LBH: Before the Fighting Begins

[crzhrs]

Around noon in the early summer of 1876, 12 troops of an understrength and poorly trained cavalry regiment of the US army began its descent into the LBH valley. At least 30 percent had only rudimenatary skills with horses and weapons that were deficient.Their commanding office would not even carry one and instead chose a different rifle. In addition the unit was divided according to political lines regarding its commanding field officer, a Lt.Colonel with a significant combat record and a controversial history.

Below them somewhere lay the largest encampment of plains Indians in history. At least 1500 to 2000 first class irregular cavalry were there, perhaps as many as 3000. Several hundred had superior weapons to the troopers. These men would be defending their families and way of life and had been bloodied in almost two decades of conflict with the troopers.

The troopers have been on campaign for weeks and are tired and hot, being up most of the night already on a forced march. Already significant mistakes had been made by the commanding officer at this time and he has not even made contact with the Indians. By noon these included.

1) His absolute belief that the Indians would scatter and flee before his regiment.

2) His discounting the information provided by his scouts as to the number and location of the Indian camp.

3) His refusal to reinforce with an additional 4 troops of cavalry from another regiment even when faced with information that the Indian force was sizeable.

4) Soon he makes another mistake by beginning to divide his force by sending his most able senior officer on a left oblique, putting him out of position to support him should things go badly.

Things are going to go from better to worse.

[El Crab]

I don't think 30% is an accurate number for recruits, is it? Most of the companies had a couple, if any. Of course, it doesn't mean that 30% weren't poor horseman or poor shots.

I'll have to pull up some info from books, but I think the tiredness was probably also a bit overblown. I wonder how much sleep they actually had after the night march.

[crzhrs]

It was 30% with rudimenatary skills with horses and weapons . . . not newly recruited men.

We know the training was not up to snuff in many aspects of the military during the time period after the CW . . . and it seemed only to get worse as time went on.

[bhist]

Crab: You’re the last person I would consider hating America. That’s why I love your quote at the bottom of your posts. LMAO!!

[George Mabry]

The troopers have been on campaign for weeks and are tired and hot, being up most of the night already on a forced march. Already significant mistakes had been made by the commanding officer at this time and he has not even made contact with the Indians. By noon these included.

1) His absolute belief that the Indians would scatter and flee before his regiment.

2) His discounting the information provided by his scouts as to the number and location of the Indian camp.

3) His refusal to reinforce with an additional 4 troops of cavalry from another regiment even when faced with information that the Indian force was sizeable.

4) Soon he makes another mistake by beginning to divide his force by sending his most able senior officer on a left oblique, putting him out of position to support him should things go badly.

Crzhrs, I would have to take issue with about every point you made in your above posting. First of all, all battles are fought by men who are tired if not exhausted. Now let's get to the four "mistakes" you list:

1."Absolute belief". What do you mean by that? Custer based his actions on his own experiences and the conventional military wisdom of the day. The fact that it didn't work out for him is not a reflection on his military competence.

2. Custer didn't discount the information from his scouts. Custer never saw the village from the Crows Nest. He took his scouts word of it that it was there and then he followed them to the village. After the trip to the Crows Nest, Custer wanted to wait a day and formulate his battle plan but his scouts insisted that he had been discovered and needed to hit the village immediately. He did that. Custer did disregard the comments attributed to the scouts that there were too many indians for his regiment to handle. But he had good reason to. Those scouts had not idea of what a cavalry regiment could or could not do. For that matter, neither do you or I. However, Custer had faced greater odds during the Civil War so I he had good reason for saying that he wouldn't meet more than he could handle. Once again, the fact that he was wrong doesn't make him stupid. All of his experiences tended to indicate that his biggest problem would be in preventing the escape of the indians.

4. It's hard to believe that if Custer had added that extra battalion of cavalry (160 men?) that the outcome would have been any different.

In summary, Custer's actions up until he left Medicine Trail Coulee were based upon decisions derived from the intelligence he received, his own experiences, and a collective knowledge base.
I tire of hearing the old argument of dividing his forces etc, etc. What Custer was basically was striking an enemy camp from the front at the same time as he hit it from the flank. That is a tried and true assault tactic then and now. The fact that it failed is not an indictment on the tactic.

Custer made mistakes. He made plenty of them. Both tactically and judgementally. But those mistakes are all made after he left MTC.

[markland]

George, strangely enough, I can agree with both of you.


1."Absolute belief". What do you mean by that? Custer based his actions on his own experiences and the conventional military wisdom of the day. The fact that it didn't work out for him is not a reflection on his military competence.

