|
Post by herosrest on Mar 6, 2018 21:25:06 GMT -6
Had 7th Cavalry followed Alf Terry's indefinate instructions to proceed up the Rosebud as far perhaps as the headwaters of the Tongue in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Maj. Reno; how would that have been done? I assume that the night march of the 24/25th June would not have taken place and that the regiment would march on at its established rate of 30-36 miles per day. What did Terry, Custer and all those advising both, consider to be the head of the Tongue? Why march to the headwaters of Tongue River?
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Mar 7, 2018 7:05:55 GMT -6
Where...……. shall we begin? Hmmm..... How about 3am, Camp on the Busby Bend of the Rosebud, and reveille to assemble for the days march down..... the Rosebud for.... 35 miles and send off a scout of the lower reaches of the Tulloch. 25 miles along the Rosebud reaches its fork and the Crook battlefield at 22 miles. What then? Certainly, further message to Terry after ascertaining where Crook went. This would have been an important decision point assuming the battlefield and various trails to and from it were detected and that would take some time. A press on decision then faces the dilemma of continuing along the Rosebud to the forks of the Tongue (25 miles), following the upper Rosebud fork towards Little Owl Creek and Lodge Grass (20 miles), or returning to Busby and the Tulloch or Rosebud or Davis Creek. Any worthwhile decision involved 50 miles of march during the 25th. Ranchetsr to Ford A is 44 miles. Lodge Grass to Ford A is 13-14 miles. Roll your own. Left click to measure distance.
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Mar 7, 2018 8:31:08 GMT -6
You are right that additional communication wit Terry would have been imperative. There is an obvious travel corridor from the Rosebud Battlefield, to Reno Creek, it comes out at the lone Tepee location area, seen it. It was there in 1876. Don't obfuscate! Steve could give you more.
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Mar 10, 2018 10:57:01 GMT -6
It helps understanding Terry's thinking, if we know what he knew and to that i'm trawling the reports which were available to him besides the maps which I have studied many times. Bit of a slog but enlightening. Lt. Maynardier reported travelling Tullock's Forks and the Rosebud during his 1859 expedition. Report on the exploration of the Yellowstone river by Bvt. Brig. Gen. W.F. Raynolds in 1859. The left branch travellled into the Rosebud valley along a lodge pole trail, obviously of interest to Terry and Custer, with good water and grass and a good road to its head offers view over the Tongue and its tributaries. Lovely.
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 11, 2018 10:26:29 GMT -6
There are several travel corridors and they were used by Herendeen. SFRC was used by Crazy Horse. It would come out near the campsites further up the Rosebud. If the Scouts go as far as the Rosebud Battlefield than they could tell Custer that the fresher tracks show them moving back down the river. So seeing that Crook had retreated and the Indians moved off down the Little Bighorn. Custer would follow that trail but would know that Crook had withdrawn and probably due from that battle. If he takes that route toward Lodgegrass he would see where thousands of Indians moved north along with those trails he had been following. But now he has the regiment in total moving north on the LBH. Herendeen was in a battle near Lodgegrass.
He would then reach close to the 7th ranch and a great high point to plant the pack that would have visibility yet be out of range. Any approach would be observed. Tom and I hiked around that location in the highway median. Custer has 12 companies to advance up the Big Village. He can block any attempt to move north in the LBH valley and drive the Indians north toward Terry. I think this is close to Terry's plan.
Regards
AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Mar 11, 2018 19:27:50 GMT -6
Yup. Terry hadn't discounted Crook showing up and in a sense, Terry was late to the party. Gillespie explains the strategy quite well here in his July 11th report, although I wonder how much was hindsight by him being an engineer (not line officeer). Bradley interrogated participants of the 1874 expedition which is whee the intel on a possible 1500 hostiles came from. 'Off' course, Herendeen was present and full of info if Custer asked. Plan as they might, the military simply did not know what they faced and nor where to find it. Each of the columns was intended to hold their own and in fact did with severe loss and reinforcement once the gathered hostile host dispersed. I would guess that the 7th hook across from Rosebud to LBH at Lodgegrass and Terry obviously understood that the village could flee along Reno Creek to either the Tulloch or Rosebud. Hence he did not want to move to LBH along Bighorn and havee the hostiles behind him to the North. It was all a real game of chance and one where no one would have or could have known the actual enemy strength. Here's Custer's problem, he was never going to learn the enemy numbers if he sat back until dawn 26th because he expected the camp to run and that was a reasonable assumption. Difficult to mitigate at any cost and the mindset simply did not contemplate it. It didn't matter who commanded 7th Cavalry - anyone else would have done as Custer and attack. Sheridan admitted that. The method of attack didn't work out but if Reno is believed the entire ten regiments of cavalry operating together in that valley would have fallen into a ditch and been slaughtered. Keep us posted - it's interesting stuff which you're doing. If you run into Wambosi out there, just pull the trigger - Be well. Added - Dug this out - The Bean shot. I believe the other frontier marksman was Muggins Taylor who made a shot during the Fort Pease siege.
