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Post by fred on Dec 5, 2016 17:01:16 GMT -6
Dan—
Here is the problem we have. Communications were nil and the only thing Custer knew for sure—other than what he had himself seen—was Benteen was on his way. Everything else would have been guesswork and hopeful assumptions, though assumptions powdered with fairly good reasoning. Custer knew Benteen would hurry; of that, I have no doubt. Since Custer had ridden the same route, he could make a valid guess as to how long it would take Benteen to arrive. From the time Custer was informed Benteen was on his way, Custer could estimate an approximate arrival. He moved his command to Calhoun Hill and he set up Keogh, ostensibly as a rear guard, but just as much to await Benteen. Where else would Benteen go? Remember, Custer sent for Benteen before he learned of Reno’s plight. Did Reno retreating bother him? Or mess up his plans? That, we will never know, but he must have weighed the problem, and decided to proceed anyway. Why? Because when one retreats, one retreats back the way one knows and that is directly back up the valley. Tom Rosser said basically the same thing; so did the warrior, Foolish Elk, and so did Private Daniel Newell. So here you have a private soldier, a former general, and even an adversary, all agreeing that is what was usually done. Why would Custer think any differently once… and if… he found out about Reno?
By the time he reached Calhoun Hill, Custer understood the danger inherent in Ford B. That was why he left behind the Keogh battalion and not just a set-of-four. Keogh served two functions: (1) a rear guard; and (2) a covering force for Benteen. If you will, Custer had a fortuitous “ace” he must have recognized: with Benteen’s approach, then arrival, he would catch in a pincer, out in the open area of the Deep Coulee flats, any Indians that had crossed at Ford B, between Benteen and Keogh.
While I see a lot of hope, poor assumptions, and wishful thinking in all this, I see no flaws in its reasoning—if everything went according to plan—and it fits all three of my criteria: logical, simple, and a continuous and coherent flow.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Bruce Robert on Dec 5, 2016 18:02:50 GMT -6
Fred,
Thank you for the book recommendations. And for what it's worth, I see nothing wrong with blowing your own horn now and again.
Bruce
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Post by fred on Dec 5, 2016 18:46:01 GMT -6
Fred, Thank you for the book recommendations. And for what it's worth, I see nothing wrong with blowing your own horn now and again. Bruce, First off, you are quite welcome. If you do buy Strategy, beware: it is extremely controversial. A lot of LBH "traditionalists" do not like that sort of thing, so they shy away. I feel an obligation, however, to warn people ahead of time. As a former Wall Street broker and trader, that is a bad business practice, but it does wonders for my hypocrisy concerns. As for tooting my own horn... well, that has never really been my thing. If you do purchase Strategy, I truly hope you enjoy it. For the genre, it has done remarkably well. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by tubman13 on Dec 6, 2016 6:39:30 GMT -6
Bruce,
Strategy is excellent. As Fred knows, many of us on these boards have tooted his horn, if you will. There are many nuggets, there in contained and the time study is in unequaled. I take no issues whatsoever, what is put forth. I have chosen to explore another avenue, the avenue may be a dead end, however I need to go to the end to be sure. Fred is the perfect foil for me. You could not have asked a better person to aim you in the right direction. You sure don't need me to tell you this
Fred has opened a number of doors for me, as has AZ, and number of others folks. It never hurts to walk through those doors and see what is inside.
Regards, Tom
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Post by crzhrs on Dec 8, 2016 11:44:08 GMT -6
Once again Fred has made this forum what it's all about: LBH!
One issue that has bothered me for quite a while is the info Boston Custer may have given his brother about Benteen.
Was Boston aware of the condition of Benteen's horses & men after traveling over difficult and unknown terrain?
Boston and his nephew Audie Reed had very little if no experience with the military and/or fighting Indians. They went along with the expedition for a summer "outing" and expecting GAC to whip the Indians.
