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Post by noggy on Apr 3, 2018 12:46:55 GMT -6
I was one off. It was 62 Henrys and 69 Springfield Model 1873 carbines. You can find it on page 78 of Archeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle by Richard Allan Fox, Jr. Ah, thank you so much. One of many books I haven`t gotten around to buy yet, just glanced throgh in googlbooks. All the best, Noggy
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Post by noggy on Apr 3, 2018 13:11:37 GMT -6
I see that on the updated FAQ, the NPS answer a question about Indian firearms that "ANSWER: About one-half probably had firearms of some sort, from muzzle-loaders to the latest repeating rifles. Archeologists tell us that they had eighty different kinds of firearms in numbers." 80 different is far from the 47 they operate with on the other link I posted. Can that be correct? Fa r larger than what Fox writes for example. (From this, question nr 33 www.nps.gov/libi/faqs.htm)
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Post by benteen on Apr 3, 2018 15:22:07 GMT -6
sorry I typed out a post (with 2 fingers) and that idiot kid with the glasses and that blue bear popped up with "Sorry" we are having problems, and it erased my message. To annoyed now to retype it. Wasn't important anyway Be Well Dan
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Post by herosrest on Apr 4, 2018 9:35:23 GMT -6
An interesting read was left by William (Bill) Allen who visited the battlefield not long after and documented what lay. I understand that he was a hunting man and gun nut who founded Allentown after initially settling at Billings. He drove the stagecoach which ran through the valley and frequently halted to allow visits. It's an interesting read and insight of something or other. Can you imagine, an ordinary bleary wet and windy day whilst visiting Standing Rock for whatever..... and my god.... That's Rain in the Face. Oh wow......... OMG. Hey, Rain! Helooooo.......... fancy a drink. I've got some questions for you. Ye haaaaa............. Adventures with Indians and game by Dr. W.A. Allen An excellent new publication covering most weapons used at LBH and other battles is: Guns of the Western Indian War by R. Stephan Dorsey published by Collector's Library, PO Box 263, Eugene, Oregon 97440. The first chapter is titled "Guns of the Hostiles" with many photos featuring Indian guns that were either captured or turned in by the Indians when they most all of them surrendered and turned over their firearms to the US Army in the late 1870's, the last batch of them surrendered in 1879, all except the Apaches. These are featured in photos in this book. Many of the Warriors "demilled " their weapons (disabled them by various means to make them inoperable by removing hammers, firing pins, etc.) so that the white eyes wouldn't use them against their fellow tribemen later. This is very obvious by examining the photos. I had the opportunity to actually inspect some actual Indian war firearms used by the cavalry, infantry and hostiles. One that I inspected was an authentic Civil war period .56 cal. Spencer Carbine with brass tacks embedded in it. As usual it was very worn with a weathered stock, rather beat up as is normal for plains Indian guns. It was mfg'd. in about 1865, seeing late Civil War use and went west afterwards as they were issued to the cavalry. Custer's troopers were armed with these repeaters during pre LBH clashes that the 7th had with Cheyenne, Sioux, Arapaho, Kiowa, etc. such as his raid on Black Kettle's village on the Washita in 1868 or so. Many indians captured their weapons from dead calvary and Infantry troopers that they killed after skirmishes, etc. They also got their ammo not only from gunrunners and homesteaders, miners, but also ambushed supply pack wagons ( if it had a smaller number of troopers escorting and guarding the pack wagons) that were en route to forts such as Fort Fetterman, Fort Abraham Lincoln, etc. where Custer's outfit was stationed. By 1873 the new single shot 45-70 trapdoor Springfield was issued to the troopers & the repeating Spencers were retired and turned in to ordnance ( they were considered wasteful of ammunition and had too short of a range), although very adequate for most battlefield engagements, in my opinion, as they were very effective in stopping Confederate cavalry charges by Jeb Stuart and others, killing & wounding many rebels. The 50 cal.Springfields were authentic Indian War period pieces being Mfg'd in 1868 through 1872. One had a "19" stamped on the butt, which I think indicated the infantry co. that it was issued to. In this case; the 19 infantry Co. possibly carried by some troopers under General Terry's command in the Little Bighorn region. I know that the 20th infantry traveled with Terry's command & others which may have included the 19th. Some Springfield rifles were issued to Cavalry units as well as carbines. It was a real thrill to me to actually hold these rifles, all mfg'd. before 1876, and imagine that they could have been used during "the Big One" with Custer,Crazy Horse & Gall........
