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Post by fred on Nov 16, 2018 10:57:22 GMT -6
You made good points and am glad you are here contributing. When you read Strategy you will find that Fred believes Custer went up the bluffs because he received an erroneous report that the Indians were fleeing from Reno instead of standing and fighting. This could very well have led Custer to believe getting north as fast as possible was the only way to prevent them from fleeing. I agree with Fred on that assumption. It is a logical assumption. Colt, I think you mean the Indians were coming back up the valley to confront Reno rather than running away. That was the Gerard report Reno ignored, but that Gerard then gave to Cooke, Herendeen telling Reno the same thing. That is what precipitated Custer's turn to the right. Regardless of the accuracy, we agree this formed the impetus. In my opinion, such a report led Custer to believe these warriors formed a screening force allowing time for the families to run. I agree wholeheartedly with your assessment of the Stiles book. I thought the epilogue about the battle was terrible, but that in no way detracted from the rest of the book, and that "rest" was the book's whole being. A marvelous book. Extremely well said, and I agree 100%. Yep. And very well trained. It is nice to see a little life back on these boards, don't you think, Colt? Steve? Tom? Geir? Now all that is needed is for Will to pop back in. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Nov 16, 2018 11:53:32 GMT -6
Regarding making "assumptions about the Custer part of the fight that no one has a clue to" that's certainly true, but in fact that was the point of my exercise - not making assumptions per se, but offering plausible scenarios based upon assumptions from such evidence as one may be aware of. Ray, This is where many people disagree with me, and I, them. I believe one can make a prima facie case for what happened to Custer by virtue of the markers, the archaeology, and the accounts of Indians. It may not be 100% accurate-- and wouldn't be-- but it can be definitive in regard to other theories. In my opinion, the time-motion-distance study I developed provides additional evidence for such an account. And by the way Ray, the Strategy of Defeat book may pose a problem for you with the Kindle edition: the time-lines are done in a small font size and may be extremely difficult to read. Those charts are the heart and soul of the book and provide the "evidence" for the narrative. It is my opinion Custer was a highly capable officer as well as being highly strung. His personality needs to be considered when commenting on him or criticizing him or lauding him. The ad hominem attacks on George Custer are unwarranted. Custer ran out of luck that day. Obviously, the biggest issue has always been the number of Indians, but Custer was unfortunate in that nothing broke his way and a series of unforeseen circumstances clearly worked against him, not the least of which were Reno's inability to retreat in the direction from where he came, and his interjection between Custer and an advancing Benteen. I believe the term was used by Reno at the RCOI, but I do not recall it in any after-action report. And he used in with regard to Weir's move toward Weir Point, not in any relation to his own move down the valley. We have a tendency to use current, modern military terminology with this era of history, and it becomes confusing and distorts events in such a way as to place criticism where it does not belong. Reconnaissance-in-force is another such red herring. My point exactly. Nonsense. You have as much right here as any of us and I detected no strong language. Military concept versus political correctness is not an issue here. Custer's intent was. If and when it was a military necessity that Custer "support" Reno in the traditional sense, i.e., from behind as everyone expected, and it was to Custer's perceived advantage in what he wanted to do, he would have done it. When it was no longer important to Custer, he eschewed it. That is what happened here. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by tubman13 on Nov 16, 2018 14:24:44 GMT -6
Fred, where do we see the precise wording in Reno's orders, was to attack the camp/village, who said it? Thank you.
Regards, Tom
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ray
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Post by ray on Nov 16, 2018 14:55:52 GMT -6
Ray, You made good points and am glad you are here contributing. When you read Strategy you will find that Fred believes Custer went up the bluffs because he received an erroneous report that the Indians were fleeing from Reno instead of standing and fighting. This could very well have led Custer to believe getting north as fast as possible was the only way to prevent them from fleeing. I agree with Fred on that assumption. It is a logical assumption. Custer was looking out for his career on that day and that affected his decision-making. If you haven't read Custer's Trials, I suggest you read it. It is a look at his career from West Point onward, ending before the LBH battle. It is an excellent read on how Custer thought and acted. Then couple that with Fred's Strategy of Defeat and the whole thing makes a lot more sense. I think the fatal mistake Custer made was deciding not to cross at ford A, but rather to go up the bluffs. From that point on, he carried out TPP for the most part correctly, but executing tactics correctly can't make up for a bad strategic decision. As you said, Custer was no idiot, but he made a series of bad decisions affecting correct employment of tactics. Using correct TPP can't help if you don't have enough firepower to overcome your enemy. Like you and Fred, I was an officer during the Vietnam era. I was in armor/cavalry.
