brave, even foolish, "die-hards" and you have your cowards, and most are in between. In a surprise situation, before the war chiefs have time to gather a bunch of Warriors together, it is often every man for himself when a cavalry column overruns a village (which happened most of the time they found one). So some men died beside their tipis, and some men ran even faster than their own wives and children. Most took the middle course...they tried to grab their families and get to the hills, fighting as necessary to keep a Soldier's hands off him or his family, often dying along the way to try to allow his family to escape. I believe that most Braves really were brave. Clair |
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Post by crzhrs on Oct 24, 2008 12:59:58 GMT -6
When you consider the steps warriors took to retreive a fallen comrade rather than let them be taken/killed by an enemy . . . I find it hard to believe that warriors/men would abandon their families.
Not saying it couldn't happen . . . but it would have to be under extreme conditions to leave loved ones in the hands of their enemies.
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Post by conz on Oct 26, 2008 18:46:11 GMT -6
From My Life On the Plains, time of Hancock's expedition:
"To break the monotony and give the horses and men exercise, buffalo hunts were organized in which officers and men joined heartily. I know of no better drill for perfecting men in the use of firearms on horseback and thoroughly accustoming them to the saddle, than buffalo hunting over a moderately rough country. No amount of riding under the best of drillmasters will give that confidence and security in the saddle which will result from a few spirited charges into a buffalo herd." - GA Custer
Training in the field - innovative training - marksmanship without ranges, and no worries about ammo.
Clair
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 26, 2008 19:36:13 GMT -6
From My Life On the Plains, time of Hancock's expedition: "To break the monotony and give the horses and men exercise, buffalo hunts were organized in which officers and men joined heartily. I know of no better drill for perfecting men in the use of firearms on horseback and thoroughly accustoming them to the saddle, than buffalo hunting over a moderately rough country. No amount of riding under the best of drillmasters will give that confidence and security in the saddle which will result from a few spirited charges into a buffalo herd." - GA Custer Training in the field - innovative training - marksmanship without ranges, and no worries about ammo. Clair It was published in 1874. This would be the 1860's 7th correct? What ammo did they have then? Was it black powder and lead or a puny rim fire? They did not have the Springfield and the 45-70 cartridge yet. You mean like shooting your horse in the head? That was a revolver wasn't it and was it a cap and ball/? They hunted buffalo by riding close to them and shooting at almost point blank range not much marksmanship training. Big animal at close range. The also shot buffalo from trains how hard of hunt can it be? I am not convinced that what was done in the 1860's means that troops were trained to the same level in 1876. AZ Ranger PS As of October 1870 there was 10, 506,657 rounds of serviceable carbine ammunition in storage for the Spencer cal .52 and 4,087,966 rounds for the Spencer cal .50. So ammunition was not the same concern as for the 45-70 and 45-55 carbines. At the time of production old machinery was used to produce the inferior cartridge cases of copper gilding because there was not enough money to update to the machinery that could make the brass cartridge case. |
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Post by conz on Oct 31, 2008 6:22:58 GMT -6
Some more notes on Regular Army training on the Plains, these out of Kershaw's LBH book, Red Sabbath:
"The near decoy disaster had convinced him that the troops needed remedial training to take on hostile warriors. Infantry firing practices despite ammunition shortages were ordered daily after Retreat, as also for the cavalry. Carrington clearly misunderstood the requirements of combat."
This evidence shows how commanders in the field do what they believe is necessary to train their units, irrespective of any regulations on the matter.
"Powell assiduously trained his men to use the new Allen conversions and identified his best company marksmen. these, he directed, were to be served by less-capable shots as loaders."
Commanders in the field pretty much do as they please, as they find necessary. Army-level regulations, budgets and statements aren't very good indicators what is really going on in combat units spread out in the field, then or today.
