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Post by dan25 on Nov 21, 2015 11:18:35 GMT -6
I would like to try this theory again, hopefully I word it so it is understandable and it sounds more like a question than a conclusion.
It has been mentioned that the overwhelming number of Indians at the LBH was a possible or definite cause for Custers defeat. Out of curiosity I wondered if this was unusual to have so many Indian's gather together outside of a reservation, or did it happen occasionally.
As I tried to find more information, I realized there was a possibility that number of Indians could deplete the food source in that area very quickly, forcing them to hunt further and further away from the village. If that happened, then how long would they have been able or willing to remain there, before being forced to break into smaller groups and move to different area's.
This now presented me with three questions to try and find answers for. Was it unusual or not to mass in such large numbers, how long would they have been able to sustain themselves, and what caused them to mass together in such a large number.
Being unable to find information regarding the first question, was it unusual or not to mass into such large groups, I then focused on the food source which seemed to be self explanatory, yet not conclusive. Not spending any more time with those two questions I moved to the third.
After reading Short Bull's interview, where he and his group of sioux and the group of Cheyenne they had camped with kept being forced to move several times due to the Army's attack's. Each time they moved it was further and further north until they finally unintentionally arrived at the LBH. There was nothing in Short Bull's interview that said or implied that they planned to go to the LBH. If that was the case, then how many other group's of Indians could have been forced there unintentionally also, and why. Understanding Short Bull's reason for being at the LBH, I then focused on the Army.
Realizing the Army's attack's took place in the south and forced those Indians to move north, I then realized that maybe Gibbon's movements along the Yellowstone and he [Gibbon's] having contact with the Indians in that area could have caused those Indians to move east. Then there were the supply depot's being set up, again the Army's presence. Did that cause any Indians to move south where eventually an extremely large number of Indians unplanned or unintentionally all wound up at the LBH.
Anyone willing to jump into this mess to help me out would be well appreciated.
Regards
dan25
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Post by montrose on Nov 21, 2015 13:25:24 GMT -6
It was unusual, but not unprecedented.
The Indians had been struggling to find a response to US forces for decades.
You raised the point that that could mass for a short period of time. The challenge was how to use that window of time to achieve a strategic or operational result. The Indians lacked the command and control and understanding of their situation to ever answer that question.
Sidebar. US military uses concepts of Strategy, Operations, and Tactics.
a. Strategy is master plan to reach your long term goals Indians had no central HQ to do this, total mystery to them.
b.Operations is basically the campaign plan. This means what do we do this year, with what we have. Indians had very limited, but capable abilities in this area.
b1. At Washita, the Indians massed, but lacked a coordinated plan for mutual defense. The 7th hit a small village on the outer perimeter. Other Indian elements massed to protect main body. Overall Indians could easily have achieved LBH outcome at Washita, but lacked the strategic, operational and tactical ability to do so, and the C2.
b2. AT LBH, they still had no strategy. Their campaign plan was to mass, and defy the US. Their campaign plan was to mass as many Indians as possible for the Jun 75 Sundance. Their tactical plan, was to mass, no outlying villages, and avoid Washita. As you point out, this is more an act of defiance than a plan. They could only mass for a very short period of time. In fact, the better their defense plan, the less time they could stay together.
