Joshua,
Something I should have addressed above. Your treatment of Herendeen not being sent through Tullock's Creek. Nice mention. This act cost Gibbon and Terry a day as they waited for Herendeen. While the Montana column struggled with rough terrain between Tullock and the LBH river they also sent scouts up Tullock to meet Herendeen.
Regards,
Tom
Yes, a rather intriguing part of the story, I think. Exactly why Custer did not send Herendeen is an interesting question.....
Since this Tullock's Creek question always seems to pop up no matter how much it is discussed or debated, I have decided to give you a sneak preview of a small section of a new book, a book I decided to undertake because of the constant harangues of "montrose," Tubman, AZ Ranger, Beth Collins, "Colt45," Mark, and several on Facebook. While this post will not address their questions and comments about Reno in the valley, it is a beginning and is germane to the overall conversation. Besides, I think it gives a decent overview as to what comes later.
DISCUSSION: SIX INCIDENTS DETERMINING CUSTER’S ACTIONS
This first halt in the Davis Creek valley gives us a brief respite to examine Custer’s actions and decisions to this point: 2:15 AM, June 25th. More important, it allows us to examine them within their proper context, a context of time and observation. It will also point out a seemingly troubled, vexed man, soul-searching and indecisive, though only for a brief period… maybe less than sixty hours of back-and-forth thinking, pondering, self-debating… a momentous time looming.
His officers’ observations of the evening of June 22 notwithstanding, the old Custer brio seemed to be in evidence the following morning, though there were several notable incidents yet to occur that led to indeterminate conundrums. The first arose fairly early on June 23—probably around 7:40 in the morning—as the column was passing through the R – 19 Indian camp—the first one seen by the regiment—and Custer remarked to Lieutenant Varnum about Reno’s failure to make a name for himself by not pushing on after the Indians. What does this tell us? At this point, the on-the-ground observations confirm Custer’s belief he would encounter only eight hundred warriors, exactly as intelligence reports had predicted, i.e., reality was confirming theory. Earlier we discussed this comment with respect to numbers of warriors and the similarity in the size of subsequent camps, but now let us look at it with respect to Custer’s orders and intentions. Whether or not one accepts this as unequivocal confirmation, Custer has made it clear he believed his regiment could handle anything the Indians could throw at him. Think about this: if Reno could have made a name for himself with just six companies of cavalry, think of the turkey shoot awaiting a full regiment. While not trying to play psychologist, this thought alone must have been invigorating and would have nullified the perceived pessimism of the previous evening. They passed through a total of three camps on the 23rd, all of approximately the same size, changing no attitudes or opinions as far as we can tell, and we see no appreciable change in Custer’s demeanor as the day wore on and no particular commentary during the evening.
Things changed however, on the 24th. It started early—seven AM, give or take some minutes—when, pursuant to orders, Custer directed George Herendeen to head off and scout Tullock’s Creek valley… and Herendeen, supported by Mitch Boyer, told the general the turn-off for Tullock’s was still some miles ahead. At this point it is reasonably safe to say Custer fully intended to abide by the letter of Terry’s order. This was the second incident and at this time was unremarkable.
The third incident came at one PM when Custer called a halt at the East Muddy Creek Sioux camp (the fifth camp along the trail), then waited in his tent for some four hours, scouts coming and going with newer and updated reports. There was no demonstrative indication of why the halt should be for so long, especially in light of the distances Custer seemed intent on traveling. Author Tom Heski felt the halt was to accommodate and wait for Varnum as he went off checking divergent trails, but that seems a bit problematic, especially since Varnum departed the command before noon and returned between four and 4:30 PM. Heski went on, “Another reason for the halt… was the remains of another village site a few miles west of Muddy Creek.” More realistic, one thinks….
At four PM—probably shortly before Varnum returned—the Crow scout, White Swan, rode into camp reporting a fresh camp discovered at the forks of the Rosebud some ten to twelve miles farther south. Heski feels this was an indication the hostiles were no more than thirty miles away. Simple as that may appear, this was momentous news.
[W]hat the Crows reported during the second halt [this one] brought [Custer] up sharply; for here was something wholly unexpected, something that might call for action radically different from what was contemplated in his orders. The Crows had been over the trail made, evidently, only a day or two before by a large body of Indians coming from the agencies to join the camps on the Little Big Horn. They had not followed the Indian trail down the Tongue, i.e., the course taken by the rest during their spring wanderings, but had crossed over to the Rosebud a little above the site of the Sundance lodge, where, as related in the report of Wallace, the troops struck it soon after resuming the march at five o’clock.
When Varnum returned he reported Herendeen’s diverging trail linked up again with the main trail up the Rosebud and farther westward. He also told Custer,
… the trail sign indicated a force of immense size ahead, that the trail was fresher by the mile, that a “… fresh camp…” had been found “… at the forks of the Rosebud…” some ten or a dozen miles west, and that the hostiles, at this time, were probably “… not more than thirty miles away…”
Custer ordered the column forward around five PM and without any witnesses to what he may have said to confidants who did not survive the battle, whatever we come up with is sheer speculation.