Clair
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 31, 2008 7:48:18 GMT -6
Some more notes on Regular Army training on the Plains, these out of Kershaw's LBH book, Red Sabbath: "The near decoy disaster had convinced him that the troops needed remedial training to take on hostile warriors. Infantry firing practices despite ammunition shortages were ordered daily after Retreat, as also for the cavalry. Carrington clearly misunderstood the requirements of combat."This evidence shows how commanders in the field do what they believe is necessary to train their units, irrespective of any regulations on the matter. "Powell assiduously trained his men to use the new Allen conversions and identified his best company marksmen. these, he directed, were to be served by less-capable shots as loaders."Commanders in the field pretty much do as they please, as they find necessary. Army-level regulations, budgets and statements aren't very good indicators what is really going on in combat units spread out in the field, then or today. Clair Conz So the infantry was prepared. So what? Isn't that Terry's complaint about Custer that he did as he pleased. Giving examples of training of other units or the same unit a decade earlier is not evidence of a battle ready condition for the 7th in 1876. In fact haven't you shown that other units have documented they trained so the argument that the 7th in 1876 was at least equal to the the others let alone the elite status you supported needs documentation. I believe Godfrey's desire to instruct horsemanship is based upon his observations. The training existed before but was deemed not necessary. The transition to the new weapon systems 45-70 carbine and Colt 45 revolvers had just begun. How many days was the entire regiment together for preparation for the battle? When was Custer physically present to insure himself of battle readiness. For example when did Custer realize the need for packs, packers, and pack animals and when did he actually do something to insure the packtrain would support the mission without being a burden or slow the operation? Was the command united and working together with very little communication needed or was it divided, thrown together for a short period time before going into battle? In respect to firearms, in order for you to be correct you would have to demonstrate there was surplus ammunition that could be used regardless of orders. Certainly there was for the 1860's carbines. For the entire year of 1876 the 7th received approximately 286,000 rounds of carbine ammunition issued. I am sure that a lot of it was used to train new troops and field operations after June 1876. I understand that the Army never has as much ammunition devoted to training as police. In order to get everyone in a class of 17 through 8 days of training and qualification with 70 percent hits at ranges to 25 yards with a handgun we expended 30,000 rounds of 9 mm or approximately 1750 rounds per student. I also believe that in the Marine Corps between boot camp, BITS , and Staging before going to Viet Nam I shot hundreds of rounds also in two weapons M14 and M16A1. AZ Ranger |
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Post by conz on Oct 31, 2008 8:14:39 GMT -6
So the infantry was prepared. So what? Isn't that Terry's complaint about Custer that he did as he pleased. Giving examples of training of other units or the same unit a decade earlier is not evidence of a battle ready condition for the 7th in 1876. In fact haven't you shown that other units have documented they trained so the argument that the 7th in 1876 was at least equal to the the others let alone the elite status you supported needs documentation. That is more lawyer attitude (policeman attitude?), than historian attitude, I think. Such documentation almost never exists, and even if it did, it would still be suspect as reflecting reality. You have to intuit what the REALITY is, not what evidence is missing. So I think the proper approach is to ASSUME that the 7th Cavalry was just as well prepared for combat as most professional militaries are in all armies, in all ages, and then see if there is convincing evidence that it isn't. If you understand how small combat units train and prepare themselves on a routine basis, you can better understand what the officers and NCOs were doing every month of every year they existed, whether in the Civil War, on the Plains, or doing occupation duty in the South. Did you see what kind of training Godfrey was proposing? He wanted more instruction on "dressage movements" and high ecole like they did at the French Cavalry school in Samur. It is wonderful for great riders to do...it is TOTALLY unnecessary, and waste of time, for the rank and file to learn it. And I don't think Godfrey was really advocating that the rank and file do dressage...he was aiming at the officers and senior NCOs, for which such higher equitation would be useful. It was together for weeks and weeks...ever since it assembled at FT Lincoln. That was more "together" regimental-level training than they would ever need. The important training was inside each company, and they need no "togetherness" to train on 95% of what they needed to know for combat. As it was, the units seem to ride in large formations just fine that day and before...I've read no complaints about the ability of the companies to ride together in various formations as battalions and a regiment. That's good training. Who cares about what Custer does? Training is NCO business. I agree that the men weren't well trained on how to pack a mule efficiently. Some were...the 7th had used them before, but many were not. It was a training deficiency, and that IS the NCO's fault for not foreseeing that it would be helpful. Of course, maybe the problems were less with the men, since lots of them DID know how to run and pack mules, and more with the mules, who were not properly trained to tolerate packs. I'll bet this was the true cause of the problem, come to think on it. These officers were some of the most experienced combat officers the U.S. Army had