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Post by crzhrs on May 10, 2016 13:35:15 GMT -6
I believe Crow Warriors may have had it with the military after the Rosebud Fight when they had to confront the Sioux while the military was having coffee. That's probably why so few went with Custer while a good number of Arikara went. From accounts Crow leaders said it was up to each individual warrior if they wanted to fight for the Army. Some leaders said no, others said yes. Apparently the Crow were right about the military's ability to fight . . . thus the Custer Debacle. crzhs,
The Crow with Custer were already with Gibbon, when Crook got it handed to him. They probably/doubtfully knew nothing about the Rosebud. You are better than that.
Regards, Tom
Maybe not as better than you think. NAs were far more quicker to report events than the military. The "moccasin telegraph" was able to relay info on Custer's demise far quicker than military intel or at least knew something occurred that was not going to be good news to Libbie and the rest of the wives, not to mention the military. I hate to use such an uncredible (incredible and crazy?) source as "Where Was Custer" by Harry Combs but Combs stated that Bouyer went to the Crows and wanted to plot out a assassination of Custer. Bouyer would let the Sioux knew where Custer was attacking and he would then kill Custer. While that seems as far fetched as Trump winning the Presidency (I know . . . but anything is possible today) conspiracy theories abound with Custer, one would have to think most Crow warriors would hesitate joining Custer. As it was . . . once the Crow Scouts realized nothing good was going to happen with Custer's plans they left leaving Custer out to dry.
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Post by dave on May 10, 2016 14:58:01 GMT -6
As posted by an esteemed member:
"We're veering into dangerous waters with politics regardless of what side of the political spectrum you are on. This forum is about the LBH so keep current politics where they belong . . . in the toilet!"
Regards Dave
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Post by crzhrs on May 11, 2016 10:19:02 GMT -6
I thought I could slip that in . . . apparently not.
Touche!
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Post by dan25 on May 13, 2016 12:19:21 GMT -6
Montrose Since your thread appears to be quite, I would ask a favor regarding logistics. I am not very knowledgeable about military logistics. When you have the time would you please explain what Custer and/or Terry did wrong, and what they should have done right in planning the logistics for the LBH campaign. This would be extremely helpful for me to better understand, also for the 100's of guests that read these boards each day I believe it would be helpful for many of them to better understand logistics.
regards dan25
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Post by montrose on May 13, 2016 15:50:03 GMT -6
Dan 2.5;
Okay, I am thinking about the TTP to address the logistics issue. There are terms and concepts that need to be explained. Steve and Fred, I would appreciate your help here. Concepts I think are obvious, are not so obvious to others.
Here are some initial concepts, around which I hope to build a discussion.
1. Lines of communication (LOC). When you deploy an element, how do you sustain it in the field?
a. On Hand resupply. This means the resupply assets you send with the element. The 1876 issue here is using wagon trains, mule trains, or just what units can carry on their person.
b. Sustainment. This is the process where you sustain a unit after initial deployment. Resupply of bullets and food, but also casualty replacements and all the other classes of supply for sustained combat operations.
2. Impact of LOC. The most efficient and effective means of USA LOCs was by railroad. The secondary method was river transport, when and where it could be used. The third was using existing road networks. The fourth, and least effective and efficient, was cross country movement.
3. Levels of war.
a. Strategy means national/tribal big picture long term goals. With respect to (WRT) your topic, the US strategy was to extend railroads into Indian territory, to allow operational and tactical actions. It also included the mainly civilian destruction of the buffalo herds, to destroy their ability of Indians to survive on the Great Plains. In discussions on logistics, I see that most posters do not see the brilliance of the US strategy, and its implementation.
b. Operations. This is campaign planning. For this era, this means yearly plans and the execution thereof. Just a reminder, there were campaign plans in the 1865-1876 period that did not involve GAC, where an over focus on GAC and 7th Cav misses operational process.
c. Tactics. This is the nuts and bolts of executing orders. Focusing on 1876, this means the decisions to use wagon trains, mule trains, or just self carry, since existing railroads and river support are fixed. I think the fan boy community will be very unhappy on my analysis of this issue. Ummm, which I have posted years ago, just can't find the threads.
4. Summary. AM I in the ballpark of what you would like to discuss. Understanding the logistical planning of LBH proves that GAC lost this fight before leaving FAL.
