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Post by fred on Dec 26, 2019 19:31:50 GMT -6
I have seen some comments about the possibility of me writing a book about the valley fight, so here is an update.
After several requests for delays, the publisher and I have agreed to a February 29 due date for two new books, one about the valley fighting, the other a day-by-day, bullet narrative about the campaign, culminating in a timeline narrative of the battle.
The valley book is 106,000 words so far and nearing an end. Need to work on maps.
The book has surprised me rather a lot. I have done more detailed work on participant accounts and have studied the ebb and flow of the battle to some surprising-- for me-- conclusions and discoveries. I am more critical of Reno than I had been... in some areas... and less so in others. The books digresses frequently and constantly and like the Strategy book, is more an analysis than a recitation of events: much of that was done already in Strategy. It uses a fair amount of current military doctrine as a comparative tool, as well as other historical comparisons. There is also a fair amount of work, once again, on Custer's orders from Terry; the lone tepee; Reno's orders from Custer, etc.
There are also some new twists in topography which have never been used before, and after a month-long breaking down of movements, some fair criticism of Reno's tactics, things I believe have never been touched on before.
Questions and discussions from Will "Montrose"; Steve Andrews; our old friend "Jodak," whoever he may be; Beth Collins; Tom Tubman; Gerry Schultz; and Paul Sewell, should all be answered, as promised... a long, long time ago. It will also contain a brief timeline, probably some 10 pages, with a couple new entries fitting in perfectly with the original data published in Strategy, none of which I have had any inkling or occasion to change or alter.
So we shall see.
In the meantime, I hope all old friends have had a very Merry and joyous Christmas and hopefully a Happy, healthy, and prosperous New Year.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by dave on Dec 29, 2019 12:32:48 GMT -6
Great News! Santa gave me a c-note so I will be able to get this tome of about the Valley Fighting!! Fred congratulations for writting about a confusing aspect of the LBH but you have set a high standard with The Strategy of Defeat at the Little Big Horn so I am excitingly awaiting this new book. Regards David
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Post by noggy on Dec 30, 2019 9:42:36 GMT -6
After several requests for delays, the publisher and I have agreed to a February 29 due date for two new books, one about the valley fighting, the other a day-by-day, bullet narrative about the campaign, culminating in a timeline narrative of the battle. Great news, Fred. Look forward to reading it. And don`t worry regarding the M Company book; despite Tom`s tip it is beneath me to beg for books. I will however steal it if ever in your neck of the woods! Merry Christmas ans happy new year. All the best, Geir
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Post by fred on Dec 30, 2019 16:36:20 GMT -6
Geir,
There is a lot of good, detailed information in the book, but it becomes tedious after a while, and his conclusions are the standard stuff. The book is well worth the money for the photos and color plates, but he details much of what you get in the Hardorff-Walter Camp books/interviews. Really good technical information-- if that is your thing-- but he raises no red flags, nor does he provide any new insight. Same old, same old.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by noggy on Dec 30, 2019 16:41:48 GMT -6
Hm, I like like red flags by this stage after reading so much various stuff.
All the best, Geir
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Post by montrose on Jan 3, 2020 10:51:23 GMT -6
Fred,
SO when can we start discussing the military decision making in the valley and overall? You were reluctant to go there in Strategy book, and given the emotional baggage of this peculiar fight, that decision made sense.
But I think its time you make a stand on Military Decision Making Process (MDMP: will provide links if needed). And I don't agree with you. We have to start a conversation for me to explain, this gets into very detailed discussions.
The valley fight was lost when the main body did not support the advanced guard, which happened before the Reno detachment was anywhere near the village, about 800 meters from Ford A. And that decision was not made by Reno.
Happy New Year.
