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Post by fred on Jun 8, 2018 12:10:49 GMT -6
Thanks for the clarification Fred! That makes completely sense. The incorrect location of the markers is a major problem for students of the battle. It is my pleasure: you are very welcome. I have spent considerable time with these markers and have identified-- to my satisfaction-- all the spurious ones, and have also identified between 29% and 32.9% of the actual markers with names. More than one at the battlefield is incorrectly placed. The rest is a guessing game, but a reasonable guess because we know where various units fought. If some cases rather than a positive ID, the marker can be "named" by the process of elimination. It is a fun exercise. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by battledetective on Jun 8, 2018 14:39:15 GMT -6
Hi! Here is the link I was mentioning about the original 1876 map: www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/forgotten-1876-map-reveals-the-truth-about-custers-last-stand-says-author-robert-nightengale-300220233.htmlSo this would be the map drawn by Maguire a couple days after the battle, and, according to the article, it would indicate that the ravine where the 28 men - presumably from E company - died is the one next to the north of Deep Ravine (as known today). I assume this would be Michno's Cemetery Ravine. However this issue has already been addressed here: www.english-westerners-society.org.uk/CAGB%20Book%20Review%2003%20-%20Mystery%20E%20Troop.htmThis link (a review by Francis Taunton) has already been posted elsewhere on this forum and criticizes Michno's hypothesis that the men from E company died on Cemetery Ravine and not on Deep Ravine. In the reproduction of Maguire's 1876 map in Taunton's review the ravine where the 28 bodies were found is marked with H. But if that is Michno's Cemetery Ravine then on Maguire's map there is no Deep Ravine, which is an outstanding feature of the battlefield. Yet, according to Robert Nightengale, the author of the article in my first link: "Both the 1876 and 1879 maps, and other corroborating maps drawn in 1876, seem to indicate a significant historical site on the battlefield has been marked in the wrong location. "Deep Ravine", a location where up to twenty-eight 7th Cavalry soldiers were killed and buried, is actually the next ravine to the north of the ravine incorrectly identified on the battlefield."
Now I'm going to nurse my headache...
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Post by herosrest on Jun 9, 2018 5:41:17 GMT -6
Thanks for the clarification Fred! That makes completely sense. The incorrect location of the markers is a major problem for students of the battle. It is my pleasure: you are very welcome. I have spent considerable time with these markers and have identified-- to my satisfaction-- all the spurious ones, and have also identified between 29% and 32.9% of the actual markers with names. More than one at the battlefield is incorrectly placed. The rest is a guessing game, but a reasonable guess because we know where various units fought. If some cases rather than a positive ID, the marker can be "named" by the process of elimination. It is a fun exercise. Best wishes, Fred. Hi fred. There are good grounds to believe and accept that Lord was not identified. That does not mean that his body was not there. You have divined the location of his remains. That's fine (for you). Be well. Added. According to Williams, Lord's boss, he was identified by the qualty of the socks on the remains.
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Post by herosrest on Jun 9, 2018 5:44:51 GMT -6
Hi! Here is the link I was mentioning about the original 1876 map: www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/forgotten-1876-map-reveals-the-truth-about-custers-last-stand-says-author-robert-nightengale-300220233.htmlSo this would be the map drawn by Maguire a couple days after the battle, and, according to the article, it would indicate that the ravine where the 28 men - presumably from E company - died is the one next to the north of Deep Ravine (as known today). I assume this would be Michno's Cemetery Ravine. However this issue has already been addressed here: www.english-westerners-society.org.uk/CAGB%20Book%20Review%2003%20-%20Mystery%20E%20Troop.htmThis link (a review by Francis Taunton) has already been posted elsewhere on this forum and criticizes Michno's hypothesis that the men from E company died on Cemetery Ravine and not on Deep Ravine. In the reproduction of Maguire's 1876 map in Taunton's review the ravine where the 28 bodies were found is marked with H. But if that is Michno's Cemetery Ravine then on Maguire's map there is no Deep Ravine, which is an outstanding feature of the battlefield. Yet, according to Robert Nightengale, the author of the article in my first link: "Both the 1876 and 1879 maps, and other corroborating maps drawn in 1876, seem to indicate a significant historical site on the battlefield has been marked in the wrong location. "Deep Ravine", a location where up to twenty-eight 7th Cavalry soldiers were killed and buried, is actually the next ravine to the north of the ravine incorrectly identified on the battlefield."
Now I'm going to nurse my headache...
