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Post by noggy on Jan 14, 2018 6:01:18 GMT -6
Yes it`s quite confusing, Dave! As I`ve said a couple of times I find the SSL, Deep Ravine and so on difficult to wrap my head around. I`ve read one of those threads, but not nr 2. Thanks! While we do not know the specifics or the thinking once the two companies and HQ were together on Last Stand Hill-- along with the 11 refugees from Keogh's command-- we can make a pretty fair guess. Since the situation-- staying on the hilltop-- was hopeless, the only possible way to survive would be an attempt at a breakout. This is the exact same rationale Reno applied to his attempted breakout from the timber. Whether the decision was made by George Custer or someone else, the "plan" appeared to be one company would attempt the breakout (E), while the second (F) would support it. Obviously, it was a one in a million shot-- heat, exhaustion, heavy uniforms, fear, numbers, etc.-- but the alternative was simply to stand and fight... and die. Initially, like all such attempts, it worked. E Company charged off the hilltop-- probably led by LT Sturgis-- into the heavy dust, some few men mounted on the remaining horses, but most of them on foot, and the Indians parted, then re-grouped, attacked, and forced the majority of the men into Deep Ravine where they were killed. There is no other logical explanation for the bodies in the ravine being from one single company: the army, after all, works as an organized force. The nine bodies found on the SSL were probably those missing two from E Company along with a few others. Now whittled down to only a few remaining on LSH, Custer was overrun, with the final killing being done in Deep Ravine. But if this was an organized breakout, would they be running straight towards the densest concentration of enemies (the village side of the river) and not away from them, like Reno at least tried to? And why not try to make a run for it with both companies? F Company would be left to their doom on LSH when E Company ran off, and E Company on it`s own would have less of a chance in succeeding in doing whatever it was supposed to achieve. Could it be that Custer and Smith already being dead or at least out of action, Sturgis or someone else on their own initiative just said screw it and ordered a final run hoping for the best? Or am I way off here, Fred? Noggy
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 14, 2018 6:03:18 GMT -6
This was in response to Dave's post and apparently Noggy was posting at the same time.
That is when a military mindset is suppose to kick in and help an individual decide what to do. It is the training and experience that you fall back upon. Stopping to think of what to do can get you killed. Obviously a military mindset can get overwhelmed when you exceed your training and experience. For some that panic feeling results in flight.
I think there is a warrior mindset that both military and law enforcement individuals need to have to be successful.
I also think Custer confused the Indians survival mindset as being fixed and therefor discounted their warrior mindset. If they do not decide to fight then of course the survival mindset of scatter and run may kick in. What I believe is that Custer never thought he could be wrong about the mindset the Indians were operating under.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 14, 2018 12:32:42 GMT -6
It does not matter what year the training and/or experience occurred.
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Post by fred on Jan 15, 2018 8:09:21 GMT -6
But if this was an organized breakout, would they be running straight towards the densest concentration of enemies (the village side of the river) and not away from them, like Reno at least tried to? Look... think about this... Custer and his troops are surrounded and they are taking fire from a knoll to the east. The terrain to the east is broken, hilly, and loaded with ravines. And there are plenty of Indians there as well, but most importantly there are those Indians behind that knoll firing at troops on the top of Last Stand Hill. The easiest route is toward the river: the terrain slopes, there is covering dust and gun smoke, and probably no more warriors than anywhere else. If you are going to break out, that is the easiest route to take. Again, put all the factors into the mix: it is called "context."All these things are important and you must include the factor of Indians scattering whenever they are attacked and confronted by an organized force. The fact it did not work is irrelevant: it had to be tried; it was the easiest and the best way to accomplish the impossible. Again, think: LOGIC, SIMPLICITY, and FLOW.Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 15, 2018 8:57:38 GMT -6
AZ Ranger, "It does not matter what year the training and/or experience occurred"? Really? I know you've read history, especially LBH history, but that is just about the most obtuse statement I've encountered in many a moon. I believe you really mean it... Regards, Pequod Robb I do. There was training in 1876 and you could evaluate battle readiness against other trained soldiers. The basic skillsets for cavalry should include horsemanship and use of weapon systems. Modes of transportation change over time and so do weapon system. The measure of a battle ready soldier for any time period results from training for that time period. So the year doesn't matter. It is the training and development of skillsets for the particular time period. The manuals of training for any particular year in fact stress what skillsets need to be developed. I believe from reading Sgt. Ryan that these particular soldiers did not meet the expected results of training and experience. Whatever year you are in you need to develop the desired skillsets. I believe battle ready skillsets do change with time. Hope that clarifies it for you. I also think it doesn't matter what year you are talking about since the training and experience for battle readiness is in fact measured against the standard for the year. I think the mode of transport for cavalry in 1876 was a horse so that skillset would be trained for. The skillset for an SAA would be different for other percussion handguns. The skillset for the 1874 Springfield would be different from a muzzle loader. So the year doesn't matter it is the battle readiness for that year that is gained from training, mastering the necessary skillset, and experience. Regards Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 15, 2018 9:00:29 GMT -6