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Post by fred on Jan 4, 2020 6:21:04 GMT -6
SO when can we start discussing the military decision making in the valley and overall? You were reluctant to go there in Strategy book, and given the emotional baggage of this peculiar fight, that decision made sense. But I think its time you make a stand on Military Decision Making Process (MDMP: will provide links if needed). And I don't agree with you. We have to start a conversation for me to explain, this gets into very detailed discussions. The valley fight was lost when the main body did not support the advanced guard, which happened before the Reno detachment was anywhere near the village, about 800 meters from Ford A. And that decision was not made by Reno. Will, I am now about 111,000 words into this thing, and have decided-- for continuity's sake-- to rewrite (not change, but just rewrite) the Reno Hill business, only because I discovered the exact location of Godfrey's skirmish line in the pullback from Weir Point and I want to include a photo of that area. Once that chapter is finished, I will get to the final "Lessons Learned" chapter, and then begin the drudgery of indexing, etc. As long as you are on here, I will contribute, but I cannot begin to reveal my own "findings" until the book is published. I am hoping that is by June: apparently Strategy has done extremely well (far better than I had hoped for: I know for certain, far better than 1,500 copies, which for this sort of thing is mind-boggling... at least to me), so the publisher is anxious for this to hit the market. So if you begin, I will certainly contribute... bits and pieces at first, then whole-hog once the book hits the shelves. I was surprised at this new effort. It should be a decent companion book to Strategy because I paid much closer attention to Reno's decision-making and have reached what I feel are some interesting conclusions, not only about his actions in the valley, but for the retreat itself. I have picked up so many things no one has ever written about before, just by a simple word or two uttered by two or more participants. It is surprising to me how much you find when you read some of these accounts very carefully. I was discussing the Custer-Ford B action on FB with a young NG lieutenant the other day, and while he loves to fling around modern-day acronyms, I found he falls into the same trap of trying to cram context into theory. We disagreed on the Custer pullback and when I raised the specter of the Strategy book and its quotes, he flung a whole passel of Indian accounts at me to prove his point. After a while, I get tired of discussing the same old bullshit, just with a different consistency. While his "quotes" were accurate, they were out of context, a fault I find increasingly difficult to point out and explain to people; a lot of things make up specific contexts. I guess-- to make an analogy-- a general "context" is made up of many smaller and more specific contexts, sort of like strands of DNA. If you omit a single strand, it changes the DNA's entire make-up. I do not like to biologize these things, but my mind can think of no other applicable example. I am not sure you are going to like all my conclusions, for I think Reno made several poor-- nay, bad-- decisions in his dispositions, but I believe my conclusions are valid, and I have spent so much time game-playing this thing that I cannot come to any other conclusions than what I have written. I will always agree with you that the most egregious mistakes were made earlier-- and not by Reno-- but that does not excuse his gaffes in the valley. What I find tantalizing about the whole thing, however, is my so-called "discoveries"-- read: conclusions-- are not the ones Reno is always criticized for. As usual, I have also gone into the minutiae of things: for example, I have pinpointed, within a couple minutes time-frame, the almost-precise time of Bloody Knife's death... which I thought was wa-a-a-yyy cool!! There is enough anecdotal evidence for that to be reasonably accurate. I am trying to think of a way to format some chapters where I answer the specific questions and suggestions you posed some time ago; yours and others'. Not sure how to do that yet, so I may just "textualize" them, but that loses some of the punch of actually answering-- or addressing-- specific questions. Still working on that. I have also decided to include those parts of the time-lines used in Strategy, though on a much abbreviated basis. They keep things in perspective. Anyway, I am really delighted to see you here; it is almost like "coming home again." I hope you are doing well, Will. I miss our banter. In the meantime, Happy New Year: I pray it is happy and healthy for all. Very, very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by noggy on Jan 5, 2020 5:36:37 GMT -6
Fred
The more I think about this, the more excited I get. For most of us novices, the Valley fight at first seems most straight forward:
Reno goes in, doesn`t get the promised support, is outnumbered and outmaneuvered, doesn`t organize a proper breakthrough/retreat/whatever, looses many men on his way to the bluffs, end of story.