Boston had no knowledge of what was going on with Reno. Once Benteen came in contact with Reno's command whatever "orders" Benteen had to "come quick" were over ridden by Reno's dire need for help and reinforcement.
Since Benteen had no idea what had happened or what orders had been given after he went on his scout he was on his own and made a decision to assist those in immediate need of help rather than trying to find Custer who Benteen may have thought he was really re-enforcing.
One can only assume Boston told GAC that Benteen was on his way and would be arriving soon. However, Boston was one man and could travel a lot faster than an entire command which may have thrown off his idea of how quickly Benteen could arrive.
One of the most important factors of Custer's decision was how much Boston told him about Benteen and his expected arrival.
Boston's lack of experience with the military and how it moves and operates plus the unexpected outcome of Reno's battle was of utmost consequences in what Custer decided to do based on the arrival of Benteen.
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Post by crzhrs on Dec 9, 2016 9:20:35 GMT -6
One more thing. How much would GAC base his battle/attack plan on the info received from Boston? Would he have that much confidence in his brother, someone with virtually no combat and/or Indian-fighting experience?
Hard to imagine GAC determining the 7th's fate/success/failure based on Boston's info.
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Post by Colt45 on Dec 9, 2016 13:44:25 GMT -6
There's no guarantee Boston told George anything. We know he passed Benteen on his way back to the pack train. We don't know for sure if he saw or spoke with Martini enroute to Benteen, and we don't know if he ever saw Reno in the valley or if he would have recognized the situation if he did. At most he would have relayed information about where he saw Benteen and maybe if he saw or spoke with Martini. By the time he caught up with George near the LNC area, the troops may have been exchanging fire with Wolftooth and been too busy to chitchat about anything. So I can't believe George would have based his plans on anything Boston related other than the fact that Benteen was back on the main Reno creek trail, if he told him anything at all.
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Post by herosrest on Dec 9, 2016 17:49:53 GMT -6
DucemusIt really is time to protest committed apology for Reno as seeds of desertion and callous abandonment by Custer are sown to the smoke and mirrors of statistical mush. See note 1
Boston Custer at best told that Benteen was on the back trail at where ever Custer worked out that battalion would be when he got the news. Of course Martin had already been sent back on the back trail to Benteen and thus that already was known by Custer who ordered Benteen and McDougall across Ford A. Martin saw Reno's command engaged in the valley and that was where Benteen was sent to support that action 'quickly'.
Boston Custer knew nothing of the retreat from the valley by Reno and the consequent decision expressed to Terry, by Benteen, that he: 'ordered by General Custer to return, came to the river, and rightly concluding that it was useless for his force to attempt to renew the fight in the valley, he joined Reno on the bluffs' . There is no question that Benteen was ordered into LBH valley to support Reno but went on the bluffs- out of sight of Custer, Keogh and Yates.
Custer's command knew nothing of the seven companies whereabouts but did see 500 hostiles east of the river on the highest point between Reno and Custer, move to attack them - cutting the five companies off from Reno, Benteen and McDougall.
The movements then made by companies C,E,F,I and L were towards high ground where they would not be surrounded in a pocket of terrain dominated by high ground. The movement away from the river invited hostiles to follow and they attacked the retreating soldiers. About as simple as it gets. Same happened to Reno.
Reno and Benteen's companies were abandoned when Custer's threat to the village was detected and countered. 7th Cavalry bit off more than they could chew and Custer's command found themselves attacked by large numbers of hostiles who moved against them east of the river from Weir's Peak and bluffs. This was known about and understood by Patterson Hughes and written about by him on the 30th June, 1876. The Patterson Hughes papers and sketch.
Had the five companies immediately moved towards Reno Hill they too would have survived the battle as the seven dug in with Reno did.
Having seen large numbers of hostiles move down river from Weir's peak into MTC, and attack them, the last place to which Keogh, Yates or Custer would move was up river - UNLESS- they knew the balance of the regiment had concentrated there as it did, unmolested.