Respectfully,
Will.I.Am
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Post by dan25 on May 13, 2016 16:52:41 GMT -6
Montrose Thank you for your response. I wish I could discuss logistics, however I have a lot to learn and understand before being able to voice an opinion. I never realized how much was involved in planning logistics for a military campaign. Your post is extremely helpful in getting me started. It would be equally helpful if you could explain what Custer or Terry did wrong in regards to their logistics. I know Gen. Terry had 1 or 2 supply depots on the yellowstone. I can only assume Terry intended to transport those supplies by pack mule rather than wagon's due to the rough terrain. Custer had a large pack train with him. Other than that I don't understand what they did wrong. regards dan25
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Post by AZ Ranger on May 14, 2016 6:39:28 GMT -6
Concepts I think are obvious, are not so obvious to others.
Hi Will
That statement is great. We sometimes view things through our own personal filters and either we don't understand things or assume that we all know what we are talking about.
I think sometimes we focus on the last hours and ignore how we got to that point and what we brought with us.
I have spent time during the last month working with our newest officers in watercraft school and other activities. This last week I had to go through defensive tactics mandatory training as an Arizona Post requirement. It was good to experience being the student rather than the instructor.
That being said I would like for Will and Fred to take us through the logistical planning that should have been done before leaving FAL.
Regards
Steve
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Post by dan25 on May 14, 2016 16:12:28 GMT -6
Montrose and Fred,
Would really appreciate your post's about what Custer and Terry did wrong with logistics for LBH.
regards dan25
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Post by AZ Ranger on May 15, 2016 5:45:41 GMT -6
I. Subsistence and gratuitous health and comfort items II. Clothing, individual equipment. Tents, organization tool sets and kits, hand tools, and administrative supplies and equipment III. Horse feed IV. Construction material V. Ammunition of all types VI. Personal demand items such as soap, toothpaste, and other nomilitary items VII. Major end items such as horses, mules, wagons, blacksmith equipment VIII. Medical material IX. Repair parts and components to include, tack repair, horse shoes, tent repair, etc. that are required for maintenance support of all equipment X. Material to support nonmilitary such as cattle MISC Water, maps, salvage, and captured material
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Post by montrose on May 15, 2016 10:10:41 GMT -6
I. Subsistence and gratuitous health and comfort items II. Clothing, individual equipment. Tents, organization tool sets and kits, hand tools, and administrative supplies and equipment III. Horse feed IV. Construction material V. Ammunition of all types VI. Personal demand items such as soap, toothpaste, and other nomilitary items VII. Major end items such as horses, mules, wagons, blacksmith equipment VIII. Medical material IX. Repair parts and components to include, tack repair, horse shoes, tent repair, etc. that are required for maintenance support of all equipment X. Material to support nonmilitary such as cattle MISC Water, maps, salvage, and captured material Steve is listing the ten classes of supply used by US military, as they apply to 1876 and the LBH campaign. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classes_of_supplyLink explains use of terms. 1. The primary purpose of logistic support in the 1876 campaign was to sustain forces in the field for as long as possible. The vast majority of any supply train consists of food for the men, and forage for the animals. In fact, forage as more important than food. Hungry soldiers suck it up and complain. Hungry animals just die. The US animals were not able to survive on prairie grass, they needed forage from the supply trains. 2. US logistic support creates a silver bullet for battle in any given campaign. Not sure what the term means to civilians. For the military it means you have one shot, so make it count. Once you use it, it is gone. A battle does two things, it burns up ammunition, and it produces casualties. Casualties forced units to fall back on their lines of communications, and cease offensive operations. I believe this fact is badly underestimated on these boards. I have dozens of posts on this issue, just don't recall where at the moment. 3. Planning problem. Millions of electrons have died on this board arguing what the role of the ammunition resupply in the mule train meant for LBH. The ammunition in the pack train was meant for resupply, and only resupply. This means if you have one engagement, you can redistribute ammo after the fight and stay in the field. There is no possible way that this class V was intended for in battle resupply. None, Zero, Nada. I have explained why many times before. Just use common sense, or find old posts, or wait til I feel like explaining this again. I do not want to sound like an arrogant ass, and I could be wrong. But I have dozens of posts explaining this issue on this board. 4. Radical hypothesis. I believe that the strike column should not have carried any ammunition in the supply train. Maybe one mule with two boxes. Maybe. The idea of carrying this ammo was to resupply the unit to stay in the field. But if the unit took a single serious wounded in action (WIA) they would fall back. SO bringing all this useless weight requires you to fight a battle with the largest Indian force in this area for decades and take no casevac WIAs. That would happen less than 1 of 100 engagements. The ammunition should have been left at the forward operating base. The entire idea of a strike column, is the word "Strike". 5. Basic load. I think it is critical to understand basic load. How many rounds does a soldier carry on his person, and how does he resupply this basic load in action? The cartridge box in this era held 20 rounds. So UBL is 20. The 7th Cav campaign plan had 20 rounds on the soldier, with 80 rounds in saddle bags. This means 5 UBL, as long as soldiers had access to their horses. Whatever was carried in the supply trains was for future engagements, not a given fight. UBL effects tactics. For most of my career, a given soldier carried 210 rounds, due to the design of load bearing equipment at the time. You could fit 2 ammo pouches around your waist with 3 mags each, and 30 in the weapon. In GWOT the belt idea goes away, and you keep ammo on upper body, I have a SEAL friend who claims he kept 12 mags on his load bearing equipment, but he also claims he had sex with a very prominent reality TV star. (Ummm, I have others who support him, but he is quite ugly, so who knows; FRO used to read this board, feel free to defend/embarrass yourself). But with 20 UBL< individual and collective training become mission critical. I have posts explaining this as well, over the years. 6. So I am in the zone of expanding on previous posts, or just saying again what I have said before. I am open to where we go next. I do ot mind repeating myself, I need a check on where posters are on the many discussions, so as to frame a reply.
