phil
New Member
Posts: 25
|
Post by phil on Oct 21, 2015 9:40:52 GMT -6
Hi everyone,
A purely hypothetical question. If Captain Keogh did attempt to disengage and withdrawal from the Calhoun, BR sector. At what point do you think he would have been able to do so whilst maintaining tactical unity?
Presumably Keogh would not have attempted to disengage until his command came under indirect fire from Calhoun Coulee. Using the timelines in Fred's book The Strategy of Defeat at the Little Big Horn. Thank you Fred. Warriors started to bring indirect fire on Keogh positions between 3.34 and 3.37 (p224-225) Command Watch Time. Crazy Horse hit I Company between 3.55 and 3.59 (p226) CMT. That gives Keogh in the best case scenario 25 minutes.
In my mind Keogh has three definite problems and potentially two others. He would be dealing with these concurrently.
1. Disengaging and withdrawing L Company in a manner that discourages Warriors in the Henryville sector from pursuing close behind.
2. Terrain and distance.
3. Likely Warrior response.
4. Preparing any wounded for travel. What if he has wounded unable to either travel or travel under their own steam?
5. Mounts lost either through indirect fire or released if any horse holders were killed or wounded. Leaving a few men on foot.
Would it have been possible to disengage within the time frame whilst maintaining tactical unity under these circumstances?
|
|
|
Post by Colt45 on Oct 21, 2015 10:19:04 GMT -6
Phil, Yes, it would have been possible to disengage by using reverse fire and movement. This is where one company halts and covers the movement of the company closest to the enemy as they withdraw. That company moves beyond the covering company and sets up. Then the roles are reversed. This allows for a retrograde movement away by leaps and bounds, plus keeps their primary weapon (carbine) at a greater range, which would be to the advantage of the army.
However, the decision to withdraw had to be made quickly by Keogh, which means he had to immediately grasp the gravity of his situation and react during the short time he had, as you noted, about 20-25 minutes tops. The withdrawal also would have had the effect of bringing 3 strung-out companies into mutual supporting range of each other, allowing for combined fire support onto the enemy, which would have slowed down their advance and kept them always seeking cover. The mutual fire support is a huge item for the army since it keeps the hostiles at bay, making their advances costly in terms of casualties. Also by withdrawing in a timely fashion, they maintain their mobility and their massed fires could have seriously impeded Crazy Horse's mounted charge through their ranks.
Even if Keogh had withdrawn in a timely fashion, he still would have taken a lot of casualties, and there is no guarantee he could have linked up with Custer, and certainly no guarantee he would not have been wiped out somewhere other than where he was, but by having mobility and not getting fixed on battle ridge, the possibility exists there might have been some survivors, or that the hostile actions would have been different than they were, which would have affected the overall outcome of the battle.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Oct 21, 2015 10:19:20 GMT -6
The Keogh battalion waited too long to do anything. No decision is a decision.
By the time they started responding to the Indian buildup, they were badly outnumbered and surrounded.
The US advantage was mobility and mass. The regiment should have stayed together.
What if Keough had returned down his backtrail and picked up the Benteen and McDougal elements himself. If GAC wanted eyes on the Indians he could man an outpost on the bluffs.
Instead Keogh did the deer in the headlights tactic. He commanded a classis DIP fight, which means Die In Place. Keogh scattered his 3 companies all far out if support of each other, allowing them to be easily overrun, while inflicted minimal Indian casualties.
By contrast, Reno tried to mass his 3 companies, when he was surrounded and facing an attack of 900 Indians from the Ford A approach. He was only able to gather 2 companies, G company was unable to reform and was left behind. But at least he tried to do the right thing, as opposed to the inept and incompetent Keogh.
|
|
|
Post by magpie on Oct 21, 2015 12:37:56 GMT -6
Phil, Yes, it would have been possible to disengage by using reverse fire and movement. This is where one company halts and covers the movement of the company closest to the enemy as they withdraw. That company moves beyond the covering company and sets up. Then the roles are reversed. This allows for a retrograde movement away by leaps and bounds, plus keeps their primary weapon (carbine) at a greater range, which would be to the advantage of the army. However, the decision to withdraw had to be made quickly by Keogh, which means he had to immediately grasp the gravity of his situation and react during the short time he had, as you noted, about 20-25 minutes tops. The withdrawal also would have had the effect of bringing 3 strung-out companies into mutual supporting range of each other, allowing for combined fire support onto the enemy, which would have slowed down their advance and kept them always seeking cover. The mutual fire support is a huge item for the army since it keeps the hostiles at bay, making their advances costly in terms of casualties. Also by withdrawing in a timely fashion, they maintain their mobility and their massed fires could have seriously impeded Crazy Horse's mounted charge through their ranks. Even if Keogh had withdrawn in a timely fashion, he still would have taken a lot of casualties, and there is no guarantee he could have linked up with Custer, and certainly no guarantee he would not have been wiped out somewhere other than where he was, but by having mobility and not getting fixed on battle ridge, the possibility exists there might have been some survivors, or that the hostile actions would have been different than they were, which would have affected the overall outcome of the battle. The leap frog tactic is great but did it exist in 1876 in our Army? My limited civil war reading suggests it didn't for the civil war. In my limited view a squad fought until they couldn't take it anymore ( usually a sudden and complete break) and retreated. The commander then sending a fresh unit through the retreating men. It being said it was a waste of time to try to turn those who were in retreat. A few weeks ago someone said you couldn't do the leap frog in Reno's position but it seems three units one covering front and one covering rear could provide covering fire for the movement. I think the age of the fire fight was just starting in 1876 and I'm not sure you have the shear fire power to keep your enemies face down hugging the earth. So was this leap frog tactic a well developed movement that our poorly trained men knew or was it after semi-auto's?