They did not know this because Reno went out of his way to hide and prevent that knowledge reaching Custer. Benteen was ordered into the valley but disobeyed that order and did not communicate this to Custer. All that was required was to place the guidons on Weir's Peak and show Custer where the seven companies were. Instead, Reno vanished down the river he had just fled across.
The archaeology for cavalry movement to western (north) fords is non existent and that which does exist supports the desperate fighting at Last Stand Hill. Had movement to lower fords happened then there is the North to South battle, Kuhlman got into it blow by blow, marker by marker, with Custer whispering the story in his deaf ears.
1 Upon arrival at LBH, Maj. Reno lied about the events and timing of the siege on his hill to his expedition commander, who reported what he had been told. So, at June 27th, 1876; Marcus A. Reno was lying (bare faced) about enemy capability during his fight to the the commander deciding what to do next. There is absolutely no doubt that Reno lied to Terry.
2.That same report makes clear that Benteen understood that he was ordered to go into the valley across Ford A and support Reno's battalion which withdrew rather than wait for promised support.Terry's report.A wee stroll LBH archaelogyNorthern fords D (x<) is the work of romantics celebrating the western way and a most notable cavalryman but it goes just a little too far. (Down river) The entire theory is based on Mark Kellogg's theorised kill site which is pure Donahue and long seeded it be in an interpretation of Gibbon's route to Custer's Battleground. Ho hum! Beaking News from Bang Mi Silly News Corp- here link is found Big Beaver's map from 1930 which explains what he said two years earlier to Joe Blummer and shows Crazy Horses route to battle across Realbird ford. Hallowed ground. Some slippery stuff - link
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Post by benteen on Dec 9, 2016 17:59:34 GMT -6
Dan— Here is the problem we have. Communications were nil and the only thing Custer knew for sure—other than what he had himself seen—was Benteen was on his way. Everything else would have been guesswork and hopeful assumptions, though assumptions powdered with fairly good reasoning. Custer knew Benteen would hurry; of that, I have no doubt. Since Custer had ridden the same route, he could make a valid guess as to how long it would take Benteen to arrive. From the time Custer was informed Benteen was on his way, Custer could estimate an approximate arrival. He moved his command to Calhoun Hill and he set up Keogh, ostensibly as a rear guard, but just as much to await Benteen. Where else would Benteen go? Remember, Custer sent for Benteen before he learned of Reno’s plight. Did Reno retreating bother him? Or mess up his plans? That, we will never know, but he must have weighed the problem, and decided to proceed anyway. Why? Because when one retreats, one retreats back the way one knows and that is directly back up the valley. Tom Rosser said basically the same thing; so did the warrior, Foolish Elk, and so did Private Daniel Newell. So here you have a private soldier, a former general, and even an adversary, all agreeing that is what was usually done. Why would Custer think any differently once… and if… he found out about Reno? By the time he reached Calhoun Hill, Custer understood the danger inherent in Ford B. That was why he left behind the Keogh battalion and not just a set-of-four. Keogh served two functions: (1) a rear guard; and (2) a covering force for Benteen. If you will, Custer had a fortuitous “ace” he must have recognized: with Benteen’s approach, then arrival, he would catch in a pincer, out in the open area of the Deep Coulee flats, any Indians that had crossed at Ford B, between Benteen and Keogh. While I see a lot of hope, poor assumptions, and wishful thinking in all this, I see no flaws in its reasoning—if everything went according to plan—and it fits all three of my criteria: logical, simple, and a continuous and coherent flow. Best wishes, Fred. Capt Fred, My friend as always I appreciate and respect your responses as they are based on your knowledge of the Military, tactics, and the facts of this engagement. However, rather then diminish my opinion on what happened to Keoghs battalion, it has increased it. Allow me to explain.... I dont believe that Custer knew exactly where Benteen was. Like others I dont think George put to much of an onus on what Boston had to say, and to my knowledge Benteen never sent any message to Custer informing him of that. Custer assumed that Benteen wasnt neck deep in warriors. Custer