-But the old axiom, "No plan survives first contact with the enemy," still applied. Personally I think that that moment occurred when he saw the entire village for the first time. He, in my opinion, began adapting his entire plan to the changed circumstances at that time.

2. Custer didn't discount the information from his scouts. Custer never saw the village from the Crows Nest. He took his scouts word of it that it was there and then he followed them to the village. After the trip to the Crows Nest, Custer wanted to wait a day and formulate his battle plan but his scouts insisted that he had been discovered and needed to hit the village immediately. He did that. Custer did disregard the comments attributed to the scouts that there were too many indians for his regiment to handle. But he had good reason to. Those scouts had not idea of what a cavalry regiment could or could not do. For that matter, neither do you or I. However, Custer had faced greater odds during the Civil War so I he had good reason for saying that he wouldn't meet more than he could handle. Once again, the fact that he was wrong doesn't make him stupid. All of his experiences tended to indicate that his biggest problem would be in preventing the escape of the indians.

-See my first point.

4. It's hard to believe that if Custer had added that extra battalion of cavalry (160 men?) that the outcome would have been any different.

-Thank you! Now if you can only get those who believe that Benteen was the anti-Christ to agree with you, one controversy of this battle will be dispelled.

In summary, Custer's actions up until he left Medicine Trail Coulee were based upon decisions derived from the intelligence he received, his own experiences, and a collective knowledge base.
I tire of hearing the old argument of dividing his forces etc, etc. What Custer was basically was striking an enemy camp from the front at the same time as he hit it from the flank. That is a tried and true assault tactic then and now. The fact that it failed is not an indictment on the tactic.

-Yet, again in my opinion, he had based his plan on there being a series of enemy villages, not a huge single village. Dividing his forces to attack the individual villages would have enabled him to utilize his two battalions as either attack forces or to reinforce any of the attack forces.


Custer made mistakes. He made plenty of them. Both tactically and judgementally. But those mistakes are all made after he left MTC.

-I have to disagree. The mistake was when he did not pursue his opportunity to attack the northern portion of the village at MTC.


Best of wishes,

Billy

[Dark Cloud]

"I tire of hearing the old argument of dividing his forces etc, etc. What Custer was basically <doing?>was striking an enemy camp from the front at the same time as he hit it from the flank. That is a tried and true assault tactic then and now. The fact that it failed is not an indictment on the tactic."

And everyone who's ever been in a snowball fight knows this. Nobody is saying the "tactic" is stupid. People do say that applying that tactic badly to a hugely superior force was quite stupid, process over point, and upon reflection usually conclude Custer wasn't stupid or given to that, and are left wondering.

Further, a tactic designed to produce predictable reactions from an enemy force of the like-minded is a far cry from attacking different Indian camp circles in close proximity with no overall command structure between them and nothing to resemble effective communication and with about an hour or more between the two attacks. I myself never tire of listening to people trying to explain that by 1876 standards, how such a small action launched over an hour past Reno's charge and over a mile away can be defined as either "support" or part of the same offensive action whatsoever.

"Those scouts had not idea of what a cavalry regiment could or could not do. For that matter, neither do you or I." It didn't and doesn't matter what "a" cavalry regiment could do. It only matters what the 7th could reasonably be expected to do that day, based on appreciation of its training and unit ability. And about that, Custer was clearly in the dark as much as you and I. The 7th had never been in action before as a united regiment, a first to go along with its exciting and emotionally rewarding activities with their first mule pack trains. What occured in the CW, with well fed horses and trained men with emotional motivation, was about as relevant as what happened at Ft. Mims. The only remotely relevant action upon which Custer himself could draw was the Washita, where virtually every comparable aspect was reversed, starting with who outnumbered who. Even though everything was different, Custer seems to have applied the same intent to his actions at LBH, did it badly to remove any hope whatsoever, and lost.

In fact, Kildeer Mt. was the clue, and while known, nobody seems to have applied its lessons. In retrospect, they're clear and informative. Large villages aren't coherent or that organized, react pugnaciously out of need, and aren't that easy to deal with.

The 7th's weapons were fine in the right hands, arguably superior. Whatever supposed advantage to the Indian's few Winchesters/Henrys were likely defused by their own lousy shooting skills, ammo needs, and maintanance skills, which hovered around zero.

[mcaryf]

One of the points about LBH that I find strange is Varnum's testimony at RCOI. He states that he had seen a part of the village and immense numbers of Indians in the valley bottom before Major Reno's command was ordered across the river. He then rides down to join Reno's command and I presume passes right by Custer.

