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Post by fred on Dec 3, 2016 18:59:35 GMT -6
I am interested in your point about coupling Indian testimony with archeological information. This would seem to provide a stronger evidence based account for "what happened." Having said that, there are going to be areas where we will only have speculation to work with, though even then there will be better/worse reasoned speculation. This battle has produced an overwhelming abundance of opinion, unsupported speculation presented as fact, and outright ideology (i.e. Custer's a rat; Custer's a saint). I would like to make use of the advice received in college: Find the source material, if possible. And if no source material exists to support claims, then it probably needs to be discarded in spite of "xyz" historian having stated it in their work. My question: Are there any books, etc. you recommend that offer this Indian testimony with archeology approach, and do it with a minimum of preconceived ideas. Bruce, Without indulging in the usual hyperbole one is confronted with today, i.e., "awesome!", "fantastic!"; your post above has almost stunned me. I have attempted-- successfully, I believe-- to do precisely what you learned in college and the advice suggested to you. If you are interested in the truth of history, either professionally as a trained historian, or avocationally like me, you must approach it from as neutral a stance as possible, discarding all preconceived notions regardless of your personal prejudices, whatever they may be. It is not easy. My own feelings have vacillated over time, but those feelings were fed by precisely the "xyz" historians you allude to. Once the conflicts between opinions and prejudices become sharp enough, however, the discarding of personal feelings becomes easier. I have not read every book written about the Little Big Horn; I have not even read every book written about George Custer. I have not read a single book about Fred Benteen (are there any?), though I do recall reading one book about Marcus Reno, so long ago I have even forgotten its title. There are only two books fitting your criteria. The first is titled, Archaeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle, written by Dr. Richard Allan Fox, Jr., one of the two trained, professional archaeologists who did the field work at the battlefield in 1984-1985. When I read that book I believed fully Fox had found "the answer." He also uses Indian accounts to support his thesis, but his work has come under hyperbolic criticism-- by some-- because of a number of his conclusions, e.g., trooper panic, no last stand, etc. The book was published in 1993, and for my two cents it is the finest book ever written about the Custer battle. Now... and I could be criticized here as well, but the only other book fitting the description of what you are seeking is my own: The Strategy of Defeat at the Little Big Horn. I am sure the Fox book can be found on Amazon; mine can be found there as well, though it seems it is temporarily out of stock (I guess that means it is popular enough to sell out quite frequently) or you may find it directly from the publisher: www.mcfarlandbooks.com/book-2.php?id=978-0-7864-7954-2Probably more than any other military event in our history, this battle needs to be understood from a timing viewpoint. If you do not understand the timing of every single event, you will never understand what happened or why or who was responsible. There are other timing studies out there, but none have been done using only the accounts of the participants coupled with archaeological findings... until my book. In it you will find more than 60 pages of time charts; more than 500 timed events; 25 separate timed incidents; and more than 1,000 primary source individual accounts supporting every timed event... except a handful I threw in as fillers to add continuity to the event. I do not like "hawking" my own work, but if what you are seeking is what you have alluded to above, then I know of no other work-- from start to finish-- meeting your criteria. Others on here may disagree, but there would be no need for these discussions if everyone thought the same. The old football tight end and coach of the '85 Chicago Bears, Mike Ditka, once said, "If you have two people and they agree on everything, you don't need one of them." He may have picked that up from George Halas, but it applies here as well. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Dec 4, 2016 9:53:40 GMT -6
Hi Fred, I have always thought that deep ravine was too narrow to be used as a major route for 200 mounted Indians. Why would Crazy Horse have chosen that route when he had just rode past a great crossing point at MFT. I like your theory about the gap in battle ridge and it would have been a great way to get behind any defense line on Calhoun hill. But if CH crossed at MTF, he could have assessed the situation and saw the advantage of this left hook through the gap.
So could he have crossed at MTF and still gone through the gap, or would this route be unattainable?
Yan.
