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Post by montrose on May 28, 2017 19:16:40 GMT -6
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Post by noggy on Jul 1, 2017 6:44:48 GMT -6
I wrote my Master about the German guerilla war in East Africa during WW1, and thought a supplement to Montrose`s post could be an interesting "opposite" written by Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, who led the defence of German East Africa during the war. Link: www.gwpda.org/memoir/LettowVorbeck/ReminiscencesofEastAfrica1920.pdfBe aware; it is written i 1920 and very colored by it`s time, it is not a balanced portrait as it is written by a very patriotic German officer, and there are som factual errors when regarding casualties inflicted on the enemy. But non of that is too important, as it is a great example on how guerilla warfare when outnumbered, out-gunned and cut of from the rest of the world can be conducted bye forces who understand this type of warfare. Living of the land, resupplying by raiding enemy depots, knowing the terrain, being familiar with the locals medicinal practices and basically a ton of ingenuity all over the line is showcased here. Hope someone will find it interesting. Link to the wikipedia page concerning the longest campaign during WW1: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_African_Campaign_(World_War_I)Link to the wikipedia page about Lettow-Vorbeck: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_von_Lettow-Vorbeck
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Post by montrose on Jul 2, 2017 14:49:21 GMT -6
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 5, 2017 11:51:24 GMT -6
Hello Will
Can you elaborate on how Custer actions differed from what is suggested in Small Wars.
Thanks
Steve
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Post by montrose on Jul 6, 2017 5:25:01 GMT -6
I linked Caldwell in first post on this thread. Go to pages 178-180. He specifically examines LBH as a vignette of how scattering force leads to defeat in detail. It can not be more clear that Caldwell believes the defeat was due to poor decision making by LTC Custer.
An amateur can cut and paste Caldwell's book hundreds of times, but can't change reality, no matter how desperate the attempt.
Chapter 5 addresses supply trains. LTC Custer's mule train was badly thought out, badly trained, and poorly implemented. The train was a serious problem. You only have to look at Crook's train to see how a competent commander works.
Ch 12 addresses tactics of the attack. Ch 20 addresses bush warfare, which gives an excellent view of how to adapt tactics to terrain and enemy. LTC Custer showed an inability to adapt tactics to non conventional threats.
Intelligence is stressed throughout the book, and GACs used on native auxiliaries was weak to nonexistent. Remember, Bouyer was Gibbon's scout, lent to help out the inept GAC. The failure to understand the combat power of natives was a major flaw for Custer.
And then there is flank attack. Whatever GAC was doing in the badlands east of the battle, it was not a flank attack. There were two NOGO terrain features between GAC and the Indians flank. If he had been where the plan required him to be, supporting the advanced guard in the valley, he could have conducted a flank attack to the west. Instead, Custer took his force past the battle and ran into uncommitted hostiles miles away. He faced a frontal attack across a river into a large enemy force. He blinked, paused, hesitated, lost in indecision. In this line of work, no decision is a decision. His deer in the headlights approach to leadership magnified the disaster that followed.
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Post by dave on Jul 6, 2017 8:01:49 GMT -6
Will That is splendid post! It puts to shame the inept twisting of Caldwell's book on another board where misconceptions of what is written are twisted to fit one's agenda. Hope you are doing better and staying out of the VA! Regards Dave
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Post by montrose on Jul 6, 2017 8:35:03 GMT -6
Dave,
The Nambla board is riddled with cut and paste. You take a text or a poster, cut out what you don't like and add things not in original to support your opinion. This is not just books and manuals, poster Keough routinely added things to my posts, so he could beat them down.
Pay attention here, he not only deleted facts I posted that destroyed his fantasy, he added things I never wrote so he could create a fantasy counter argument. I stopped posting there on the 18th time he did this, and that was 5 years ago.
The folks who post on the NAMBLA board are co conspirators. They know the lies, they know why and they support the NAMBLA agenda. I do not.
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Post by edavids on Jul 6, 2017 9:56:29 GMT -6
Dave, The Nambla board is riddled with cut and paste. You take a text or a poster, cut out what you don't like and add things not in original to support your opinion. This is not just books and manuals, poster Keough routinely added things to my posts, so he could beat them down. Pay attention here, he not only deleted facts I posted that destroyed his fantasy, he added things I never wrote so he could create a fantasy counter argument. I stopped posting there on the 18th time he did this, and that was 5 years ago. The folks who post on the NAMBLA board are co conspirators. They know the lies, they know why and they support the NAMBLA agenda. I do not. Hence "Keogh" is an incompetent moderator only interested in his agenda driven drivel and should be removed by the LBHA as moderator unless that organization is looking to perpetuate the lies.