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Post by dan25 on Nov 21, 2015 15:49:44 GMT -6
It was unusual, but not unprecedented. The Indians had been struggling to find a response to US forces for decades. You raised the point that that could mass for a short period of time. The challenge was how to use that window of time to achieve a strategic or operational result. The Indians lacked the command and control and understanding of their situation to ever answer that question. Sidebar. US military uses concepts of Strategy, Operations, and Tactics. a. Strategy is master plan to reach your long term goals Indians had no central HQ to do this, total mystery to them. b.Operations is basically the campaign plan. This means what do we do this year, with what we have. Indians had very limited, but capable abilities in this area. b1. At Washita, the Indians massed, but lacked a coordinated plan for mutual defense. The 7th hit a small village on the outer perimeter. Other Indian elements massed to protect main body. Overall Indians could easily have achieved LBH outcome at Washita, but lacked the strategic, operational and tactical ability to do so, and the C2. b2. AT LBH, they still had no strategy. Their campaign plan was to mass, and defy the US. Their campaign plan was to mass as many Indians as possible for the Jun 75 Sundance. Their tactical plan, was to mass, no outlying villages, and avoid Washita. As you point out, this is more an act of defiance than a plan. They could only mass for a very short period of time. In fact, the better their defense plan, the less time they could stay together. Thanks montrose, I am not really good with military terminology, but I think I understand it enough to get what you are saying. Was there any specific reason why Crook and Terry didn't try to coordinate their movements, it seems the results might have been better? As for the Indians massing when they did, do you think that was deliberate or accidentally? Regards dan25 |
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Post by fred on Nov 21, 2015 15:55:18 GMT -6
Dan,
It was reasonably rare for a mass congregation like what was found at the LBH. If memory serves me correctly, the last time something as big or almost as big occurred was during the Powder River Expedition from Fort Laramie, July-October 1865, commanded by BG Patrick E. Connor. A village of some 2,000 lodges was reported, though I think that may have been a bit overblown... my guess.
I say that because the LBH was supposed to have been the largest ever; but then again, says who?
Regardless, the Little Big Horn valley was known to be a Sioux and Cheyenne sanctuary, ofttimes frequented by either or both tribes, and in fact, I believe was so frequented only the year before. For example, on April 29, 1876, CPT Ball’s advance continued down the Little Big Horn valley, noticing the ravine-cut bluffs on the east side of the river. Soon, the column passed through an area where a large Indian camp had been the preceding summer. The camp was located just below the mouth of Lodge Tail Creek and had been a Cheyenne camp, though McClernand and Paulding incorrectly identified it as Sioux. (From my notes.)
So this area was not unknown to be an Indian camping ground.
As for how long it would be camped on, with a village of that size (1876), not long. At most, only a couple days. Also, if you are paying attention (< G >), you would have noticed they originally started up the valley and camped for at least one day south of the Reno Creek/Little Big Horn confluence and when large herds of game were reported farther north (down-valley), the camp reversed direction and moved into the location it was in when attacked. Indian accounts claim they would have stayed there only a couple days before having to move again. This is also one of the reasons I believe those large numbers that joined after the Crook fight, probably joined closer to June 23 than to June 18.
You need to see the Participants book for the size and lengths of stay in the various locations to get any sort of grip on these camps. In my opinion, that gives a decent description. Then again... I'm prejudiced.
Best wishes,
Fred.
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Post by fred on Nov 21, 2015 15:59:07 GMT -6
Was there any specific reason why Crook and Terry didn't try to coordinate their movements, it seems the results might have been better? Yeah, because neither knew where the other was and because the whole area was crawling with Sioux and the whole area was not properly and accurately platted. Deliberate. I have read-- though heavens knows where!!!!-- the Indian communication system (!!!!!) called for the jamboree, and it was believed it might be the last one, ever. I am convinced, completely, it was a deliberate congregation. Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by benteen on Nov 21, 2015 17:55:45 GMT -6
Gentlemen,
Add to that, if this congregation wasnt planned, for 8-10 thousand people to just show up at the same location may be the most prolific coincidence in history.
Be Well
Dan
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Post by Beth on Nov 21, 2015 19:08:08 GMT -6
It isn't a huge coincidence. There weren't that may places left were they could have gone. They needed a large amount of game like buffalo and really the only place that the buffalo existed anymore was in the north. They needed water and forage so they had to stick to river valleys.
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Post by montrose on Nov 21, 2015 21:39:55 GMT -6
The decision to mass was what made 1876 unusual. It was a deliberate action, planned at least since Feb. The non reservation Indians sent out a call to arms to all of their fellow tribes, sub tribes, families, etc. The event they announced was to assemble for a Sun Dance, which occurred a week prior to LBH.