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Post by fred on Nov 16, 2018 15:12:30 GMT -6
Fred, where do we see the precise wording in Reno's orders, was to attack the camp/village, who said it? Thank you. You are making me spill the beans on my new book. By the time you guys are finished with me, I won't need a publisher!!!!! Here is one paragraph from an analysis of Reno's orders. You get the added bonus of the "support" business: "Custer’s orders therefore, were for Reno to, “Take as rapid a gait as you think prudent and charge afterwards; and the whole outfit will support you.” Colonel William A. Graham wrote these were the only orders Reno received, and after receiving no reply to two Reno messengers telling Custer the Indians were to Reno’s front and in strength, Reno had every right to expect the promised support in the manner he expected it: from behind. Graham’s correspondent, Captain Robert G. Carter—a severe critic of virtually all the 7th Cavalry officers—did say Reno would naturally expect Custer to follow him if Custer said Reno would be supported, and he believed both Cooke and Keogh accompanied Reno to Ford A." Do you notice anything significant in those orders? An omission, perhaps? Or better yet, something not there? The word, "village." There is absolutely no credible evidence, based on accounts of everyone who heard those orders, that the word "village" was ever uttered. Like so many other things with the Little Big Horn, assumptions lead to erroneous beliefs. Reno was never ordered to attack the village, per se. Yet that is one of the areas where some people condemn him, isn't it? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by tubman13 on Nov 16, 2018 15:52:18 GMT -6
Fred, it was not my intent to draw that out. At least not that completely. You know I look forward to the book.
I hope I was not too harsh on GAC earlier, regarding hanging Reno out to dry, I know it was not his intent to get those 3 companies mauled, but I think he never gave it another thought. They would have just been collateral damage if the mission that GAC had in mind worked out. I also think that mission/plan was fluid and never concrete. It was like outcome based schooling, you don't really have to learn anything, just pass the test so the teachers and administrators look good.
Regards, Tom
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ray
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Post by ray on Nov 16, 2018 15:55:00 GMT -6
Ray, You made good points and am glad you are here contributing. When you read Strategy you will find that Fred believes Custer went up the bluffs because he received an erroneous report that the Indians were fleeing from Reno instead of standing and fighting. This could very well have led Custer to believe getting north as fast as possible was the only way to prevent them from fleeing. I agree with Fred on that assumption. It is a logical assumption. Custer was looking out for his career on that day and that affected his decision-making. If you haven't read Custer's Trials, I suggest you read it. It is a look at his career from West Point onward, ending before the LBH battle. It is an excellent read on how Custer thought and acted. Then couple that with Fred's Strategy of Defeat and the whole thing makes a lot more sense. I think the fatal mistake Custer made was deciding not to cross at ford A, but rather to go up the bluffs. From that point on, he carried out TPP for the most part correctly, but executing tactics correctly can't make up for a bad strategic decision. As you said, Custer was no idiot, but he made a series of bad decisions affecting correct employment of tactics. Using correct TPP can't help if you don't have enough firepower to overcome your enemy. Like you and Fred, I was an officer during the Vietnam era. I was in armor/cavalry. Hi Colt,
I wholly agree with each of these points, having come across them in my research and seeing the logic. His critical decision also seems to me to be deciding to scale the bluffs instead of following Reno, and as Fred notes there is "support" ( ) for Custer having been told that the Indian camp was fleeing, a concern uppermost in his mind (because it would deny him a victory that was his due?).
Some may argue that Custer's fatal mistake was (1) violating his orders and diverting from following the Rosebud to follow instead the trail of the Indian Camp down Davis Creek (and possibly aggravating that by not delaying his attack a day or 2 to coincide with the arrival of Terry/Gibbon) or (2) splitting his force at Halt 3 or earlier, but both were in fact consistent with doctrine.