Attached is the Nightengale map and Maguire's actual map which was sketched as dated and included to the reports forwarded to the Chief of Engineers by Humphries. With regards to Michno's 'early' radical theory, it changed during his subsequent writing. The map which Nightengale wrote up and developed, shows the 'Clockwise' military theory of events. The command moved along GGR and fought in DR before retreating to LSH and moving back towards Reno/Benteen. Frances F. Victor, wrote up the military theories in 'Eleven years in the Rocky Mountains and life on the frontier also a history of the Sioux war, and a life Gen. George A. Custer, with a full account of his last battle', published in 1877. An important book. Quote 'Several theories as to the subsequent movements of the troops have been entertained by persons who visited the grounds. One is, that the soldiers.......' were all killed. - Link - to the book online.The easiest way in which to comprehend the map forming the basis of Nightengale's 'mystery' is to realise that it really was forgotten'. Maguire had nothing, what so ever, to do with the proofing and engraving of it. Same with that used at RCoI.
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Post by battledetective on Jun 10, 2018 13:27:41 GMT -6
Thanks Herosrest. The map on the right is dated July 2nd and the one on the left Sept 19th, 1876, and seem more accurate. Both are drawn on a large scale and probably leave several features out. What clearly transpires from them however is that the village extended far downriver of Medicine Tail Ford and thus was bigger than some people think.
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Post by herosrest on Jun 11, 2018 12:14:55 GMT -6
The map representations of the village were not based upon 'eye ball'. That is, Maguire presented a representation of what he understood from what he saw on the ground. This was a part of his testimony to RCoI. What in fact took place was that the camp moved along the river on the evening of the 25th June. What Maguire and many others saw on the ground, the impressions of the tipi's was in fact succesive camps. This is clear from both native and military accounts of it. Terry had one of his NCO's go out and count the tipi (lodge) sites and the total was 1800. There were around 800 - 1000 tipi's in the camp which 7th Cavalry attacked. This was the opposite of what happened with 7th Cavalry's assessments of camp sites during the march down the Rosebud. What was taken as succesive camps moving only a short distance each few days, was actually concurrent camp sites of the various tribes present. It's a matter which still draws considerable interest and discussion. A corollary is scout William (Billy) Cross who left the battle on the afternoon of 25th June with the Ree's who moved off to Powder River. His report of the battle was given on July 4th and put the tipi count at 8-900. Cross: 'There were about 8 or 900 lodges. The Uncpapas, Ogalallas, Sans Arcs, Minneconjou's, Cheyennes; in all 5 tribes'. He gives a much lower estimate of the fighting strength of the Indian village than many of the other eye-witnesses that day, almost half as many lodges as that estimated by Gerard and Herendeen. He left the battle before the camps moved down river. 8-900 is still a big camp regardless of how many fighting men you ascribe to each tipi. There were 7 warriors staying with Two Moon. The camp was much larger before the night of the 23/24th June when a significant contingent departed for Powder River. Gerrard and Herendeen based there assessments of village size using what they saw on the ground after Terry arrived. Billy Cross got a good estimate of the camp size before he left Reno Hill on the 25th. I've attached what is the best that we understand about the movements of the camp during summer 1876 up to the battle. You will see that Reno's scout crossed the camp's trail on 10th June the the mouth of Mitzpah Creek, 9 days before he returned to Terry and Custer.
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Post by battledetective on Jun 12, 2018 13:00:47 GMT -6
Herosrest, I find it a bit strange that the Lakotas would have moved barely a village length downriver on the evening of the 25th. That would mean that the Hunkpapas would have moved approximately to the site previously occupied by the Cheyennes. I know the Natives planned to move downriver towards the confluence of the Bighorn to new hunting grounds on the 25th, but the move was disrupted by the Army attack. Why move only one or two miles - while the warriors were busy with the siege of Reno-Benteen? Then we know that on the 26th the camp dispersed towards the west. I guess some lodges may have been moved around, but such a small move of the big village downriver doesn't make much sense to me. Of course I may be wrong. And even if there were 'only' 800-1000 lodges, would that include the wickiups of unmarried warriors? Among the 'summer roamers' there must have been a high proportions of young men looking for adventure, a good hunt and maybe a last scrap with the wasichus. That would suggest that the proportion of warriors on the 25th would have been higher than that found normally in an Indian village. Cheers!
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Post by battledetective on Jun 12, 2018 17:37:31 GMT -6
I found this link, with maps allegedly drawn by Natives: decolonialatlas.wordpress.com/2017/06/26/hunkpapa-maps-of-the-battle-of-little-bighorn/The last one is said to have been drawn by Sitting Bull with a military cartographer. What do you make of the abandoned lodges in the south? Does it indicate that the village was slowly 'creeping' northwards as Herosrest wrote? Some groups of Indians who changed position or left the village?
