Battle For France

[montrose]

I know we have several world war 2 scholars here. Fred, Ian, Noggy, etc. Because of comments on this board I have been involved in deep research in the battle for France in May 1940.

I was expecting to learn about technology and organization design. My own personal field of study is how the development of gunpowder and relevant weapons led to new organization designs for both military units and political entities.

What I learned is that French military units were horribly bad 1939-1945. What equipment they have is not a factor, what side they are on does not matter. France was defeated by every combatant in WW2.

The only effective combat units fielded by France had one unique and constant factor: they weren't French. They were African or Asian soldiers from colonies. The most effective resistance in 1940 came from soldiers from Madagascar.

Late in the war, De Gaulle realized it was politically bad juju to have the main effort of France be the colonies. He deliberately ordered the colony units sent home, and recruited massive levies of untrained former collaborators to take their place. The effectiveness of French units plummeted, as can be seen in Nordwind and all after. And the colonies knew they had been screwed, these veterans all revolted to throw the cowards out.

A main problem in the battle for France is that hundreds of thousands of soldiers deserted and fled, the majority fleeing without any contact with the enemy. The huge volume of deserters was a major obstacle in reinforcing units getting to the front, they could not get through the throngs of deserters blocking the roads.

Blitzkrieg theory is a false theory. The Germans overestimated the effect of this theory, because they used it on a useless army. The theory led to arrogance. Using the lessons of France led to efforts to replicate it against Russia, UK and USA; all leading to failure.

Kursk, EL Alamein, Bulge all saw initial tactical success, followed by operational and strategic defeat.

What I learned from 1940 was not what I expected to learn.

How does this apply to 1876 US Army. This was a bad army. It was badly trained and badly led. What amuses me is so was the 1976 Army, of my father and (eventually) myself. I am proud that I was in the US Army when it sorted itself out in late 1980s/early 1990s.

The 1876 Army had an annual desertion rate of 20% (sometimes higher). So an enlistment contract of 5 years with 20% desertion means what at end of contract? Several first sergeants at LBH were former deserters.

But these soldiers did not run in battle. Fighting an enemy that didn't take prisoners sure as hell helped. The soldiers at LBH stayed under officer and NCO command until it was hopeless.

The US Army won most of its engagements 1865-1898. The theory issue for LBH is why did we lose this one, and not all the others. LBH is an outlier that does not match the pattern of other encounters.

I have my own opinion, on countless other threads. The enlisted men and noncommissioned officers did their job. The 7th Cav had an officer problem.

[herosrest]

^Ducemus

All you need to know - Schlieffen Plan Follow on with the 'See also', bottom of article.

Be well.

I'm considering re-modeling our lounge and am thinking about this table as the centrepiece because it reminds me very much of a pillbox and the Maginot Line, which actually did its job unlike its later German counterpart Seigfreid and th e Atlantic vesion before it. Shoot and scoot.

[fred]

I am not a believer in the concept of "Blitzkrieg" being a failure. Quite the contrary. What I do believe-- with Diane's sufferance and forbearance for a great diversion from the purpose of these boards-- is the concept is misunderstood in its purpose and execution.

What follows is the vague paraphrasing of a number of sources I have collected over the years, ideas, writings, and concepts I accept and believe. I can provide the actual sources-- privately, if anyone is interested-- but I beg forgiveness for posting this without including those sources. Please understand, these are not my writings, but mirror my beliefs.

(With so much going on in my life, I have simply not had the time to coalesce these ideas into my own work. When I do, full credit shall be given to the authors.)


The roots of both Blitzkrieg and the Panzerwaffe can be seen in traditional German tactical thinking. The German Army had always engendered a tradition of initiative in its officers and soldiers. Staff training encouraged adaptability and flexibility at all levels and orders were not always sacrosanct—nor was constructive criticism necessarily seen as insubordinate. This belief in initiative found fulfillment in the doctrine of Auftragstaktik, which may be loosely translated as “Mission Tactics.” The German high command would formulate a strategic plan, laying out the key targets and objectives and the various military units from army level down to squad were allocated these objectives, but the nuts and bolts of their attainment was left to the commanders on the ground.