He had tactical discretion and had struck the trail of the Indian camp, thus partially fulfilling his mission, and following the trail was a no-brainer. Sighting the horse herd and the smoke of the camp from the Crow's Nest prompted him to attack straight-away rather than wait for Terry/Gibbon, a logical decision. "Splitting his force" into 4 battalions (Reno and Benteen independently, and Keogh and Yates under Custer) and pack train with Co. B was a tactical imperative, because 12 direct reports (plus staff, scouts, etc.) exceeded his span of control. In fact, he was very late "splitting" (organizing and providing direction to) his force on the 25th; it should have been done before they left Busby; Reno testified that although assigned battalions, he and Benteen discussed along Davis Creek their lack of specific orders from Custer (apparently, reading Custer's mind would have been a valuable trait if subordinate to him ). Custer's movement to contact with Benteen as flank security was tactically sound (even if Benteen may have been miffed about it).
Therefore, unless one counts his career choice, and taking his fear of the Indians getting away as a sign of impetuousness, his major blunders were still ahead of him at that point, although Reno claimed at his Inquiry "I think (after the great number of Indians that were in the village) that the following reasons obtain for the misfortune. His rapid marching to two days and a night before the fight. Attacking in the daytime at 12 m (sp) and when they were in the qui vive instead early in the morning, and lastly his unfortunate division of the regiment into three commands.” (Inquiry p. 652)
I take it that Reno meant not so much the organization into battalions but them being separated when contact with the enemy was imminent (or had actually just begun). This may be a good time to ignore the possible tardiness of Benteen closing in from his flank security role, which is perhaps best to be discussed separately.
Aside: I was a (senior) 1LT Armor officer when I arrived in Nam with DA orders to command the 173rd's tank company, but found a long line of senior Armor captains ahead of me marking time while waiting for a shot at the plum role. Facing a long (6 months +/-) period as a junior staff officer tucked away somewhere, I took the alternative opportunity offered to command an Infantry company straight away. Custer wasn't the only one who made rash decisions.
Blessings,
Ray
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Post by tubman13 on Nov 16, 2018 16:12:12 GMT -6
Oh, and by the way, Fred, you are dead on regarding the location of the timber, predicated upon Bloody Knife, C. Reynolds, and Dorman location. I visited in 2017. Tell the other guy who thinks it is somewhere else.
Regards, Tom
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ray
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Post by ray on Nov 16, 2018 16:16:32 GMT -6
Fred, where do we see the precise wording in Reno's orders, was to attack the camp/village, who said it? Thank you. You are making me spill the beans on my new book. By the time you guys are finished with me, I won't need a publisher!!!!! Here is one paragraph from an analysis of Reno's orders. You get the added bonus of the "support" business: "Custer’s orders therefore, were for Reno to, “Take as rapid a gait as you think prudent and charge afterwards; and the whole outfit will support you.” Colonel William A. Graham wrote these were the only orders Reno received, and after receiving no reply to two Reno messengers telling Custer the Indians were to Reno’s front and in strength, Reno had every right to expect the promised support in the manner he expected it: from behind. Graham’s correspondent, Captain Robert G. Carter—a severe critic of virtually all the 7th Cavalry officers—did say Reno would naturally expect Custer to follow him if Custer said Reno would be supported, and he believed both Cooke and Keogh accompanied Reno to Ford A." Do you notice anything significant in those orders? An omission, perhaps? Or better yet, something not there? The word, "village." There is absolutely no credible evidence, based on accounts of everyone who heard those orders, that the word "village" was ever uttered. Like so many other things with the Little Big Horn, assumptions lead to erroneous beliefs. Reno was never ordered to attack the village, per se. Yet that is one of the areas where some people condemn him, isn't it? Best wishes, Fred.
Hi Fred,
The specific words from Reno's testimony at the inquiry were "Lieutenant Cook, Adjutant, came to me and said the village was only two miles ahead and running away; to move forward at as rapid a gait as prudent and to charge afterwards, and that the whole outfit would support me. I think those were his exact words.” (Inquiry, p. 648)
Maybe it's just me, but "charge" seems in this case to be synonymous with "attack" and the object of the "charge" was "village".
And, yes, I noticed the use of the word "support".
