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Post by herosrest on Sept 13, 2017 17:51:14 GMT -6
Now, joy of joys, is 7th Cavalry returning to Battle Ridge, over Cemetery Ridge from the western fords which they crossed. In 1926! link to Source.
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Post by herosrest on Sept 14, 2017 18:03:03 GMT -6
On another board, we have had a lively discussion about JSIT's story of the battle, and how that story, if taken as true, changes much of what has been considered "facts" about the movements of Custer. Here is a link to his story: digital.libraries.ou.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/CampbellWS/id/307/rec/41The map on page 3 shows the Custer battalion moving from LNC directly across Deep Coulee to Calhoun Hill, never approaching Ford B. We have always assumed as fact that accounts like White Bull Cow's referred to the river skirmish as occurring at Ford B. This was always a problem because if Lt Smith was the officer wounded there, why was he found at LSH? It made no sense to haul a wounded officer all the way to LSH, when he could have been left with L company while Custer went north. Now if we assume that the river skirmish occurred at Ford D instead of Ford B, it now makes more sense that Smith was found on LSH. This also helps explain Kellogg being found initially around the Ford D area and the retreat to Cemetery Ridge, with the subsequent delay there. JSIT also states that the soldiers at Calhoun Hill were the last to die. That scenario would support the north to south battle flow that some have stated occurred. C and L company men found between Calhoun Hill and LSH would also support the south to north battle flow. If we take the JSIT account as accurate, we have no action at Ford B, but initial action at Ford D. Custer is repulsed at the river, but moves to Cemetery Hill to supposedly await the arrival of Benteen and Keogh, who was presumably waiting in the swale, where he could both see Benteen's approach and provide support for his movement into the battle area. As pressure increased on Custer from the north (hostiles crossing at Ford D) and from hostiles coming up Deep Ravine, Custer most likely felt the need to deploy E company along the SSL to stem the flow. While all this is happening, L company, who was left behind to guard Custer's rear from Indians crossing at Ford B, are finding more pressure than they can handle. As they begin to break and flee north toward Keogh, Keogh gets hit from the south, east, and west. I company appears from their markers to have been caught from 3 sides almost at once. As Keogh is getting hit, Custer and F company are already on LSH dealing with the Indians from the north and west. LSH, Keogh sector, and Calhoun Hill were probably all engaged at the same time, with Calhoun Hill falling last, if we believe JSIT. This is one theory that fits with his story, and it doesn't pose any problems that I can see with Fred's timelines in "Strategy", which I think are pretty much on the money. One big problem, though, is how does C company fit into this. I can see Custer leaving one company at Calhoun Hill to guard his rear, as they have already engaged Wolf Tooth, and can see the hordes coming across Ford B. I can also see leaving a company behind to watch for Benteen and to support his movement into the battle area with the slow-moving packs. But with only 5 companies, why would he leave a third company behind, only approaching the ford with two companies? We have always assumed that C company charged down the coulee from Calhoun Hill, went too far and were forced back. But what if C company was with E and F at Ford D? If C company deployed on the left flank of E company when they deployed from Cemetery Hill, this would put them spreading across Deep Ravine above the headcut, which would have been further west in 1876 than it is today C company, if in that position, would have been getting fire from both the Deep Ravine infiltrators and the Indians on GGR. If we assume the Indians were able to drive a wedge between C company and E company, C would have nowhere to go but into Calhoun Coulee and FF ridge. In this scenario, they would have been retreating toward Calhoun Hill, not charging down from it. When you look at the pattern all the markers make, it is a large circular shape, so this is a possible scenario to account for where the C company markers appear. All of this assumes that JSIT's story is accurate. Since he walked the battlefield with Wolf Tooth, his story, though second-hand, has a ring of truth to it. And as a former military man, I have always had trouble believing Custer would leave behind 3/5ths of his combat power and only move