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Post by jodak on Feb 4, 2016 13:47:32 GMT -6
A little behind on the timeline, but I just caught this that may have had a bearing on Pearl Harbor. Richardson's chief subordinate was Admiral Charles Snyder, Commander of the Battle Force. Although his tour was not schedule to end until that summer, Snyder did not desire to serve under Kimmel and requested his immediate relief. This was granted, and he was replaced by Vice Admiral William Pye on January 31, 1941. Within the new Pacific Fleet structure there were three vice-admirals, or principal subordinates to Kimmel (Pye, Halsey, and Wilson Brown). Of the three, Pye was senior, making him Kimmel's second in command. He was also one of the navy's acknowledged deep thinkers and had never been bested in maneuvers, and Kimmel came to rely heavily on him for advice. It is not known what sort of counsel that he may have given Kimmel throughout the year in regard to the potential for attack, base defensive measures, etc., but after being briefed on the Japanese move south on December 6, the day before the attack, he made the following pronouncement - "The Japanese will not go to war with the United States. We are too big, too powerful, and too strong." Whether this statement or earlier interactions had a bearing on Kimmel's apparent complacency, it is impossible to know.
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Post by jodak on Feb 5, 2016 7:32:36 GMT -6
February 5, 1941 General George Grunert, MacArthur's predecessor as commander of U.S. forces in the Philippines, since the following message to the War Department -
FEBRUARY 5, 1941. 7:04 AM
From Manila To: MILID Number 41, February 5th. British consular source reports Governor East Java intercepted telephone conversation between two important Japanese at Sourabaya and Lawang discussing news that Japanese attack is scheduled for February, tenth repeat tenth. Both Japanese arrested and both denied conversation. This message for G dash two signed Orear. Governor comments very few Japanese believed to be armed and no difficulty is anticipated in taking all Japanese into custody when desired. Evaluation of data low.
GRUNERT
This was obviously a false alarm, but it is indicative of many such that transpired during the months leading up to the actual beginning of hostilities and probably contributed to a tendency to discount them all by those in command.
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Post by jodak on Feb 5, 2016 7:34:58 GMT -6
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Post by dave on Feb 5, 2016 11:58:52 GMT -6
jodak What an incredible find. Thank you for sharing it with me and the others. Regards Dave PS I am listing a web site that compares battleships. I am sure you are familiar with it but thought others might find it interesting. www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm
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Post by jodak on Feb 5, 2016 13:48:13 GMT -6
Yes I have that website. It is a great site, but I wish it had also included the North Carolina class, the first "modern" U.S. battleships. Those may have been omitted because they were identical to the South Dakotas in armament, although not quite as well protected, particularly below the waterline where "shorts" could follow an underwater trajectory before impacting the ship. Even so, I believe the North Carolinas were nearly the South Dakotas' equals, and superior in some respects, and it would have been interesting to see how they fell out in comparison to the others.
This is another website that deals specifically with the older battleships that the pre-war doctrine referenced in my previous post was based upon (www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-071.htm ).
As an aside, in a post several days ago I indicated that I do not believe that either the Japanese or the U.S. initially viewed carriers with the importance that they would later achieve. That was somewhat borne out in the article on pre-war doctrine, when it indicated that the U.S. visualized the role of carriers as being to reach out and initiate contact at long range and inflict sufficient damage to the opposing fleet to cause it to slow down enough to be caught by the U.S. battleships, which would deal the decisive blow, so battleships were still considered the decisive element of the fleet.
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Post by dave on Feb 5, 2016 15:39:14 GMT -6
jodak Once again thank you for the post and web site. I also agree that there should have been coverage of the North Carolina class as well especially as the USS Washington out preformed the USS South Dakota against the IJN Kirishima off Guadalcanal. Regards Dave
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Post by dave on Feb 5, 2016 19:10:33 GMT -6
jodak In my readings of the material you have provided I find a few gems. I found a training film for sailors assigned to the 16" guns of the Iowa Class BBs. Very interesting and informative. Regards Dave www.youtube.com/watch?v=0OmOQs0ziSU
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Post by jodak on Feb 6, 2016 17:28:37 GMT -6
Dave, you are correct that Washington deported herself far better than did South Dakota in the engagement in question. However, in fairness to South Dakota, she was a brand new ship that was still working out the bugs, although Washington was not much older. The big difference was in personnel/leadership. Washington had the reputation in the fleet of being an efficient, tightly run ship, while South Dakota's reputation was just the opposite, and, in her short life, had already been involved in a grounding and a collision, both of which caused extensive damage. She was also at a slight disadvantage in fighting ability due to he fact that she had been fitted out as a fleet flagship and lost two 5 inch turrets in the process. However, that is a 20% reduction, and when it is considered that all but one of the hits that she took were from cruiser and destroyer fire from relatively close range, the reduced secondary armament may have been a factor in her relative inability to defend herself. On the plus side, although she suffered extensive superficial damage, her armor performed fine, and none of her vitals were compromised. As previously indicated, all but one of the hits that she took were estimated to have been 8" or smaller caliber, so a battleship's armor should have been able to withstand that with little problem. However, she shrugged off the one battleship 14" hit that she received as well. Although it dished in the main deck, it did not penetrate or cause serious damage.