Reno went on to give his (possibly self-serving) impressions after viewing the overall battlefield after Terry arrived (emphasis mine): "After travelling over his trail it is evident to me that Custer intended to support me by moving further down the stream* and attacking the village in flank. That he found the distance greater to the ford than he anticipated, that he did charge, but his march had taken so long, altho’ his trail above showed he had moved rapidly, that they were ready for him. That Co.’s C and I and perhaps E had crossed to the village or attempted it, at the charge were met by a staggering fire and that they fell back to find a position from which to defend themselves but they were too closely followed by the Indians to permit time to form any kind of line. I think had the regiment gone in as a body and from the woods from which I fought advanced upon the village, its destruction was certain. But he was fully confident they were running away or he would not have turned from me.**" (Inquiry, p. 652) NOTES: * to Medicine Trail Ford; ** at Ford A.
Blessings,
Ray
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Post by noggy on Nov 16, 2018 17:09:12 GMT -6
It is my opinion Custer was a highly capable officer as well as being highly strung. (The kid raises his hand) Highly capable in general or in certain scenarios? GAC in his role during the ACW was by most accounts and at least what I`ve read an ace. Good for him. But as a regimental commander in the type of war the US Army waged (vaged?) on the Plains? One could argue he never proved much in the rather unique field of fighting the original inhabitants apart from some light fights in 73 and of course attacking sleeping people at Washita. And very little he did as regimental (in field) commander before the 76 campaign looks good. All misspellings are not my fault, we have been out watching yet another terrible performance by our national side. (Football/soccer) All the best, Geir
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Post by noggy on Nov 16, 2018 17:15:47 GMT -6
I guess that'll wait until I see if I return, because I got what I came here for. Thanks again. Having said that, I'm open to communicating via email.
Blessings,
Ray
Haven`said hello, but hello. Hope yo stay around, it`s good with knowledgeable, active people here. All the best, Noggy
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ray
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Post by ray on Nov 16, 2018 17:22:04 GMT -6
Hi Geir,
Might one say that Custer SANK to his level of incompetence? (CAUTION: hideous paraphrase of the immortal "Peter Principle," IMHO one of the greatest management books (alongside the "One Minute Manager" and the Bible) ever penned. I especially like how the last third of the "Peter Principle" merely parroted the first part, which actually demonstrated Dr. Peter's point. Err, having said that, it might be said that the last third of the Bible parrots (explains) the first part. oops.)
Blessings,
Ray
P.S. The days when my football teams (of whatever code) reigned supreme on the field seem long past... much like me.
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Post by Colt45 on Nov 16, 2018 18:25:38 GMT -6
To understand why Custer wasn't a good field grade commander, just look at his promotion history. He had a small amount of time as a company grade officer before being promoted to brevet brigadier general. He never served as a field grade officer during the civil war. It was only after the civil war that his permanent rank was set at lieutenant colonel. He never had the chance to learn his trade by spending years in the lower ranks. He was good at doing the things generals did, so long as a senior general was providing overwatch on his activities, as was the case in the civil war. After the war, he had less upper level supervision and so was on his own hook most of the time. Sadly, he had very little experience to fall back on as a regimental commander. At LBH he was still thinking like a general would with lots of troops under his command instead of as a regimental commander with limited resources. Again, Custer's Trials does a great job of illustrating this.
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ray
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Post by ray on Nov 16, 2018 18:28:31 GMT -6
2. "Bring pac(k)s" did not mean to bring the pack train: that was McDougall's responsibility, not Benteen's. It meant to bring some of what the pack train was carrying, viz. ammunition. Witness that Hare galloped down to the pack train from Reno Hill and galloped back with several mules laden with ammo ahead of the pack train's arrival on Reno Hill. Therefore, upon receipt of Cooke's order (after questioning Martini), Benteen would have likely ordered someone to go back to the pack train then watering at the Morass a few kilometres further upstream along Reno Creek and get some extra ammo. I disagree. When the note was written, Custer's 5 companies had not fired a single shot, and Custer had just viewed what seemed to be a successfully conducted operation in the valley from his perch on 3,411. Benton's actions in sending back Hare were driven by the expenditure of ammunition in the valley by Reno's three companies. Benton himself claimed the note placed him in charge of the pack train, vice McDougall. Hi Fred,
Sorry about regurgitating this portion of an earlier post but I tend to get lost flipping between posts, pages, threads and various websites when discussing a point.
