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Post by wild on Aug 10, 2016 4:51:45 GMT -6
Custer has to attack at MTCF for to do otherwise was to admit he had blundered. Is he going to have a look at the ford and then ask his scouts if they thought there was something more suitable? And the word filters back the line that the command cannot cross. Why can they not cross ? Is a handful of Indians too strong for them? "If we must turn aside from a few Indians what hope have we of defeating that painted horde"?
Custer must force the pace ,he has to be at the head of the column.This is what he does and this is his last opportunity of glory. An awful pity those Western Painters did not depict a charging Custer mid stream flanked by the regimental and national colours going hell for leather,rather than a pathetic last stand. The Brits do last stands so much better.....the thin red line ,dying in square ,bayonets still defiant . Could this board not grant Custer a soldier's death, dying at the head of his men ,charging the enemy. Cheers
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 10, 2016 5:05:03 GMT -6
Nah! But, I still luv ya man, it has great cinematic value. Where is technicolor when you need it. Regards, Tom
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Post by wild on Aug 10, 2016 5:32:36 GMT -6
Ah Tom where's yar romanticism ? It could be that the LS is the greatest injustice in US military history. Hurrah and Cheers
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Post by benteen on Aug 10, 2016 11:26:30 GMT -6
Fellow Forum members,
This will probably be boring, but I feel compelled to say it. I have had some issues to deal with (no more than anyone else) that has made me put Custer on the back burner. In going to the forum today I saw a post which made me livid. I have no doubt that my response would have caused a flame war which is what we dont need.
My main purpose for this post is to show gratitude. It is comforting to know that if you are unaware of an attack being launched against you, that you have mates that have your back. Col Montrose, Richard, Capt Fred, Tom, Dave....Thank you it is much appreciated.
With that being said, I close the chapter on that saga and look forward to adding my gibberish (My favorite Dark Cloud word) to some of these fine posts I have been reading.
Be Well Everyone Dan
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Post by wild on Aug 10, 2016 13:44:28 GMT -6
Semper Fi Dan . Richard
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Post by shan on Aug 10, 2016 14:45:50 GMT -6
I have always felt that the case for Custer being shot at ford B is a rather weak one. Why, if that had happened, would they have ended up on LSH if the pressure coming from the Indian side wasn't that strong at that point?
Given that, the case for him being disabled or even killed at ford D seems a more likely possibility, it would certainly make the pull back toward LSH more plausible, and whats more, it would even allow for JSIT's story of a pause somewhere in the cemetery area, where they could have stopped to check how bad he was, make a lot more sense.
So, if it's not Custer who was shot at ford B, then who was it that was reported to have been hit in, or at the edge of the river? Smith seems to be the most likely candidate, but this begs a question that has always worried me.
If it was Smith: and we're assuming that he's wounded and not killed, what would have been the procedure for dealing with a problem like this? Why would they have taken him all the way to LSH when the man must, at the very least, been in some discomfort, and then why leave him there, possibly guarded by a platoon of his company, while they then moved onto ford D? Surely it would have better for both Smith, and the need to get on with the mission, if they'd left him in the care of Keogh when they briefly re-united on Calhoun hill, who could at least given him some medical aid?
Shan
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Post by fred on Aug 10, 2016 14:51:03 GMT -6
It is comforting to know that if you are unaware of an attack being launched against you, that you have mates that have your back. Col Montrose, Richard, Capt Fred, Tom, Dave....Thank you it is much appreciated. Guys as good as you will always have people like us to cover your back... especially when there is a liar and a snake involved. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 10, 2016 14:55:01 GMT -6
shan,
Very good, I would say brilliant, but I might wreck Richard's screen play. Pray, please continue on with your thoughts!
Regards, Tom
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 10, 2016 14:57:14 GMT -6
Speaking of snakes, Fred, let the venom cease.