Is it clear in any subsequent accounts whether the information about the village was passed by any of the scouts to Custer before Reno's attack? If so, why should we assume that the location and size shoulds be a sudden surprise for Custer when he first sees it from Weir Point or wherever?

I guess it would have only taken less than 15 minutes for Custer to mount the bluffs where Varnum had been and spy out the land before issuing the attack order to Reno. Should this not be added to the list of possible errors?

Regards

Mike

[George Mabry]

My thanks to Markland and Darkcloud for their comments.

Markland, we don't disagree on Custer making a mistake when he left MTC. I too believe he would have been better off attacking. In all fairness to Custer, he would probably say that too if he were here using hind site to critique his performance.

You said Custer based his initial plan on there being a series of villages instead of one huge village. I'm not sure I'm understanding you. Are you saying that it was a mistake to send Benteen off to the left? Granted that move ended up hurting him but at the time it was a reasonable decision to make.

Darkcloud, I agree with what you said about tactics. What I was trying to say was that based on the information he had at the time, he had a good, workable battle plan. His problems came when he failed to execute that plan or any variation of it that I can see.

Custer had to attack once he though his presence had been discovered near the divide. There was no other option. Although we know now that that might not have been the case, Custer had every reason to believe he'd been spotted and the village alerted.

If you disagree with this I'd enjoy hearing your comments.

Thanks again for your comments and I look forward to hearing your responses.

[George Mabry]

mcaryf said:

One of the points about LBH that I find strange is Varnum's testimony at RCOI.

Mike, I'm not aware of any testimony that Custer was surprised or intimidated by the size of the village that he saw from the bluffs prior to entering MTC. The statements that I recall all say Custer was elated coming down from the bluffs thinking he'd caught the indians napping.

I don't believe he ever got that "oh s***" feeling until sometime after reaching the northern end of battle ridge.

[elisabeth]

Which would be another mistake to add to the list, perhaps ...!

Godfrey remarks at one point (Graham, p. 135) that they'd seen evidence of the numbers and of the way the Indians were camping together, but hadn't understood it. "June 24th we passed a great many camping places, all appearing to be of nearly the same strength. One would naturally suppose these were the successive camping-places of the same village, when, in fact, they were the continuous camps of the several bands. The fact that they appeared to be of nearly the same age, that is, having been made at the same time, did not impress us then."

This has always bothered me a bit. There are excuses for cavalry officers not reading the signs correctly (though it's surprising that none of them grasped it) -- but the scouts? Surely they must have known what they were looking at. Did they not tell Custer? Or did he simply ignore them? Because this evidence could have told him not only the numbers to expect, but that he'd find a single continuous village rather than the separate villages he seems to have been planning for ...

[mcaryf]

Hi Georgemabry

WRT Custer's supposed thoughts from Weir, I was picking up on the theme that this was the first time that he really started to accept the scale of the village. I was not really commenting on whether he might have regarded it as a good or bad thing that he had located it, but I would suggest he might have reconsidered whether sending 120 or so men to attack it before he was in position to support that attack was a smart idea.

I was also querying whether Varnum or some other scout might have told him the village, or at least some of it, was in sight if he chose to ride up the bluffs to see it.

Regards

Mike

[d o harris]

Varnum reported to Custer just as Reno was moving out. Either in his communications with Camp, or in his reminiscences, Varnum stated he told Custer the valley was full of Indians. Custer apparently pressed the Lt. for more precise answers, and Varnum said to him, in effect, "Maybe you better go up there and see for yourself." 'Up there' meaning the bluffs where Varnum had observed the Indians in the valley.
Custer had a good deal more intelligence regarding the size of the Indian camp than we are sometimes willing to concede. He was sent in pursuit of the village discovered by Reno, a single contiguous village of 400 lodges. He followed this village to where it crossed from the Rosebud to the LBH. In addition there were clear signs of other, smaller encampments that had travelled the same route at a date later than the large village. The Lame Deer band of Minneconjou had come up the Rosebud from the South and crossed on about the 23rd; a band of Sans Arc, of about 25-30 lodges may have crossed at approximately the same time. Hollow Horn Bear, the Brule arrived about that time with a small band of Two Kettle, all warriors and probably numbering 20-25.
By following Indian accounts (and Gray's) of the large village it is clear the sites of a large village found by the 7th as it marched South up the were in fact later camping sites of the same village, and not several villages, regardless of Godfrey's ability to divine the meaning of horse apples. Godfrey also believed morning mists above the hills were Indian smoke signals. The village of 400 lodges would indicate a warrior force of 500-800, nearer the former than the latter. Custer's estimate of from 1,000 to 1,500 warriors, given at officer's call the night of the 24th, implies he was aware of the later additions, and he was not apprehensive on this account.
What Custer probably was not aware of is that the large gathering of Indians had been substantially enlarged by bands that had moved from the South, up the LBH, and had joined the village of the 23rd. This included a large contingent of Hunkpapa from the headwaters of the LBH, and, I believe, but could not prove at present, a very large group of several bands of agency Indians that had been on the headwaters of the Rosebud during the Crook fight, after which they moved West and North to join the village on the LBH. It is probable the movement of these Indians down the LBH was beyond the knowledge of Custer's scouts.
Summer villages were typically larger, more compact, and moved more frequently than winter villages, in which bands, even when camped in the same general area, were widely separated, due to the necessities of finding graze and fodder for the horses, nearby game to supplement stored food, and sanitation.
Based on the evidence Custer should have had, I believe he expected to find a large, compact village, with, perhaps, small, late arriving groups, somewhat isolated from the main village.

