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Post by fred on Mar 16, 2016 13:00:26 GMT -6
The reason why I assumed you were hard on Kanipe is because in your book you raise the possibility of him being a "malingerer" (page 107). Michael, Please... please!! Pay very close attention to my language and the way I have written that book. I am a very "aggressive" writer. When I want to make a point, I make it in no uncertain terms. That upsets a lot of people, because my aggressiveness undermines their beliefs in the strongest terms. Generally, however, I want the reader to make up his own mind, to think for himself, to arrive at his own conclusions based on the evidence I present and based on my reasoning. I have said this before: Strategy is a thinking man's book, not for everyone. Go back to page 5 and read the paragraph starting with, "One final thing..." in the right-hand column. Now go back to page 107 and find the word, "malingerer." You won't. And you won't because it is not there. So I have not called Kanipe a malingerer, have I? What I have written was my case for what I believe to be Kanipe's actions. I presented what we know and how I interpreted it, then ended it with, "Unless, of course, our good sergeant somehow… malingered…?" Read that in context with what I wrote on page 5. I wrote that book with as much evidence as I could find and present, so intelligent people like you could make up your own mind based on all the evidence extant, as well as my own presentation of logic. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Mar 17, 2016 9:51:56 GMT -6
I believe Kanipe's horse was failing. Since he was dropping out anyway, may as well have him send information to trailing elements, both to synchronize actions and to form a common operational picture (COP).
The problem is that Kanipe specifically denied this theory. He claims it was Finkle falling out, who desperately tried to keep up, and died doing his duty on the ridge named after him.
Miltary culture matters. Tom Custer served as an assistant/orderly to LTC Custer on this campaign. (Not an ADC, that is brigade and above position, this was a regiment). For any officer to go and give an order to a member of a company, is an enormous breach of military custom, and law.
If the regimental commander, or one of his flunkies, wants to task a company to send a runner, they task the company commander and first sergeant. The company command team selects the individual.
The Kanipe story does not reflect military culture, and the way this Army operated. It is extremely suspicious.
If this had happened, 2LT Harrington would have kicked CPT Custer's ass, and been supported by every company and regimental commander in the Army. I think the discussion on these boards do not understand the difference between an officer in command, and one not.
Respectfully,
WJB
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Post by mchlwilson on Mar 17, 2016 18:31:54 GMT -6
I believe Kanipe's horse was failing. Since he was dropping out anyway, may as well have him send information to trailing elements, both to synchronize actions and to form a common operational picture (COP). The problem is that Kanipe specifically denied this theory. He claims it was Finkle falling out, who desperately tried to keep up, and died doing his duty on the ridge named after him. Miltary culture matters. Tom Custer served as an assistant/orderly to LTC Custer on this campaign. (Not an ADC, that is brigade and above position, this was a regiment). For any officer to go and give an order to a member of a company, is an enormous breach of military custom, and law. If the regimental commander, or one of his flunkies, wants to task a company to send a runner, they task the company commander and first sergeant. The company command team selects the individual. The Kanipe story does not reflect military culture, and the way this Army operated. It is extremely suspicious. If this had happened, 2LT Harrington would have kicked CPT Custer's ass, and been supported by every company and regimental commander in the Army. I think the discussion on these boards do not understand the difference between an officer in command, and one not. Respectfully, WJB Montrose, It seems to me that the command climate of the 7th was one enormous breach of military custom. Custer had with him a brother and a brother-in-law as subordinate commanders, another brother working as a civilian contractor, and a nephew on summer vacation. The whole arrangement was highly unorthodox and poor for morale. Given that command climate I wouldn't be surprised if Tom Custer told Kanipe to go get the pack train, and I wouldn't be surprised if Harrington did not object. All the best, Michael
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Post by mchlwilson on Mar 18, 2016 11:11:08 GMT -6
The reason why I assumed you were hard on Kanipe is because in your book you raise the possibility of him being a "malingerer" (page 107). Fred,
"Malingered", "malingerer".....OK. But why introduce to the reader a devastating pejorative term if it is neither what you believe nor what someone you are citing believes? It's a pretty tough word! It undermines your goal of having the reader make up his own mind.
I do believe you make a good case against Kanipe, however. I stand ready to be convinced, but for the moment I am giving ol' Dan the benefit of the doubt because of the unorthodox command climate in the 7th. In fact, I MAY later find it convenient to change my mind for a (ahem, cough, cough) little article I am working on...more on that later.