toward the river with 2/5ths. I can see leaving a rear guard, and an escort for Benteen, and advancing to the river with 3 companies, but C company being left behind is a bewilderment since at the time they all reached Calhoun Hill, they were not under any severe pressure. Leaving one company as a rear guard makes sense given the light pressure at the time. The positives of assuming JSIT's account is accurate are it explains why Algernon Smith was found where he was, and positions the river fight at Ford D. Plus it helps account for why C company men were found in the various locations they were found in. It also helps support the argument that Calhoun Hill was where the real last stand occurred. It also fits with the timelines of the battle, in particular, Fred's. The big unresolved item in this scenario is C company's movements. Were they left behind with L company? Did they go with E and F? Was the "charge" of C company conducted down from Calhoun Hill or was it the movement from Cemetery Hill southward along SSL? I am not sure we can ever know for sure about C company, but if JSIT's story is true, it makes sense to believe C company had gone with E and F initially toward Ford D. Ok, time to shoot holes in JSIT's story and my theories based on that story. w There were and are many practical nuts.... and bolts theories of what happened and why. The why's can become incredibly compljcated as soon as the research of events which took place in 1878 are ignored. All theory ignoring or ignoring Nelson Miles' information abbout the Custer fight is little room material. Subsequent research and theses regarding the Custer fight is interesting anther why way. This, or that, why is how was it come about and that requires understanding of the very very many accumulated theories. The Timber account of it is post Marquis whose informants were battle participants. Timber claims this also but his informants and Marquis, were long dead in 1956 when Timber entirely contracicted them. That is, his interpretation is at odds with that of those who informed him and Marquis. How can that be? Well, the teory from Timber is derived from those developed by Kuhlman who incorporated William Bordeaux's slightly earlier theory. Bordeax used participants information giving that after significant fighting across MTC and Deep Coulee, Custer Hill was wiped out very quickly before a general melee up river along the Battle Ridges. Timber had access to Kuhlman and was able to read the many books e.isting then. Timber was not the orinater of the North to South flow theory and nor was Richard Fox. That sobriquet is with William Bordeax as far as I can figure out. His informants entirely contradict Mrs Spotted Horn Bull and virtually all previous understanding of tactical play. It is interesting to contemplate the theories origins as much as the play they portray because of the inherent contradictions which they present. Here's one. A very observant John Gibbon described the terrain very well in his articles about the battle and a potentially incredibly whacky obscure and without proof concept paper allows for the Kellogg reporter to have been killed or at least discovered near bluffs below Deep Ravine where the body would obviously have been dragged. Thepoint here is that there is not one word from Gibbon about shod horse trails or other evidence that Custer's companies wrre at the Cemetery Ridge or lower western fords. He would have seen it had it existed and everyone would have read about it from Gibbon.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 15, 2017 6:30:49 GMT -6
Now, joy of joys, is 7th Cavalry returning to Battle Ridge, over Cemetery Ridge from the western fords which they crossed. In 1926! link to Source. Actually what you showing there is that they did not cross CR they were between it and the river. Probably started on the backside closer to the administrative property since it would be a good staging area for the event. Maybe you should come an visit the battlefield and I could show the location shown in that picture. They are not riding across CR and I think you can see the markers on SSL. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 15, 2017 6:42:42 GMT -6
The Cheyenne accounts have their horse across the river at Ford Ds. It is from this location they observed Custer on the bluffs. I am sure that all crossings were used by Indians since there was so many of them but the horses across the river would be in Ford D area.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 15, 2017 6:47:52 GMT -6
HR
I would like some information that you posted somewhere regarding doing viewscapes. What I am interested in is the viewscape from SSR toward the valley.