assumed that Martini got thru to Benteen with Cooks message. Remember Martinis horse was shot it could have easily been Martini and Cooks note was floating in the LBH River Was Custer aware that in the message Cook had emphasized that Benteen bring the packs? Sure Custer is a fine horseman and could estimate how fast 3 companies of Cavalry could travel (If he knew whae they were) but who can estimate how fast they could go dragging 175 ornery mules; From 3411 Custer may not have seen Renos retreat from the timber, but he did see him driven into it by hundreds of warriors headed in the same direction Benteen would be coming from. How could he know that Benteen wouldnt stop to help Reno or that he would be able to cut his way thru them. Capt, GAC was planing a strategy to attack/asault what I consider not an Indian village, but a small city of 8-10 thousand people. The linchpin of his plan would have been the link-up of Benteen and Keogh. There are just too many assumptions any of which are wrong the plan goes down the tubes. I know Custer was a risk taker, but I dont think even Custer would formulate a plan based on all those unknowns and assumptions Capt, I know I am a thick headed Irishman, but I still believe that Custer did not order Keogh to be where he was when his battalion was destroyed. It happened because of a mis-judgement by Capt Keogh as to the warriors disposition. Be Well Dan
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Post by Bruce Robert on Dec 10, 2016 17:03:09 GMT -6
Dan,
I am interested in your statement about Keogh not being placed by Custer at Calhoun Hill. Do you think he was reacting to ever greater enemy pressure rather than acting on orders to hold that position?
My limited knowledge suggests that there was a continuum starting from acting and moving towards reacting and finally routing as pressure (real or perceived) increased, and this movement occurred sooner than is typically suggested. Are you suggesting something along these lines?
Thanks, Bruce
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Post by benteen on Dec 10, 2016 17:57:23 GMT -6
Dan, I am interested in your statement about Keogh not being placed by Custer at Calhoun Hill. Do you think he was reacting to ever greater enemy pressure rather than acting on orders to hold that position? My limited knowledge suggests that there was a continuum starting from acting and moving towards reacting and finally routing as pressure (real or perceived) increased, and this movement occurred sooner than is typically suggested. Are you suggesting something along these lines? Thanks, Bruce Bruce, I just finished responding to a question on the blue board that was similar to your question. It is under Custer attack at Ford D. If you read it and it doesnt give you a satisfactory answer please tell me and I will attempt to give you a better answer. It is one of my longest posts and I type with 2 fingers or I would put it up for you here Be Well Dan
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Post by Bruce Robert on Dec 12, 2016 14:13:10 GMT -6
Dan,
I look forward to reading your post. One problem, what is the "blue board?"
Thanks, Bruce
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Post by benteen on Dec 12, 2016 16:04:05 GMT -6
Dan,
I look forward to reading your post. One problem, what is the "blue board?"
Thanks, Bruce Bruce, It is another LBH board called the Centenial Campaign run by a Lady named Beth (Good moderator) just like our Diane. I am not good with computers so I dont know how to provide a link for you. But maybe one of our other forum members can help out. Be Well Dan
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 13, 2016 7:39:20 GMT -6
Here is a Michael Donahue map. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by wild on Dec 20, 2016 17:49:04 GMT -6
Festive greeting to all .Hope all are of good cheer and in robust good health.
Bruce
I am interested in your statement about Keogh not being placed by Custer at Calhoun Hill. Do you think he was reacting to ever greater enemy pressure rather than acting on orders to hold that position Because of the Indian vast superiority in numbers and because Custer led his command into the maw of this great mass his entire command,wings,companies and platoons were in a constant state of being outflanked. Thus any positioning of individual units was a much use as moving the deck chairs on the Titanic. Also as Custer had no effective means of command and control other than follow my butt it is very unlikely he indulged in unit positioning.
Again best wishes to all. Richard
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