But if this was an organized breakout, would they be running straight towards the densest concentration of enemies (the village side of the river) and not away from them, like Reno at least tried to? Look... think about this... Custer and his troops are surrounded and they are taking fire from a knoll to the east. The terrain to the east is broken, hilly, and loaded with ravines. And there are plenty of Indians there as well, but most importantly there are those Indians behind that knoll firing at troops on the top of Last Stand Hill. The easiest route is toward the river: the terrain slopes, there is covering dust and gun smoke, and probably no more warriors than anywhere else. If you are going to break out, that is the easiest route to take. Again, put all the factors into the mix: it is called "context."All these things are important and you must include the factor of Indians scattering whenever they are attacked and confronted by an organized force. The fact it did not work is irrelevant: it had to be tried; it was the easiest and the best way to accomplish the impossible. Again, think: LOGIC, SIMPLICITY, and FLOW.Best wishes, Fred. Fred I think it was determined to be the best available choice at the time. Sometimes the dragon wins. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by noggy on Jan 15, 2018 9:34:42 GMT -6
. Again, put all the factors into the mix: it is called "context."I have heard of it TU for the reply. Noggy
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Post by benteen on Jan 15, 2018 14:47:09 GMT -6
But if this was an organized breakout, would they be running straight towards the densest concentration of enemies (the village side of the river) and not away from them, like Reno at least tried to? Look... think about this... Custer and his troops are surrounded and they are taking fire from a knoll to the east. The terrain to the east is broken, hilly, and loaded with ravines. And there are plenty of Indians there as well, but most importantly there are those Indians behind that knoll firing at troops on the top of Last Stand Hill. The easiest route is toward the river: the terrain slopes, there is covering dust and gun smoke, and probably no more warriors than anywhere else. If you are going to break out, that is the easiest route to take. Again, put all the factors into the mix: it is called "context."All these things are important and you must include the factor of Indians scattering whenever they are attacked and confronted by an organized force. The fact it did not work is irrelevant: it had to be tried; it was the easiest and the best way to accomplish the impossible. Again, think: LOGIC, SIMPLICITY, and FLOW.Best wishes, Fred. Capt Fred. As always I respect and value you thoughts and opinions on this battle, Not to disagree. but rather to offer a different scenario of what happened. I don't believe any orders were given, I don't even know if there were any Officers alive to give them. The idea that Custer would order one CO to sacrifice his company so another could escape doesn't sit well with me. Even if he did. how could F company provide covering fire for E company. They were outnumbered 10 or 20 to one and being hit from all sides. if this was an organized break out than all of the command would do it not just some. What I believe is that at this stage there was no company cohesiveness , they were all together fighting for there lives. At some point some of them realized that as Bloody Knife said "They would be going home by a road they had never travelled" And just said "Screw It" "Feet don't fail me now" and took off. with others following. I do agree that when they charged out, the warriors did temp give way fearing this was some kind of trick or trap, but when I say temp I mean very temp, within a minute they realized that this was just a few soldiers trying to escape and quickly pounced on them. Be Well Dan PS......Nice to talk to you again my old friend
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Post by mac on Jan 15, 2018 18:59:13 GMT -6
Contemplate that they, Company E, were never on LSH but rather,as we know, on CR and when they lost their horses they were forced off CR and down towards Deep Ravine. Much more likely given the situation. At that point some warriors saw them run down the slope leading from/off the hill. Remember dust confusion etc. Cheers
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Post by noggy on Jan 16, 2018 5:37:59 GMT -6
I don't believe any orders were given, I don't even know if there were any Officers alive to give them. The idea that Custer would order one CO to sacrifice his company so another could escape doesn't sit well with me. Even if he did. how could F company provide covering fire for E company. They were outnumbered 10 or 20 to one and being hit from all sides. if this was an organized break out than all of the command would do it not just some. What I believe is that at this stage there was no company cohesiveness , they were all together fighting for there lives. At some point some of them realized that as Bloody Knife said "They would be going home by a road they had never travelled" And just said "Screw It" "Feet don't fail me now" and took off. with others following. I do agree that when they charged out, the warriors did temp give way fearing this was some kind of trick or trap, but when I say temp I mean very temp, within a minute they realized that this was just a few soldiers trying to escape and quickly pounced on them. This is a way better description than what I managed to make, and I think it is a scenario which very well could have found place. (Then again I say that a lot)
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 16, 2018 6:29:33 GMT -6
Contemplate that they, Company E, were never on LSH but rather,as we know, on CR and when they lost their horses they were forced off CR and down towards Deep Ravine. Much more likely given the situation. At that point some warriors saw them run down the slope leading from/off the hill. Remember dust confusion etc. Cheers Maybe their horses went that direction first.
