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Post by magpie on Oct 9, 2015 10:52:11 GMT -6
So ignoring my list of 5 objections and going with the crowd I like AZ ranger thoughts and see a kill zone when crossing the mouth of MTC. It is just a shame we don't have the archeologically managed ballistic evidence for this whole most important part of the actual battlefield. I guess you guy's have Keough with or without a slug in his knee covering from the greasy grass ridge/ Calhoun ridge shooting at Indians hidden behind earth 6-800 yards away in Deep Coulee and the bluff just North of Ford B that includes the bench that Sheridan said 20 men could control all of Mouth of Medicine tail with. And if you want to move the action to Luce Ridge or what ever fancy you have the more numerous Indians on fresh horses will beat you to position and make you pay. While your taking your siesta the Indians can move their newly aquired long range spencers into position. If mules without bullets in them are hard to manage just think what they'll be like with bullets in them.
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Ford D
Oct 9, 2015 16:59:41 GMT -6
Post by wild on Oct 9, 2015 16:59:41 GMT -6
Hi AZ
I don't see the covering effect that you suggest. Just how far would Benteen with packs (your choice) have to move outside of the supportive fire of Keogh's location. I think all of the mules would be shot or run off before the reached MTC. There are two many parallel drainages for the Indians to use for cover and concealment. Just look at what Weir observed as compared to Edgerly and the resulting recall of the company. If one company can't make it why would two more and pack mules be expected to make it?
Keogh might have been placed at a rallying point but he could not provide cover for the majority of the terrain that would have to crossed by Benteen and packs to get within supportive distance Do you support the Ford D theory that Custer split his command and set out Northwards to find a ford which would facilitate an attack by the combined forces of himself and Benteen? Cheers Richard
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Ford D
Oct 9, 2015 19:41:41 GMT -6
Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 9, 2015 19:41:41 GMT -6
Hi AZ I don't see the covering effect that you suggest. Just how far would Benteen with packs (your choice) have to move outside of the supportive fire of Keogh's location. I think all of the mules would be shot or run off before the reached MTC. There are two many parallel drainages for the Indians to use for cover and concealment. Just look at what Weir observed as compared to Edgerly and the resulting recall of the company. If one company can't make it why would two more and pack mules be expected to make it?
Keogh might have been placed at a rallying point but he could not provide cover for the majority of the terrain that would have to crossed by Benteen and packs to get within supportive distanceDo you support the Ford D theory that Custer split his command and set out Northwards to find a ford which would facilitate an attack by the combined forces of himself and Benteen? Cheers Richard Richard I listened to a presentation two years ago by Michael Donahue and Douglas Scott regarding movement to Ford Ds, They made compelling presentations of artifacts, artifact removal, timber area destroyed, pictures before the new entrance and map presentations. Donahue even talked about Gordie's book and reference to ford D. I found no reason to discount their presentation. That is about as much as I say on how I formed my opinion. So yes it fits with Fred's and Gordie's books and it was supported by Donahue and Scott. I will admit I am a friend of Gordie (author) and his daughter Tori (who made it possible for Gordie's book to be published) , Fred (author), Mike Donahue (NPS), and Steve Adelson(NPS). Regards Steve
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Ford D
Oct 10, 2015 3:06:53 GMT -6
Post by wild on Oct 10, 2015 3:06:53 GMT -6
Hi AZ I think I'm correct in saying that the Ford D theory is based on Benteen's combining with Custer ? Custer would not have split his forces while in contact with the enemy unless it was a tactical certainity that Benteen was coming ? The theory has Keogh's battalion positioned so as to facilitate Benteen's arrival. From Weir Point Benteen can be within Keogh's tactical zone within 10 minutes . You support the logic of this tactical arrangement? But you also support Benteen's action in halting on Reno hill . You cannot have it both ways. Cheers Richard
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Ford D
Oct 10, 2015 6:33:27 GMT -6
Post by magpie on Oct 10, 2015 6:33:27 GMT -6
Richard I listened to a presentation two years ago by Michael Donahue and Douglas Scott regarding movement to Ford Ds, They made compelling presentations of artifacts, artifact removal, timber area destroyed, pictures before the new entrance and map presentations. Donahue even talked about Gordie's book and reference to ford D. I found no reason to discount their presentation. That is about as much as I say on how I formed my opinion. So yes it fits with Fred's and Gordie's books and it was supported by Donahue and Scott. I will admit I am a friend of Gordie (author) and his daughter Tori (who made it possible for Gordie's book to be published) , Fred (author), Mike Donahue (NPS), and Steve Adelson(NPS). Regards Steve AZ: 1.) what were the convincing artifacts? 2.) what Terrain features favored a contested movement from East bank to West bank by team blue? 3.) what Terrain features discouraged a contested or even uncontested movement from West bank to East bank by team red? 4.) why does Fred rule out Ford D for a crazy horse route?