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Post by fred on Dec 4, 2016 11:39:37 GMT -6
Ian,
Why would he cross at Ford B when the action was clearly heading north? Plenty of warriors were already crossing there; the refugees were heading farther north; the action was clearly in that direction; Crazy Horse had about 200 warriors with him... so why cross there? If you want to head off action proceeding northward, why attack from the south? I am reasonably certain Crazy Horse would have paused at Ford B, assessed what he was seeing, then decided to move north to get around the troops on Calhoun Hill. I am equally certain Crazy Horse was unaware Custer was even farther north as Horse broke through that gap.
Deep Ravine was not too narrow, either then or now. Deep Coulee-- past its entrance-- is more narrow for a good distance than Deep Ravine. And no one says you need to send horsemen up Deep Ravine in a column-of-fours. It was by far the best entry point to Battle Ridge just to the north of Calhoun Hill (which is where he guessed-- accurately-- the action was taking place) of any other crossing and I am quite sure those Indians knew the terrain very well.
Simple tactics, my friend, simple tactics.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Dec 4, 2016 11:52:37 GMT -6
Just for the record-- not to start any brou-ha-ha or insult anyone, but there are several issues that pop up from time to time I feel are so ludicrously preposterous as to warrant no discussion-- certainly from me-- and I just shut them down and move on:
(1) the idea George Custer walked down Reno Creek at speeds of 4 MPH or even less.
(2) that Fred Benteen deliberately sacrificed Custer and 209 men because he had on a pout and disliked ol' Iron Butt.
(3) Custer being shot at Ford B.
(4) Custer attacking across Ford B.
(5) a north-south, i.e., Ford D to Calhoun Hill, start-to-finish, battle flow.
Anyone wishing to argue those points, please refer to my book.
Explanations as to why I feel this way about these issues are always something I am willing to discuss. I have no interest, however, in arguing or defending against what I feel is just silly stuff. And again, there is not a single shred of evidence-- either archaeologically or anecdotally-- that defends any of those issues.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 4, 2016 14:07:13 GMT -6
Fox put the ki-bosh on the old "Crazy Horse Ravine" business. Fox believes-- as do I, based on more Indian accounts-- Crazy Horse moved up Deep Ravine. No question in my mind. Again, we can all have whacky theories, but unless they can be supported by evidence, they remain just that: whacky. Crazy Horse went up Deep Ravine, then breeched Keogh's position through the gap on Battle Ridge... in my opinion, my most important contribution to this whole event... the gap in Battle Ridge. Current thinking today is the bottom of the Cheyenne village (the most farthest north) was across from Medicine Tail Coulee ford. Michno also placed it there. That is incorrect, though not by much. It extended about 1/4-mile farther north... maybe even 1/2-mile. All you need to do is read Wooden Leg, then check a map. Why would anyone-- modern-day anyone-- dispute that? How could they? With what proof or support? Best wishes, fred. I think that is the current thinking in regards to CH. Donahue has him coming across MTF if I recall correctly. I agree within +/- with your placement of the Indian village. Not that my opinion matters. I do think they had horses on the other side of the river. I call them Ford Ds since there are several starting below the NPS housing to the road. I read what you posted and in your book regarding Ford D. What was Custer attempting to accomplish do you think? I think he is still on offense and looking to cross the river to the Big Village side. Regards Steve
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Post by fred on Dec 4, 2016 14:45:32 GMT -6
Steve, I think that is the current thinking in regards to CH. Donahue has him coming across MTF if I recall correctly. If Mike has Crazy Horse crossing at Ford B, then he is wrong. I would believe if that is Donahue's current interpretation, then he is relying way too much on inaccurate maps. Again, corroboration is always best and every single shred of material coming out of that battle-- and this includes the archaeology-- needs to be vetted against something else. Who vets the map? No more than what I wrote in the book. I think he backed away from the ford (D) to await Keogh and Benteen, knowing now his reconnaissance was over and he knew everything he had to know. It wasn't until he reached Cemetery Ridge when he discovered his plans unraveling. I agree with you here, 100%. He was on the offense-- certainly in his own mind-- all the while and until reaching Cemetery Ridge. And there is no doubt in my mind, taking his dispositions into account, he fully intended to cross at Ford D and run through those families. I do not agree with Rich Fox that Custer was interested in gathering up those families to break the warriors' cohesion; but I do agree with him that Custer was going to cross and attack the families. In my opinion Custer saw, basically, the end of the Plains Indians when he saw what he did at Ford D. This was his armageddon... this was the final battle. He had them all and he was determined to clean house. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by tubman13 on Dec 4, 2016 15:41:32 GMT -6
Ian, Why would he cross at Ford B when the action was clearly heading north? Plenty of warriors were already crossing there; the refugees were heading farther north; the action was clearly in that direction; Crazy Horse had about 200 warriors with him... so why cross there? If you want to head off action proceeding northward, why attack from the south? I am reasonably certain Crazy Horse would have paused at Ford B, assessed what he was seeing, then decided to move north to get around the troops on Calhoun Hill. I am equally certain Crazy Horse was unaware Custer was even farther north as Horse broke through that gap. Deep Ravine was not too narrow, either then or now. Deep Coulee-- past its entrance-- is more narrow for a good distance than Deep Ravine. And no one says you need to send horsemen up Deep Ravine in a column-of-fours. It was by far the best entry point to Battle Ridge just to the north of Calhoun Hill (which is where he guessed-- accurately-- the action was taking place) of any other crossing and I am quite sure those Indians knew the terrain very well. Simple tactics, my friend, simple tactics. Best wishes, Fred. How many whacky theorists do you wish to deal with. Count me in!