That`s pretty much how I saw it at first and concentrated more on Battle Ridge/Last Stand Hill. I have a feeling that to many, the Valley fight in some way is not a "proper part" of the battle; only the Custer part seems to interest them. I was guilty of that myself early on, and it was a mistake (just like deciding to have a alcohol free January) which I have been rectifying. But even in much of the literature about the battle written by real or "real" historians, I get sort of the same feeling. Might be wrong. I often am regarding the battle. But either way, a book dedicated to this part of the battle surely will be a needed addition to the bibliography (we`d say it like this over here, might be wrong in English but hope it makes sense).
All the best, Geir
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Post by fred on Jan 6, 2020 4:10:25 GMT -6
Geir,
I do not think you are wrong about the valley fight. Every narrative I have read regurgitates essentially the same thing, just as you so eloquently and briefly described.
I am either terribly confused or am a rogue when it comes to this stuff, but even with the Facebook sites and the apparent popularity of the Strategy book, there is constant pushback. There are so many things that are apparent, yet never questioned with either event, and I do not know if one in twenty understands what "context" means. People claim they have read what participants had to say... but have they? How do they explain some of these comments? Or do they? Articles appear and are remarked upon-- or maybe not?-- then filed away as though they were never even written?
I guess people are too involved with their own theories, 95% of which are simply wrong.
Wishing you a very happy New Year and thanks for helping keep these boards alive, active, and blossoming.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by shan on Jan 6, 2020 11:47:37 GMT -6
Fred,
I'm not altogether sure what you mean when you say context is everything, and that people fail to put what they read into context.
I'm guessing that I may well be one of these people, but then try as I might, when I read the say, the Arikara Narratives for the umpteenth time, no matter how much I try, I have great difficulty in putting many of the individual accounts into some sort of general context.
Can you give us a simple example of what you mean, one that we might all recognise?
Shan, David
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Post by fred on Jan 7, 2020 5:59:29 GMT -6
I'm not altogether sure what you mean when you say context is everything, and that people fail to put what they read into context. I'm guessing that I may well be one of these people, but then try as I might, when I read the say, the Arikara Narratives for the umpteenth time, no matter how much I try, I have great difficulty in putting many of the individual accounts into some sort of general context. Can you give us a simple example of what you mean, one that we might all recognise? David, "Context" may be the single most important element in properly understanding not only what happened at the Little Big Horn, but with other historical events as well. Actions and motives can never be truly understood until the full circumstances of events are brought to bear on the discussion, and in my opinion, that is the importance of context. Too often, people forget that and they treat each separate event as a stand-alone without taking into consideration what led to that event or how it came about. There is a very good book by a British officer, General Rupert Anthony Smith, titled Utility of Force, and he makes a couple references to "context" and how important it is. “Wars and conflicts are conducted at four levels—political, strategic, theatre and tactical—with each level sitting within the context of the other, in descending order from the political; it is this that gives context to all the activities of all the levels aimed at the same objectives, and enables coherence between them.” The emphasis is mine. ... and... “… It must never be forgotten that the political considerations provide the context within which the strategy rests. Therefore the relationship between the political and strategic levels must always be very close, to the point of engaging in continuous reassessment and debate, which does not stop until the overall purpose or aim is achieved. At the same time, it must always be remembered that the political objective and the military strategic objective are not the same, and are never the same: the military strategic objective is achieved by military force while the political objective is achieved as a result of the military success.”Events lead into one another and before the end result can be assessed we must understand the preceding events and how they caused of affected that end result. Even the "end result" may not be the actual end, but may be the context fitting into the next event. A simple example: Reno's retreat. Everyone considers it a fiasco and a serious black mark against the man; but was it? How does that retreat fit within the contexts of simultaneous and surrounding events, circumstances, terrain, enemy