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Post by herosrest on Jun 13, 2018 1:06:53 GMT -6
That is a great find (maps). There is a reference work on the cartography by Michael Donahue which is worth the investment. review 1 www.custerbattlefield.org/report%20drawing%20battle%20lines.htmreview 2 www.friendslittlebighorn.com/drawingbattlelines.htmIt was not understood by many of the expedition who fought LBH and those who relieved the Reno Benteen Defence site, that the village relocated downstream. That is a simple reality and one that continues with students of the battle. There are historians and authors since 1876, who believed the village sprawled downriver to Deep Coulee and beyond and this completely affected and undermines the associated theory and understanding of events their version of the battle presents. Godfrey, for example, never under stood the actual size and location of the camp. Same with Walter M. Camp, as far as I know although he died before pulling all his research and theory together. The matter is cleared up by Capt. Freeman of 7th Infantry who understood the camp moved, and noted it when he arrived with Terry as senior Captain of the infantry. The camp size was understood and fully presented by E.S. Curtis (Shadow Catcher) and also by Marquis in the Richard Woodenleg book. Richard Fox presents the evidence effectively. Curtis map - upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5f/Custer%27s_route_over_Little_Bighorn_battlefield.jpgMarquis map - www.nps.gov/media/photo/gallery.htm?id=7EBBE597-1DD8-B71B-0B0702486E91EF9DFull view (Online) Marquis book. See map last page. catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/006802828The size and location of the camp at the time that 7th Cavalry attacked is the single requisite which must be accepted and understood before serious study of events can occur. The matter injects immense confusion to study and understanding and neither really begin until the implications of the confusion brought to thinking by accepting the large village and its consequences - is rejected as falsity. Charles Rankin gets into this matter - www.historynet.com/book-review-legacy-new-perspectives-on-the-battle-of-the-little-bighorn-charles-e-rankin-ww.htm Great Book. You cannot understand LBH before the understanding the enormity of the village size problem and its impact since day 1 of studying events. It pervades all correct and flawed thinking and undermines theory and thinking in quite profound ways because of the implications. For example, there is an acceptance that Craxy Horse rode to the end of the camp (Cheyenne ville) and used the ford there to cross the river. That ain't Ford D. Ten myths link
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Post by noggy on Apr 10, 2019 2:15:49 GMT -6
How many E Company men where found dead of LSH. I didn`t pick up on this when it was posted, Ian, but it made me think about what kind of presence E Company actually had on LSH itself when lack of documented E Company casualties there are considered. Indian fire on LSH seems to have been heavy before it was rushed, and NA accounts indicate most they found alive there were already wounded. E Company men had left before that (I`m on board with Michno here, others may disagree but makes no difference). Yet as you say, dead E Company men found on LSH are... Smith, for sure. Then some unidentified, I believe? How come so few E Company men were killed by the same fire which decimated F? I wonder how many actually made it to LSH before running away from it. All the best, Geir
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 10, 2019 4:16:15 GMT -6
Hi Geir, if you look at cemetery ridge, you can see just how exposed and vulnerable any position would be, especially one which could only muster around thirty men to form a skirmish line. We have some conflicting accounts about the way E Company kept their horses, did each trooper hold onto their own mount or did they designate horse holders in the standard way. If they did have horse holders, then this is how I came to a total of thirty in skirmish.
If the E Company skirmish line was facing the river, they would leave their right flank open, this flank would contain Crazy Horse Ravine, which would be a tempting avenue for Indians to get around the flank of E. Any attack from this direction could be enough to cut through the horse holders and drive a wedge between C Company and any supporting Company like F for instance, and forcing E Company on foot to head to the nearest cover, which would be any ravine to the south or southeast. Once E Company got took out of the defensive line, F would have no choice but to pull back to LSH.
E Company had 38 in total, 28 found in a ravine and another 6 horse holders killed back on the ridge, leaves 34, Smith is on LSH, 35, that leaves 3 to find, maybe the missing three were among the dead along SSL.
Ian.
