Post by fred on Dec 28, 2006 10:39:31 GMT -6
Elisabeth and Horse--
Elisabeth, I believe you are correct when you say, "both sides were relying on the enemy doing what they 'always' did." Willert brings up the point that we always seem to give these supernatural powers to the Indians, i.e., they are always aware, always lurking, always doing the right thing at the right time. (That's paraphrased, of course.) The fact was-- according to Willert-- that the Sioux and Cheyenne blew it w/ regards to the Terry-Gibbon-Custer columns. They last saw Gibbon heading down the Yellowstone, so they merely assumed he would continue that way & he was no longer a threat. They never spotted Custer or Terry, until maybe Custer was heading up the Rosebud, and even then what did those who did the spotting do w/ the information? Yet w/ Crook, they dogged his column well after the fight. And you are also correct when you say the Indians did not expect a daylight attack. Some participants admitted that. Of course that brings up the questions, "Well boys! What were you planning on doing? Relaxing on the 25th, waiting for the hammer to strike the following morning? Or were you planning on leaving?"
The business w/ Tullock's was all about options. By not scouting that valley, Terry could not move up in that direction. One wonders what constituted a "scout"; 1 man, i.e., Herendeen; or a company-sized scout, or a battalion? I tend to think maybe the whole regiment for fear of what might be there. Once it was declared free, Herendeen could then be sent down. I also believe the valley was easily accessible from both sides, though at limited points of egress. By not scouting Tullock's, Terry was limited to the Big Horn-LBH route. Remember too, there was no certain plan for the two columns to meet, no coordinated attack plan between the two. The thinking was that the hostiles were on the upper reaches of the LBH; faulty maps helped give that impression because of the way the upper Rosebud was drawn. By moving up Tullock's, Terry could have inserted himself into the LBH valley a lot closer to where the Sioux were thought to be and therefore possibly coordinated an attack w/ Custer who was supposed to be coming down the valley. (This is another reason why I am so insistent that Custer disobeyed his orders. Yes, there was flexibility built into those orders, but the flexibility concerned timing and coordination rather than Custer's "right" to assume the attack all by himself. No one was under any illusion as to what the main attacking force was to be, but the effort was strongly made by Terry for some sort of coordination. Custer's precipitous actions precluded any coordination. And you also know how I feel about communications and coordination in those days!)
I agree w/ Horse about Herendeen being under Custer's command.
Horse-- Early in the morning of the 24th (around 7a.m.), Custer told Herendeen to get ready to scout Tullock's. Herendeen said it was too early, that they had not reached the entrance to the valley. As the column continued, the trail grew wider and fresher (this "fresher" is one of the keys to the whole event; the trail itself was much fresher than the camp circles! What does that tell you?) and Custer called a halt for 4 hours. I believe it was during this halt that Custer finalized his thoughts-- developed several days earlier-- that he would follow that trail-- disobeying his orders-- and attack. I believe his "decision," as communicated to his officers on the morning of the 25th was not as "spur of the moment" as we would be led to believe.
When the column finally did pass the entrance to the Tullock valley, Herendeen told Custer this was the time. Custer ignored him and the column pressed on:
6:30pm—The command reaches the gap in the western hills that led to the headwaters of
Tullock’s Creek. Herendeen told Custer, but the latter only kept moving forward & Herendeen simply remained in the column. No trails went in the direction of Tullock’s Creek. “But Custer—Herendeen recalled—only looked at him, said not a word, and finally the civilian scout reined back to once again take his place in the moving column. Herendeen was unable to fathom Custer’s curious behavior at this junction, but Custer’s reason should have been obvious—the hostiles trail continued up the Rosebud Valley, but where did it lead?” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 241]
As for Kuhlman, I do not agree w/ his assessment of the packs. Custer's command had not fired a shot. What were they going to do w/ all that extra ammo? And where exactly would he have expected the pack train to go once the mules were relieved of their ammo burden? That also implies defense, and I believe "darkcloud" brought up the very good point that this operation-- read Custer-- was not geared for defensive action. Richard Fox certainly doesn't believe it, and I clearly do not. Someone else-- "wild" or "Realbird"-- brought up another excellent point, that Custer was agitated & chomping at the bit (or is it "champing"?), and I believe that is also accurate; measured, but accurate. I think he smelled a big, big victory and was not pressed at all, least ways not until he returned to Cemetery Ridge from his foray to the Ford D area. That's when it all fell apart and that was when the weaknesses in his tactical plans and dispositions were exposed. Up until then-- and applying the assumption that the Indians would run and scatter-- those dispositions were sound. Anyone who says different must believe that Custer was routed from Ford B, otherwise they are devoid of any knowledge of basic cavalry or military tactics. Maybe that's too harsh, so I will back off a bit from that statement. I would merely say, they are wrong.
