Maybe this will help. It's my "profile" on Wallace and it is long, but I believe the answer is in there... though I haven't checked recently.
2LT GEORGE D. “NICK” WALLACE, COMPANY G, 7TH U. S. CAVALRY; REGIMENTAL ITINERIST
Wallace, 2LT George Daniel (nicknamed and called primarily, “Nick”; “Long Soldier” or “Tony Soldier”)—b. York County, SC, June 29, 1849 – d. killed in action at Wounded Knee, SD, December 29, 1890. Company G. DOR: June 14, 1872, same as Harrington and Varnum. Graduated from the USMA with Varnum and Harrington. Supposed to have been between 6’ 3” and 6’ 4” tall, probably only slightly shorter than Edgerly. Acting Engineer Officer for the campaign: the itinerist or regimental recorder with the column. Appointed regimental adjutant after the battle. Joined the 7th Cavalry (G) in the south, replacing T. J. March. Participated in the Yellowstone (1873) and Black Hills (1874) expeditions. Took part in the Nez Percé Campaign in Benteen’s battalion and was at the battle of Canyon Creek, September 13, 1877. Promoted to captain, Company L, September 23, 1885, and served in Kansas, Montana, and Missouri.
Very close friend and roommate of Varnum. Father was a Congressman from SC, Alexander Stewart Wallace (b. December 30, 1810 – d. June 27, 1893). Mother was Nancy Lee Ratchford. Wallace married Caroline (Carrie) Otis, October 6, 1882, in St. Paul, MN. She died in Bronxville, NY, April 9, 1942. Son, Otis Alexander, b. September 12, 1889. Wallace was killed—shot in the head and abdomen—December 29, 1890, at Wounded Knee while leading a dismounted charge. He was the last of the officers who served under George Custer to die in battle. Buried in Yorkville, SC.
Heitman’s register: Wallace, George Daniel. SC. SC. Cadet USMA 1Sep1868 (9th); 2LT 7th Cav 14Jun1872; 1LT 25Jun1876; regimental adjutant 25Jun1876 to 6 June 1877; CPT 23Sep1885; killed 29Dec1890 in action with Sioux Indians at Wounded Knee, SD.
NOTE—In his annual report, dated July 11, 1876, for fiscal year ending June 30, 1876, Major George L. Gillespie, Chief Engineer, Military Division of the Missouri, wrote: “… itineraries being kept by persons usually averse to duties foreign to their proper sphere, are necessarily imperfect and inaccurate, as the marches are long and the records entered hastily, and the engineer officers at department headquarters hesitate to use them except with great care and caution” [Carroll, … The Federal View, p. 20].
1876—A letter written by Wallace, July 4, 1876, from the Yellowstone Depot, M. T., to a friend, “Knoblauch.”
Yellowstone Depot, M. T. July 4, 1876
My Dear Knoblauch,
I sent you a Postal Card yesterday, but I will now try to give a rough sketch of our last campaign.
On the 22nd of June, the 7th Cavalry left the Yellowstone and followed up the Rose Bud. On the 23rd we struck an old trail, but by the evening of 24th it was quite fresh. At 4 PM when we went into camp, the Scouts reported that the trail left the Rose Bud and led across to the Little Big Horn River. In order to cross this divide without being seen, we moved at 12 PM [sic, midnight] 24th but daylight came on before we got to the top. We halted, made coffee for the men & moved on. (25th)
Our Scouts came in and reported that the Indians had discovered us. The gait was increased and on we went. After going about ten miles farther we found a teepee and saw quite a dust ahead which the Scouts said was a retreating village.
Col. Reno with Troops M. A. & G was ordered forward with orders to charge the Indians wherever found. We moved forward at a gallop. After moving about 1½ miles, we crossed Little Big Horn, then went up a broad valley for about three miles, our right resting on the river.
The fight had now commenced between the Sioux & our Scouts. The former suddenly became thicker than mosquitoes. Gen’l. Custer was behind (at least we left him there) but not sending us any assistance, we were now in rather a hot place. The Indians were all around and bullets whizzing uncomfortably close. We got behind some trees, dismounted, and threw out skirmishers. We now discovered that just beyond the woods was a village of over a thousand lodges, and that with less than 100 men we were fighting the whole Sioux nation.
Orders were given to mount and charge, and now was the terrible slaughter. If a man’s horse fell he was gone up. The Sioux crowded down behind and following poured a terrible fire in our rear. We finally reached the river. The Indians stopped at the bank and shot men & horses as they rode up the other bank. Gaining the top of the bluff we rallied. I could find but five men of G Troop. McIntosh was missing, so was Hodgson. He had been Reno’s Adjt.
Upon inquiry, I learned McIntosh had been seen to fall on the plain and that Hodgson had been shot in the River. Capt. Benteen with H. D. & K. Troops soon came up, and soon after, Capt. McDougall with ‘B’ Troop guarding the Pack Train.