Ironically, dependence of the Blitzkrieg upon the horse was so great the numerical strength of German Army horses maintained during the entire war period averaged around 1,100,000. Of the 322 German Army and SS divisions in November 1943, only fifty-two were armored or motorized. Of the November 1944 total of 264 combat divisions, only forty-two were armored or motorized. The great bulk of the German combat strength—the old-type infantry divisions—marched into battle on foot, with their weapons and supply trains propelled almost entirely by horses. The light and mountain divisions had an even greater proportion of animals, and the cavalry divisions were naturally mainly dependent on the horse.

Heinz Guderian visualized armor’s use as such: tanks would assault the enemy’s defense zone along a narrow frontage (maybe as little as a KM), break through and then accelerate as they headed for their strategic objective. The armored cars of the reconnaissance units would go on ahead to probe points of resistance and once the tanks had broken through, the motorized infantry and then the ordinary infantry would follow in their wake. The whole operation would be supported from the air. This was the essence of Blitzkrieg.

Long before the German Army fielded its own armored forces, the foundations for a mobile approach to warfare were being established in doctrine and in training programs. This became the ground in which the roots of Blitzkrieg were established. While the concept of Blitzkrieg appeared to be a fundamentally new way of making war, it was as much an operational improvisation based on sound tactics on the ground, effective close air support and good leadership as any original strategic approach. Neither the apparently invincible blending of armor, infantry, artillery, and combat engineers into combined arms, nor the joint coordination of air and ground forces makes for a successful strategy. If tactics form the steps from which operational leaps are assembled, a coherent strategy must shape and chart the guiding path. A national or grand strategy seeks to balance the overall aims or ends with the military and other means available by determining the most appropriate ways of prosecuting a security and defense policy and, if deemed necessary, of conducting war. Likewise, the apparent advantage of operating on interior strategic lines, allowing the switching of forces between the Western and Eastern Fronts, cannot compensate for an overall lack of military resources, as events of the First World War had shown.

The following, while I have now included sources, is drawn from my own work and pertains to what I believe is the genesis of Blitzkrieg as an offensive concept. It also refers to the German word I used above: Auftragstaktik.


Auftragstaktik is a tactical system developed during World War I, whereby commanders—realizing troops had been committed to battle—found it almost impossible to conduct the battle according to plan. They decided it was better to provide a general outline or orders without detailed instructions, thereby allowing subordinate commanders to run the fight as they saw fit based on the conditions they encountered, all within the set parameters. The German general, Hermann Hoth, was critical of OKH for allowing Hitler to interfere with this type of tactical thinking, something he did constantly with disastrous results for the German army. NATO, today, employs this concept’s principles. It also ties in with Russell Weigley’s comments about how German NCOs were trained. In Henry G. Gole’s book, General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War [37], the author makes a point of telling the reader how much DePuy admired this tactic, also saying, “it has more to do with carrying out the commander’s intent, not just specific orders.”

As a captain in 1921, the future German field marshal, Erich von Manstein, commanded a company in the small village of Angermünde, north of Berlin. “During his tour of command… he was able to develop his leadership skills and training methods. In exercises he stressed the need for commanders at all levels to think (Denken) and to act (Handeln) as necessary without always seeking prior authority…. Manstein’s self-styled approach to running his company was pure Auftragstaktik (mission command): a philosophy of command based on informing a subordinate what he has to achieve without prescribing how.” The German Army would require “soldiers, as well as non-commissioned and commissioned officers, who not only could think for themselves at their own level, but also were capable of taking the job of their superiors with minimum preparation.” [Major General Mungo Melvin, Manstein: Hitler's Greatest General, 44]

“… [T]he willingness to take calculated risks—not rash gambles—within a given framework of allocated authority marks this particular style of command. It is one that requires entrusted, independently minded commanders who are keen to grasp the initiative, acting purposefully while following their superior commanders’ broad intentions.” [Melvin, Manstein, 323 – 324]



Best wishes,
Fred.

[Yan Taylor]

The German plan was sound though, they drew us and the French into Belgium and then struck through the Sedan, which had us looking over our shoulder. I think that the Germans did their homework and knew which points to attack. Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and France, all border Germany, so they would have had extensive plans of the area.