EVER had. If they didn't know how to properly communicate now, they never would. It had nothing to do with "training" for this particular event. They had been giving and taking combat orders for years. Maybe they were OVER trained in it? I'm sure Custer could get as much ammunition as his command could possibly carry every time it went to the field, both on this major operation, but also for every little patrol they went on. When in the field, you can fire off a LOT of ammunition as "operations" expenditures that have nothing to do with "training" allotments. Its the oldest trick in the book for any armies that keep track of such things...they train more on "operations" ammo and budgets than they do with "training allocations," when there is an actual war on. The only place such an investigation would actually be useful is during their occupation duty in the South...they would have less ability to fire their weapons during that time. But if I were a clever commander or NCO, I KNOW I would still find a way to fire all I wanted. It is a good investigation as to the state of training and marksmanship of the 7th...it brings out a lot of info on how the Army works, but how is that applied to what happened at LBH? Do you really think that Warrior casualties are proportional to the marksmanship training of the 7th Troopers? I don't think war really works that way...sounds good in theory, but it is a very different thing in practice with large groups in large battles. Were there tactical maneuvers that the companies of the 7th couldn't execute well enough to do their mission properly, as evidenced by anything that happened at LBH? Does anyone think that the 7th Cavalry Regiment was such a farce that it would break and run at the first volley, like volunteer regiments in their first battle in the Civil War? I agree with you, AZ, that training on every aspect of Soldiering can ALWAYS be better...lord knows my companies could always improve in my modern Army units. But there isn't time to do everything, so you have to prioritize what is most important at the time, and each company commander, and each NCO, makes their own determinations as to what their units need to learn/practice the most. We should normally trust that these military professionals know how to get their units ready for the combat they envision coming up. Clair |
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 31, 2008 9:17:20 GMT -6
Did you see what kind of training Godfrey was proposing? He wanted more instruction on "dressage movements" and high ecole like they did at the French Cavalry school in Samur. It is wonderful for great riders to do...it is TOTALLY unnecessary, and waste of time, for the rank and file to learn it. And I don't think Godfrey was really advocating that the rank and file do dressage...he was aiming at the officers and senior NCOs, for which such higher equitation would be useful.
Yes I saw it. The idea was an independent seat which is beneficial to engaging while moving. Apparently the Army agreed because the training manuals of the last of the cavalry years included more horsemanship.
I'll leave the dressage up to clw but I believe those were war movements from cavalry in origin.
The difference I believe, was the 7th suppose to be cavalry or mounted rifles? The horse was a means of transportation either a true cavalryman in my opinion knew how to use the horse in battle. Of the 12 companies which ones as described by eyewitnesses deployed on horses?
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 31, 2008 9:39:42 GMT -6
You have to intuit what the REALITY is, not what evidence is missing.
The Indians won and no one intuited that could happen to the 7th and that is the REALITY. I think to often that examples of other villages as how it should be done and worked are used when in reality they are not composed of the same warriors with a different view of their future.
Attacking a small city is not the same as attacking Army base recently engaged and battle ready.
AZ Ranger
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Post by Dark Cloud on Oct 31, 2008 9:51:12 GMT -6
There is much testimony and many accounts (DeRudio and Ryan come to immediate mind) that the 7th were not adequately trained for mounted combat, or to hit much with their firearms.
1. This may come as a shock, but the American Civil War's cavalry encounters were united in their overall unimportance except to fanboys today. That they used the saber against each other is true, but so what? They'd have been better off using firearms and/or cannister at distance. The idea is to "win" battles with as little loss to your side as possible, shorten the war, achieve national aims, not personal "honor" issues. All this does is facilitate fanboy fluffernutters squeezing their thighs over pointless, 'romantic', and often fictional mounted combat tales which, in most cases, are composed entirely of exaggerated implausibilities derived from literary templates, of which you remain ignorant.
2. There is absolutely no evidence the majority of 7th soldiers were even adequate horsemen for mounted combat, much less superior horsemen to Indians who could ride bareback at early ages. There is zero evidence of the chronic, mandatory training and practice needed. There were excellent horsemen among them, but as a group (and to be effective, they have to act as a unit) no.
3. You're arguing with Custer. This explains why cavalry was relatively useless, since enemy weapon range meant they'd have to retreat to reload under cover a long way. A sword in the hands of the unskilled on a mount he barely controls is a near sure win for the opponent.
4. What's this "we?" You including yourself with combat vets now? Don't. Indians often dispersed into smaller units, not 'run', which suggests defeat. In the only other battle that compares with LBH, they did not run and for the same reason: too large a village, too confused.
5. Indians didn't pretend to be cavalry. They didn't act as units, they didn't react as units. To continue to pretend they were cavalry and grade them upon it is moronic.