|
|
|
Post by benteen on Oct 21, 2015 13:46:06 GMT -6
Phil, Yes, it would have been possible to disengage by using reverse fire and movement. This is where one company halts and covers the movement of the company closest to the enemy as they withdraw. That company moves beyond the covering company and sets up. Then the roles are reversed. This allows for a retrograde movement away by leaps and bounds, plus keeps their primary weapon (carbine) at a greater range, which would be to the advantage of the army. . Colt 45, Sir, I agree with what you say about the reverse fire and movement (Leap frog)tactic but is not that only usefull when the enemy is only coming from one direction. In Renos case they were coming from every direction which is why he conducted a breakout. Be Well Dan
|
|
|
Post by Colt45 on Oct 21, 2015 15:45:01 GMT -6
magpie, Yes, fire and maneuver has been around for a very long time. That's kind of what it looked like Custer was starting when he went up the bluffs after sending Reno into the valley, that is, one unit fires, the other maneuvers. this works going forward and going backward. Little Roundtop is also an example of fire and maneuver.
Benteen, My comments were related to Keogh's actions at battle ridge before he was surrounded. I was not referring to Reno, where he was forced to execute a breakout, as you noted.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Oct 21, 2015 16:21:16 GMT -6
The term for the leapfrog is bounding overwatch. It is a technique that can be used both on offense and on defense.
The technique was known and used frequently this era. We do not have to go very far to see its use during this time period. In fact we only have to wait an hour.
During the withdrawal from Weir peak Godfrey's company set up a hasty defense while the other 2 companies withdrew.
Further, Godfrey used the same technique within his own company. He had half his men form a skirmish line while the other have bounded back 200 or so meters. Then the first group withdrew past the new skirmish and back again another bound. Thus we see the technique used at both company and individual level.
|
|
|
Post by magpie on Oct 21, 2015 16:23:46 GMT -6
magpie, Yes, fire and maneuver has been around for a very long time. That's kind of what it looked like Custer was starting when he went up the bluffs after sending Reno into the valley, that is, one unit fires, the other maneuvers. this works going forward and going backward. Little Roundtop is also an example of fire and maneuver. Benteen, My comments were related to Keogh's actions at battle ridge before he was surrounded. I was not referring to Reno, where he was forced to execute a breakout, as you noted. Just curious are you separating volley fire and maneuver from the continuous bursts of firing (fire fight of today)?
|
|
|
Post by magpie on Oct 21, 2015 16:34:01 GMT -6
The term for the leapfrog is bounding overwatch. It is a technique that can be used both on offense and on defense. The technique was known and used frequently this era. We do not have to go very far to see its use during this time period. In fact we only have to wait an hour. During the withdrawal from Weir peak Godfrey's company set up a hasty defense while the other 2 companies withdrew. Further, Godfrey used the same technique within his own company. He had half his men fork a skirmish line while the other have bounded back 200 or so meters. Then the first group withdrew past the ne skirmish and back again another bound. Thus we see the technique used at both company and individual level. Do you have any insight or better yet access to the military reports of the 1873 Custer action out numbered 3-4 to one caught on poor ground starting with a 15 man dismounted rear guard, bringing up the rest of your troop dismounting and walking the entire troop dismounted under fire and returning fire to defensible high ground with your back to the river and then waiting for rescue as Custer describes in "The Globe" July 1876. Many of the same individuals on both sides were in that action. I would think each came back from it with different ideas. LBH seems like a rematch.
|
|
phil
New Member
Posts: 25
|
Post by phil on Oct 21, 2015 17:04:16 GMT -6
Phil, Yes, it would have been possible to disengage by using reverse fire and movement. This is where one company halts and covers the movement of the company closest to the enemy as they withdraw. That company moves beyond the covering company and sets up. Then the roles are reversed. This allows for a retrograde movement away by leaps and bounds, plus keeps their primary weapon (carbine) at a greater range, which would be to the advantage of the army. However, the decision to withdraw had to be made quickly by Keogh, which means he had to immediately grasp the gravity of his situation and react during the short time he had, as you noted, about 20-25 minutes tops. The withdrawal also would have had the effect of bringing 3 strung-out companies into mutual supporting range of each other, allowing for combined fire support onto the enemy, which would have slowed down their advance and kept them always seeking cover. The mutual fire support is a huge item for the army since it keeps the hostiles at bay, making their advances costly in terms of casualties. Also by withdrawing in a timely fashion, they maintain their mobility and their massed fires could have seriously impeded Crazy Horse's mounted charge through their ranks. Even if Keogh had withdrawn in a timely fashion, he still would have taken a lot of casualties, and there is no guarantee he could have linked up with Custer, and certainly no guarantee he would not have been wiped out somewhere other than where he was, but by having mobility and not getting fixed on battle ridge, the possibility exists there might have been some survivors, or that the hostile actions would have been different than they were, which would have affected the overall outcome of the battle. Hi Colt.