We waited for some time to hear from Custer. Instead of coming to our support, he had taken C. E. F. I. & L. Troops and gone ahead. After waiting for some time, Captain Weir was sent to communicate with him. But from the highest bluff, nothing could be seen of him [Custer] and as the Indians were trying to cut him [Weir] off, he rejoined us.
We now selected a good position and prepared to let them come, and to wait for orders from Custer. The Indians surrounded us & poured in a deadly fire, but we had to lie still and take it. Night came on. We dug rifle pits. We could not move our wounded and had to stay. By daylight the next morning they commenced and for five hours a man hardly dared to show his head. Bullets were thicker than hail.
About 12 M. they let up and commenced going to their village but kept sharpshooters at work, and late in the afternoon the whole village [illegible] to 1,900 lodges & over 3,000 warriors moved off.
We knew how weak we were and dared not follow. The day had been fearfully hot and suffering for water had been fearful. At 12 o’clock some volunteers had fought their way to the river and got water for the wounded but our horses had not had any for early 48 hours.
We now changed our positions so as to get water and we again prepared to see them in the morning, but they disappointed us. The sun rose bright & clear over the scene of our struggles, but still we could not leave our wounded and the number had greatly increased. We could not explain Custer’s absence. About 8 AM a column of dust was seen rising down the valley and then a column of mounted men. Scouts were sent out and found it was Gen’l Terry with 4 Troops 2nd Cavalry and 6 companies 7th Infantry.
I was sent by Major Reno to meet them and escort them to our position, and it was only then that we learned that Genl. Custer and five Troops (C. E. F. I. & L) had been massacred. Not one man left to tell the story. Hodgson had been buried that morning, McIntosh was buried by Captain Logan 7th Infantry.
During the day we moved our wounded to Genl Terry’s Camp and got our remnant ready for moving. The next morning we moved to the scene of Gen’l Custer’s fight, but the sight was too horrible to describe. We buried 204 bodies and encamped near Genl Terry. But the smell of dead horses forced him to move camp several miles. We spent the 29th making horse-litters for wounded. Started at 6 PM and at daylight reached the boat at junction of Little Big Horn and Big Horn rivers. Moved down Big Horn and July 2nd crossed the Yellowstone at mouth [of] Big Horn and are now equipping for a new start.
Gen’l Sheridan had sent dispatches to Gen’l Terry not to attack as all the Indians of the plains were here and too strong for him. The dispatches came too late. Thirteen officers killed. After promotions are made there will be a vacant 1st Lieut and no 2nd Lieuts.
Love to all, time’s up. Write.
George D. Wallace Lt & Adjt. 7 Cavalry
Have written hurriedly excuse everything. Kind regards to Mrs. P. & G. also Miss T.
Summarized from the letter:
1. On the 23rd they struck an old trail, but by the evening of the 24th it was very fresh. 
2. Wallace claimed they went into camp at 4 PM.  [This of course is incorrect. Almost all accounts say this halt was at 1 PM.]
3. Scouts reported the trail left the Rosebud and led across to the LBH River. 
4. The column left for the divide at midnight. 
5. He wrote, “[D]aylight came on before we got to the top.” The column halted and made coffee. 
6. Scouts reported the column had been spotted. 
7. Wallace wrote, “The gait was increased and on we went.”  [He is referring to the move down Reno Creek. Another indication they did not “walk” down the creek.]
8. Wallace said they traveled about ten miles, then came upon the tepee.  [Also, another example that the lone tepee was much closer to the river than the one supposedly reported near the morass. This is an excellent estimate of distance by Wallace; the actual distance was 10.11 miles.]
9. They saw a great deal of dust ahead and the scouts said it was from a “retreating village.” 
10. When Reno received his orders “to charge the Indians wherever found,” he moved forward at a gallop. 
11. They moved about 1½ miles, then forded the LBH.  [Another perfect distance estimate.]
12. They went down “a broad valley for about three miles.”  [Yet another very good distance estimate.]
13. Wallace said the village was more than 1,000 lodges. 
14. After Reno retreated and they reached the hilltop, Wallace could only find five G Company men. 
15. Benteen soon came up.  [No relative time estimate given.]
16. Wallace wrote, “soon after,” McDougall and the packs arrived.  [Again, no time estimate, but he used the word “soon” rather than give the impression it was a long while before the packs arrived.]
17. Wallace said Weir was sent to communicate with Custer. 
18. As the Indians left the valley, Wallace now estimated up to 1,900 lodges and 3,000 warriors. 
19. As Terry approached, Wallace said scouts were sent out to see who was coming. 
20. Reno sent Wallace out to greet Terry. 
21. Wallace wrote, “Gen’l Sheridan had sent dispatches to Gen’l Terry not to attack as all the Indians of the Plains were here and too strong for him. The dispatches came too late.” 
1877—Carroll, John M., ed., General Custer and the Battle of the Little Big Horn: The Federal View. J. M. Carroll & Company, Bryan, TX, and Mattituck, NY: 1986. Pages 64 – 66.
REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS. APPENDIX PP. REPORT OF LIEUTENANT GEORGE D. WALLACE, SEVENTH CAVALRY. SAINT PAUL, MN, January 27, 1877.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the march and the country passed over by the Seventh Regiment of Cavalry from the 22nd to the 25th of June, 1876:
At 12 M. on the 22nd of June, 1876, the Seventh Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Custer, left camp on the Yellowstone and moved up that stream for 2 miles to the mouth of the Rosebud, then up the Rosebud. We crossed the latter near its mouth. It was a clear running stream, from 3 to 4 feet wide, and about 3 inches deep; bottom gravel, but in many places water standing in pools. Water slightly alkaline. Owing to delays with the pack-train the command moved only about 12 miles that day. We camped on the left bank of the Rosebud, at the base of a steep bluff. We had plenty of wood and water, and grass for our animals. During the greater part of the march the trail followed the high ground, or second bottom, where the soil was poor, the grass thin, and crowded out by sage-brush and cactus. In the lower part of the valley the soil appeared to be good, the grazing fair, the bottom timbered with large cottonwood. Small willows grew thickly along the banks in many places. For the first 8 miles the hills sloped back gradually, but near camp were more abrupt, and covered with stones and cactus. Several deep ravines were crossed during the day. The only serious obstacle to a wagon-train would be the numerous crossings of the bends of the Rosebud. Weather clear, but not unpleasantly warm. No game visible. Plenty of fish in the creek.
June 23, 1876—Orders were given last night that trumpet-signals would be discontinued, that the stable-guards would wake their respective companies at 3 AM, and the command would move at 5 AM. General Caster stated that short marches would be made for the first few days, after that they would be increased. All were ready at the appointed time, and the command moving out we crossed to the right bank of the Rosebud. The bluff being very broken, we had to follow the valley for some distance, crossing the Rosebud five times in 3 miles; thence up the right side for about 10 miles. There we halted, to allow the pack train to close up. Soon after starting, crossed to the left bank and followed that for 15 miles, and camped on right bank at 4.30 PM, making a distance of over 30 miles. The last of the pack train did not get into camp until near sunset. About 5 miles from our last camp we came to the trail made by Major Reno, a few days previous, and a few miles farther on saw the first traces of the Indian camps. They were all old, but everything indicated a large body of Indians. Every bend of the stream bore traces of some old camp, and their ponies had nipped almost every spear of grass. The ground was strewn with broken bones and cuttings from buffalo hides. The country passed over after the first few miles was rolling, and a few deep ravines the only obstacle to hinder the passage of a wagon train. Soil poor, except along the creek. Grass all eaten up. Plenty of cottonwood along the creek. During the last 5 or 6 miles of the march, the cottonwood timber was gradually replaced by ash and a species of elder. The valley was about one-fourth of a mile wide, and for the last 15 miles the hills were very steep and rocky, sandstone being present. The country back from the hills looked to be very much broken. The hills were covered with a short growth of pines. No game seen during the day; weather warm and clear.
June 24, 1876—The command moved at 5 AM this morning. After we had been on the march about an hour, our Crow scouts came in and reported fresh signs of Indians, but in no great numbers. After a short consultation, General Custer, with an escort of two companies, moved out in advance, the remainder of the command following at a distance of about half a mile. We followed the right bank of the Rosebud; crossed two running tributaries, the first we had seen. At 1 PM the command was halted, scouts sent ahead, and the men made coffee. The scouts got back about four, and reported a fresh camp at the forks of the Rosebud. Everything indicated that the Indians were not morn than thirty miles away. At 5 PM the command moved out; crossed to left bank of Rosebud; passed through several large camps. The trail now was fresh, and the whole valley scratched up by the trailing lodge-poles. At 7:45 PM we encamped on the right bank of Rosebud. Scouts were sent ahead to see which branch of the stream the Indians had followed. Distance marched today, about 28 miles. Soil in the valley very good, and in many places grazing very fine. Timber scattering, principally elder and ash. Hills rough and broken, and thickly covered with pines. Weather clear and very warm. About 9 PM the scouts returned and reported that the Indians had crossed the divide to the Little Big Horn River. General Custer determined to cross the divide that night, to conceal the command, the next day find out the locality of the village, and attack the following morning at daylight. Orders were given to move at midnight, but we did not get off until near 1 AM, and, owing to delays on account of pack-train, we had only marched about 8 miles when daylight appeared. We halted, and the men were ordered to make coffee. While waiting here a scout came back from Lieutenant Varnum, who had been sent out the night before. In a note to General Caster, Lieutenant Varnum stated that he could see the smoke of the village about 20 miles away, on the Little Big Horn. The scout pointed out the butte from which the village could be seen. It was about 8 miles ahead.
We moved on, and when near the butte Lieutenant Varnum joined us and reported that the Indians had discovered the command and that he hard seen couriers go in the direction of the village. General Custer assembled the officers, told them what he had heard, and said he would move ahead and attack the village without any further delay.