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Post by fred on Jan 16, 2018 7:25:11 GMT -6
The problem with all these other theories is they do not stand up under scrutiny and evidence available.
First off, we have no Indian accounts claiming troops ran willy-nilly off Cemetery Ridge and into Deep Ravine, but we do have Indian accounts claiming troops moved from Cemetery Ridge to Last Stand Hill. Why would there be accounts of one, but not the other? Second, if running off Cemetery Ridge to Deep Ravine were the case why were no HQ personnel found in the ravine? One might think by that time, men were intermingled. In addition, why were only F Company personnel identified in Cemetery Ravine and not E Company men? To me, this scenario is a perfect case of trying to cram context into theory and it leaves out the factors mitigating against it, i.e., it is "feel good" theory in place of logic and flow.
Second, the idea of a helter-skelter run off Last Stand Hill also holds no water. Once again, it does not count for the fact only E Company bodies were identified in Deep Ravine. If it were a massed, panic move off the hilltop, why were no F Company or HQ personnel ID'ed there? Yet F Company men were seen in the basin and other areas. It also belies the fact LT Smith was found on Last Stand Hill (probably because of wounds suffered elsewhere, i.e., Ford B), yet LT Sturgis was unaccounted for. Why would Sturgis be the only officer known to be in that vicinity not found or identified? Doesn't that seem a little suspicious?
As for the idea of abandoning comrades on the hilltop, I doubt that was the plan. Despite the odds against anything working, there had to be a try, an attempt at escape. Or do we just surrender to fate without so much as a fight, because that is what is being suggested here: fatalism.
You had the two Custers, George Yates and Algernon Smith on that hilltop (forget the inexperienced Reily and Sturgis for a moment). These were men who would fight to the last and plan a way out, regardless of the limited time and dire circumstances. As I have said many times here and elsewhere, Indians broke and ran when confronted by an organized force: it is my opinion this was uppermost in Reno's mind, as well, when he ordered the "charge" from the timber. Critics scoff at that word ("charge"), but there was a distinct rationale in Reno's actions, regardless of how they turned out. (In both cases-- Reno in the timber and Custer/Custer/Yates/Smith atop Last Stand Hill-- time was of the essence, only moments to make a decision, and if we buy the fact Custer did what he did that day because he was worried about the Indians scattering, then we must apply the same logic-- and experiences-- to quickly thought-out plans in attempts to escape.)
We can never know for sure, but we can reasonably speculate the E Company move off the hilltop would use the same logic we apply to the criticism of Reno in his move, i.e., a covering force to extricate the troops remaining on Last Stand Hill. If we blame Reno for not applying such tactics (in his case an impossibility), then why don't we apply the same rules to Custer? Or are we just supposed to believe men like George and Tom Custer, George Yates, and Algernon Smith would simply prefer to sit on their hands awaiting the inevitable?
I think we need to give these men some credit for preferring to try the improbable to simply giving up.
Sorry, but I reject both "theories" as ill-conceived.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jan 16, 2018 7:34:48 GMT -6
I think it was determined to be the best available choice at the time. Sometimes the dragon wins. Steve, I agree... and possibly the only choice. I will make an analogy. If you watched the Minnesota Vikings-New Orleans Saints football game on Sunday, it came down to the last play. The Minnesota QB tossed a prayer to his receiver, Diggs, and the Saints' player, Williams, attempted to undercut Diggs thereby keeping him in bounds. There were only four or five seconds left in the game and the Vikings had no more time-outs. By undercutting Diggs, Williams would have (1) kept him in bounds, thereby running out the clock, and (2) by doing so, Diggs would have been upended and quite possibly have dropped the ball. The fact Williams' attempt failed does not mean the guy bungled the play or it was a bonehead play. It simply did not work out that way. You see tackles like that made all game long; this one simply did not work. You can apply that same logic to certain events at the LBH. That is what 95% of these so-called battle students can never seem to figure out. They are too pleased with their home-spun theories and that always means cramming context into theory rather than the other way around. You need to consider all factors before reaching a conclusion and those factors not only include eye-witness accounts, but logic. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jan 16, 2018 7:36:46 GMT -6
Maybe their horses went that direction first. Obviously, some did. Runs The Enemy made his "coup" charge across Cemetery Ridge scattering a number of the Gray Horse Troop's horses. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by dave on Jan 16, 2018 9:12:04 GMT -6
Fred As always you confuse me with facts which requires studying and understanding before opening my mouth. Once again I will get my poor wrinkled marked up copy of Strategy and see the terrain and envision the movement of the men.
The MARINES have landed!! Good to see you back Brother Dan as we have missed you. Regards Dave
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