Allowing for a quick conference with his officers or sending messengers with information of intent. How long would it have taken Keogh to organise this movement? How would wounded men and or troops without mounts have factored into Keoghs thinking?
|
|
|
Post by Colt45 on Oct 22, 2015 8:44:43 GMT -6
Phil, If Keogh had been in the vicinity of Calhoun hill prior to C company's charge and if he grasped the situation at that time, he would not have had C company charge, but he could have ordered the reverse bounding overwatch Montrose spoke of by informing Harrington and Calhoun of his intents, and had those two company begin retrograding north toward I company, which we can assume was at that time on the eastern side of battle ridge. He could have started that retrograde within a couple of minutes after issuing the order to the lieutenants.
If he started the maneuver early enough, he still had his mounts in the swale with the horse holders, and his wounded numbers would still be small, so getting people out was still a possibility. the longer he stayed in place, however, the more wounded he received and the more surrounded he became, which eliminated his mobility. Indian testimony supports the contention that Keogh had some time to react, and was not overrun within minutes of arriving at Calhoun hill and battle ridge.
|
|
phil
New Member
Posts: 25
|
Post by phil on Oct 22, 2015 13:17:18 GMT -6
Phil, If Keogh had been in the vicinity of Calhoun hill prior to C company's charge and if he grasped the situation at that time, he would not have had C company charge, but he could have ordered the reverse bounding overwatch Montrose spoke of by informing Harrington and Calhoun of his intents, and had those two company begin retrograding north toward I company, which we can assume was at that time on the eastern side of battle ridge. He could have started that retrograde within a couple of minutes after issuing the order to the lieutenants. If he started the maneuver early enough, he still had his mounts in the swale with the horse holders, and his wounded numbers would still be small, so getting people out was still a possibility. the longer he stayed in place, however, the more wounded he received and the more surrounded he became, which eliminated his mobility. Indian testimony supports the contention that Keogh had some time to react, and was not overrun within minutes of arriving at Calhoun hill and battle ridge. Hi Colt,
Thanks for the detailed response. So unless battle circumstances varied in unknowable ways such as Keogh wounded early he could have disengaged. Although likely a close run thing. With, as you stated earlier no guarantee that Keoghs Battalion would not have met their ends in another location.
For those members who have visited the battlefield and stood on Calhoun Hill and Battle Ridge. What views does it afford of Warriors crossing from Medicine Tail Ford?
|
|
|
Post by Colt45 on Oct 22, 2015 14:56:47 GMT -6
Phil, From Calhoun hill, you can see MTCF and you can see down Calhoun Coulee, toward Greasy Grass Ridge. From there, the troops could see the hostiles coming across at ford B, and those that crossed at ford C and were coming up Calhoun Coulee. As you move over to battle ridge, you lose sight of the ford B crossing and as you go further into the Keogh sector you lose sight of Calhoun Coulee, but pick up site of the Deep Ravine area. You lose sight of Calhoun Coulee fairly soon after leaving the Calhoun hill area as you have a ridge line that will block your view. Getting past the ridge line is where you can begin to see down Deep Ravine. All of the coulees have rolling terrain that provides a lot of cover for Indians approaching on foot and moving in a way to avoid being seen easily.
Try watching the videos that Custer Apollo posted on youtube. He has some good views of the various areas of the battlefield that will help you visualize the area.
|
|
|
Post by wild on Oct 22, 2015 14:58:21 GMT -6
Instead Keogh did the deer in the headlights tactic. He commanded a classis DIP fight, which means Die In Place. Keogh scattered his 3 companies all far out if support of each other, allowing them to be easily overrun, while inflicted minimal Indian casualties Custer's command was organised into 7 units ,2 battalions incorporating 5 companies .Not a single unit battalion or company show either cohesion or organisation .Other than two points of resistance ie LSH and Keogh's position, no organised resistance can be discerned on that bloody field . Custer took his command down MTC into a position where he was outflanked fore and aft and within minutes of hundreds of aggressive combative "savages". There are two possibilities open to him ; fight and die in place or run for the high ground . I see him running for the high ground and nearly getting there . This probable scenario does not allow for ford hunting , single troop actions or tactical maneuverings akin to the proverbial Titanic deckchairs and does not involve incompetance on the part of honest soldiers allowing them to rest in peace.
|
|
|
Post by benteen on Oct 22, 2015 16:37:31 GMT -6
Benteen, My comments were related to Keogh's actions at battle ridge before he was surrounded. I was not referring to Reno, where he was forced to execute a breakout, as you noted. Colt 45, Of course you were. I have no idea why I thought you were discussing Reno. Heck, the title of the thread is Keogh disengages. Be Well Dan
|
|