At 12 M., on the 25th, we crossed the divide between the Rosebud and Little Big Horn. From the divide could be seen the valley of the Little Big Horn, and about 15 or 20 miles to the northwest could be seen a light blue cloud, and to practiced eyes showed that our game was near. A small stream starting from the point near where we crossed the divide flowed in the direction of the smoke. After the assignment of battalions was made, General Custer followed down the right bank of this stream, and Major Reno the left. When within three miles of Little Big Horn, Major Reno was ordered across to the right bank and the two columns moved together for some distance, when Major Reno was ordered ahead. He re-crossed this stream, moved down it, crossed the Little Big Horn, halted his column, formed line and moved down the valley and commenced the battle of June 25.
In passing from the Rosebud to the Little Big Horn, we followed up the left branch of the first, then up a dry ravine to the crest of the divide; grass short, soil poor, hills low. From the crest to the Little Big Horn the country was broken and the valley narrow; some timber along the little stream we followed down. Distance traveled during the night of the 24th and on the 25th about 6 miles. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. D. WALLACE, First Lieutenant and Adjutant Seventh Cavalry.
The CHIEF ENGINEER Department of Dakota.
1879—RCOI, Wednesday, January 15, 1879; Thursday, January 16, 1879; Friday, January 17, 1879; Thursday, February 6, 1879.
Before the divide—
1. On the 24th: “We started again at 11 o’clock that night and moved on until about daylight. The horses were stopped again without anything to eat. We moved on again at 8 or 8:45, having gone about 10 miles during the night…. I cannot tell the time for I could not see my watch.” [71 – 72]
2. “All signs and the reports of our Indian scouts indicated… [the Sioux] were within 20 or 25 miles of us.” 
3. On Thursday, February 6, 1879, Wallace was asked to give the itinerary. He gave it as follows: • The march began at 8:45 AM.  • The first halt was at 10:07 AM.  • They started again at 11:45 AM.  • They halted at 12:05 PM, about ¼ of a mile beyond the crest of the divide. The division of the command was made at this time.  • They moved out at 12:12 PM. [540 and 541] • Wallace estimated this was 12 or 15 miles from Ford A.  • From the time the command was divided to the time Reno and Wallace reached the LBH, Wallace looked at his watch only once.  • “… we started out at 11:45, at 12:05 it [the march] halted and the division into battalions was made, it moved on at 12:12. That is the only record of time I have….” 
From the divide to the approach to Ford A—
4. Command halted at 12:15 PM. Described battalion breakdown. 
5. Wallace reported that there were ten men from each company with the packs. “Captain McDougall had 40 or 45 men in his company and, with the pack train, ten men from each of the other eleven companies.” 
6. Reiterated that the division of the command into battalions was made after noon on the 25th, on the western slope of the divide, just before the start of the small ravine forming Reno Creek. [41 and 42] • The only thing Wallace heard was Cooke giving Reno his companies. 
7. Wallace last saw Benteen about ½ to ¾ of a mile to the left as he passed over a hill. 
8. He never heard of any plan to re-unite the battalions. 
9. Wallace claimed to have looked at his watch about the time Custer called Reno to the right side of Reno Creek. It was about 2 PM. Fifteen minutes later, Cooke issued the “attack” order to Reno.  • Wallace was riding with LT Hodgson, both to Reno’s left.  • Wallace reiterated that it was Cooke who gave Reno the order “to cross the river and charge the fleeing Indians.”  • Wallace said this was “A little time after we passed the burning tepee about 2½ miles from the ford ‘A’.” Wallace said Cooke “used the words the Indians are about 2½ miles ahead.”  • Wallace guessed this was nine or ten miles from where the command had been divided and it was now past 2 PM.  • Wallace did not see Custer communicate any orders directly to Reno.  He thought he would have heard something if Custer had spoken to Reno.  “I am pretty positive about it. I saw no one approach him but Lieutenant Cooke, and I saw and heard no other order given.” 
10. Q: “Are you sure the time of your watch was the true time of day when you looked at it, or may it have been an hour or more slow or fast?” A: “ I am not sure about that. It may have been fast or it may have been slow. I never have claimed that it was the local time of the place.” 
11. Wallace claimed the command never halted, even after Custer had called Reno over to the right bank of Reno Creek.  • The only time Wallace looked at his watch during the march from the divide to Ford A was when Custer called Reno over to the right bank of the creek. Wallace thought an orderly came over to tell Reno to cross. 
12. Custer and Reno moved down the stream (Reno Creek), generally one hundred to three hundred yards apart, “… owing to the nature of the ground.” After ten or twelve miles, Reno was called across. The two battalions then moved parallel, past a tepee with dead bod[ies]. After passing the tepee, the adjutant [Cooke] came to Reno and said, “the Indians were about two miles and a half ahead and Major Reno was ordered forward as fast as he could go and to charge them and the others would support him.”  • These were the last orders Wallace heard.  • The columns were parallel when Reno received those orders, maybe twenty to twenty-five yards apart.  • Benteen’s command could not be seen. 