Thanks
AZ Ranger
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Post by herosrest on Sept 15, 2017 14:39:28 GMT -6
Hi, [a href=" www.google.co.uk/maps/@45.5259319,-107.3837178,3a,75y,80.32h,90t/data=!3m8!1e1!3m6!1sAF1QipMjl8iac6YrJQ4jawRU22_RTNHTlaKOPJdaViao!2e10!3e11!6shttps:%2F%2Flh5.googleusercontent.com%2Fp%2FAF1QipMjl8iac6YrJQ4jawRU22_RTNHTlaKOPJdaViao%3Dw203-h100-k-no-pi-0-ya243.32288-ro-0-fo100!7i7168!8i3584"]link[/a] This is using Google Maps. Link will not link because of syntax... ho hum. Cut and paste this www.google.co.uk/maps/@45.5259319,-107.3837178,3a,75y,224.67h,69.51t/data=!3m8!1e1!3m6!1sAF1QipMjl8iac6YrJQ4jawRU22_RTNHTlaKOPJdaViao!2e10!3e11!6shttps:%2F%2Flh5.googleusercontent.com%2Fp%2FAF1QipMjl8iac6YrJQ4jawRU22_RTNHTlaKOPJdaViao%3Dw203-h100-k-no-pi-0-ya243.32288-ro-0-fo100!7i7168!8i3584 into a browser. Locate your area of interest and if tere is a road route through the terrain a terrain view can be obtained by scrolling in (zooming) as far as possible. Take the cursor to the little orange man in the bottom right corner. Click and hold and move him to a spot on the road. Release. Blue spots are targets. One exists for the sharpshooter terrain. With Google Earth you can get down low and dirty across all the terrain and walk around to your hearts content. Bing do a similar thing with mapping. The link given is quick and dirty. Google Earth is a big install on a Windows system but fairly easy to get the hang of. Same trick - zoom right in and suddenly you are standing on the terrain and able to roan about - along Cardinal points. I found the Microsoft mapping App to be very good but haven't used it a while. I brush up and see what it can do. It is constantly updated like all software now and I find tat a pain. I did a while back to gain an idea where Sheridan camped in 1877 and tried to compare that with the supposed 1879 Sanderson image. See how you do. John (Young) Two Moon was late to spot the cavalry and even later to the fight. His ponies were not east of the river. I do not believe that Two Moons crossed the river to fetch ponies or had herds across the river. Wooden Legs lodge did not have their horses across the river. In fact, I know of no Cheyenne who had ponies east of the river but will gladly be updated on the matter. Who were they? Two Moon - ' I went to water my horses at the creek, and washed them off with cool water, then took a swim myself. I came back to the camp afoot. When I got near my lodge, I looked up the Little Horn towards Sitting Bull's camp. I saw a great dust rising. It looked like a whirlwird. Soon Sioux horsemen came rushing into camp shouting: "Soldiers come! Plenty white soldiers."
I ran into my lodge, and said to my brother-in-law, "Get your horses; the white man is coming. Everybody run for horses."
Outside, far up the valley, I heard a battle cry, Hay-ay, hay-ay! I heard shouting, too, this way [clapping his hands very fast]. I couldn't see any Indians. Everybody was getting horses and saddles. After I had caught my horse, a Sioux warrior came again and said, "Many soldiers are coming."
Then he said to the women, "Get out of the way, we are going to have hard fight."
I said, "All right, I am ready."
I got on my horse, and rode out into my camp. I called out to the people all running about: "I am Two Moon, your chief. Don't run away. Stay here and fight. You must stay and fight the white soldiers. I shall stay even if I am to be killed."