I will most likely be back at the battlefield in the fall. I am hoping we will cross paths there some day!
All the best,
Michael
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Gerry
Junior Member
Peter
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Post by Gerry on Mar 18, 2016 12:33:10 GMT -6
Hi Montrose, It has been awhile since we have had a conversation. It has been quite on the other boards, so I have ventured over here. I would like to put some thoughts about your post. You understand where I come from and the perspective in way I look at this battle. With that said, I do believe Knipe was a messenger and the series of events that took place fall within my understanding of what transpired. I believe Kanipe's horse was failing. Since he was dropping out anyway, may as well have him send information to trailing elements, both to synchronize actions and to form a common operational picture (COP). The problem is that Kanipe specifically denied this theory. He claims it was Finkle falling out, who desperately tried to keep up, and died doing his duty on the ridge named after him. In the Peter Thompson narrative, I have the four members of Company C falling out as the five companies with Custer first catch a view of the village and break into a gallop. This occurs south of Reno Hill as the troops reach to top of the bluffs coming out of Reno/Ash Creek. The five troops maintain their gallop up to SSR where the troops are reassembled, Custer is at 3411, and Capt. Custer dispatches Sgt Knipe. Meanwhile back behind Reno hill to the south is Thompson and Watson with horses blown and the other two, Brennan and Fitzgerald cut and ran to the rear. Here also is Sgt Finkle, who had fallen behind as described by Sgt Kanipe. Thompson wrote, "I looked back and saw my comrade Watson trying to get his horse on its feet. The poor brute had fallen and was struggling to gain an upright position. Beside him I saw Sergeant Finkle of our company sitting calmly on his horse looking on and making no effort to help Watson in his difficulty. But finally the poor animal gained his feet with a groan, and Finkle passed on with a rush to overtake our company. By this time the last of the companies had disappeared over the crest of the hill." This crest of the hill is close to the park boundary fence south of Benteen/Reno Hill. As the companies approached SSR, Sgt Knipe would be sent back across country as Finkle had fallen back as described by Knipe. Sgt Knipe would not follow the trail of the five companies but cut across country toward the pack train and would not see the soldiers who had fallen out. Thompson would write, "Custer had sent two messengers back, the first one Sergeant Knipe of Company C, the second one bugler Martin from Company H to Captain Benteen". Thompson wrote, "The captain of our company, Tom Custer, was on his brother's staff. ... and this left Lieutenant Harrington in command of our company." This was noted early after the expedition left FAL. In the months previous to the expedition Company C was under the command of Capt. Tom Custer, 1st Lieutenant Calhoun, and 2nd Lieutenant Harrington. So when Calhoun was assigned to Co L and Capt Tom to staff, it left junior 2nd LT Harrington in command. To me that does not seem to be the case during the campaign trail. Let me give an example. Thompson wrote, "As we approached the Powder River the country began to be very rough and broken. When about fifteen miles from the river General Custer took half of our company and dashed off towards it. His object was to find as easy and direct a route as possible. We rode in this mad way for nearly an hour when we came to a halt. Riding up to one of our corporals named French, Custer told him to take a man and ride in a certain direction where he would find a spring of water and ascertain what condition it was in. Custer then wheeled his horse around and dashed away in a westerly direction, leaving us standing at our horse's heads until his return. Custer's brother, Tom, was the only one who went with him. This action would have seemed strange to us had it not been of almost daily occurrence."Now this would have occurred the afternoon/evening of June 6th, arriving at the Power River the following day on June 7th. I do not know if Harrington or what Sargents were present but there was "half of Company C" and Capt Tom Custer. General Custer had no problem giving orders to a Corporal and not to an Officer or Sargent but direct to the Corporal. Thompson then wrote, "Corporal French soon returned looking very foolish. General Custer rode up to and said, “Did you find the spring?” “No, sir,” said French, “there is no spring there.” “You are a liar,” said Custer. “If you had gone to where I told you, you would have found it.” He spoke in such a positive manner that we felt sorry for poor Corporal French"In this instance General Custer ordered a trooper and followed up with a chastise when the trooper failed in his mission, without using proper channels. I think Custer would use these troops as he well fit. Thompson wrote "The third day after leaving Powder River we came to Rosebud Creek. The first night here our company was fortunate enough to secure a good camping place. But our good fortune was of short duration for Major Reno sent orders for us to exchange places with Company F. We knew this was an outrage upon us, but as Company F outranked us, their captain being with them, we had to comply. If Captain Custer had been with us it might have been different, but Lieutenant Harrington had more sense than grit."Here is one more short example of LT Harrington's