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Ford D
Oct 10, 2015 7:22:22 GMT -6
Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 10, 2015 7:22:22 GMT -6
Richard I listened to a presentation two years ago by Michael Donahue and Douglas Scott regarding movement to Ford Ds, They made compelling presentations of artifacts, artifact removal, timber area destroyed, pictures before the new entrance and map presentations. Donahue even talked about Gordie's book and reference to ford D. I found no reason to discount their presentation. That is about as much as I say on how I formed my opinion. So yes it fits with Fred's and Gordie's books and it was supported by Donahue and Scott. I will admit I am a friend of Gordie (author) and his daughter Tori (who made it possible for Gordie's book to be published) , Fred (author), Mike Donahue (NPS), and Steve Adelson(NPS). Regards Steve AZ: 1.) what were the convincing artifacts? a carbine minus the wood parts in Crazy Horse draw is the one I remember. The rest will be coming out in a book. Part of the argument against it was the lack of artifacts. The scrapping of the surface to remove materials to build the entrance. The photo showing the Kellogg marker along the old entrance road. I also heard about the finding of 6 troopers intact but not sure if that was part of the presentation. 2.) what Terrain features favored a contested movement from East bank to West bank by team blue? If you look at the river on both sides it is genrerally a lot flatter and easier to cross. The removed timber had caused a rejection of some Indians accounts due to the lack of timber. Some timing issues change if the observation of a trooper being shot was at the Ford D and route past the cemetery area. 3.) what Terrain features discouraged a contested or even uncontested movement from West bank to East bank by team red? The crossing is from flat ground on both sides. Sometimes terrain features are neither good or bad for offense or defense rather how you use it. Thompson ford would be a good example, The ingress would require the troops to climb down the bluffs in full of the village and within range of the weapons. The Indians without a doubt knew of the crossings. Custer allowed them to have interior lines of movement based upon the movement he selected from Reno Creek. Custer selected the right bank of the river with its narrow approaches and limited crossings for troops in formations. It also had steep banks forcing troops into defiles in some places. The river was a plus for the Indians and a negative for Custer. It was his choice rather than hitting the other flank (if villages have flanks). If he moved to left around Reno he would have defeated the Indians attempt to flank and surround Reno, he could drive off the horse herd which was the Indians center of gravity, he would have the high ground on the bluffs, he could drive them on foot either north or toward the high bluffs along the camp area and force them to cross the river on foot. His fields of fire toward the village from the bluffs near the present highway would give full advantage of the weapon system he had to work with at the time. It would give open fields of fire and the infrastructure in the village at best would officer concealment. Certainly not cover enough to stop a .45-70 bullet. 4.) why does Fred rule out Ford D for a crazy horse route? Donahue believes Crazy Horse was on the other side almost directly across the battlefield from Crazy Horse draw. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by tubman13 on Oct 10, 2015 7:44:02 GMT -6
Magpie,
Fred will continue to disagree with me on your #4. Mainly because I am a hardhead and as he has said cockamamie. Besides he would never let me have my way on this. When you are as old as Fred, you can become set in your ways. That is ok as long as he writes books that are 90-95% correct.