[d o harris]

I agree with El Crab that the tiredness issue is overblown. This is another of those 'givens' we are all prone to accept without actually investigating. It has its basis in a couple of lies Benteen told Terry, and which Terry incorporated in his confidential report to Sheridan, that from 5 A. M. on the 24th until going into the fight Custer marched the regiment 78 miles in 34 hours. The actual distance was 56 miles. When this report reached Sheridan's Chicago headquarters it was leaked to the press that Custer had forced a march of 78 miles in 24 hours. That Benteen provided this misinformation is verified by his letter of July 4, to his wife. The serving comes in different portions, but the net weight is the same.
Terry also stated in his report that after the night march the regiment went into camp, but did not unsaddle. Further embellishments on this theme were the men resumed the march without breakfast, perhaps chewing on raw bacon when the march to the LBH was resumed. At the COI Benteen stated the 2:30 A. M. halt, June 25th, was made without orders to unsaddle. Captain Moylan stated the same thing--at the 2:30 halt he received no orders to unsaddle. I find it a bit curious that at the COI Benteen and MOylan said the same using virtually the same words. Each seemed very careful to state he received no orders to unsaddle.
Looking back to the Officer's Call meeting the evening of June 22, Custer told his officers the only decisions that would come from headquarters was when to march and when to halt. All other decisions would be left to the company commanders, in whom Custer openly expressed confidence. If Benteen's and Moylan's horses were not unsaddled, and company mules unpacked it was not because of Custer, but because of Benteen and Moylan.
At the COI Moylan also testified that at the halt a staff officer he could not identify told Moylan to have the men get some sleep, and when they got up in the morning to have coffee. Presumably, a fire adequate to boil coffee was adequate to cook bacon and could have been used for the same purpose.
The troops and horses under the command of Benteen and Reno should have been no more fatigued than is usual for a cavalry force that ever went into battle. After all, while the other six troops were on Reno's scout of several days, the troops commanded by Reno and Benteen on the 25th had little to do other than await Reno's return.

[Dark Cloud]

"Misinformation" is quite different from a "lie," I'd think. Which is it? People under stress can be wrong.

Don't forget, the Rosebud was increasingly undrinkable by men and horses the further up they went, making bad coffee. If exhausted men and horses on really hot days cannot drink it, it's quite bad. Few could.

So what is "usual" for a cavalry force's rest before battle? The lush eastern US with water and foliage always isn't really relevant to the west and alkaline water and shadeless rests.

In any case, I add up Gray from 5 AM on the 24th to 3PM on the 25th for Custer, and the total is 50.75. This is flat map. Benteen and Godfrey both thought they'd gone much further because of their ups and downs, but on the map it isn't true. On the 23rd, though, they'd marched 33 miles flat map.

I doubt you'd face the numerous airmen after their missions from WWI onward and call them liars when they overclaimed kills, targets hit, and ships sunk. But by your standards, they must be liars, eh? Was their trauma worse than the 7th's? I cannot say, but I'd hesitate before calling accomplished, medalled, and loyal soldiers liars.

And what does info in the wars since suggest? Do soldiers exaggerate and succumb to hyperbole after horrible events? Like everyone else on the planet does? Seem to. Go figure.

Slack. This was a grueling march followed by a dice with Death, and I'd wager whoever ran with the mules thought it was 150 miles if an inch. Benteen had no reason or purpose to lie to his wife; that letter wasn't meant for the public.