I rode swiftly toward Sitting Bull's camp. There I saw the white soldiers fighting in a line. Indians covered the flat. They began to drive the soldiers all mixed up—Sioux, then soldiers, then more Sioux, and all shooting. Therefore, with Two Moon's band of Cheyenne rushing to confront Reno - they had retrieved their animals and charged towards Reno before any cavalry east of the river could have reached the western fords below Last Stand Hill. This is a central difficulty with this theory - timing and realistic timing dismisses it. There were not two or more long halts of wenty minutes or more and that which occurred was at Deep Coulee. Here's the sort of image which Google Earth can generate, Nothing like photography but it can provide specific image views. With regards to the Cemetery ridge image of 7th Cavalry, of ourse they were not going to plogh up the graves with a four thousand hooves but that was a different age. Even publishing the image nationally anyone seeing it saw cavalry west of LSH and how many of those with any kind of interest or memory of the battle knew where was what. So, this 50th Anniversary RE-ENACTMENT muddied the waters of memory and there were many non English speaking participants at this battle who fought Custer or heard their fatheers, uncles and everyone, really, talking about the thing and there it was 50 years on, being re-enacted to an incredibly unsophisticated audience who knew nothing about what really happened. %0,000 people for each of three days. It then took another 30 years for the JSiT revelations and an incredibly lengthening imaginery string which stretches a further 61 years still getting longer by the minute. The cemetery which 1876 Cheyenne participants recalled was the Custer Battleground where the 210 or so who fell, were buried. Of course the cemetery was moved later but not the location in participants memories. If the JSiT and Peter Powell interpretations of the battle are applied to Deep Coulee rather than Deep Ravine terrain, then, they work equally well and better and tell the real story regardless of wishfull thinking in telling 1956 historians something that they wanted to find. That being the answer to what happened. Nelson Miles got it all found out in 1878.
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Post by shan on Sept 22, 2017 14:41:56 GMT -6
I put some of this up on the other board recently hoping to stimulate some discussion about an episode that isn’t much discussed, and given that there seems to be absolutely nothing happening on this board, I thought I’d put it up here as well to see what happens.
Having looked back through a number of my books concerning the battle, there seems to be one question that never gets raised, let alone answered, when it comes to the Left wings excursion to the fords D area, and that is, how come Custer didn’t seem to realise how serious things were up on Calhoun hill?
Now I know all this is a matter of timing, and that it also depends on whether you happen to believe in a long battle or a shorter version. For myself, I tend to believe that after the two wings united on Calhoun hill, and that after the left wing had departed to look for yet another ford, between maybe 35 and 45 minutes elapsed before C company was dispatched to deal with the ever growing problem in Calhoun Coulee: so a mean average would give us say 40 minutes. This then would constitute what is often referred to as the so called long slow period of the fight, which consisted of mainly long distance sniping.
Of course unlike the Reno episode, apart from the Indians, there was no one left alive to give us a time check on all this, and given that the Indians weren’t all carrying pocket watches, the few times that they actually mention time frames, must have been approximations that were put into their mouths by various translators. The famous one that refers to how long the fight took, “it took as long as it takes a man to eat his meal,” can mean anything, after all most of us have been around a table where some people scoff their food before it's hardly touched the plate, whilst other just like to sit back and take their time. Incidentally, I feel much the same about JSIT’s 30 minute wait on Cemetery Ridge, I just can’t believe that the Cheyennes were so precise about their time keeping.
Anyway, to get back to my point, if we say that it took the left wing some 30 to 40 minutes to check out the fords D, and then hang around the Cemetery ridge area, this would mean that they arrived back shortly before C company launched their fatal charge, in which case, they must have seen and heard all hell breaking loose. So why then, didn’t they immediately go to their aid. It seems very weird that they just sat there and ignored what was going on, after all, you can see right across to Calhoun hill from where they were, it isn’t very far. This then means that they were must have been having problems of their own, in other words, something serious was happening over there that prohibited them going off to help the right wing, something that eventually drove them up to LSH. And there’s one other thing that clinches it for me, remember that the men fleeing what was happening down in the Keogh area, could see the left wing already up on LSH, so they knew, that if they were going to get out of this alive, then getting to LSH was their only hope.
Shan, David
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Post by Colt45 on Sept 22, 2017 21:02:32 GMT -6
Shan, Custer wouldn't have been aware of what was going on at Calhoun Hill because he was heavily engaged at that time. He didn't leave L company behind along with C and I. He needed all the combat power he had available to effect a river crossing and make a significant impact on the village. He would have taken all 5 companies to the ford D area, where there are several crossing places. If you look at the river course in 1876, you will see a crossing near where the bridge and interstate are located, and another one is a little more upstream and is at a right angle to the first. This would give Custer the ability to hit any resistance from two different directions, if that resistance was light or composed only of fleeing non-coms.