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 12, 2018 7:43:49 GMT -6
HR
In my job there are exigent circumstances and you must react. When reviewing actions taken by an officer establishing what brought about the exigent circumstances is looked at. I think Custer created the exigent circumstance when he turned up Davis Creek.
AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Mar 12, 2018 18:43:42 GMT -6
I got lost on the thread title. I assume you want to know Brigadier General(BG) Terry's campaign plan? Terry commanded a Department, as did BG Crook. Comparing subordinate elements within Terry's Department, to other Departments, I am having trouble seeing the discussion.
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Mar 13, 2018 11:29:40 GMT -6
HR In my job there are exigent circumstances and you must react. When reviewing actions taken by an officer establishing what brought about the exigent circumstances is looked at. I think Custer created the exigent circumstance when he turned up Davis Creek. AZ Ranger Hindsight can present this as the unfortunate matter which it became. In broader terms, 7th Cavalry's presence on the Rosebud was known to hostile decision makers. It was not known or expected by the hostiles that 7th Cavalry would be hurtled into a day time attack on the camp. I assume that you suppose that the hostiles would not have discovered 7th Cavalry on the Rosebud had they followed it rather than Sundance Ck. The result of Custer following his orders would have been the exact repeat of a week earlier and Crooks defeat. &th avalry would have arrived at Crook's battlefield and been attacked as Crook was. The point of Custer's decision to halt - was to conceal the regiment. That is quite clear from many participants. It seems that you suggest that Custer was at fault for attacking. That is why he was there. To find Sitting Bull's camp and attack it. It does (did) not matter how he went about it because the outcome would have been the same. Had 7th Cavalry avoided battle then they would have been attacked whenever they arrived within a days march of the camp. I know that you believe the Sioux could have been beaten by 7th Cavalry but state again, there were too many Indians. There really were.
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Mar 13, 2018 12:18:57 GMT -6
I got lost on the thread title. I assume you want to know Brigadier General(BG) Terry's campaign plan? Terry commanded a Department, as did BG Crook. Comparing subordinate elements within Terry's Department, to other Departments, I am having trouble seeing the discussion. Interested more in how he arrived at it. What intelligence was available to him. Bradley did interogate members of the 1874 expedition when it returned and there were reports from 1873 as well. There were detailed reports from Raynolds, Maynardier, Hayden, Warren, Forsyth and others and thus, for example, the lodgpole trail along the eastern fork of the Tulloch into Rosebud valley would have been known since Maynardier followed it. If Gillespie (an Engineer) was correct, there were constraints upon Terry who was to prevent the hostiles crossing to the north of the Yellowstone and this was why Gibbon operated as he did. AHT intent for 7th Cavalry is reasonably clear from the instruction issued to Custer, prevent hostiles moving around the left flank of his march, hope to discover Crook, as Reno was so ordered, and scout the Tulloch which is problematic because it was understood as being a broad watershed stretching from the Rosebud near Busby and along the length of Sundance Creek to the area covered by 2nd Cavalry's Ball & McClernand in their recon up the Bighorn. With 7th Cavalry conforming to Terry's desire for march down the Rosebus, then - how far' bearing in mind the wish to examine the headwaters of the Tongue should the regiment have proceeded and scouted? Gibbon's column was to move to the confluence of the Bighorn with Little Bighorn where its future movements 'must be controlled by circumstances as they arise'. So there was no definate commitment of 7th Infantry and 2nd Cavalry to LBH valley, when Terry instructed Custer. What else had Terry considered.
|
|
|
Post by noggy on Mar 14, 2018 4:04:47 GMT -6
HR In my job there are exigent circumstances and you must react. When reviewing actions taken by an officer establishing what brought about the exigent circumstances is looked at. I think Custer created the exigent circumstance when he turned up Davis Creek. AZ Ranger I know that you believe the Sioux could have been beaten by 7th Cavalry but state again, there were too many Indians. There really were. How many NAs do you assume were at the LBH? They were many enough to beat the 7th when presented to them piece by piece, for sure. That`s what happened after all. But with the regiment united? Do you believe the outcome would have been the same if a 12 company charge was made? I don`t.