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Post by noggy on Apr 10, 2019 10:01:41 GMT -6
E Company had 38 in total, 28 found in a ravine and another 6 horse holders killed back on the ridge, leaves 34, Smith is on LSH, 35, that leaves 3 to find, maybe the missing three were among the dead along SSL. Ian. Hi Ian For me, I`ve never reflected much really on the numbers during the LSH/DR/CR fighting. In litterature it`s basically F and E on LSH. The end. The state of each company upon reaching LSH not so much. Many books still operate with all 28 making the run at the end. I doubt many think that today It makes me still wonder if E had some sort of better cover than F (fatter horses ) or the arcs of arrows being "nicer" or whatever, because the sprint came at a point many NA accounts have all remaining resistance on LSH almost ended. That would mean the remnants of E were intact while F seemingly reduced to a few wounded. F was higher up on LSH, right? Simply making them easier targets? Off topic: I`ll try to get your questions posted on a military discussion forum I know of towards the end of the week. Many of its members are ex-army and most very interested in history. They should be able to help out. All the best, Geir
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 10, 2019 13:50:56 GMT -6
Hi Geir, the E Company story also has two camps, one group say that after fighting on cemetery ridge, E actually joined F and the RHQ on battle ridge/LSH etc. and later made a break for it towards deep ravine, the second group says that they got pushed off cemetery towards DR.
Thanks for the help regarding the Norwegian army, I tried a site yesterday posted up some questions and drew a blank.
Ian.
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Post by shan on Jun 29, 2019 9:47:47 GMT -6
I'd like to ask the members, or indeed anyone else come to that, a question about something that has bothered me for awhile, one that doesn't seem to have generated much discussion.
I read in a number of books, and seen it said numerous times on both these forums, that as the situation deteriorated on L.S.H. E troop was ordered off the hill as some kind of a diversion, or if not a diversion, simply because there wasn't enough room for them tup there. Now I've kind of accepted that theory without thinking about it too much, but recently I've begun to question it. Surely, if you wanted to cause a diversion and drive some of the Indians away from your front, you would use mounted men. A. they could cover the ground much more quickly, and B. a group of thirty or more mounted men would be much more intimidating.
Given that it's generally accepted that E.troop had lost their horses to the so called suicide boys somewhere near the visitor centre; a number of Indians mention witnessing this, and Standing Bear has depicted it in several of his drawings: as well as showing the movement E troop, on foot, towards Deep ravine. So why use them, when the obvious choice would have been F. troop, who, as far as we know, were still mounted on their arrival at L.S.H. The thing about using mounted men is that they could move about and cover a much greater area as they threatened this or that bunch of warriors, whereas men on foot couldn't, in fact they themselves were extremely vulnerable to groups of mounted Indians, and several Indians mention either being mounted, or else witnessing a number of others who were mounted moving about below L.S.H.
I've also seen it said that part of the tactic was for these men to make their way down to the river, a highly unlikely scenario given the heat and the distance, where they could then take shelter amongst the tree. Now if we accept that Custer did indeed go to check out the Fords D, and then make his way back to Cemetery Ridge, he will have seen for himself that there was little or no tree cover east of the river, and none lining Deep Ravine either. So where were they to hide? The ravine itself? Well, the evidence is all over the accounts as to how that one panned out.
Lastly, I've also seen it said that their movement off the hill was to help divert attention from a number of mounted men who'd been sent to try and make their way back to Reno or Benteen. Again, wouldn't using F troop: still mounted, in order to help clear a path for these messengers make more sense?
The whole thing just doesn't ring true to me, but then nor does the counter argument, which was that it was simply a case of men panicking and making a run for it. Now I'm pretty sure that something like that did happen, for there are Indian accounts of a group of anything from seven to twelve men coming off the hill towards the end of the battle, but twenty eight men from the same troop, all panicking? No, there must be some other explanation.
Shan ~ David
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Post by Colt45 on Jun 30, 2019 6:13:43 GMT -6
Shan, Most likely, when Custer was repulsed from ford D, he regrouped in the vicinity of cemetery ridge. He would have had his 5 companies attempting to cross at a couple of places in the ford D area, hence the need to regroup on the higher ground of CR. E company would have been placed on the left flank along cemetery ridge while F was placed on the right flank. C, I, and L would have been along battle ridge extension. The plan would have been to withdraw from the area using reverse fire and movement. F and E were to cover the other 3 as they moved back toward Reno along battle ridge (the way they had come).
This maneuver was unsuccessful due to hostile forces being too great for E and F to contain, plus the fact L had been stopped at Calhoun hill due to resistance, C was forced to try and support the right flank of L, and I was caught in transit behind battle ridge.
Most of E company never made it to LSH as they were without mounts and were forced off cemetery ridge toward deep ravine. They were not ordered to create a diversion, nor did they run all the way from LSH to deep ravine. If they panicked at all, it would have been when they had been forced to the edge of deep ravine.
Your gut was telling you the truth. Neither of the scenarios you laid out occurred they way the theories say they did. Those theories are mere speculation.
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