13. Wallace said the order was about this way: “‘The Indians are about two miles and a half ahead, on the jump, follow them as fast as you can and charge them wherever you find them and we will support you.’” 
14. The heads of the columns came together when Reno crossed over.  • They moved this way—parallel—for a mile. 
15. Wallace was riding to Hodgson’s left; Hodgson rode to Reno’s left. 
16. Wallace claimed that after the two columns rode parallel to each other for a mile, Cooke came over to Reno and issued him the “attack” order. 
17. Wallace thought Custer’s column was to the right and rear of Reno’s (approaching Ford A) and that Benteen was somewhere to the left and rear. He knew of no orders involving Benteen. 
18. Reno’s column was on the Indians’ trail. 
19. Wallace thought he might have seen a trail leading to the right, over the hill, not in the direction of the village, back near where Reno received his orders. 
20. Wallace was with Reno.  They were together until after the battalion crossed at Ford A. When Reno was given the order, he moved off at a gallop. 
21. They galloped until Ford A, then crossed at a walk, the horses [and riders] scattering. The command went through the timber, then re-formed. 
22. Wallace was asked, “If a body of cavalry is advancing towards a stream at a rapid gait, is it not always thrown into some little disorder and needs some little reorganizing on the opposite side of the stream?” Wallace replied yes. [44 – 45]
23. When Wallace crossed at Ford A, he turned to the left, halted, and filled his canteen. 
24. Cooke and Keogh started toward Ford A with Reno’s battalion. Wallace heard them talking. They were with the command until after Reno crossed back to the left bank of Reno Creek. Wallace did not know when they departed. 
25. Did not know when Cooke and Keogh turned back from Ford A, but Wallace saw them both within a half-mile of the ford. 
26. Reno was in front of the line, right of center. 
27. Wallace stressed the point about Reno being supported. He also stressed that was what he understood to be the case. It was the only order Wallace heard given to Reno. 
28. Wallace understood Reno’s order was based on the Indians fleeing. 
29. Reno was “moving at an ordinary gallop,” and made the 1½ or 2 miles to Ford A in about fifteen minutes after receiving the “attack” order. 
30. Wallace had looked at his watch when Custer called Reno to the right bank of Reno Creek. This was before the “attack” order. It was then 2 o’clock. 
31. Last saw Custer, “Soon after the order was given to move forward. He was moving to our right as we moved off at a gallop. [Custer] was moving at a slow trot.” He thought Custer was following. 
32. When the order was given to Reno, the command was moving along the right bank of Reno Creek. They were moving at a gallop. The Indians were apparently running.  • They moved some distance and the trail led to the left. Reno re-crossed Reno Creek (to the left bank).  • After a few hundred yards they reached the ford of the LBH used by the Indians. 
33. Wallace considered the horses pretty tired by the time the command reached Ford A. 
From Ford A, down the valley, to Reno’s timber—
34. Men were tired and the horses worn out.  • Water was belly deep to the horses.  • Since the command had scattered somewhat when crossing, they went through some timber and halted to reform. 
35. After crossing at Ford A, there was a belt of timber. “After crossing the command was halted for a minute or two until they could close up and form in line….” Varnum, Hare, and the Indian scouts were ahead of the command as it moved down the valley. 
36. A column – of – twos was the usual order for crossing rough country. After crossing at Ford A, the command was formed in a column-of-fours in the timber. Once through the timber “A” and “M” were formed left-front into line. They formed while moving. A trot at first, then a gallop. When the speed was increased, Hodgson ordered “G” to the extreme left. 
37. First shots fired 1¾ miles from Ford A; two miles to the timber. 
38. Thought Custer was to Reno’s right and rear when Reno first engaged the Indians. 
39. Companies A and M (right) formed in a line, Company G in line, in the rear as reserve.  • First a trot, then a gallop.  • Lots of dust, but as they moved forward, they could see Indians coming at them.  • G Company was brought up to the left of the line.  • When near the timber, the command halted and formed into a skirmish line, the horses brought into the timber. 
40. “The first I saw of the village was after we were dismounted and were forming the skirmish line. … [T]here was some timber between us and the village.” 
41. Saw the village for the first time when on the skirmish line. The Indians were thick in front of it. 
42. Engagement began around 2:30 to 3 PM.  • On February 6th, Wallace gave the estimate for the beginning of the fight in the timber as 2:30 PM. 
43. The troops had moved down the valley about 1½ to 1¾ miles when the first shots came from the Indians. 
44. Two hundred to 300 Indians when they halted, numbers always increasing until they left the bottoms.  “There were something over two hundred.” 
45. Wallace told of hearing several stories of the village being 1,800 lodges and five to seven warriors per lodge, plus wickiups. 
46. Command halted about one hundred fifty yards from the river. It “advanced to where the creek made a quick bend and the right wing was resting on top of the cut bank with the creek below. The village was across the bend, 75 or 100 yards to the first tepee, but on the same side of the stream we were.” 