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Post by noggy on Apr 26, 2018 1:29:04 GMT -6
For those interested in arms, this thesis from 2004 has some interesting data regarding different weapos and ammunition. A lot of focus on the JCATS and theories, but I found quite a bit here to be interesting (not finished with the whole thing). Give it a read www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a424983.pdfAs a fan of the band, I never knew "Iron Maiden" could be used for target practise (no, not the band itself!). Noggy
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Post by noggy on Aug 28, 2018 5:05:13 GMT -6
Are we too quick to put emphasis on the sheer number of rifles? As proved by the muskets used during the battle, weapons could have been collected over several decades, but without a large amount of ammunition, what impact would they have? 1500 warriors with rifles sounds terrifying. But 1500 warriors with 5-6 rounds each not so much. A steady supply of ammo would be more difficult to have access to for the Indians than a potential "one time purchase" of a rifle.
Noggy
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Post by montrose on Aug 28, 2018 6:45:03 GMT -6
Resupply. Only source of resupply was from legal reservation traders; and illicit sales from US traders. There is a myth that Indians could find expended cartridges, and manufacture percussion caps and bullets to recreate a round. Never happened. The largest supply of bullets Indians ever received was LBH, and they ended up leaving many, many rounds on the battlefield, found by later visitors.
Training. Low supply of ammo means nothing available for training. Look at how Indians hunted buffalo. They rode to within 2 meters of target before firing, even after the introduction of firearms. Indians were notorious bad shots at ranges over 50 meters.
An exception is the Indian sharpshooter at the Reno Hill fight. He was steadily hitting targets at a range of 5-600 meters. That is amazing shooting using iron sights with the low velocity rounds and weapon data of that era.
Tactics. Indians would fire a few rounds at silly ranges, 800 meters. Intent seems to be to generate return fire, see how their medicine is working. This means do they get effective fire whipping by their ears, or are rounds nowhere near. Indians would infiltrate to close the gap using cover and concealment, with some distracting enemy so others could get closer.
Bravery runs are an example. An individual rides past enemy to draw fire and gauge enemy accuracy. Another Indian tactic was a mass fire, where many would shoot at once while others slid forward, with the intent to judge whether conditions were favorable to a charge. Note these demonstrations instantly created a loud firing event, easily mistaken for a volley. Not just the Indian fire and maneuver, but US fire response.
{US forces fired no volleys at LBH; none, nada; zero. Not as a signal, not as a fire technique. A brown Bess technique against shoulder to shoulder enemies was irrelevant at LBH, and US sergeants clearly knew this.}
Note that resupply works both ways. The distraction technique causes enemy to waste fire, and you are watching his volume of fire. US cartridge box holds 20 rounds. Say you get a soldier to fire 2 rounds per hundred meters starting at 800 meters. So at 100 meters, he has 4 rounds. I believe the Indians tactic, technique and procedures were excellent, and well designed to get US soldiers to fire excessively at long range, and be critically short in ammunition when Indians closed to effective fire range.
My point is you adjust what you do if in an ammunition shortage, both in training and tactics in a fight. The Indians did this, the US did not.
Anecdote. Many years ago I was working in Malawi, whose main claim to fame is Madonna adopted some kids from there. They were involved in the then civil war in Mozambique. The government had many outposts to cover a railway line, which Malawi has sending folks to help. The guerrillas had an interesting way of attacking. They would have a few soldiers fire at long range, and the garrison would blaze away. Then 30 minutes later again, Then 30 minutes another repeat. Pretty much no fire was returned at 3rd attack, government soldiers generally had a magazine and a half for their AK rifles, 45 rounds. Then the guerrillas would walk into the outpost with machetes and kill everyone.
Ammunition supply and basic load affect tactics, techniques, and procedures.
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Post by noggy on Sept 3, 2018 1:32:47 GMT -6
Speaking to the choir. I come from long line of hunting men, soldiers and competition shooters.
My point, much better worded by you, was that often used terms as "out-gunned" and such are useless if they only refer to the number of guns and specific models.The skill of the shooter and how many rounds available to the him (or her, to be politically correct) are kept out of the equation.
As for Malawian rebels; we use the same tactics today when messing with our Swedish neighbors.
All the best, Geir
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Post by montrose on Mar 19, 2019 8:52:46 GMT -6
My current guestimate is 1800 warrior with 400 breechloaders, 400 muzzle loaders remainder bows and melee weapons.
Maybe we should look at range vice weapons. What is the distribution curve of US casualties with respect to range?
300 meters to infinity: Maybe ten, the Indian marksman on Sharp Shooter Ridge is the exception for this battle. He clearly was a trained shooter. Only the breechloaders and some very good Civil War muzzleloaders could hit anything in this range. Most fire at this range is waste of fire.
200-300 meters. Hit chance increasing, as long as target stationary. Rifle and musket only. Still, insignificant.
50-150 meters. Bows now matter, and untrained shooters can more reliably hit targets they aim at. BY this I mean elevation, wind, leading a target, all those myriad things shooters have to be taught, and PRACTICE, become less important as range shortens. Casualties are now reasonable with respect to ammunition supply, wounds likely are higher than fatalities. Here is where Indians disrupted US organizational integrity, and created the conditions to close the gap.