Where besides Benteen's statement do we find evidence for Benteen's claim that Cooke's note transferred the pack train under his authority?
Comments: while I can see that Benteen may have retrospectively chosen to apply that interpretation on the note in order to justify his tardiness in responding to Custer (given that he was being accused of failing to ride to Custer's aid just as Custer had failed to ride to aid Benteen's best friend Elliott at Washita), it is not clear that "Bring packs" in any way means "take command of the pack train." Occam's Razor would suggest that it means "bring packs (i.e., extra ammunition)." Historian Walter Camp cited Benteen’s reply upon receiving the message: “After he read the message handed to him by Martin, he was heard to remark, ‘Well, if he wants me to hurry how does he expect that I can bring the packs? If I’m going to be of service to him I think I had better not wait for the packs.'” This comment is clear when one appreciates that Benteen's battalion had been on the move into the Flats by the North Branch of Reno Creek while the pack train under 1LT Mathey (who was interestingly a store clerk in civilian life) and MacDougall's Company B who guarded it were stationary at the Morass behind him at least a klick (and probably more than 2) at the time.
If I were in Custer's boots at the time the note was written, I would not have ordered the cavalry unit that I wanted to come quickly with extra ammunition to link up to burden themselves with a slow-moving pack train that I didn't think was in any danger given that their size and numbers were supplemented by Co. B, and the fact that both Reno's battalion and my own were between the hostiles and the pack train.
And yes, Fred, the wording above can be seen as support that "packs" MIGHT have meant "pack train" instead of just "packs (of ammunition)," but in context Benteen clearly thought that "pack train" was illogical while in a later context Benteen and Hare thought that bringing up mules carrying "packs" (of ammunition) to Reno Hill in advance of the pack train was not just logical but necessary.
Blessings,
Ray
Blessings,
Ray
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Post by fred on Nov 16, 2018 18:40:14 GMT -6
Ray,
Do not make the mistake so many others make by reading into things something that was not there. Examples: Custer wanted the ammo from the packs and that is why he ordered Benteen to “bring packs.” “Ammo” is an assumption and that assumption can change the entire meaning of the note and affect the entire tenor of the battle.
Another example: “village” was not mentioned in Custer’s orders to Reno. Including Reno, there were thirteen eye-witness accounts of the order-giving by Cooke. You cite what Reno said at the RCOI, but others at the separation also heard the orders and who is to say Reno was more accurate than Davern… or Wallace? In Reno’s after action report, he wrote, “As we approached a deserted village, and in which was standing one tepee, about 11 AM [sic; circa 1 PM], Custer motioned me to cross to him, which I did, and moved nearer to his column until about 12:30 AM (sic; 1:03 PM) when Lieutenant Cook, adjutant, came to me and said the village was only two miles above, and running away; to move forward at as rapid a gait as prudent, and to charge afterward, and that the whole outfit would support me. I think those were his exact words.” Yet at the RCOI, Reno never mentioned “village,” and neither did others when asked Reno’s orders. As for Martini, he spoke of hearing Custer tell Cooke to order Reno forward. Martini used the word “village,” but never specifically when referring to the precise orders. The way Martini couched his comments, it appears he simply assumed the “village” was the objective, yet when he spoke of the phrasing, he never used the word. Plus, Martini’s recollections were more than 40 years after the battle.
While all this may seem nothing more than a tempest in a teapot, it emphasizes the importance of being specific and not assuming meanings when we really do not know what really was meant. Reno gets pilloried for stopping before getting into the village, thereby failing to obey orders. If however, no one mentioned attacking the village proper, why blame Reno for not doing something never intended? We can apply this same logic to Reno’s orders several days earlier when he led his scout to the Rosebud. Those orders were—apparently—quite specific—though never written—and he was severely chastised for disobeying them, regardless of the value of intelligence he brought back.
In short then, it is a poor habit of inserting one’s own meanings into instructions, notes, orders, etc., making assumptions that lead to opposite intentions. That becomes a cottage industry of misinformation and speculation and is far from factual history.
Best wishes, Fred.
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