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Post by montrose on May 15, 2016 10:18:18 GMT -6
I. Subsistence and gratuitous health and comfort items II. Clothing, individual equipment. Tents, organization tool sets and kits, hand tools, and administrative supplies and equipment III. Horse feed IV. Construction material V. Ammunition of all types VI. Personal demand items such as soap, toothpaste, and other nomilitary items VII. Major end items such as horses, mules, wagons, blacksmith equipment VIII. Medical material IX. Repair parts and components to include, tack repair, horse shoes, tent repair, etc. that are required for maintenance support of all equipment X. Material to support nonmilitary such as cattle MISC Water, maps, salvage, and captured material I can probably do a sidebar post on what they got right and wrong here on planning what they carried. It will come out to too much class 5, to the point where they crippled their mobility, and too few class 4. ( 2 shovels ring a bell? They needed more than that for field latrines).
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Post by dan25 on May 15, 2016 11:46:21 GMT -6
I. Subsistence and gratuitous health and comfort items II. Clothing, individual equipment. Tents, organization tool sets and kits, hand tools, and administrative supplies and equipment III. Horse feed IV. Construction material V. Ammunition of all types VI. Personal demand items such as soap, toothpaste, and other nomilitary items VII. Major end items such as horses, mules, wagons, blacksmith equipment VIII. Medical material IX. Repair parts and components to include, tack repair, horse shoes, tent repair, etc. that are required for maintenance support of all equipment X. Material to support nonmilitary such as cattle MISC Water, maps, salvage, and captured material AZ, I certainly appreciate your trying to help me understand logistics,. Your list is very helpful, but it did not explain what Custer or Terry actually did wrong in planning the logistics for LBH. regards dan25
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Post by dan25 on May 15, 2016 11:53:34 GMT -6
I. Subsistence and gratuitous health and comfort items II. Clothing, individual equipment. Tents, organization tool sets and kits, hand tools, and administrative supplies and equipment III. Horse feed IV. Construction material V. Ammunition of all types VI. Personal demand items such as soap, toothpaste, and other nomilitary items VII. Major end items such as horses, mules, wagons, blacksmith equipment VIII. Medical material IX. Repair parts and components to include, tack repair, horse shoes, tent repair, etc. that are required for maintenance support of all equipment X. Material to support nonmilitary such as cattle MISC Water, maps, salvage, and captured material Steve is listing the ten classes of supply used by US military, as they apply to 1876 and the LBH campaign. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classes_of_supplyLink explains use of terms. 1. The primary purpose of logistic support in the 1876 campaign was to sustain forces in the field for as long as possible. The vast majority of any supply train consists of food for the men, and forage for the animals. In fact, forage as more important than food. Hungry soldiers suck it up and complain. Hungry animals just die. The US animals were not able to survive on prairie grass, they needed forage from the supply trains. 2. US logistic support creates a silver bullet for battle in any given campaign. Not sure what the term means to civilians. For the military it means you have one shot, so make it count. Once you use it, it is gone. A battle does two things, it burns up ammunition, and it produces casualties. Casualties forced units to fall back on their lines of communications, and cease offensive operations. I believe this fact is badly underestimated on these boards. I have dozens of posts on this issue, just don't recall where at the moment. 3. Planning problem. Millions of electrons have died on this board arguing what the role of the ammunition resupply in the mule train meant for LBH. The ammunition in the pack train was meant for resupply, and only resupply. This means if you have one engagement, you can redistribute ammo after the fight and stay in the field. There is no possible way that this class V was intended for in battle resupply. None, Zero, Nada. I have explained why many times before. Just use common sense, or find old posts, or wait til I feel like explaining this again. I do not want to sound like an arrogant ass, and I could be wrong. But I have dozens of posts explaining this issue on this board. 4. Radical hypothesis. I believe that the strike column should not have carried any ammunition in the supply train. Maybe one mule with two boxes. Maybe. The idea of carrying this ammo was to resupply the unit to stay in the field. But if the unit took a single serious wounded in action (WIA) they would fall back. SO bringing all this useless weight requires you to fight a battle with the largest Indian force in this area for decades and take no casevac WIAs. That would happen less than 1 of 100 engagements. The ammunition should have been left at the forward operating base. The entire idea of a strike column, is the word "Strike". 