A competent US would have realized the urgent priority to attack before this assembly, not after.
Sherman and Sheridan wanted an early campaign. In fact they intended combat to occur on or about 15 Feb 76. Terry and Custer were slow as pond water, and did not meet commanders intent. In fact, Terry and Custer should have been relieved for starting 90 days late.
We know the real reason for the delay was that Custer was part of a conspiracy to frame Grant for corruption. He had been working this conspiracy since Sep 74. I am not wrapped around the unethical and immoral side of Custer. My concern is that his main effort was his political and economic shenanigins the two years prior to LBH. During this period he grossly neglected his duties and responsibilities as regimental commander.
The unit entered the 1876 campaign badly trained and badly organized for a combat operation.
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Post by dan25 on Nov 22, 2015 9:00:34 GMT -6
I thank every one for their helpful answer's.
I am not sure what would be the proper protocol, to reply to each individual, or one reply meant for all.
I don't want anyone thinking I didn't appreciate their input.
As for Crook and Terry, even not knowing where each other was, just seems strange that they made no attempt to
communicate with each other, since they both were assigned to this military operation. There must have been a telegraph at both forts.
Was there any problems or bitter feelings between the two?
I am also interested in Gen. Sheridan and his relationship with Custer. This may seem like I am getting to far side tracked
away from the battle at LBH, but I am curious if Sheridan could have had any influence on how Custer conducted his actions and decisions at the LBH. It appears to me Sheridan had a considerable amount of admiration for Custer.
On YouTube there is a video of a Park Ranger explaining to spectators the events that took place at LBH. During his speech he mentioned that at Appomattox, as people were leaving after Gen. Lee had signed the surrender, that Gen. Sheridan took the stand that Lee had signed on and presented it to Libby Custer, exclaiming that if anyone deserved it, it was her husband Gen Custer. He intervened between Custer and President Grant, getting Custer back his command, as though no other officer in the entire Army was qualified. We will never know, but surely there was quite a personal conversation between them. What Sheridan may have said or recommended to Custer could have had some direct influence.
I Would appreciate anyone's thoughts on this.
Regards
dan25
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Post by montrose on Nov 22, 2015 11:22:35 GMT -6
Dan25,
Terry and Gibbon got along professionally, and seem to genuinely like one another.
Telegraph is a garrison communication method. It becomes useless one units leave home station. Communication in the pre radio era requires extensive planning. Subordinate officers must understand your primary plan, and then your alternate and contingency plans. They will have to choose alternate plans without communicating with you. So commander's intent and the PACE (Primary, Alternate, Contingent and Emergency plans) plan become critical.
Sidebar. Note to myself to explain 5 point contingency plan when elements separate. And this dates to Rogers Rangers and Benjamin Church. I get accused of using modern concepts for ancient methods. The terms change, not the concepts.
Tactically, their is an art and a science to using messengers. The standard procedure is you tell the runner the message, and then have him repeat it. I believe Martini failed this test, and was given a written message. The better alternative was to send a different messenger.
Also note you have carrier pigeon messengers, like Martini. He had no understanding of what was going on around him, and could deliver no situational awareness to either target or source.
But you also can select messengers of higher rank and higher capability as soldiers, sergeants or officers. At LBH the regimental sergeant major, regimental trumpeter, regimental adjutant, and CPT Keogh were all used as messengers and observers.
A messenger is not the message. He carries situational awareness of what is going on with the commander, and the commanders intent. But he also gathers situational awareness of what is going on at the receiver. SO he brings back essential data to the commander. Note how Voss, Sharrow, Cooke, and Keogh filled this role.
I think folks on these boards do not understand the planning aspects that follow using messengers. A commander must determine how much time will pass before his messenger reaches the target. Then how much time it takes for a messenger to return. And during this time, the tactical situation the commander had at the moment he sent the messenger can change. This gets into why commanders intent is so important. What is the master plan, what leeway does a subordinate have to change or ignore the actual message if it addresses an obsolete or incorrect estimate of the situation.