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Post by wild on Aug 10, 2016 17:00:01 GMT -6
Hi Shan If the case for Custer being shot at ford B is weak surely you can come up with more reasons than
Why, if that had happened, would they have ended up on LSH if the pressure coming from the Indian side wasn't that strong at that point? The decision was to withdraw out of contact. If you are not attacking and the defensive options in and around the ford are zero you get the hell out as fast as possible. The terrain dictated the direction and location. There is a clear run to Calhoun Hill , If they fell back the way they came there were going into awful terrain which Benteen described as an awful place to fight Indians. Calhoun hill is the highest local elevation with good all round visibility . Hold that and ya goh a chance. The markers would suggest that they were taking casualities as they approached the hill. to be continued Cheers
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Post by wild on Aug 10, 2016 19:36:00 GMT -6
This issue was peddled by the late lamented . I now regret not supporting it more vigorously than the insipid like Pontius Pilate I find no wrong with this issue. I took it up now[somewhat lightheartedly] mainly because things were somewhat slow and the thread was dying a death. Now I find it ticks all the boxes. I can get a wounded Custer up onto Calhoun hill. I need take him no further ,the panic and confusion and 2000 Indians will take him the rest of the way to LSH. I readly admit that I have a problem with Keogh [but it is not fatal to my case]When Custer is at MTCF I have no idea where Keogh has taken post. Im suggesting he is holding back until the HQ Battalion have cleared the ford. Seeing the HQ Battalion withdrawing he has no option but to cut across country to try for a junction with it at Calhoun hill. The wounded Custer scenario has two big advantages over the ford D scenario 1 it is simple 2 Custer must go to MTCF he does not need to go to ford D Cheers
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Post by Colt45 on Aug 10, 2016 19:51:50 GMT -6
Wild, You can't say for certain that the markers indicate direction of travel toward Calhoun hill. They could just as easily be men fleeing that area toward MTC after C and L companies collapsed. There is no military value in crossing at ford B directly into the middle of the village. You are attempting to cross in a narrow environment where it is not easy to cross in line abreast, which is how you bring a lot of firepower on the opposite force. You also wind up with hostiles to your front in a 180 degree arc. Crossing into those conditions is the same as walking into a u-shaped ambush, i.e. enemy on 3 sides, and with the narrow crossing and river to your rear, your options are very poor.
Ford D, on the other hand, is a much flatter area with higher terrain to move back to if necessary. Also, if Custer was the wounded officer at ford D, the halt on cemetery ridge and subsequent delay makes a lot of sense as the troops treat Custer and the next senior officer decides what to do, since it is likely no one knew Custer's plan. Certainly Reno and Benteen did not, and maybe neither did TWC or Keogh.
Militarily, it has never made sense for Custer to send 2 companies to ford B, with 3 companies too far away on LNC to provide effective fire support. He wouldn't attempt a crossing with only 2 companies, and he didn't need 2 companies to inspect the ford for possibilities. It also never has made much sense to pull back to Calhoun hill if the pressure or perceived pressure at the ford B was enough to prevent a crossing. Why would anyone move north, further away from support, leaving a gap that is sure to be filled with hostiles that wind up in your rear. And to top that off, why leave 1-2 companies behind, position a 3rd back in the swale area, and then proceed toward ford D with only 2 companies. Custer was rash and aggressive, but not stupid.
It is a lot more likely the JSIT account gives the most accurate picture of Custer's movements, and that account has all 5 companies staying east of MTC and approaching the river from the ford D area. The terrain there fits a cavalry attack better than MTC, and the fact they moved north after MTCF indicates the pressure was not strong enough to force a move back south toward Reno and Benteen. It would only be after the attempt at ford D that the pressure would be enough to force a withdrawal. It's easy to look at the marker locations and deduce movement in a given direction, but that is a faulty logic as we have no witnesses to the actual movement, and the terrain is such that the Indian accounts are each only able to see a piece of the battle. They also didn't use the same names that the whites used for landmarks and such, making the reader of the account make assumptions about where something occurred. And such assumptions are generally going to be wrong.
None of us know exactly what happened and most of what we think we know has come from accepting the assumptions of others as passed down in their stories or writings. At this point, the battle could have happened almost any number of ways, so all we can do is look at the evidence we have at hand and use our experiences to frame that evidence into a logical sequence of events, knowing all the while that we are working off a set of assumptions that could easily be wrong.