5. Basic load. I think it is critical to understand basic load. How many rounds does a soldier carry on his person, and how does he resupply this basic load in action? The cartridge box in this era held 20 rounds. So UBL is 20. The 7th Cav campaign plan had 20 rounds on the soldier, with 80 rounds in saddle bags. This means 5 UBL, as long as soldiers had access to their horses. Whatever was carried in the supply trains was for future engagements, not a given fight. UBL effects tactics. For most of my career, a given soldier carried 210 rounds, due to the design of load bearing equipment at the time. You could fit 2 ammo pouches around your waist with 3 mags each, and 30 in the weapon. In GWOT the belt idea goes away, and you keep ammo on upper body, I have a SEAL friend who claims he kept 12 mags on his load bearing equipment, but he also claims he had sex with a very prominent reality TV star. (Ummm, I have others who support him, but he is quite ugly, so who knows; FRO used to read this board, feel free to defend/embarrass yourself). But with 20 UBL< individual and collective training become mission critical. I have posts explaining this as well, over the years. 6. So I am in the zone of expanding on previous posts, or just saying again what I have said before. I am open to where we go next. I do ot mind repeating myself, I need a check on where posters are on the many discussions, so as to frame a reply. Montrose, I appreciate your response. Every thing you and AZ has posted is extremely helpful. I apologize for asking you to repeat what you have already posted, I did'nt know. I should have searched the old posts more thoroughly. I look forward to any future posts regarding military logistics, especially what you think Custer did wrong for the LBH. regards dan25
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Post by tubman13 on May 15, 2016 15:36:55 GMT -6
dan25,
I will hope that Will and Steve will kick my butt for this post and that you will find it harsh. Fred, you are welcome to jump in as well
Terry was an extremely bright guy, not an Indian fighter. He was an attorney and an administrator. He had very little knowledge as to what was needed for a campaign of this magnitude. he was planning on delegating this duty.
Custer was playing around in the east until called to Washington for hearings and had no time to set up this expedition/campaign. Grant pulled the Custer plug, and it was a cluster puck(to use a hockey phrase).
The OIC of the 7th Cavalry was checking out horse flesh in St. Louis and not paying much attention to his regiment. Not only that he never made sure his regiment was properly mounted, knowing they were going to be in the field.
GAC was all involved I his own personal agenda until Grant pulled out the rug. By the time he begged Terry et. el. for reinstatement little time was left for planning.
Custer had never used Pack Mules previously, prior to 6/22 Custer flew by the seat of his pants from that day on. Custer skirted the spirit of his orders, he paid the price. Those who fail to plan, plan to fail. He did not even use the resources he had properly, ie. scouts.
Regards, Tom
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Post by dan25 on May 15, 2016 18:01:31 GMT -6
dan25, I will hope that Will and Steve will kick my butt for this post and that you will find it harsh. Fred, you are welcome to jump in as well Terry was an extremely bright guy, not an Indian fighter. He was an attorney and an administrator. He had very little knowledge as to what was needed for a campaign of this magnitude. he was planning on delegating this duty. Custer was playing around in the east until called to Washington for hearings and had no time to set up this expedition/campaign. Grant pulled the Custer plug, and it was a cluster puck(to use a hockey phrase). The OIC of the 7th Cavalry was checking out horse flesh in St. Louis and not paying much attention to his regiment. Not only that he never made sure his regiment was properly mounted, knowing they were going to be in the field. GAC was all involved I his own personal agenda until Grant pulled out the rug. By the time he begged Terry et. el. for reinstatement little time was left for planning. Custer had never used Pack Mules previously, prior to 6/22 Custer flew by the seat of his pants from that day on. Custer skirted the spirit of his orders, he paid the price. Those who fail to plan, plan to fail. He did not even use the resources he had properly, ie. scouts. Regards, Tom Tom, That's really great information, thank you. I now understand why this was a complete mess even before they left FAL. I know very little about military policies, tactics and strategy, but even as a novice I realized quite a while ago that Custer did not use his scouts properly. He should have had better information on many things, especially the terrain. Is it safe to assume that GAC planned the supply depots on the yellowstone not Gen. Terry? regards dan25
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