As it was, the resistance was heavy and already on the east side of the river. Hence the crossing plans were thwarted. Now when you plan an assault, you always setup rally points for everyone to meet at in the event things go awry or folks get separated from each other. The high ground of Cemetery Ridge and Battle Ridge Extension are the logical rally points for 5 companies going to 2 different crossing points. When the crossing attempt was foiled, it took some time to get everyone back to the rally points, and get a plan in place for what to do next. This could take from 15 to 30 minutes easily considering the terrain, distance involved, tired horses and men perhaps on foot.
It is my belief that E and F, and probably HQ rallied on CR, while C, I, and L rallied on BRE. With the amount of hostile activity, it would be logical on Custer's part to assume he could withdraw back the same way he came, so tactically he would have ordered a covered withdrawal. The lead element to withdraw first would have been L company, followed by C, then I, while E and F provided the cover for the withdrawal. L gets to Calhoun hill, encounters heavy activity from those crossing at ford B, sets up skirmish lines and engages, waiting for the rest of the battalion to show up. C arrives next, sees the open right flank on L company and moves into the coulee to cover that flank, unaware of all the hostiles on greasy grass ridge. All the while C and L are doing this, E, F, and I are also engaged heavily. I company is the next to leave the area but gets trapped in transit by hostiles coming from Deep Ravine through the gap, and by Indians that had been on L companies left flank who continued over to the east side of battle ridge. And also while I is moving out, E and F fold due to pressure, with F moving to LSH and E mostly moving off CR toward Deep Ravine. What was going on was 3 different battles occurring at the same time in different places.
There is artifact evidence to support the fact that there was fighting north of LSH, as several rifle cases belonging to rifles from C company have been found north of LSH on BRE, along with a colt SAA revolver.
So, the reason Custer didn't rush to Calhoun hill to assist was because things didn't happen in the order your question presupposes.
Anyway, that is my opinion.
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Post by tubman13 on Sept 23, 2017 7:29:16 GMT -6
There are none so blind as those who will not see. Nice explanation Colt!
Regards, Tom
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Post by noggy on Sept 23, 2017 16:33:29 GMT -6
I think that when it comes to the Custer part of the battle, it`s easy to use what we now know and implement it as something the participants knew or should have known back then. "Why would Custer split his forces when he was about to be overrun by hostiles and go North? It makes no sense." And it doesn`t, if one believes that he knew what was about to hit him.
But if he did not know at the time he went further North leaving Keogh behind, and this is of course a big point, it`s really nothing else than what had been done shortly before towards Ford B. Making a short trip North to reccon would surely seem like more efficient use of time than sitting there idle waiting for Benteen, and this move seems to be very much in line with Custer`s attack-oriented mindset. I`m not sure if Custer had to have met that hard a resistance at the Northern Crossing to leave; with two companies I guess he was just scouting ahead before a crossing in force with 8 companies (as far as I recall, Native accounts once again vary when it comes to the severity of fighting around Ford D and how close the soldiers actually moved.) But when moving on back, the soldiers must have been followed by a growing force of warriors who would be troublesome and of course we suddenly have Crazy Horse and the Fabulous Thunderbirds appearing in the middle of what was Custer and Keogh`s route of reuniting. By that time Keogh had already been lightly engaged for a while but all accounts tend to make the larger attack on his forces a rather swiftly affair. (I think Mr. Wagner`s Timeline fits the scenario pretty well, but I`m once again away from home and can`t refer to the times he uses, but as far as I remember make a lot of sense).
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 24, 2017 10:03:54 GMT -6
I think Colt explained it. There is no doubt that Custer had a good idea of the size of the village once they crossed MTC and once you open the battle with Reno its time to fight. Why would Custer want to lose time by going north to a ford and then have to pull back and call the three companies. One thing I have learned is to never give up something you have cleared. I think using all five companies would be problematic but attacking with 2 companies would be useless.