If one can provide a logical reason for a piece of evidence being found where it was, or someone being at a certain place, then the assumption base becomes more likely. If there is no logical reason for someone being found where they were, or an artifact being found where it is, then it is more difficult to draw a conclusion that has a good chance of being correct.
I personally believe that all 5 companies moved from the LNC area to Calhoun hill, through the Keogh sector, behind LSH and the battle ridge extension, and then attempted crossing at ford D, but for one reason or another, aborted that, moved back to cemetery ridge and BRE and setup a temporary defensive position. Pressure forced a retreat back to the south. The retrograde was led by L company that had enough time to have at least two different skirmish lines on the hill. C company followed closely behind L and probably tried to secure L's right flank. I company retreated under heavy pressure and got caught up in the Indians coming from Deep Ravine, Calhoun Hill and Calhoun Coulee, and from the east ridge to their left. E company lost their mounts and that exposed F company's left flank, and they already had issues with their front and right flank. F had no choice but to retreat back toward LSH.
This scenario also helps explain why LSH has men from C company and I company in the mix when their companies were much further away. These might not be men fleeing from Calhoun Hill and I company, but rather men lost during the retreat movements or separated from their companies during the confusion and the retreat. To me, this is a more logical sequence of events than the traditional notion of an attempt to cross at ford B, repulsion and retreat up to calhoun hill, followed by a further move north. It also gives a little more credit to the officers' decisions once past ford B as they responded to what they faced.
This is just my opinion. It is no better or worse than any other theory. I just think it can explain what was found and how people were found better than the traditional theory.
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Post by wild on Aug 11, 2016 2:22:48 GMT -6
Hi Colt Impressive post and there is much with which to agree.
Let me say at the outset that Custer blundered when he split his forces and placed a river between his forces and those of the enemy. In a word he was dead the moment he descended MTC. His following operations were akin to moving the proverbial deckchairs on the Titanic .[poetic licence here]
You can't say for certain that the markers indicate direction of travel toward Calhoun hill. They could just as easily be men fleeing that area toward MTC after C and L companies collapsed. The position of the Markers do not conform to "fleeing" but rather to loses from a formed and moving column. And flight would not be advisable in that direction.
There is no military value in crossing at ford B directly into the middle of the village. You are attempting to cross in a narrow environment where it is not easy to cross in line abreast, which is how you bring a lot of firepower on the opposite force. You also wind up with hostiles to your front in a 180 degree arc. Crossing into those conditions is the same as walking into a u-shaped ambush, i.e. enemy on 3 sides, and with the narrow crossing and river to your rear, your options are very poor. The same would apply to any other possible fording location. You also pay a price for delaying attacking as I have set out in a previous post
Ford D, on the other hand, is a much flatter area with higher terrain to move back to if necessary. These suggested advantages would not have been known to Custer so you cannot offer them as support for a ford crossing.
Militarily, it has never made sense for Custer to send 2 companies to ford B, with 3 companies too far away on LNC to provide effective fire support. He wouldn't attempt a crossing with only 2 companies, and he didn't need 2 companies to inspect the ford for possibilities. It also never has made much sense to pull back to Calhoun hill if the pressure or perceived pressure at the ford B was enough to prevent a crossing. Why would anyone move north, further away from support, leaving a gap that is sure to be filled with hostiles that wind up in your rear. And to top that off, why leave 1-2 companies behind, position a 3rd back in the swale area, and then proceed toward ford D with only 2 companies. Custer was rash and aggressive, but not stupid. My scenario suggests Custer was attacking with all 5 coys ; Keogh holding back until the lead battalion had crossed . [avoiding a queue to cross
It is a lot more likely the JSIT account gives the most accurate picture of Custer's movements, and that account has all 5 companies staying east of MTC and approaching the river from the ford D area. The terrain there fits a cavalry attack better than MTC, and the fact they moved north after MTCF indicates the pressure was not strong enough to force a move back south toward Reno and Benteen. I'm suggesting the move North was triggered by Custer's incapacitation not by Indian pressure .The withdrawal triggered the pressure.
It would only be after the attempt at ford D that the pressure would be enough to force a withdrawal. Again the aborted attack and withdrawal at MTCF was a reaction to Custer's incapacitation .