I will start here:
Godfrey in what is quoted below seems to back up JSIT's tale of not Ford B but rather possible Ford D/northern movement.
The accepted theory for many years after the battle, and still persisted in by some writers, was that Custer’s column had turned the high bluffs near the river, moved down the dry (Reno’s) creek, and attempted to ford the river near the lowest point of these bluffs(FordB); that he was there met by an overpowering force and driven back ; that he then divided his battalion, moved down the river with the view of attacking the village, but met with such resistance from the enemy posted along the river bank and ravines that he was compelled to fall back, fighting, to the position on the ridge. The numerous bodies found scattered between the river and ridge were supposed to be the first victims of the fight. I am now satisfied that these were men who either survived those on the ridge or attempted to escape the massacre.
"The wife of Spotted Horn Bull, when giving me her account of the battle, persisted in saying that Custer’s column did not attempt to cross at the ford(B), and appealed to her husband, who supported her statement. On the battle field, in 1886, Chief Gall indicated Custer’s route to me, and it then flashed upon me that I myself had seen Custer’s trail. On June 28, while we were burying the dead, I asked Major Reno’s permission to go on the high ridge east or back of the field to look for tracks of shod horses to ascertain if some of the command might not have escaped. When I reached the ridge I saw this trail, and wondered who could have made it, but dismissed the thought that it had been made by Custer’s column, because it did not accord with the theory with which we were then filled, that Custer had attempted to cross at the ford, and this trail was too far back, and showed no indication of leading toward the ford. Trumpeter Penwell was my orderly and accompanied me. It was a singular coincidence that in 1886 Penwell was stationed at Fort Custer, and was my orderly when visiting the battle field. Penwell corroborated my recollection of the trail. The ford theory arose from the fact that we found there numerous tracks of shod horses, but they evidently had been made after the Indians had possessed themselves of the cavalry horses, for they rode them after capturing them. No bodies of men or horses were found anywhere near the ford, and these facts are conclusive to my mind that Custer did not go to the ford with any body of men."
I luv you man, spike the interest!
Regards, Tom
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Post by fred on Dec 4, 2016 16:57:04 GMT -6
Tom, please, give me more credit than that!! I have read the Godfrey stuff any number of times and dealt with it in Strategy.
The fact there were shod tracks across Luce and Nye-Cartwright ridges proves only that troops crossed there, and of course, we know some did: Keogh's battalion. Would Godfrey know Custer split his command?
LT McClernand saw, remarked, and wrote about organized columns heading down Medicine Tail Coulee toward the ford. How does Godfrey account for that? (Hint: he didn't.)
TMP Dose's body was found only a couple hundred yards from Ford B; Dose was attached to HQ, so how did he get there? How come Godfrey forgot about Dose? Or did he ever know about Dose? (Hint: Godfrey doesn't and didn't.)
There are slews of Indian accounts telling about troops at that ford. How does or did Godfrey account for those? (Hint: he didn't.)