The French army was in a state of transition. They wanted to improve their weapons systems from their rifles up to their artillery. Just look at my web site to see how many different AFVs and guns/howitzers they had. They wanted to change all their infantry rifles from 8mm to 7.5mm and change a lot of their artillery from WW1 stocks to new designs. Having said that, when you had a commander like Gamelin, who distrusted radios, you are on the back foot from the start. Gamelin wanted to run communications with the British and Belgians like they did in WW1.

At the start of ‘Fall Gleb’, both the Allies and the Germans had roughly the same number of division, the Allies had 135 [France 94, UK 10, Belgians 22 and the Dutch 9) and the Germans 136, but the Germans had the advantage of having better quality troops, except for the BEF, who were a fully pro army.

Major clashes of armour between the Germans and the French accured at ‘The Battle of Hannut and Stonne’. The biggest British use of armour was at Arras.

[fred]

Another nice post, Ian.

My only comment is that numbers of divisions do not always tell the tale. I noticed the affinity you Brits have for using divisions as a benchmark of strength when I read one of the Keegan books, but size of divisions is more revenant except when considering deployment... and even then, numbers matter. The TO&E strength of the Waffen-SS Panzer Division of 1944 was 18,548 men, whereas Soviet tank units were not much bigger than brigade strength in other armies.

I do not know what the comparable British and French divisions were in 1940: I am sure you have those numbers. Without resorting to my library, memory tells me the Germans, moving into France in 1940, were essentially outnumbered in men, aircraft, and tanks. Even those numbers, however, hardly tell the tale, for much of the French equipment was positioned throughout the country, hardly ready to meet an enemy incursion, especially from whence it came.

I was not aware that the BEF was once again totally a standing army, just like the seven divisions of World War I.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[noggy]

Blitzkrieg as a concept and the execution of it was never perfect. But a rapid, high-risk war was the only one Germany could allow itself to fight. Strategically, it made sense. When fighting numerically superior forces, a war of attrition was the last they`d want. We`re talking about a country where millions of men for years worked in factories, while entire divisions collapsed on the Eastern Front, simply because ideology demanded that women were "made" to be house wives. Meanwhile, in the rest of the world... I always recommend anyone interested in the 3 Reich and it`s war economy to read David Stahel. Some years ago, I wrote an article about the battle of Kiev. Even if Gemran military history had interested me immensely for years, I learned a lot about just how shaky the whole German war machine really was already in 41, where it`s easy to think of them as just strolling along until the snows set in.

[noggy]

Apr 17, 2019 16:22:30 GMT -6 fred said:

Another nice post, Ian.

My only comment is that numbers of divisions do not always tell the tale. I noticed the affinity you Brits have for using divisions as a benchmark of strength when I read one of the Keegan books, but size of divisions is more revenant except when considering deployment... and even then, numbers matter. The TO&E strength of the Waffen-SS Panzer Division of 1944 was 18,548 men, whereas Soviet tank units were not much bigger than brigade strength in other armies.

Soviet Infantry Divisions had just about 10 000 men. During the war, I believe they fielded 2 000 of these rifle divisions. That means a German Division often could beat several Soviet divisions, which on paper is very misgiving. And they often operated with terms we don`t like, Guard regiments, Shock Armies and so on.

All the best,
Geir

[noggy]

If this works, it shows German, British and US Divisional structure in 44: ccnmtl.columbia.edu/services/dropoff/schilling/mil_org/comp_strength_new.html
But of course, real German Divisional strength was often much lower. Hitler just loved to see "Divisions on his maps, even if they in fact were close to company size.

[Yan Taylor]

You are right Fred, the BEF contained Territorial divisions. these T Divs were well trained though and served well, probably better trained then most of the French divisions.
Here is a list of the Infantry divisions prior to the 10th May 1940;

1st Infantry Division (Regular)
2nd Infantry Division (Regular)
3rd Infantry Division (Regular)
4th Infantry Division (Regular)
5th Infantry Division (Regular)
42nd East Lancashire Infantry Division (Territorial)
48th Infantry Division (Territorial)
50th Northumbrian Infantry Division (Territorial)

[fred]

Ian,

Five regulars, eh? People should be aware that a British Territorial unit was-- still is?-- the equivalent of a U. S. National Guard unit. Similar concept. And in World War I, they were different still from units of the Kitchener Army. Interesting stuff here.