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Mar 14, 2018 4:35:55 GMT -6
Noggy, your point is excellent, and has been offered by many. The tactics used would have doomed even more had not Reno and Benteen hunkered down. one does not have to care for Reno, before, during, or after the battle. It is much easier to defend a dug in position that it is to attack a location where your enemy has great interior lanes of travel. All of this I am sure you know.
There are better places for GAC to have launched his attack. One in particular that would be easy to defend if need be and it would block the NA's access to the Bighorn Mtns. That, however, is what happens with lack of scouting and lack of familiarity of the battle space. Sharing the plan, at some point, with his subordinates, would not have hurt either.
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Mar 14, 2018 18:27:12 GMT -6
I know that you believe the Sioux could have been beaten by 7th Cavalry but state again, there were too many Indians. There really were. How many NAs do you assume were at the LBH? They were many enough to beat the 7th when presented to them piece by piece, for sure. That`s what happened after all. But with the regiment united? Do you believe the outcome would have been the same if a 12 company charge was made? I don`t. There would have been eight companies attacking into the valley with the same outcome. Say 400 troopers with Custer and as we are learning from Montrose, broadly unfit for purpose. Benteen and the packs would have been cut off in the way in which Custer's advance with the five companies was. I had not realied how poorly trained the troops were and with weapons that jammed and unable to ride worn out horsesand shooting off all the carried ammo in 10 minutes. Pessamistic maybe Custer obviously wasn't.
|
|
|
Post by noggy on Mar 16, 2018 19:52:52 GMT -6
How many NAs do you assume were at the LBH? They were many enough to beat the 7th when presented to them piece by piece, for sure. That`s what happened after all. But with the regiment united? Do you believe the outcome would have been the same if a 12 company charge was made? I don`t. There would have been eight companies attacking into the valley with the same outcome. Say 400 troopers with Custer and as we are learning from Montrose, broadly unfit for purpose. Benteen and the packs would have been cut off in the way in which Custer's advance with the five companies was. I had not realied how poorly trained the troops were and with weapons that jammed and unable to ride worn out horsesand shooting off all the carried ammo in 10 minutes. Pessamistic maybe Custer obviously wasn't. I disagree. Reno`s 3 companies could never have busted the village alone. A fullhearted 8 company charge would have at its worst fared better than the poor 3 sent first. Remember; the US Army was a threat to women and children, the loved ones of the fighting men. The would have to secure them. Even if a stalemate at first, the strategic objective would have somewhat accomplished.
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Mar 18, 2018 8:50:02 GMT -6
There would have been eight companies attacking into the valley with the same outcome. Say 400 troopers with Custer and as we are learning from Montrose, broadly unfit for purpose. Benteen and the packs would have been cut off in the way in which Custer's advance with the five companies was. I had not realied how poorly trained the troops were and with weapons that jammed and unable to ride worn out horsesand shooting off all the carried ammo in 10 minutes. Pessamistic maybe Custer obviously wasn't. I disagree. Reno`s 3 companies could never have busted the village alone. A fullhearted 8 company charge would have at its worst fared better than the poor 3 sent first. Remember; the US Army was a threat to women and children, the loved ones of the fighting men. The would have to secure them. Even if a stalemate at first, the strategic objective would have somewhat accomplished. The Sioux and Cheyenne were at a disadvantage in being dismounted in the camp and as you say, bound to stand and cover an exodus by the families. Custer was certainly aware of the horse as centre of gravity in ordering scouts to raid the herds. Eight company attack would deploy Reno as advance or left of the line. There's plenty to play with and there would have been chaos, as there was, in the camp to begin with. Once the fighters were mounted it was inevitable that their numbers and firepower would begin to tip the balance of power and control. According to testimony, it was not possible to ride into the camp across the ditch obstacle.
|
|