Now I know these boards burn thousands of electrons on Martini, Kanipe, even Goldin.
But MAJ Reno sent two of his own messengers to LTC Custer explaining the situation n the valley. Reno was regiment advanced guard, so these messages automatically trigger main body support of its lead element. In addition, Custer had sent forward his own adjutant and the senior Captain with the main body.
So why did LTC Custer ignore his own plan? He had four triggers to support the Reno element in the valley. Not only did he ignore his own triggers and his own plan, he failed to tell Reno why and what the new plan was. He also failed to tell the two trailing elements what his plan was.
I believe the key to understanding this loss is right here. No other regimental commander in the US Army would have failed as badly as GAC on 25 Jun 76. The LBH loss is unique to Custer, and unique to how poorly the 7th was trained, as compared to the other 35 maneuver regiments.
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Post by dan25 on Nov 22, 2015 13:14:04 GMT -6
Dan25, Terry and Gibbon got along professionally, and seem to genuinely like one another. Telegraph is a garrison communication method. It becomes useless one units leave home station. Communication in the pre radio era requires extensive planning. Subordinate officers must understand your primary plan, and then your alternate and contingency plans. They will have to choose alternate plans without communicating with you. So commander's intent and the PACE (Primary, Alternate, Contingent and Emergency plans) plan become critical. Sidebar. Note to myself to explain 5 point contingency plan when elements separate. And this dates to Rogers Rangers and Benjamin Church. I get accused of using modern concepts for ancient methods. The terms change, not the concepts. Tactically, their is an art and a science to using messengers. The standard procedure is you tell the runner the message, and then have him repeat it. I believe Martini failed this test, and was given a written message. The better alternative was to send a different messenger. Also note you have carrier pigeon messengers, like Martini. He had no understanding of what was going on around him, and could deliver no situational awareness to either target or source. But you also can select messengers of higher rank and higher capability as soldiers, sergeants or officers. At LBH the regimental sergeant major, regimental trumpeter, regimental adjutant, and CPT Keogh were all used as messengers and observers. A messenger is not the message. He carries situational awareness of what is going on with the commander, and the commanders intent. But he also gathers situational awareness of what is going on at the receiver. SO he brings back essential data to the commander. Note how Voss, Sharrow, Cooke, and Keogh filled this role. I think folks on these boards do not understand the planning aspects that follow using messengers. A commander must determine how much time will pass before his messenger reaches the target. Then how much time it takes for a messenger to return. And during this time, the tactical situation the commander had at the moment he sent the messenger can change. This gets into why commanders intent is so important. What is the master plan, what leeway does a subordinate have to change or ignore the actual message if it addresses an obsolete or incorrect estimate of the situation. Now I know these boards burn thousands of electrons on Martini, Kanipe, even Goldin. But MAJ Reno sent two of his own messengers to LTC Custer explaining the situation n the valley. Reno was regiment advanced guard, so these messages automatically trigger main body support of its lead element. In addition, Custer had sent forward his own adjutant and the senior Captain with the main body. So why did LTC Custer ignore his own plan? He had four triggers to support the Reno element in the valley. Not only did he ignore his own triggers and his own plan, he failed to tell Reno why and what the new plan was. He also failed to tell the two trailing elements what his plan was. I believe the key to understanding this loss is right here. No other regimental commander in the US Army would have failed as badly as GAC on 25 Jun 76. The LBH loss is unique to Custer, and unique to how poorly the 7th was trained, as compared to the other 35 maneuver regiments. Montrose, Very interesting and informative information, thank you. My question was with Gen. Crook and Gen. Terry not trying to communicate with each other. I am with the understanding that after The Rosebud incident Crook never tried to notify Terry or Gibbon's of his decision to return to Fort Fetterman, Instead Crook only notified Gen. Sheridan, who in turn notified Terry and Gibbon's. This information should have been considered important enough for messenger's to have been sent from the forts rather than hold the message until they returned making the message useless. Was there any problems or bitter feelings between Crook and Terry? Also you never mentioned your thought's regarding Sheridan having any possible influence on Custer. Regards dan25 |
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Post by dave on Nov 22, 2015 13:22:24 GMT -6
Dan
If you are interested in the relationship between Custer and Sheridan, Sherman and Grant you need to get a copy of Custer's Trials by T J Stiles. I highly recommend this book and I learned quite a lot about Custer and his life. Good, bad or indifferent Stiles covers it very well.