Theories pondering whether Custer went to Ford B or not are little better than the ignorance associated with the other items I outlined earlier. The main difference is ignorance rather than stupidity.
Go back and look at those five items and think about them... then tell me how anyone with even a modicum of intelligence can support those theories. Here is another hint: let's take two of my favorites: Custer walked down Reno Creek... OK... he knows he has been spotted; he believes Indians have headed back to camp to warn it of the troops' approach; the biggest fear of the campaign designers and practitioners is that the Indians would scatter... and Custer walks 11 miles to contact? Think about that...
Second... Custer attacks at Ford B. Well, you just quoted the Godfrey jazz, right? So we know a number of troops never did go to the ford. We find a HQ soldier dead, near the ford, so we can assume troops were there. And George Custer is going to attack, across a river, into a village whose northern end he doesn't yet know the location of (bluffs still intervene there) and he leaves 60% of his attacking force one mile back...? Think about that...
And we are supposed to believe these theories hold water...?
The Strategy of Defeat at the Little Big Horn has been out for 25 1/2 months. I have been active on three message boards and Facebook and I have yet to run into a single argument, a single theory, a single idea to make me change a single word in that book. Mike Donahue's and Steve Andrews' idea of a slightly different route once in Cedar Coulee is acceptable to me because it does not change a single minute of my timing analysis, so it is a slightly alternate theory of movement which I can easily accept over my own. (And probably will after another trip to the battlefield.) Other than that, I have seen nothing to make me change anything written in that book.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by tubman13 on Dec 4, 2016 19:56:07 GMT -6
Tom, please, give me more credit than that!! I have read the Godfrey stuff any number of times and dealt with it in Strategy. The fact there were shod tracks across Luce and Nye-Cartwright ridges proves only that troops crossed there, and of course, we know some did: Keogh's battalion. Would Godfrey know Custer split his command? LT McClernand saw, remarked, and wrote about organized columns heading down Medicine Tail Coulee toward the ford. How does Godfrey account for that? (Hint: he didn't.) Was he ever asked? Was he aware?TMP Does' body was found only a couple hundred yards from Ford B; Dose was attached to HQ, so how did he get there? How come Godfrey forgot about Dose? Or did he ever know about Dose? (Hint: Godfrey doesn't and didn't.) How did Sharrow end up where he was? What about the two bodies in the parking lot of the Trading Post? How do you account for the company C pistol casings on BRE extended?There are slews of Indian accounts telling about troops at that ford. How does or did Godfrey account for those? (Hint: he didn't.) He did not, but I gave you one. Maybe poor translation, a ford by the Cheyenne village is a ford, geographical awareness.
Theories pondering whether Custer went to Ford B or not are little better than the ignorance associated with the other items I outlined earlier. The main difference is ignorance rather than stupidity. Go back and look at those five items and think about them... then tell me how anyone with even a modicum of intelligence can support those theories. Here is another hint: let's take two of my favorites: Custer walked down Reno Creek... OK... he knows he has been spotted; he believes Indians have headed back to camp to warn it of the troops' approach; the biggest fear of the campaign designers and practitioners is that the Indians would scatter... and Custer walks 11 miles to contact? Think about that... Second... Custer attacks at Ford B. Well, you just quoted the Godfrey jazz, right? So we know a number of troops never did go to the ford. We find a HQ soldier dead, near the ford, so we can assume troops were there. Was he there by choice order or was he running, or was he going for help? And George Custer is going to attack, across a river, into a village whose northern end he doesn't yet know the location of (bluffs still intervene there) and he leaves 60% of his attacking force one mile back...? Think about that... Would you attack the center of a village? Tactics, Tactics, Tactics? The alternative tale makes GAC look much smarter!
And we are supposed to believe these theories hold water...? Water, no, potential yes.
The Strategy of Defeat at the Little Big Horn has been out for 25 1/2 months. I have been active on three message boards and Facebook and I have yet to run into a single argument, a single theory, a single idea to make me change a single word in that book. Mike Donahue's and Steve Andrews' idea of a slightly different route once in Cedar Coulee is acceptable to me because it does not change a single minute of my timing analysis, so it is a slightly alternate theory of movement which I can easily accept over my own. (And probably will after another trip to the battlefield.) Other than that, I have seen nothing to make me change anything written in that book. I find nothing wrong with your timing, I just think it is possible that GAC spent his time doing something else. May I also say the gap in your book is an important finding, and it would be the perfect place to cut to pieces of troops trying to return south. C&l Were stopped and maybe CO. I was hit broad side and the Buffalo hunt was on.