47. The skirmish line’s right was anchored in the timber. [22 – 23]
48. The skirmish line took up a few hundred yards. 
49. Skirmish interval was five yards; Wallace thought seventy or seventy-five men were on the skirmish line. 
50. Skirmish line advanced one hundred yards, horses all in the timber, right flank resting on the timber. 
51. After forming the skirmish line, Wallace saw Reno go into the timber with McIntosh and Company G. Wallace did not see Reno, but heard his order to “charge.” 
52. Shortly after the skirmish line advanced to where it finally halted, Wallace looked back and did not see Custer. He asked Moylan if they should send a message back to Custer and the two asked the scout, Billy Jackson, if he would be willing to take a message to Custer, but Jackson said he would never make it through. This was when Wallace first noticed Indians to the soldiers’ rear. 
53. The timber concealed the dimensions of the village, so Wallace could not judge its physical dimensions. Could not estimate numbers except that he “saw plenty of Indians.” 
54. He could see a ravine a few hundred yards in front of the river’s loop when they halted. Indians were coming out of the ravine. 
55. Reno’s timber grew in a former bed of the LBH and the trees were young, none as big as a man’s body. Thick undergrowth. The body of timber was crescent-shaped on a bank four or five feet high. Only twenty-five yards wide, no protection. Could not have remained there. [30 – 31]
56. The bottoms were four to five feet higher than where the timber grew.  • From the descriptions of others, it appears the timber itself was on a slight plateau—though below the general prairie—and when the skirmish line withdrew it pulled back into an old river channel, the “brow” (see Gerard’s testimony) of which formed the bank on which the troopers fired from. The opposite bank seemed to form the west side of this plateau, the east side being formed by the LBH’s left cut-bank. See Moylan’s testimony as well, p. 223. • Moylan’s testimony: “… [F]rom the timber Major Reno could not have done any damage to the village or anyone in it. The ground was so much lower than that on which the village stood that he would overshoot the village.”  See Moylan’s testimony.
57. One end of the timber was probably one hundred yards from the village. 
58. The skirmish line advanced until its right hit the loop of the stream, then it halted. 
59. Instead of pressing the command’s front, the Indians moved around the line’s left flank. 
60. After being in line “some time,” it was reported the Indians were across the LBH and trying to get at the troopers’ horses. 
61. Company G then was taken off the line and moved into the timber. 
62. Wallace said Reno—after setting up the skirmish line—took G Company into the woods. 
63. He saw Reno on the skirmish line for a few minutes, then saw him go into the timber. While he heard Reno’s voice, Wallace didn’t see the major until they arrived on Reno Hill. 
64. Running low on ammo on skirmish line. 
65. Wallace said much of the ammunition had been used and he knew one company had to withdraw some of their men to retrieve more from the saddlebags. This was done before moving into the timber. 
66. Wallace said Moylan and Varnum told him they had to take half their company back for more ammunition. 
67. Saw two men killed or wounded and heard of one other. 
68. Indians across the stream were within fifty yards of the troops in the timber and in the soldiers’ rear. 
69. Indians were getting in the timber. 
70. Receiving fire from across the river. 
71. Wallace felt that from dismounting to form the skirmish line until they retreated, it was forty-five minutes. 
72. They were in the bottom about forty-five minutes and about 2/3 of that time (30 minutes) was spent on the skirmish line. 
73. Wallace felt if Reno had remained in the timber every man would have been killed. 
Retreat from the timber to the arrival on Reno Hill—
74. Word was passed down they would have to charge. Couldn’t find McIntosh, so he mounted what men he could find and they started out. When he cleared the woods he saw troops moving off, apparently in a column-of-fours, at a gallop. 
75. One Indian got within ten feet of Wallace on the charge from the timber. 
76. No Indians between the front two companies and Wallace as he left the woods. Plenty Indians to his right.  [Wallace seemed very hesitant to give answers regarding the retreat from the timber. This included distance, time it took, dissemination of orders, Reno’s condition or character, etc. See page 29]
77. Riding through Indians in the bottoms. Indians followed—behind and alongside—but stopped at the river’s edge. Indians then followed across. 
78. The distance from where the retreat began to where the command crossed the river: “Over half a mile.” 
79. The retreat crossing was about twenty-five feet wide, belly deep to a horse, near bank was four to five feet high, the far bank about eight feet. Narrow place to get up on the opposite bank. 
80. Three to five minutes to cross for the entire command. 
81. There were Indians on the hills. Wallace believed Hodgson was killed by a shot from up on the hilltops. 
82. It was probably 2:20 PM when the command crossed at Ford A; 10 minutes to reach the timber (I would guess that’s Reno’s timber and the skirmish line); in the valley for forty-five minutes, so the “charge” began at 3:15 PM; ten to fifteen minutes to reach and scale the “bad lands” to the top of Reno Hill. They would have been there by 3:30 PM according to Wallace. 