forces. Could Reno have set up a rear guard? Could he have held the timber? Set the retreat within the surrounding contexts. Are you aware the terrain would have never allowed him to set up a proper rear guard? Are you aware the enemy forces' positioning would have never allowed him to set up a rear guard? And there is more. So you cannot simply isolate an event, then critique it for good or worse. All these thing affect Reno's decision-making and mitigate-- or worsen-- those decisions. Are you aware Reno made the decision to bolt the timber long before he did? Context. Are you aware, despite these mitigating circumstances, the retreat was still bungled, though for a different reason? Context. Too often people chose to rally around their heroes, demonizing everyone else without understanding context and what circumstances drove these men to do what they did. The key-- and Will Bender will probably agree with me here-- is an officer in command of troops must assess, attempt to plan forward, consider situational alternatives, and act accordingly, anticipating enemy reactions. The funny apart about this-- for me, anyway-- is I look back many, many years to when I was an officer commanding troops in combat. My situation was different because I was no longer commanding infantry soldiers, but my training as an infantry officer stood me well. In the few situations I was in where I had to react under enemy fire, I did precisely what I wrote above. Was that because I was a "brilliant" tactician? No, not at all; it was because I was trained superbly by an Army that knew how to fight and how to train and what good leadership was. I become smug when I think of that... and not just a little bit proud, because I feel friends like Bender reacted and were trained in the same way. After reading General Smith's work, I suspect the British Army is similar. Anyway, if I had not done so before, I wish you the happiest of New Years; may it be healthy, joyous, and peaceful old friend. Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 7, 2020 6:35:07 GMT -6
Hi Fred, I think that Reno weighed up his options probably based on the idea that Custer was probably behind him,or at least in the area.
Stopping his battalion was the right idea, which was I believe, was also backed up by some of his company officers. The whole thing started to go pear shaped when his battalion started to fragment and drip by drip, move into the timber, this of course left his left flank exposed.
There could be an argument that says, that Reno's battalion was left too long holding a skirmish line without support, now would that support be expected by Reno? Would he have made a different decision if he knew that he was the only combat unit in the valley?
Reno must have knew that the longer he remained in the valley unsupported, the more likely the chance he was going to be isolated and worn down.
In hindsight Reno could have dismount, formed skirmish lines, fired ten rouns per trooper then mounted up and pulled back.
But I suppose he would then have been called a coward.
BTW; I think he did handle the skirmish line badly, as to dilute your firing line in such a way that your flanking company almosts gets cut off was out of order, it doesn't help that DeRudio ends up taking cover in the trees, which is strange for an officer who had men to command. After that command and control seem fall apart, but I was not stood in that timber on the 25/06/1876, so what do I know.
All the best for 2020
Ian
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Post by dave on Jan 7, 2020 17:21:58 GMT -6
Say Fred, did you mention our ole buddy Harlan Jay Ellison to the young Lieutenant? Regards Dave
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Post by fred on Jan 7, 2020 18:21:28 GMT -6
Say Fred, did you mention our ole buddy Harlan Jay Ellison to the young Lieutenant? Dave, Happy New Year my friend!!! And which "young lieutenant" are you referring to? Best wishes, Fred. P.S.-- Whoops!! I see it now. No, I did not. I decided instead to back away and just drop it; it is not worth the fight, the aggravation, or the time. I just do not have the energy any more to take on every post I see. From now on I simply post a photo of the book cover, tell them my answer is in that and it has not changed in the five years the book has been in print. All the evidence is there and if they do not agree, unless they can refute my conclusions whatever they say that differs is wrong. It becomes less frustrating for me and more frustrating for them because they will always have that doubt in the back of their minds. I keep telling people on FB I am not there to teach or convince anyone of anything. Same here. I simply reach my conclusions, write them, have them published (fortunately for me), and if someone does not like those conclusions, they are free to refute them, but, again, unless you have more and better evidence or reasoning, my conclusions stand. FCW
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Post by dave on Jan 7, 2020 18:27:08 GMT -6
The National Guard LT you mentioned Regards Dave
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