demeanor. Thompson wrote, "There were places where we had to build bridges and grade approaches before we could cross, a work which ought to have been done by each company in turn. But this was not the case. The captain of our company, Tom Custer, was on his brother's staff. Lieutenant Calhoun was in command of Company L and this left Lieutenant Harrington in command of our company. He had us at nearly every bridge building or road grading until we began to grumble and in no undertone either. Our dissatisfaction became so pronounced that one day Major Reno overheard us. The next time our company was brought up by Harrington, Major Reno ordered us to the rear. Were we sorry? Not much."Once again Thompson showed how LT Harrington held the position but was not in command. This junior officer took orders from everyone and volunteered Company C whenever. Thompson demonstrated that General Custer could and would give orders directly to an enlisted man. LT Harrington would not object even if, as Thompson wrote, "it is a recognized rule that when the regiment goes into camp, the company takes whatever position falls to them whether it be good or bad. When we exchanged places with Company F we got a poor camping place and a miserable sage brush to graze our horses on. You can imagine the feelings of our company when this exchange took place." Now I know that senior officers can change the position of the companies on their discretion but it shows the grumbling and discontent in the troops of Company C under LT Harrington. So when it came to June 25 as the troops were galloping up the east banks and the General wished to send a messenger back to bring up the packs, it does not surprise me that Capt Tom Custer rode to Company C and dispatched Sgt Knipe. Would junior 2nd LT Harrington like it, no, but he would accept it. Gerry
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 19, 2016 7:14:48 GMT -6
Gerry
I think the difference is whether Tom Custer acted on his own sending Kanipe or that General Custer sent Tom. We can only go by what Kanipe claims. I would think if Tom was delivering an order from the General he would have told Kanipe that it was from the General.
Regards
Steve
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Gerry
Junior Member
Peter
Posts: 63
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Post by Gerry on Mar 19, 2016 10:58:35 GMT -6
Gerry I think the difference is whether Tom Custer acted on his own sending Kanipe or that General Custer sent Tom. We can only go by what Kanipe claims. I would think if Tom was delivering an order from the General he would have told Kanipe that it was from the General. Regards Steve As you stated, we only have what Kanipe said. In one of his accounts (1924) he wrote, "Just then the captain told me to go back and find McDougall and the pack train and deliver to them orders that had just been issued by General Custer." Kanipe always said he received the message from Captain Thomas Custer and never said he heard the General issue the order. Gerry
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Post by Colt45 on Mar 19, 2016 18:20:50 GMT -6
It would not be unusual for an officer delivering a message to an enlisted to not mention that the order comes from a superior officer. For the enlisted to know that the officer giving him the order is just relaying the message is irrelevant. There were plenty of times where I was given orders to accomplish some task, and the subordinates I assigned believed I was the one who originated the order. To them the origin of the order was irrelevant. In most cases, they know anyway that the order probably originated from much higher up.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 20, 2016 13:13:26 GMT -6
It would not be unusual for an officer delivering a message to an enlisted to not mention that the order comes from a superior officer. For the enlisted to know that the officer giving him the order is just relaying the message is irrelevant. There were plenty of times where I was given orders to accomplish some task, and the subordinates I assigned believed I was the one who originated the order. To them the origin of the order was irrelevant. In most cases, they know anyway that the order probably originated from much higher up. I agree Colt45. Custer would have knowledge if he had sent Kanipe through Tom and would be sending Martin with a different order within a few minutes. The route the pack train was to take would not be the same as Custer took since Kanipe stated Tom wanted the pack train to move cross country or something like that. The pack train did not deviate from its route because of Kanipe delivering a message. Kanipe gave no message to Benteen in real time but later claimed he had a message for Benteen if he ran into him. I don't think I ever knew much past my Sgt in my chain of command of what I was to do. Only when I heard it on the radio did I have any clue beyond an NCO. Regards Steve
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 20, 2016 14:11:23 GMT -6
Colt, Steve,
I received orders from Sr. NCO's, Lt.'s, Captains, even a Major on occasion. Generally I could tell from their demeanor if the order came from on high. Genesis, did not matter, I either performed the task or passed it on to whoever would. I have also passed an order from one officer to another. The difference between Kanipe's deliverance of an order and orders I passed on, other than the fact that MacDougall and Mathey said at the RCOI, that they did not receive it, was that I informed the receiving officer who it came from at the time I delivered it.