Best wishes, Fred. Fred,
As you know, I have read both of your books and use the hell of your 1st one, anyone who does not use it as a resource is a fool. I know you can deal with one dissenting voice. I will even listen to Cheyennes at the battlefield during veterans ceremonies. I certainly can't prove you wrong nor would I attempt to shout you down. The conventional theory, however is not flawless.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Dec 5, 2016 6:02:19 GMT -6
One thing that always puzzles me is that Custer supposedly stopped, dropped off 60% of his force and went on a recce mission. Now I am no Custer expert, but does this sound like Custer?
I tend to see it this way, Custer is commanding the 7th cavalry. He makes his battle plan to include three fighting elements and a pack train. He then detaches one battalion to head left.
That leaves him with two battalions in which to find and attack the village. Now when he orders Reno to move up the valley to the village, then this is the start of the attack, so in reality the attack plan was initiated at that point and the two battalions were in attack mode.
Now if he saw Reno doing his bit in the valley (3411), then this would surly urge him to get into the fight, as it would be paramount to the plan that both battalions should be hitting the village, so when he arrives on the high ground around the southern end of battle ridge, why would then decide to drop off Keogh and go scouting, he could see the village and knew for a fact that Reno was fighting in the valley.
As far as I can see we have two options here;
A: Custer loses all thought to what his other battalions are up to and decides to stop and go looking for the north end of the camp, which could have been a job for Bouyer and the F Company detail.
B: Custer saw the urgency and went as fast as he could to find a fording place which would be far enough away from the village so he could cross unopposed and then roll up the village from north to south and hopefully squeeze the inhabitants between his own battalion and Reno’s, and if Benteen arrives he can jolly well pitch in too.
These are just question that I need to get off my chest, and I have no agenda or other motive, only then that. Yan.
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Post by tubman13 on Dec 5, 2016 8:10:50 GMT -6
All,
Off topic, for those interested, Upton and Sons(publishers) is having a serious Christmas sale.
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Post by fred on Dec 5, 2016 10:56:49 GMT -6
One thing that always puzzles me is that Custer supposedly stopped, dropped off 60% of his force and went on a recce mission. Now I am no Custer expert, but does this sound like Custer? Yes... it does. And there is precedent. Check out his actions at the Washita. Different format, same idea, same objective. At the Washita, however, he couldn't even see the village and he laid his plans without ever knowing its precise location. Ian, without being insulting, you sound like a staff officer. My question to you is, So what? Your question would be valid if your premise were valid. It is not. Again, I go over this in Strategy. If you choose to believe otherwise, that is your option. In my opinion, however, you would be completely wrong. First of all, I have emphasized Custer's speed. At 3,411, he gained knowledge. He did not dawdle there, but assessed what he was seeing and moved on in haste. As he moved, he had part of the picture, but it was still incomplete (1) how far downstream does the village extend, i.e., how many Indians am I likely to confront? and (2) how far away are these families going? So he moves north to find either, (1) high ground where he can see everything, or (2) proximity where he can see everything. He arrives at Luce Ridge because as he heads down Medicine Tail Coulee he can clearly see tepees, so he knows the village extends still farther downstream. On Luce Ridge, his younger brother reaches him and informs him about Benteen and the packs. He adds that to his "folio" of intel. Unfortunately, however, all his questions are still unanswered, so "high ground" doesn't do it for him; he needs "proximity." So, like the Washita, he heads closer to the village, to his enemy (... and by the way, this is exactly what we did on patrols when I was in the army) and he takes one of his two contingents with him because he needs the strength in case of a confrontation... which he gets. At Ford B he sees much, much more: Indians fleeing downstream... but more troublesome, he still-- because of the intervening bluffs masking the river course-- cannot see the full northern extent of the village. None of this has anything to do with Reno, even if Boston Custer has told him Reno was pulling back. Reno was achieving-- in one way or another-- his objective: bringing the warriors to battle and tying them down. Reno's threat to the village was palpable and that threat-- as George Custer would know-- would be met by the full