On Reno Hill—
83. Soon after reaching the top of the hill, it was reported Benteen was coming. 
84. Benteen was one hundred to two hundred yards away when Wallace first saw him. 
85. Wallace felt about 1½ hours elapsed between Reno receiving Custer’s order from Cooke and the arrival of Benteen on Reno Hill, “Somewhere about 4 o’clock or after.” 
86. Out of ammo. He could only find seven men from G Company. 
87. Could see the dust from the pack train. 
88. Estimated the packs to be 3 miles away by their dust. Could not make them out, specifically. 
89. Wallace felt the packs arrived shortly after Weir’s company moved out.  90. Ammunition was taken from one pack mule and distributed.  • On February 26th, Wallace reiterated having seen one box split open—with an axe—and all the ammunition was taken. The men came and got it themselves.  [Maybe Packer Churchill got it confused and only one box of ammo was reloaded.]
91. Wallace never heard of any practice regarding “volley firing.” It was fire-at-will. 
92. Heard no firing other than “scattering shots in the bottom on the left, no heavy firing.” He thought it came from the village and did not sound like fighting.  [Here is another reference to the sound of firing and how it was interpreted from experience.]
93. Wallace felt that by the time Reno occupied the hill, Custer was engaged and had to be at least beyond where the first body had been found. 
94. Benteen arrived at Reno Hill about ten minutes after Reno’s command. The packs arrived about an hour later. 
95. Most of the Indians left the bottoms between Benteen’s arrival and the arrival of the packs. Then, no heavy firing 
96. After the command returned from Weir Peaks, the Indians occupied the high ground to the left [Sharpshooters’ Ridge] and on the right (a small knoll). There was a long ridge in front and that was occupied as well. The firing was steady, heavy, in volleys, until dark. 
97. Saw Reno go to Hodgson’s body; saw his return. Also saw him when the command attempted to move on “… after getting in a supply of ammunition.” 
98. No uneasiness—at all—regarding Custer. Much swearing that he had abandoned them. 
99. Saw Weir’s company move toward Custer and “after the ammunition was distributed the entire command was moved in that direction.” 
The Move to Weir Peaks—
100. H and K—in that order—followed Weir.  [Godfrey thought he was third in line, but maybe he included “D” as first.]
101. Weir’s company dismounted and fought for a while, then moved back. 
102. During the Weir advance, Wallace, with his seven men from Company G, was sent to a high position on the right [probably the Weir loaf]. 
103. Once at Weir Peaks, Wallace saw Indians “all over the country but no firing was going on.” Moylan could not keep up with the wounded and the Indians started coming for them, so the command went back to Reno Hill. 
104. Estimated “several thousand” Indians in front of Weir and coming up. 
105. Weir’s command left before the pack train arrived. 
106. Move back to Reno Hill was orderly. Company G moved at a walk. 
107. The command returned to Reno Hill between 5 and 6 PM. 
After Weir Peaks—
108. Estimated one thousand to two thousand Indians—from the ground occupied and the shots fired—surrounding Reno during the evening of the 25th. 
109. Did not know what Indians engaged Custer. 
110. Sniper firing after 4 PM. 
111. Sun went “down as a red ball.” The next day was cloudy and rainy. 
112. Estimated “deep twilight” came on at about 9 o’clock or after.  • The firing continued until about 9 PM, until dark.  • Started up again around 3 AM, “Before it was clear daylight.”  • Firing was continuous until after noon. Only sporadic in the afternoon. 
113. Indians opened fire at daylight on the 26th. Firing kept up all morning. After noon, the firing slackened: mostly snipers. Near sunset they saw the Indian village moving. 
114. As the Indian village was moving, Wallace said they estimated it to be 2½ to 3 miles long and ½ mile wide. 
115. “At the time I thought there were some four or five thousand [“fighting men”]. From what I have heard from Indians since, I think there were nine thousand.” 
After the 26th—
116. “We moved down to a point on the LBH some two miles and half probably below where we had made our stand, then moved back up on a hill on the bank of a large ravine. After going about 2 or 300 yards we found the first man that was killed.” 
117. A dead gray horse was found near the river (the Ford B area). “[T]hen back almost on a line perpendicular to the creek, two or three hundred yards, was a dead man on the top of a hill [h]is body filled with arrows.” 
118. Wallace felt it was a running fight, the troopers retreating all the time. 
119. “Where we found the first horse was a ravine making a little valley running into the river [possibly MTC]. On a knoll [Custer’s knoll?] was the first man [Butler or Foley] and then another ravine [Deep Coulee] running into the first ravine [MTC], then on a ridge [Finley Ridge] and over to a second ridge [Battle Ridge]. It was on this second ridge the last stand was made. There was one ravine running in a southeastern direction [Calhoun Coulee?], the side of it forming a ridge in one direction [“Harrington Ridge”?], then striking another in front of the position [Battle Ridge]. There was a second ravine running into the river [Deep Ravine]; back of that another ravine [Cemetery Ravine?] running in another direction, making General Custer’s last stand on a T-shaped ridge. It was not the highest point, there was a higher point between it and the river back of that about 200 yards was a still higher ridge.” 