Also... and this has been gnawing at me most of the morning... we should not be too quick to denigrate or minimize the German effort of World War II. There has been no direct criticism, but the innuendo is palpable. "Blitzkrieg myth," "blitzkrieg failure," "German war machine," "men in factories," etc., all seem to me to be small pot-shots rather than effective, constructive criticism. If you asked the British and French troops in May and June of 1940 if the "blitzkrieg" was a myth, or the Soviet soldiers of 1941 and 1942, I think they would look at you like you had lost your collective minds (and I am not talking about you, Ian).

"Blitzkrieg" as a concept is a theory of methodology, one of whose functions is what we, today, call the combined arms technique, i.e., the conjunctive use of armor, infantry, artillery, and air power to achieve an offensive goal. If it "failed" the Germans it is because the principle was aborted by human tampering... and you can take your choice of culprits, starting with Hitler, but not ending there. One can place a modicum of blame on a sometimes-timorous General Staff or even field commanders themselves. In my opinion, the concept is entirely valid and plays right up to a primary goal of all German offensive policies: surprise.

As for quality of leadership and troops, I think there has been enough written by enough qualified people attesting to the superiority of German leadership and German forces during that war. Germany did not lose World War II because of inferior troops, inferior leadership, or inferior doctrine. Remember: it was a world war and the Germans were simply overwhelmed. You combine that with the intransigent stupidity of a despot like Hitler and you have the perfect formula for what befell Germany.

Anyway, I have on too long. Time to go back to the Little Big Horn.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Yan Taylor]

I am sure that around this time,the British army only had eight regular Infantry Divisions, Thirty IDs in total with 11 first line TA Divisiona nad 11 second line TA Divisions.

Did the US National Guard have such a two tier system?

[fred]

Apr 19, 2019 12:13:01 GMT -6 Yan Taylor said:

I am sure that around this time,the British army only had eight regular Infantry Divisions, Thirty IDs in total with 11 first line TA Divisiona nad 11 second line TA Divisions.

Did the US National Guard have such a two tier system?

Ian,

No. [The short answer.]

[The long answer...] When I was in the U. S. Army (1962-1972), it was organized as follows. We had a draft, so you had regulars (enlisted men and officers) and you had regulars (Regular Army or RA). The standing army was comprised of both. If you were drafted, you were, in essence, a reserve member of the active army and you served two years active duty. At the end of the two years, you were transferred into the active reserve (one weekend "drill" each month, plus two weeks summer camp). That obligation was for two more years. After that, you spent two years in the inactive reserve. No drills, no weekends, no meetings: simply a name on a roster in case the flag went up (and it never did).

If, however, instead of being drafted you enlisted, your obligation was three years active (for sure) and three years inactive (I think). That ended your obligation. Reserve officers (through ROTC or one of the state service academies, i.e., the Citadel or VMI) were the same.

Regular officers had a three-year obligation and then instead of being automatically discharged-- as the reserve officers were-- in order for an RA officer to leave the service he had to resign and the army had no obligation to accept that resignation.

The National Guard was treated similar to the Active Reserve, except for the active service. If you joined the National Guard voluntarily, your active service was limited to six months, then 3 1/2 years in the Active Guard (same as the Active Reserve), and two years inactive after that.

That is how I remember it. The National Guard units reported to their state and therefore the governor was the C-in-C; unless, of course, the unit was federalized. Then the chain of command fell under the Regular Army. The Army Reserves were always federal; never state.

My bone of contention with the all-volunteer military today is that it relies very heavily on the National Guard. (I have no idea if there is still an Active Reserve component any more.) While I am sure the army is still good, no way can it be better or even as good as the volunteer-draft army of old. And there are a lot of reasons for that in my opinion. No matter how good the training may be, "weekend warriors" are not as proficient as full-time active duty troops. That is a whole 'nother subject, however.

Best wishes,
Fred.