fury of the Indian warriors. The big prize was farther downstream... and Reno was of no concern to Custer. Now if you think of Custer as this great altruistic warrior who would never leave troops behind or in the lurch, then fine, you have your opinions and you are on your own from here on out. You write, on one hand, it doesn't "sound" (or whatever words you used) like Custer, yet the two actions, e.g., Elliott/Washita, Reno/LBH, and not dissimilar; so Reno, as long as he is tying down warriors is doing what Custer wants. It may not be the textbook plan, but it is working nonetheless. So Custer continues north. First of all, the F Company detail is probably out front, anyway. There is evidence they were the first to Ford B (something else that slipped by Godfrey and his so-called recollections on ten years hence). And I do not buy Custer losing sight of anything; he was way too shrewd. He knew exactly what he wanted, what he needed, and had a pretty damn good idea of how he was going to get it. As for the F Company detail, that's all well and good, but Custer was still the type of officer who needed to see for himself. His Civil War exploits, the 1867 and 1868 campaigns, and now the LBH were all perfect examples of Custer sending out small parties and following them up himself, right on their heels. Sending out small scouts in these environs was counter-productive. A fellow named Charles Wright wrote a book about the law and the LBH and criticized Custer and Terry for not sending out these small parties to look for the Indians. Wright fails to consider both distances involved and the peripatetic nature of what they were seeking. This is not a lot different and the immediate danger to small scouting parties is equally palpable. Why do you think Custer sent three companies and his best officers off on the scout to the left from the divide? I believe Custer counted on Benteen and that was why he left Keogh behind... or certainly one of the reasons: Custer understood the danger of and at Ford B. My answer to the second part of your question is another question: If Custer is moving at great speeds-- and I believe he is-- why would he waste more time going even farther downstream than where he knows the Indians are gathering? Time wasted going more north; time wasted backtracking in the valley...? That makes no sense. What makes sense is pinpointing the location of the refugees; estimating the resistance; then backing away and awaiting reinforcements, which he hopes (believes?) are only a few minutes away. Even if he spooks Indians at Chasing Creek, how much farther will they pull away from there? At Ford D, Custer's recon was complete. The problem now became, by the time Custer backtracked the short distance to Cemetery Ridge, Keogh was already in action... and Reno had blocked the way for Benteen. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Dec 5, 2016 11:32:34 GMT -6
LT McClernand saw, remarked, and wrote about organized columns heading down Medicine Tail Coulee toward the ford. How does Godfrey account for that? (Hint: he didn't.) Was he ever asked? Was he aware?Who knows? Who cares?
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Post by fred on Dec 5, 2016 11:39:41 GMT -6
... and by the way, I have no idea how that formatting above turned out the way it did. Too time-consuming for me to care.
FCW
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Post by benteen on Dec 5, 2016 15:48:16 GMT -6
I believe Custer counted on Benteen and that was why he left Keogh behind... or certainly one of the reasons: Custer understood the danger of and at Ford B. Capt Fred, This has been one of the times where I dance to my own drum and disagree with most if not all historians. I dont believe Custer left Keogh behind to wait for Benteen or any other reason. I believe Custer was going to attack at Ford D, but was not going to do it with 90 men but rather his entire 5 Companies. Can a commander make plans which involve moving a unit to a certain placeto link up with another unit..... of course he can, as a combat Officer you may have done it yourself. In order to do that dont you have to know that moving units location, their ETA, their disposition. Custer knew none of these things. What he knew was there were hundreds of warriors heading in the same direction that Benteen would be coming from. Benteen may have been neck deep in warriors and not only couldnt come, but needed help himself. In fact he didnt even know if Martini got thru to Benteen with the message I dont think that Custer would leave 3/5 of his combat effectives waiting for an event (Benteens arrival) when he didnt know when or even if this event would take place. I posted my theory a while back and the jist of it was that Capt Keogh had no intention of fighting a battle at his location, he mis-judged the warriors disposition and found his command in a jackpot unable to stem the onslaught. Be Well Dan
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