0 to 50 meters. All range weapons are effective now. Pistols can now be used. Indian bows and training were optimized for this range. I believe the majority of US casualties occurred at this range. I would say no less than 75% of US fatalities were in this bracket.
The Indians did not win because of better weapons or better training. The US force at LBH was badly led and badly trained; significantly worse than the other regiments of the 1876 Army. Umm, and that Army set a very low bar. Basically, the 7th was the worst player on a team in any sports league you choose that lost every game in a given season.
Am I making sense here?
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 19, 2019 10:22:55 GMT -6
William
Yes and good to see you posting my friend.
Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 19, 2019 10:41:56 GMT -6
Custer probably had a little over 200 Springfield Carbines and so far we can account through forensic analysis about 69 different carbines. As far as Indian firearms the Henry 44 rimfire alone on the Custer Battlefield has 62 forensically different Henry repeaters. So apply a Peterson Index we would think that the known US carbines to identified carbines has a individual identification rate of 2.9 (known) : 1 (forensic individual identification). If the same rate applies to the Henry repeater that would be approximately 175 Henry repeaters along.
Standing up to shoot on Calhoun Hill was the way to shoot into Henryville. Whereas shooters in Henryville would only have to wait for the soldiers to stand. We went on a tour to that area with the Friends group and got to walk off the paths and roadway.
I think the Indians got to concentrate the weapons they had and there were no open available locations to shoot from with Indians waiting for openings to move in to.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by shan on Mar 20, 2019 10:56:17 GMT -6
William,
glad to see you back and kick starting some discussion on this board.
Now AZ rangers comment s prompts a question, or maybe two who knows? If the Indians who had gathered in the Henryville area had such firepower, and if, as he says, the troopers had to stand up to make them keep their heads down, one would have thought that the casualty rate amongst L troop would have been much higher much earlier on in the fight. Even allowing for the fact that they were having to snap their shots off as the situation allowed, the sheer volume of fire would have meant that a fair bit of it would have hit their target.
The question is, how quickly did the warriors accumulate in the area? If it was fairly early on, then L troop would have taken a number of casualties before C troop got themselves into trouble.
Shan ~ David
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Post by noggy on Mar 21, 2019 2:43:19 GMT -6
I think most findings of casings fired from Indian rifles, if I remember my Scott/Fox correctly, would fit with the majority of US casualties not coming from rifle fire. These seem to have been fired from great distances and not straight in the face of the troopers. The Indians could keep rifles for decades and even make musket balls, but I doubt they`d be keeping up massive fire throughout the battle. Harassing fire to allow other to move up for close combat and bows would never the less work pretty well.
All the best, Noggy
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Post by noggy on Mar 21, 2019 2:46:06 GMT -6
Custer probably had a little over 200 Springfield Carbines and so far we can account through forensic analysis about 69 different carbines. As far as Indian firearms the Henry 44 rimfire alone on the Custer Battlefield has 62 forensically different Henry repeaters. So apply a Peterson Index we would think that the known US carbines to identified carbines has a individual identification rate of 2.9 (known) : 1 (forensic individual identification). If the same rate applies to the Henry repeater that would be approximately 175 Henry repeaters along. Still? Aren`t these numbers pretty old now? Or has there simply not been done more in the field of individual identification since Fox (not the TV channel) and friends? All the best, Noggy
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Post by montrose on Mar 21, 2019 8:55:16 GMT -6
The most effective use of firearms in battle is to shoot what you aim at.
But fire can also have useful effects, even if zero probability of hit. Get hidden enemies to reveal their position, suppress enemy fire, distract. I am reluctant to use the term fix, since that term on these boards does not mean fix, has been strained into cloud cuckoo land.
The Henryville fire caused little to no casualties. It did focus the attention of L Company, and caused them to waste fire on targets out of range. The infiltration that destroyed L and C company occurred on the exact OPPOSITE side of Calhoun Hill. SO ineffective Indian fire set the conditions for a massive tactical victory. Indian casualties in this sector were tiny, a handful. Lame White Man may have fallen to friendly fire.
I think the limited basic load of combatants in just not understood at LBH. The cartridge box for US soldiers carried 20 rounds. Twenty. I get that more rounds were in the saddle bags. How does this help when primary US tactic was dismounted skirmish lines.
The excessive firing of US soldiers at targets out of range was a significant cause of their defeat. This is not an individual soldier failure. It is a failure of noncommissioned and commissioned officers.
My argument is that Indian forces had little to no hits at even ideal ranges for their weapon systems. Their ineffective fire caused a disproportionate US response, where the USG had ammunition problems long before the enemy entered into effective range. The Indians took very few casualties at LBH, just mind boggling given US weapons. Poor US leadership at NCO and officer level meant the Indians closed the gap from 300 to zero meters against folks out of ammunition.
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