I do not believe Custer was routed or pushed away from Ford B, or even pressed shortly thereafter. If I am wrong, then his troop dispostitions were completely ridiculous and I would agree w/ those who state it. Having said that, I do not believe Custer was an incompetent-- and he certainly would be such if he placed his companies the way we think they fell if he was under dire straits.
I also believe "darkcloud" was correct in another thread when he went on about the meaning of the "note." If Custer wanted such specifics, he would have directed Cooke to be more specific. That note meant exactly what it said. Custer wanted Benteen and he wanted the packs. Period. Why the packs? To me, the men, not the ammo. Should Cooke have written, "the men" instead of the "packs"? Think of the confusion that would have wrought. Once Custer had the whole contingent-- and remember again, he believed he knew just where all those folks were located, thereby showing no duress or any aniticipation of duress-- he could dispose or place the packs wherever he wanted & he could have gone on w/ the men.
Also, I have noticed over time, the more we have to try to justify a position, the less likely it is that the position is valid. There is too much feeble justification in why Custer wanted the packs and what he meant w/ the note. Quite frankly, if I were Custer-- either in Cedar Coulee or 600 yards from Ford B-- and I am looking at the whole thing from what I know so far (& I do believe Custer first went to the high ground before he moved to Ford B via MTC or any other route), I would have wanted those additional men. How about you?
Best wishes to all,
Fred.
Elisabeth, I believe you are correct when you say, "both sides were relying on the enemy doing what they 'always' did." Willert brings up the point that we always seem to give these supernatural powers to the Indians, i.e., they are always aware, always lurking, always doing the right thing at the right time. (That's paraphrased, of course.) The fact was-- according to Willert-- that the Sioux and Cheyenne blew it w/ regards to the Terry-Gibbon-Custer columns. They last saw Gibbon heading down the Yellowstone, so they merely assumed he would continue that way & he was no longer a threat. They never spotted Custer or Terry, until maybe Custer was heading up the Rosebud, and even then what did those who did the spotting do w/ the information? Yet w/ Crook, they dogged his column well after the fight. And you are also correct when you say the Indians did not expect a daylight attack. Some participants admitted that. Of course that brings up the questions, "Well boys! What were you planning on doing? Relaxing on the 25th, waiting for the hammer to strike the following morning? Or were you planning on leaving?"
The business w/ Tullock's was all about options. By not scouting that valley, Terry could not move up in that direction. One wonders what constituted a "scout"; 1 man, i.e., Herendeen; or a company-sized scout, or a battalion? I tend to think maybe the whole regiment for fear of what might be there. Once it was declared free, Herendeen could then be sent down. I also believe the valley was easily accessible from both sides, though at limited points of egress. By not scouting Tullock's, Terry was limited to the Big Horn-LBH route. Remember too, there was no certain plan for the two columns to meet, no coordinated attack plan between the two. The thinking was that the hostiles were on the upper reaches of the LBH; faulty maps helped give that impression because of the way the upper Rosebud was drawn. By moving up Tullock's, Terry could have inserted himself into the LBH valley a lot closer to where the Sioux were thought to be and therefore possibly coordinated an attack w/ Custer who was supposed to be coming down the valley. (This is another reason why I am so insistent that Custer disobeyed his orders. Yes, there was flexibility built into those orders, but the flexibility concerned timing and coordination rather than Custer's "right" to assume the attack all by himself. No one was under any illusion as to what the main attacking force was to be, but the effort was strongly made by Terry for some sort of coordination. Custer's precipitous actions precluded any coordination. And you also know how I feel about communications and coordination in those days!)