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Post by jodak on Feb 7, 2016 12:37:14 GMT -6
February 7, 1941 General Walter Short appointed to command of the U.S. Army's Hawaiian Department, with the following admonition from General Marshal -
"My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation…Please keep clearly in mind in all your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration…"
He also receives the following instructions from Secretary of War Henry Stimson -
War Department Washington, February 7, 1941. SECRET
Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.
2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.
3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.
4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.
5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured-forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.
6. With reference to you other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective. /s/ HENRY L. STIMSON Secretary of War.
However, it appears that Short never adequately understood his mission, which is both amazing and an indictment of Marshall for not recognizing and correcting the problem. A good biography of Short is here - pwencycl.kgbudge.com/S/h/Short_Walter_C.htm
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Post by dave on Feb 7, 2016 17:49:51 GMT -6
jodak Once again thank you for the info. General Short was more concerned about sabotage than air raids and set the table for the Japaneses on December 7, 1941. Marshall gave him sage advice and counsel which Short did not accept. Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Feb 9, 2016 7:32:56 GMT -6
February 9,1941 The U.S. House of Representatives passes the Lend-Lease bill to provide material assistance to the United Kingdom, China, and Free France, which was to limit the U.S.'s ability to bolster its own capabilities. In addition to the foreign demands made by Lend-Lease, the U.S. was faced with the problem of enhancing its defenses on the west coast and throughout the Pacific, as well as equipping the rapidly expanding army at home, and there were simply not enough resources to satisfy all demands. General Marshall was particularly concerned about this, and a good amount of his energies over the coming months were spent wrestling with it.
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Post by jodak on Feb 12, 2016 9:30:27 GMT -6
jodak In my readings of the material you have provided I find a few gems. I found a training film for sailors assigned to the 16" guns of the Iowa Class BBs. Very interesting and informative. Regards Dave www.youtube.com/watch?v=0OmOQs0ziSUThere are two important things that I think should be noted from the film. The first is that in this film and similar ones of U.S. gun crews in action, they are never wearing personal protective gear such as flash hoods and gloves, whereas their British counterparts invariably are. I've wondered if that is an indication that the British had less confidence in the built in safety aspects of their turrets that possibly led to the loss of some of their ships at Jutland and the Hood. The second thing to note is that only the powder propellant charges were stored in the magazines in the bowels of the ship, while the projectiles were stored vertically on projectile rings on lower levels of the turret, making it possible to winch them into the loading chutes fairly rapidly. On the other hand, British shells were stored horizontally in the magazines and had to be picked up and conveyed to the loading chutes via overhead rails. It seems to me that would have been significantly slower and the rate of fire slowed accordingly, but I may be wrong. I'm assuming that other nations had procedures similar to the British, and that would have been particularly true of the Japanese, who emulated British designs in many respects, with some of their ships even having been designed and built in British yards.
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Post by dave on Feb 12, 2016 18:03:59 GMT -6
jodak I have had the opportunity to be around 16" shells exhibited on the USS Alabama and it is difficult to express just how big they are. Weighing over 2,000 lbs the shells are just huge and it is hard to imagine the force needed to fire each round. Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Feb 13, 2016 7:52:00 GMT -6
jodak I have had the opportunity to be around 16" shells exhibited on the USS Alabama and it is difficult to express just how big they are. Weighing over 2,000 lbs the shells are just huge and it is hard to imagine the force needed to fire each round. Regards Dave The thing that brought that home to me more than anything was watching a news cast of the New Jersey firing her guns at targets inland during our intervention in Lebanon. The cameraman was standing on shore shooting video of the New Jersey well out at sea. When she fired her guns the camera would jump around almost uncontrollably and make it difficult for the cameraman to keep her in frame. Keep in mind, this was not due to the concussion of the shells landing and exploding on land behind the cameraman, but of the guns themselves firing, with the concussion traveling through the water to shore and then through the land to the cameraman, probably a mile or two from the ship.
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Post by dave on Feb 13, 2016 11:53:02 GMT -6
The broadsides by capital ships had to be an awesome sight unless you were on the receiving end. Regards Dave
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