So think about this. Custer with 2 companies is out of sight before reaching Ford Ds. Any of them. What is C,I,L expected to do if Custer becomes engaged and remains out of sight.
Regards
Steve
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Post by shan on Sept 25, 2017 13:52:19 GMT -6
Colt45, I think that's an interesting idea, although it's not one I personally subscribe to, but who knows, nothing about this part of the battle makes much sense, so maybe your right.
Part of the reason I wanted to kick start a conversation about this, was A, things were very quiet here, and B, whilst there are never ending discussions as to how long it took for the command to ride to ford A from the divide, or else whose watch times are correct, most people, including myself, have very little to say when it comes to the Custer part of the fighting.
Of course we all know why that is, given that there were no white survivors, we have very little to go on excepting for the Indian accounts both oral and visual, a few theories on the part of the army people who viewed the battlefield some days later, and of course, the recent archaeological evidence. Now the thing about the body placements, and all the archaeological stuff, is that you can't tell in what sequence things happened, but, if we turn to the Indian evidence, compromised as it is, I think we can, and do, get some sense of the way that the battle flowed.
The two events that have probably left us with the most witness statements are, according to the Indians, the final acts. These concern their elimination of all resistance on LSH, and finally, the hunting down and dispatching of the men who made a run to Deep Ravine, in that order. These two events were witnessed by a number of warriors who left us their accounts, and were also depicted in several artworks.
As far as they were concerned, this was the end of the fight. They do not say, " that after that, we then pursued the other soldiers South, where we finished them off piecemeal, nor do they say that the last of the fighting took place in and around the Calhoun Hill area.
Shan.
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Post by noggy on Sept 26, 2017 1:30:08 GMT -6
Of course we all know why that is, given that there were no white survivors, we have very little to go on excepting for the Indian accounts both oral and visual, a few theories on the part of the army people who viewed the battlefield some days later, and of course, the recent archaeological evidence. Now the thing about the body placements, and all the archaeological stuff, is that you can't tell in what sequence things happened, but, if we turn to the Indian evidence, compromised as it is, I think we can, and do, get some sense of the way that the battle flowed. What`s your take on the SSL? Was it a skirmish line, or an attempt to break out? I find the idea of a skirmish line there very strange, but so does trying to flee toward the enemy`s camp.
All in all, I have a hard time agreeing with myself when it comes to the fight around LSH.
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Post by shan on Sept 26, 2017 8:17:28 GMT -6
Noggy,
I'm afraid I can't answer your question, because A. I don't know the answer, and B. I'm having to rethink all my ideas as to what might have happened on this portion of the field.
This is not the first time that this has happened to me, but then I guess its one of the things that keeps us all hanging around these boards. No one that I've read as yet, have managed to come up with an explanation of what happened that has managed to totally satisfied me. I think the answers are there in the Indian accounts, and of course in the artwork, but then that aspect of the story generally gets ignored, I suppose the main the problem with the oral accounts is that 99.9% of them have come through the mouths of translators, most of whom probably abbreviated bits and pieces of these accounts in order to cut out all the repeditive bits, as well as those parts where a warrior was obviously boasting, boasting which they felt had little or no relevance to the information the army wanted, which was of course, what the hell happened to Custer?.
The other problem we have with the native accounts is that they either had different names for various parts of the battlefield, or else had none at all. And remember, when these first stories were told, most of the names we've all become famiilar with, were yet to be named: Calhoun hill, Henryville, Luce and Nye Cartwright, Deep coulee and Deep ravine ~ although I suspect that the Indians may have had a name for that particular feature, and of course Custer, or Last stand hill. In other words, when we read the Indian accounts, apart from when they use the words for river, fords, { un-named,} hill, high hill, gulch, etc, we have no idea where they were when they were describing something.
Shan
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Post by tubman13 on Sept 28, 2017 5:11:52 GMT -6
Shan, Noggy,
Two very thought provoking posts. How about their horses were run off and they are pushed to that position from, say, CR while in defensive posture.
Regards, Tom
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