Herendeen told Walter Camp, in all likelihood in a 1909 letter,
… the command started ahead on the large trail again, which became fresher as we advanced. We passed over places where a number of camps had been pitched quite close together from which we wrongly inferred that the Indians had been traveling very slowly and moving only for grass… these camping places represented the village of separate bands or tribes simultaneously encamped and not successive camps by any one band.
Speculation may crumble somewhat at the next incident, revealing the workings of an incandescent mind: the fourth incident in our sequence. At 6:30 PM, Custer and his lead elements reached a gap in the western hills leading to the Tullock’s Creek headwaters. Herendeen told Custer it was time for him to depart, but with nary a comment the latter kept moving forward and Herendeen simply remained in the column. No trails went in the direction of Tullock’s Creek.
But Custer—Herendeen recalled—only looked at him, said not a word, and finally the civilian scout reined back to once again take his place in the moving column. Herendeen was unable to fathom Custer’s curious behavior at this junction, but Custer’s reason should have been obvious—the hostiles trail continued up the Rosebud Valley, but where did it lead? [Emphasis included]
Why? Why was Custer so eager to send off Herendeen at seven-ish in the morning, yet would not even acknowledge him less than twelve hours later? What happened? What had changed? Do the Kuhlman and Heski musings hit the mark after all?
There are two rational explanations, one better than the other. The first is, Custer took the four hours between one and five PM to think of his varying alternatives, and the reports of White Swan and Lieutenant Varnum convinced him he would now be operating against the upper end of his enemy force estimates: the thirteen to fifteen hundred warriors rather than the eight hundred originally anticipated. This seems weak, however, and if Custer did not flinch when he saw the signs and markings embedded in the creek’s valley for the last two days, he had to be inured to further portents of size. What more clearly explains his attitude toward Herendeen appears more ominous or artful. The continuing reports of fresher trails as well as a fresh camp led to a certain dubiety Custer needed to reconcile in his mind… or so we sense. Coupled with the earlier belief the Sioux were in the Little Big Horn valley, these reports suggested the Indians had followed the western fork of the Rosebud, i.e., Davis Creek, across the divide and into the Little Big Horn valley, and because of the freshness of the trails, the quarry was in the valley’s lower reaches rather than its upper. This, as Kuhlman alluded to, brought Custer up sharply. Or it should have. And it led directly to this fourth incident—the Herendeen snub—and what appears to be a pellucid path into Custer’s thinking: would the Tullock’s Creek route lead Terry to the Sioux in the lower valley before Custer could get there?
The man needed, however, to see these things for himself and so the command moved on to the Busby bend and the sixth large Indian camp.
Once the evening camp had been ordered—and as we see in Figure B—Custer wasted no time in gathering Varnum and the Crow scouts together to get the latest information. Indeed, the scouts reported the Sioux had turned west and crossed the divide heading into what would be considered the lower Little Big Horn valley. Once at the river, it was unsure which direction the hostiles would be heading, however. We can consider this the fifth incident in our sequence and combined with the freshness of the trails, it leads to a rational and understandable decision (while at the same time, in contravention of his written orders and any intent expressed verbally by General Terry): Custer meant to cross over here rather than pursue farther up the Rosebud.
We now come to something of a dichotomy in time, and again, while we do not want to play psychologist, let us try to delve further into Custer’s mind. If Tom Heski is correct and the Indians were no more than thirty miles away, Custer would believe he could make up a substantial portion of that distance by a night march and either attack in mid-morning of the 25th or hunker down and have a go at the Indian camp very early on the 26th… and who knows, maybe even thinking that would still beat Terry to the target. (Remember, this is rampant speculation!) In either case, he would be excluding the Terry-Gibbon forces, for if the Indians had made their turn, it should be up the Little Big Horn valley, not down and Custer would be inserting the 7th Cavalry between the camp and Terry. This brings us to the dichotomy and the sixth—and last—of our incidents. According to Fred Gerard—and as we have seen—Custer asked both Gerard and Half Yellow Face if the command could cross the divide by midnight, both replying, No; yet the command still departed. This seems odd, but even odder when we consider Major Reno said it was two AM when the scouts told Custer he could not cross the divide before daylight, and therefore that was when Custer called the halt. This makes more sense than Custer being told at the beginning of the trek, as Gerard claimed in his 1879 court of inquiry testimony. After all, the Crow scouts knew the country: the divide was about eleven miles from the Busby bend, a three hour walk under normal conditions; but these conditions—a pitch-black night—were far from normal and as we can see from Figure ?, the command would average no more than 1.9 to 2.1 miles per hour to the first halt. Instead, the news at this point would have been the motivator for the two AM halt and a cementing of plans for the June 26 option. It should also be remembered when Custer chose to halt at 2:15 AM, he still had no earthly idea of the precise location of his elusive foe.
Best wishes,
Fred.