Why in the world would officers - and specific mounts - need dressage training if not the men - and specific mounts - who would do the mounted fighting? It would be logical that Godfrey had no particular interest in dressage at all so much as a bureaucratic tool to assure that horsemanship was taught with the requisite hours in the training saddle by a method that could be immediately noted in review.
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Post by conz on Oct 31, 2008 11:48:12 GMT -6
AZ,
I agree that more equestrian skill is always better for any cavalryman...that is not the issue, though.
The issue is whether the Troopers of the 7th Cavalry were good enough horsemen to do their job.
A sidebar of this issue is that if they spent more time training equestrian skills, what other training would have to be reduced? Marksmanship training, drill & discipline, horse care, equipment care, guard duty, logistics and medical support...you get the idea.
It is one thing to walk into a unit and say..."your riding skills could be better," or "your marksmanship skills could use improvement." We can ALL do that, and you can even do that with modern Special Operations Forces outfits...they can ALWAYS do better, and REQUIRE better "training."
So if the 7th had better marksmanship, better equestrian skills, and more exerienced Soldiers, could it have performed better in battle? Sure...no argument.
Is their level of skill or performance, though, an indictment of the unit? Certainly not, in my opinion.
Was their level of training something that contributed significantly to their defeat at LBH? I'd have to say very little, if any at all. I think some situations you can't "train your way out of."
Clair
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Post by conz on Oct 31, 2008 12:08:05 GMT -6
There is much testimony and many accounts (DeRudio and Ryan come to immediate mind) that the 7th were not adequately trained for mounted combat, or to hit much with their firearms. Dozens of dead Indians might disagree with them. Anyway, I never thought my units were adequately trained either, but they passed all their tests and won plenty of awards. I was just a martinet...its a Regular Army trademark. Emotional nonsense...one of the hallmarks of the Civil War was that the American army finally learned how to use "battle cavalry" decisively. See Sheridan's battles in the Valley in '64, and the final campaign that defeated Lee. The very best Civil War cavalry units used sabers throughout the war, and for good reason. When you figure that out, you'll understand cavalry combat. There is absolutely no evidence that the Troopers, as a whole, could not maintain cavalry standards for mounted combat. They seemed to have moved in formation across all kinds of terrain just fine at LBH, and elsewhere. Riding in formation is a difficult skill...it takes a group of experienced and good riders to do it smartly. And the 7th Cavalry was one of the "smartest" outfits around, according to evidence. Only a few of these guys could ride Indian fashion as well as the Indians. But only a few Indians could ride cavalry formations as well as the 7th Cavalry. So what's the point? Since the Troopers of the 7th Cavalry were skilled in mounted saber combat, this doesn't apply. These guys were Regular Army professionals. They could use a saber as well as any Warrior could use a carbine. I can't tell what you are referring to here...Warriors, if run out of their village, will float around nearby...they won't go far. They'll try to regroup into bands for a counterattack if they can get groups large enough. The Cavalry had better have the village burned, and horses shot, by then. I don't know what you are referring to here. Indians have their own form of units around key leaders, normally organized by tribe and society. It is a loose association and relationship based on the individual, but it certainly exists. Warriors never fought individually...they fought as "packs." Some packs could number in the dozens, even hundreds of leader packs together, following the same leader. It is very common for senior officers to make names for themselves by touting "new and improved" training methods and programs for the "betterment of the Army." High equitation improves horsemanship skills generally, and these skilled riders will teach even basic level horsemanship more effectively as a result. The Army never intended to turn entire companies of Troopers into the "U.S. Olympic Equestrian Team." But a sprinkling of such skilled riders throughout the force, as instructors, is always desired. Clair |
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Post by AZ Ranger on Nov 2, 2008 7:15:14 GMT -6
Conz
I am not asking for military training records in fact just the same type you have posted indicating others had trained. In particular the make up of the individuals, training, and tactical preparation from the time of receiving the Springfield carbine 1874 -1876 for the 7th.
Battle ready is what was important, training and practice are components of it. I think there to many assumptions of what went in the west. Just to exist there required a lot work out of the soldiers on a daily basis. Other than raking the Marine Corps grass (sand) and making my bed I don't remember doing much to exist on a base.
Since the primary plan of attack was to get to the Indians before they ran, how much time was spent on what to if they stood and fought on large numbers. From Custer on down to the last private enlisted were they battle ready for Indians that were willing to fight and had the numbers to be effective?
AZ Ranger
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"If there are no dogs in Heaven, then when I die I want to go where they
