Post by mcaryf on May 16, 2006 14:15:53 GMT -6
I will return this thread to commenting on the article Alfuso posted and try to distract those of you fighting each other with some other ideas.
First I have to say I did enjoy reading the article. Part of the enjoyment of course was from revelling in my own superior knowledge of the LBH in minor details such as Reno and Benteen waiting for the packs rather than consolidating their defence as well as the over estimation of some of the distances. However, I did not think that these minor blemishes detracted from quite an interesting article which did home in on one of the key mysteries (for me at least) of LBH. This being, what on earth was Custer waiting for near LSH? The thought that Benteen might still be coming in time to do anything useful was plainly forlorn. The idea that Custer might need a lot more ammo is also a strange one that I have never really understood. The need for loads of ammo implies a battle of attrition rather than shock and I just do not think the 7th Cavalry were likely to win that sort of fight against those sort of numbers in that type of terrain.
However, at the end of the day the article dresses up in a lot of fancy words a rather simple question - why did not Custer run away to fight again another day? A less perjorative phrasing might be why did not Custer seek to reunite his command by himself retracing the steps he had already taken on the basis if the Benteen won't or cannot come to the Custer then the Custer must go to the Benteen (substitute mountain and Mahomet to get the original).
If I was going to try and write on the same lines as the article I would probably throw in some other US military examples such as the heavy losses the US army suffered in the Battle of the Bulge when they initially refused to roll with the German punch and tried to hold onto ground that was not really valuable per se.
My answer would be a learned thesis along the lines of a relatively youngish country (or a person) that has got used to winning is not very good at tactical withdrawals which might all too easily be misinterpreted as defeats. After all look at the opprobrium that was meeted out to Reno who at least saved the larger part of his command by retreating. There is a considerable gulf between US and UK thinking in this regard - somehow I do not imagine that Dunkirk would have been regarded in quite the same way in the US as it was in the UK.
Well there you are then - I did quite enjoy the article and it did have the merit of bringing to my mind an analogy that I had not seen before between two of my favourite battles LBH and The Bulge. Benteen is probably McAulliffe, Reno has reached the Meuse and is still going, Ridgeway would have liked to have done a Custer at St Vith but finally heeded Monty (Gen Terry)'s sensible orders whilst I wonder what that other George (Patton) would have done at LBH?
Regards
Mike
First I have to say I did enjoy reading the article. Part of the enjoyment of course was from revelling in my own superior knowledge of the LBH in minor details such as Reno and Benteen waiting for the packs rather than consolidating their defence as well as the over estimation of some of the distances. However, I did not think that these minor blemishes detracted from quite an interesting article which did home in on one of the key mysteries (for me at least) of LBH. This being, what on earth was Custer waiting for near LSH? The thought that Benteen might still be coming in time to do anything useful was plainly forlorn. The idea that Custer might need a lot more ammo is also a strange one that I have never really understood. The need for loads of ammo implies a battle of attrition rather than shock and I just do not think the 7th Cavalry were likely to win that sort of fight against those sort of numbers in that type of terrain.
However, at the end of the day the article dresses up in a lot of fancy words a rather simple question - why did not Custer run away to fight again another day? A less perjorative phrasing might be why did not Custer seek to reunite his command by himself retracing the steps he had already taken on the basis if the Benteen won't or cannot come to the Custer then the Custer must go to the Benteen (substitute mountain and Mahomet to get the original).
If I was going to try and write on the same lines as the article I would probably throw in some other US military examples such as the heavy losses the US army suffered in the Battle of the Bulge when they initially refused to roll with the German punch and tried to hold onto ground that was not really valuable per se.
My answer would be a learned thesis along the lines of a relatively youngish country (or a person) that has got used to winning is not very good at tactical withdrawals which might all too easily be misinterpreted as defeats. After all look at the opprobrium that was meeted out to Reno who at least saved the larger part of his command by retreating. There is a considerable gulf between US and UK thinking in this regard - somehow I do not imagine that Dunkirk would have been regarded in quite the same way in the US as it was in the UK.
Well there you are then - I did quite enjoy the article and it did have the merit of bringing to my mind an analogy that I had not seen before between two of my favourite battles LBH and The Bulge. Benteen is probably McAulliffe, Reno has reached the Meuse and is still going, Ridgeway would have liked to have done a Custer at St Vith but finally heeded Monty (Gen Terry)'s sensible orders whilst I wonder what that other George (Patton) would have done at LBH?
Regards
Mike