Regards
Dave
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Post by tubman13 on Nov 25, 2015 13:38:17 GMT -6
Communication, Crook knew Gibbon had Crow Scouts, the Crows knew how to contact their encampments, their encampments knew how to contact Gibbon's scouts. Tough but doable. In a timely fashion, who knows? It did not seem to be of importance to Crook. Crook's white scouts also knew the area as well. I am sure you have all heard about the Charlie Reynolds from several years earlier.
Anyway Happy Thanksgiving to all.
Regards,
Tom
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Post by montrose on Nov 25, 2015 21:49:51 GMT -6
Dan25 wrote: Start quote:Very interesting and informative information, thank you.
My question was with Gen. Crook and Gen. Terry not trying to communicate with each other.
I am with the understanding that after The Rosebud incident Crook never tried to notify Terry or Gibbon's of his decision to return to Fort Fetterman, Instead Crook only notified Gen. Sheridan, who in turn notified Terry and Gibbon's. This information should have been considered important enough for messenger's to have been sent from the forts rather than hold the message until they returned making the message useless.
Was there any problems or bitter feelings between Crook and Terry?
Also you never mentioned your thought's regarding Sheridan having any possible influence on Custer. End quote.
1. Departments. Crook and Terry were Department commanders. There four Departments in the Missouri Division, commanded by Sheridan. The term Division is based on territory, and combines admin and operational tasks, and in no way, shape or form has any relationship to the organizational division normally used in discussing the military.
a. As Department commanders, they communicate with Sheridan. Sheridan decides the 5Ws and any necessary frag orders, that is his job. There are times a commander tasks 2 subordinate elements to directly coordinate and change plans, but this is not SOP< the task, conditions, and standards are clearly articulated in operations plans/orders.
b. Take a look at how Terry ran the Dakota operation. He had several moving parts, the Gibbon element, Custer element, the baker/supply depot elements, the river boats. Any time any two of the subordinate elements interacted, Terry supervised with numerous command and control measures.
c. Lines of communication(LOC). Military uses this term to discuss the logistic/support trail behind a unit. I think with radio and satellites the communicate part of this idea. Crook set up a base camp at Goose Creek. From there his LOC goes back to a fort with a telegragh line. SO any message he wants to send involves a messenger or combat unit traveling for many days in hostile territory, just to inform Sheridan.
It is then Sheridan's job to determine if Terry needs to be informed. Step one: where is Terry? Terry is leading units in the field, deep in enemy territory. His location is unknown.
In this environment a message Crook to Sheridan to Terry is a process of weeks. And during this time, both outlier elements can move, fight battles, do all those things units do on operations in enemy territory.
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Post by magpie on Dec 3, 2015 14:02:56 GMT -6
Sheridan wrote of Custer's recent and similar mistake that nearly ended in disaster but didn't specify. I made the leap to 1873 Yellowstone but failed to get the official report that Custer gave to General Stanley that was to be attached. HR found the Stanley report without Custer' 2 pages. Anyone have this connection?
Reno asked Varnum to be his messenger. Varnum wanting to participate in G's recon in force and "charge" and Reno saying wait a minute here what I'd really like is you to go check on the skirmish line and come right back to me. Varnum got side tracked and Reno made the trip back himself it would seem.
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