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Post by dave on Jul 6, 2017 19:03:00 GMT -6
Will When a person cannot use facts they twist them as you mentioned. Sadly most readers are not aware of the truth and therefore have no idea that fantasy has replaced reality. Regards Dave
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Post by montrose on Jul 6, 2017 21:28:56 GMT -6
Ehhh, let's focus on Small Wars, and not that other site.
Can someone copy the LBH summary on page 178? I get a mess when I try pasting it here.
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Post by noggy on Jul 7, 2017 1:10:19 GMT -6
Dave, The Nambla board is riddled with cut and paste. You take a text or a poster, cut out what you don't like and add things not in original to support your opinion. This is not just books and manuals, poster Keough routinely added things to my posts, so he could beat them down. Pay attention here, he not only deleted facts I posted that destroyed his fantasy, he added things I never wrote so he could create a fantasy counter argument. I stopped posting there on the 18th time he did this, and that was 5 years ago. The folks who post on the NAMBLA board are co conspirators. They know the lies, they know why and they support the NAMBLA agenda. I do not. Hence "Keogh" is an incompetent moderator only interested in his agenda driven drivel and should be removed by the LBHA as moderator unless that organization is looking to perpetuate the lies. Can someone explain to me what kind of connection the two boards have? They are obviously using the same layout and have similar names (I actually first registered there and it took me a while to realize I`d missed even though I after a few years had learned the difference), but apart from that? Is there any or are they just two freakishly similar sites?
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Post by edavids on Jul 7, 2017 9:05:43 GMT -6
There's "history" but I will let someone who has been posting far longer than I have explain things.
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Post by montrose on Jul 7, 2017 15:58:55 GMT -6
Extract from Small Wars: A very serious disaster befel a column of United States troops during the Red Indian wars on the Little Big Horn, which illustrates the danger of tactical separation. The column consisted of 12 troops of cavalry, with a train of pack animals. On getting touch with the Indians it was formed into four parties, one of five troops under Colonel Custer commanding the column, and two of three troops each, one of them under Major Reno ;the fourth of one troop formed the baggage guard. The force was moving down the valley of a stream. When it was reported that the enemy's settlement was only two miles off, Major Reno's party was sent to the front to move rapidly against the enemy, it being understood that Colonel Custer would support. The two other parties had got altogether separated from this main portion of the force. Major Reno found the Indians in great force and being unsupported he was, after a hot fight and heavy loss, compelled to take refuge on a bluff close by, which proved a satisfactory refuge. Fortunately he was joined here by the two parties which had gone astray, and with their assistance was enabled to hold his own against the determined attacks which the Indians kept up for many hours. Colonel — Custer's force appears to have moved to the right of the valley firing was heard on that side. Apparently it got back eventually to near the river some distance lower down than where Major Reno's force had taken up — position this at least was conjectured from the tracks. But what occurred exactly is not known, for the force was annihilated and nothing but the bodies of men and horses served to tell the tale of the disaster. It appears to have been the case that the five troops fell in with an overwhelming force of Indians, and that these afterwards came to attack Major Reno's party. 'Fortunately that officer secured a good position, and had partially entrenched his men while there was yet time.
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 8, 2017 6:41:56 GMT -6
Nowhere in small wars does it recommend that you subdivide/weaken your firepower without a shared plan.
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Post by montrose on Jul 14, 2017 11:07:37 GMT -6
It is amusing that Small Wars is used to support LTC Custer's performance at LBH, when it specifically condemns it. In CH 12 Caldwell points out that the scattering of force is not a function of enemy actions, but bad planning and bad judgement by the commander. LBH is used as the example to prove this.
The main body travels two tactical bounds behind the advanced guard. The advanced guard makes contact, develops the situation, and the main body then reacts. At LBH the main body was required to counter the enemy force that swept around the advanced guard open flank and surrounded the Reno Bn.
This process needs to happen in a timely manner. How much time? Five minutes. Cavalry combat moves fast, you have to make rapid decisions followed by swift execution. The main body had to be in position to block the open flank before the Indians got there. The dismount decision was forced on Reno, due to the failure of the main body to be where they were supposed to be, when they were supposed to be.
It appears LTC Custer decided to have the advanced guard become an independent attack, to seize the village by itself without support. The commander is required to tell his subordinate of such a massive, overwhelming change of mission and plan. The failure to do this crosses a line from incompetence to gross incompetence.
Three understrength companies had no chance of capturing the village by themselves. If Reno had known he was an independent attack, he would not have dismounted at all. He would have moved back towards Ford A, crossing the river was the only option for survival. Instead he dismounted to give the main body time to attack the Indian force surrounding him.
The failure of the main body to support the advanced guard is the reason the advanced guard was defeated. The only reason.
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