Regards, Tom
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 22, 2016 6:33:40 GMT -6
I was sent to China Beach one time when they were expecting an attack. I was assigned a bunker outside of a General's quarters and placed behind the sand bags around a window. Several other Marine's were at other locations. I realize now we were the early warning alarms but at the time we were proud to be selected to do the job.
I was also selected to be security at a meeting of Generals in Da Nang. I have no clue in either case how I got selected but am sure now that these were not random events and there was officers involved in the selection. I got a great picture of the Commandant of the Marine Corps getting into his personal jet. I still have the pictures and some of the taped on names of some of the Generals present. What seems odd to me is that these security details were made up of Marines from different units. I was the only one from my company.
Maybe some officer can fill in the blanks on how such selection would have been made.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by fred on Mar 22, 2016 8:47:53 GMT -6
Other than my driver-- who reported directly and strictly to me-- I operated through my officers and first sergeant, solely. No man heard from me unless it was an on-the-spot correction or direction. If a soldier needed to be spoken to-- "Put your helmet on, soldier!!"-- I told him directly, with one helluva glare at his platoon leader.
All orders went through my lieutenants and if it was something pertaining directly to the men in general, it went to the first sergeant with the officers being informed. My officers ran their platoons... not me. All responsibility rested with me; authority-- not responsibility-- was delegated to "Top" and the officers. And the officers knew what fell in their realm of responsibility.
You were told once; the second infraction, you were relieved... unless the first infraction was egregious, then you got your ass relieved immediately. I had one case of each with an officer: one warning, the second time, out; and the second officer, immediate dismissal.
When you worked for me, you either left as one damn fine soldier/officer/NCO, or you got busted.
And as far as I am concerned, that is the only way to run a combat unit. And believe me, I learned from the very best.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Gerry
Junior Member
Peter
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Post by Gerry on Mar 22, 2016 16:44:01 GMT -6
Other than my driver-- who reported directly and strictly to me-- I operated through my officers and first sergeant, solely. No man heard from me unless it was an on-the-spot correction or direction. If a soldier needed to be spoken to-- "Put your helmet on, soldier!!"-- I told him directly, with one helluva glare at his platoon leader. Best wishes, Fred. Fred, I just watched a documentary on the Huey helicopter in Vietnam and was surprised on the number of soldiers with-out their helmets on. For some reason that struck me as sort of strange especially in the scenes of medavacs during combat. Maybe due to the wind more than anything. As we know there was a separation between the officers and enlisted, two different class of soldiers. Back in 1876 there were a lot of different uniforms and accouterments that were issued or personally purchased. One of my favorite quotes from "The Conquest of the Missouri"--- "There's just one kind of officer enlisted men like; The kind that knows his business when the shots begin to strike."Gerry
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 22, 2016 16:48:16 GMT -6
Gerry
We took our flak jackets off and sat on them until close to departure.
Steve
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Post by fred on Mar 22, 2016 17:54:13 GMT -6
We took our flak jackets off and sat on them until close to departure. That would have been fairly close to the "vest" with me. I had no requirement for either helmets or flak jackets when we were at base camp or if we were at a brigade camp overnight. Forward camps, my men wore them all the time... flak jackets buttoned (snapped). They came with zippers and snaps for a reason. The only exception I would make was if a truck broke down and the driver needed to change a tire or some other thing. Then the guards came out to make sure he would be OK. No one rode in my convoys without a helmet and flak jacket... and fatigue blouse. This was the army, not some Lower East Side flop house. When I went to Vietnam, I had three goals: (1) accomplish my mission, whatever it may have been; (2) do my job as a combat officer; and (3) get my men home safely. I fell two fatalities short of a perfect record. This was serious stuff, not something to be taken lightly. Because of poor vision and having to wear glasses, I was sort of a displaced infantryman, but luckily because of where I had served before-- and with whom-- I got a plum assignment with the 1st Infantry Division. I always knew we had a fairly dangerous job, but until recently I had no idea just how bad some viewed it. I was discussing some of these missions and what we did, where we went, with some ex-infantryman, and to a man they agreed they wouldn't have anything to do with running convoys. One guy told me he was riding shotgun on one convoy and said he would take 30 days in the jungle before he did that again. I guess when you run them every single day, it becomes a mundane chore... and that's what we did... every day of the week, including Sundays, I had trucks on the road. I have to tell you: I am rather proud of that service: moreso because of my men; but we always accomplished our mission... like real pros. Best wishes, Fred.
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