I agree w/ Horse about Herendeen being under Custer's command.
Horse-- Early in the morning of the 24th (around 7a.m.), Custer told Herendeen to get ready to scout Tullock's. Herendeen said it was too early, that they had not reached the entrance to the valley. As the column continued, the trail grew wider and fresher (this "fresher" is one of the keys to the whole event; the trail itself was much fresher than the camp circles! What does that tell you?) and Custer called a halt for 4 hours. I believe it was during this halt that Custer finalized his thoughts-- developed several days earlier-- that he would follow that trail-- disobeying his orders-- and attack. I believe his "decision," as communicated to his officers on the morning of the 25th was not as "spur of the moment" as we would be led to believe.
When the column finally did pass the entrance to the Tullock valley, Herendeen told Custer this was the time. Custer ignored him and the column pressed on:
6:30pm—The command reaches the gap in the western hills that led to the headwaters of
Tullock’s Creek. Herendeen told Custer, but the latter only kept moving forward & Herendeen simply remained in the column. No trails went in the direction of Tullock’s Creek. “But Custer—Herendeen recalled—only looked at him, said not a word, and finally the civilian scout reined back to once again take his place in the moving column. Herendeen was unable to fathom Custer’s curious behavior at this junction, but Custer’s reason should have been obvious—the hostiles trail continued up the Rosebud Valley, but where did it lead?” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 241]
As for Kuhlman, I do not agree w/ his assessment of the packs. Custer's command had not fired a shot. What were they going to do w/ all that extra ammo? And where exactly would he have expected the pack train to go once the mules were relieved of their ammo burden? That also implies defense, and I believe "darkcloud" brought up the very good point that this operation-- read Custer-- was not geared for defensive action. Richard Fox certainly doesn't believe it, and I clearly do not. Someone else-- "wild" or "Realbird"-- brought up another excellent point, that Custer was agitated & chomping at the bit (or is it "champing"?), and I believe that is also accurate; measured, but accurate. I think he smelled a big, big victory and was not pressed at all, least ways not until he returned to Cemetery Ridge from his foray to the Ford D area. That's when it all fell apart and that was when the weaknesses in his tactical plans and dispositions were exposed. Up until then-- and applying the assumption that the Indians would run and scatter-- those dispositions were sound. Anyone who says different must believe that Custer was routed from Ford B, otherwise they are devoid of any knowledge of basic cavalry or military tactics. Maybe that's too harsh, so I will back off a bit from that statement. I would merely say, they are wrong.
I do not believe Custer was routed or pushed away from Ford B, or even pressed shortly thereafter. If I am wrong, then his troop dispostitions were completely ridiculous and I would agree w/ those who state it. Having said that, I do not believe Custer was an incompetent-- and he certainly would be such if he placed his companies the way we think they fell if he was under dire straits.
I also believe "darkcloud" was correct in another thread when he went on about the meaning of the "note." If Custer wanted such specifics, he would have directed Cooke to be more specific. That note meant exactly what it said. Custer wanted Benteen and he wanted the packs. Period. Why the packs? To me, the men, not the ammo. Should Cooke have written, "the men" instead of the "packs"? Think of the confusion that would have wrought. Once Custer had the whole contingent-- and remember again, he believed he knew just where all those folks were located, thereby showing no duress or any aniticipation of duress-- he could dispose or place the packs wherever he wanted & he could have gone on w/ the men.
Also, I have noticed over time, the more we have to try to justify a position, the less likely it is that the position is valid. There is too much feeble justification in why Custer wanted the packs and what he meant w/ the note. Quite frankly, if I were Custer-- either in Cedar Coulee or 600 yards from Ford B-- and I am looking at the whole thing from what I know so far (& I do believe Custer first went to the high ground before he moved to Ford B via MTC or any other route), I would have wanted those additional men. How about you?
Best wishes to all,
Fred.