120. Appointed regimental adjutant. 
121. Men in the deep ravine were from E Company. 
122. Keogh’s men were lying “halfway down the northern side of the slope… appeared to me to have been killed running in file.”  [This was actually the eastern side of Battle Ridge.]
123. Around Custer, “[f]our or five of them [the men] were piled up in a heap beside a horse and the body of General Custer was lying rather across one of the men…. They had struggled but I do not think for any great length of time. They had apparently tried to lead the horses in a circle on the point of the ridge and had killed them there and apparently made an effort for a final stand.” 
124. There were twenty or thirty men near, but not right around Custer. 
125. A couple of piles of twenty-five to thirty cartridge cases on Calhoun Hill. He saw very few cases anywhere else, but couldn’t tell who fired them, Indians or soldiers. 
126. Fight couldn’t have lasted much more than thirty minutes.  [Wallace was probably referring to the Custer fight, not including Calhoun or Keogh.]
127. From where Wallace last saw Custer alive—in the flats—to where Custer was killed, was around six to seven miles, according to Wallace. “It would require more than an hour. They could not move at a gallop all the way.”  [Wallace obviously did not count stops.]
George Wallace's location - divide to separation of Custer and Reno.
In his RCOI testimony, Wallace said he was near Reno when the order from Custer to Reno was given.
Others dispute this, saying he was with/near Custer. My question is, what testimony placed him near Custer? Who and When.
Obviously he went with Reno, so if he was with/near Custer he had to have left him. When and Where>
Thanks Fred for your comprehensive (as always) information on Wallace. My question was prompted by the statement on another board that Wallace could not have heard the order to Reno as he was with Custer.
On another point, Wallace seems to be as big a villiam as Reno and Benteen for a certain group of people. I am wondering why every thing he said at RCOI is dismissed as a lie. It may have to do with his time estimates.
Member, US Constabulary Association
US Army, Retired
Charles A. Varnum letter of April 1909, to Walter M. Camp (BYU Camp Collection)
I was not present and did not hear what was said at the officer's meeting. It was decided to move on and attack the village and I went to the front at once with my Indians, Lieut. Hare to the right front & I to the left. I reported to Genl. Custer two or three times on what I saw but got at last far to the left front & found I had only Pvt. Strode of A Co, my orderly, with me.
As our paths had diverged to some extent, I was some time rejoining the command & found all my scouts bunched at the head of the column. I said to the Genl. that I thought it was of little use to report any more as he could see all I could. He asked me what I saw and I said the village was out of sight behind the bluffs, but this valley was full of Indians.
Col. Reno was just passing Hdquarters at a trot. I asked where they were going and he said to the attack. Reno had three troops, A. G. & M. I asked where I should go and he said, go ahead with the scouts. I proceeded to cuss out my Rees telling Custer they had run away from me while I was out to the front. Gerard, the interpreter, said he thought he could take them with me and talked to them in their language. Lieut. Hare had come in & was then with me. He & I put spurs to our horses & the Indians followed.
Lieut. Wallace was acting Engineer officer & was riding with Custer. [Note. This contradicts Wallace's statements that he was riding with Reno at this time.] I turned back & told him not to hang back with the coffee-coolers to come on with the fighting men. Custer laughed and told Wallace he could go. (Wallace & I were class mates & very intimate friends).
Wallace joined us and we passed Reno in the ford and started down the valley. Wallace, Hare & myself and Strode (my orderly), an orderly of Hare's, whose name I forget, & Pvt. Hacket of G Troop (Wallace's orderly), Fred Gerard, the Interpreter, Charley Reynolds and a lot of Indians, but which or what ones I did not notice & could not now remember if I did. In a general way the Indian scouts with the people named above covered the advance. Reno formed line after a while & then dismounted to fight on foot.
Account of events by George Herendeen (who?) bear out that Wallace could have heard Custer's verbal orders for Reno to take the scouts.
The scouts charged down on the abandoned lodge, cut it open, and found in it a dead Indian. Custer came up while we were at the lodge, Colonel Reno having the advance. I heard Custer say to Reno, "Reno, take the scouts, lead out, and I will be with you."** Reno started at a gallop, and as he rode called out, "Keep your horses well in hand." My horse fell, and for a few moments I was delayed, but I caught up with Reno at the ford. As we were crossing I heard the Crow scouts call out to one another, "The Sioux are coming up to meet us," and, understanding the language, I called to Reno, "The Sioux are coming." Reno waited a few moments until the command closed up, then crossed the Little Big Horn, and formed in line of battle on the prairie, just outside some timber. The formation was made without halting, and the line kept on moving, first at a trot and then at a gallop. - Helena Herald, Thursday, January 4, 1878
Clue here, as to why Reno eventually decided to halt the advance. However, the valley before him and in sight, was not then full of hostiles.
Last Edit: Oct 4, 2015 18:08:45 GMT -5 by herosrest