None of us know exactly what happened and most of what we think we know has come from accepting the assumptions of others as passed down in their stories or writings. At this point, the battle could have happened almost any number of ways, so all we can do is look at the evidence we have at hand and use our experiences to frame that evidence into a logical sequence of events, knowing all the while that we are working off a set of assumptions that could easily be wrong. Agreed
If one can provide a logical reason for a piece of evidence being found where it was, or someone being at a certain place, then the assumption base becomes more likely. If there is no logical reason for someone being found where they were, or an artifact being found where it is, then it is more difficult to draw a conclusion that has a good chance of being correct. In general agreement but I hold that all artifacts and Indians accounts are tainted. I confine my "fabrications" to character,terrain,tactical logic , weapon potential.
I personally believe that all 5 companies moved from the LNC area to Calhoun hill, through the Keogh sector, behind LSH and the battle ridge extension, and then attempted crossing at ford D, but for one reason or another, aborted that, moved back to cemetery ridge and BRE and setup a temporary defensive position. Pressure forced a retreat back to the south. The retrograde was led by L company that had enough time to have at least two different skirmish lines on the hill. C company followed closely behind L and probably tried to secure L's right flank. I company retreated under heavy pressure and got caught up in the Indians coming from Deep Ravine, Calhoun Hill and Calhoun Coulee, and from the east ridge to their left. E company lost their mounts and that exposed F company's left flank, and they already had issues with their front and right flank. F had no choice but to retreat back toward LSH. The 7th had no command and control system to support such a series of moves . Moving while in contact with the enemy is lethal
This scenario also helps explain why LSH has men from C company and I company in the mix when their companies were much further away. These might not be men fleeing from Calhoun Hill and I company, but rather men lost during the retreat movements or separated from their companies during the confusion and the retreat. To me, this is a more logical sequence of events than the traditional notion of an attempt to cross at ford B, repulsion and retreat up to calhoun hill, followed by a further move north. It also gives a little more credit to the officers' decisions once past ford B as they responded to what they faced. Moving past MTCF left a door open behind him . Custer did not know there was a ford at D or what the local conditions were nor was he likely to ask advice of his scouts. The price of searching for another ford was such as to bankrupt the operation.At MTCF Custer still had suprise,possible local superiority and this was IT he had to attack.
This is just my opinion. It is no better or worse than any other theory. I just think it can explain what was found and how people were found better than the traditional theory. Gallantly put and a pleasure talking with you. Richard
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Post by wild on Aug 11, 2016 2:48:00 GMT -6
PS Just to emphasise this point again as I think it important for our discussion You cannot offer possible advantages at Ford D in support of Custer going there as these would have been unknown to Custer. The choice Custer had was MTCF or a possibility of something better at a price. cheers
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Post by shan on Aug 11, 2016 3:12:23 GMT -6
Good post Colt45,
Can't say I agree with all of it, but given that we have so little Indian testimony to be sure of who went where and when, the scenario you set out is as plausible as any other.
A few thoughts.
If the move down to ford B. was primarily to figure out if it made any sense to use it, either directly, or, if the opportunity arose, at some point in the future, and if, as a result of the reconnaissance they found that the other side of the ford was already occupied by Indians who were giving every indication that they were prepared to stand and fight, Indians who were about to be reinforced by even more, mounted Indians making their way towards it, wouldn't this have provide a good opportunity to inflict some serious casualties on them should they attempt to cross?
Now this might serve two ends. Firstly, this would allow the other three companies back on Luce ridge to move rapidly North and look for a further crossing: yes I know they were probably being bothered by Wolf Tooth and Big Foot around this time, but one suspects that this wasn't much more than a flea bite if that. And secondly, it would tie up a large number of Indians who would have previously moved on to engage Reno. As far as we're aware, Custer himself wasn't aware at this point that Reno was about to be driven from the field, so, by tying up a large number of warriors at the ford, he would be giving space and time for Reno to push on.
That this never happened, indicates two things to me. A. he never intended to cross in the first place, and B. the opposition down there was so low key, and, as of the moment; there appeared to be no sign of large numbers of mounted warriors about to threaten his rear.
Shan
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