Regards, Tom
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Ford D
Oct 10, 2015 7:59:23 GMT -6
Post by magpie on Oct 10, 2015 7:59:23 GMT -6
I have heard the rumors of a find of bodies and I could see it as a game changer but frankly as I have tried to in the past think out various scenarios I was wondering If we recon Ford D and plan that movement and then we come under attack would not some of our men head that way after disintegration and not all refugees trickling down Deep Ravine. So a wrench can be thrown.
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Post by fred on Oct 10, 2015 8:25:13 GMT -6
4.) why does Fred rule out Ford D for a crazy horse route? Because there is no support for it, either in artifacts found/archaeology or in Indian accounts, while there are oral accounts claiming Deep Ravine-- in one nomenclature or another-- was his route. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Oct 10, 2015 8:39:27 GMT -6
I think I'm correct in saying that the Ford D theory is based on Benteen's combining with Custer ? Wild, By stating the above as you do, it appears you are linking the two as necessary. To me, that leaves a false impression. Custer was looking for a ford across which he could attack and enclose all the Indians, north by him, south by Reno. He would have done this regardless of Benteen or Benteen's whereabouts. Everything Custer did-- in my opinion-- was based on his belief he was in full control. That does not make it correct or tactically sound: it was simply his belief. Again, not necessarily. He split his forces because he visualized little or no danger... or at least danger he could easily handle with either of his two battalions. Yes, though I would not use the word "facilitate." Not true. Keogh's "tactical zone" encompassed only the area he could control and that was limited. Weir Point was close to 2 ½ miles from Calhoun Hill. Plus, it was over difficult terrain and by this time, crawling with Indians. I do not see the correlation here. Quite frankly, I believe with what he saw at Ford D, had Keogh showed up-- his battalion in tact-- without Benteen, telling Custer they had been cut off, Custer would have gone across Ford D without Benteen and attacked anyway. I am convinced completely, with the resistance Custer had seen along his various forays, he felt he could handle anything he came across. It was only when he reached Cemetery Ridge he saw what he was really up against. Cemetery Ridge was the "Great Awakening." Best wishes, Fred.
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Ford D
Oct 10, 2015 9:15:39 GMT -6
Post by magpie on Oct 10, 2015 9:15:39 GMT -6
4.) why does Fred rule out Ford D for a crazy horse route? Because there is no support for it, either in artifacts found/archaeology or in Indian accounts, while there are oral accounts claiming Deep Ravine-- in one nomenclature or another-- was his route. Best wishes, Fred. The original recipee. Conceptually I have the following problems with: 1.) after disintegration I doubt men would flee into the enemies advance 2.) On the inside of that triangle of ridges that includes "South Skirmish" , Custer Ridge, and the unamed ridge from Calhoun Hill to Deep ravine there are essentially no bullets. So if you have a Crazy horse approach from Deep Ravine you'd have bullets lodging in the ridges on the inside of my triangle. There is approximately 17 total Indian bullets inside that triangle.
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Ford D
Oct 10, 2015 9:22:53 GMT -6
Post by magpie on Oct 10, 2015 9:22:53 GMT -6
I think I'm correct in saying that the Ford D theory is based on Benteen's combining with Custer ? Wild, By stating the above as you do, it appears you are linking the two as necessary. To me, that leaves a false impression. Custer was looking for a ford across which he could attack and enclose all the Indians, north by him, south by Reno. He would have done this regardless of Benteen or Benteen's whereabouts. Everything Custer did-- in my opinion-- was based on his belief he was in full control. That does not make it correct or tactically sound: it was simply his belief. Best wishes, Fred. South, Upstream of Ford B you could trap Indians against the combination of river, high bluffs and cliffs however down stream It gets a bit porous. Trap how? You don't have enough men to envelope on a 360 basis.
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Ford D
Oct 10, 2015 10:22:04 GMT -6
Post by fred on Oct 10, 2015 10:22:04 GMT -6
South, Upstream of Ford B you could trap Indians against the combination of river, high bluffs and cliffs however down stream It gets a bit porous. Trap how? You don't have enough men to envelope on a 360 basis. Who said anything about trapping Indians? And if that were your objective, why would you try it near Ford B? I think you are missing the whole point of this thing. The goal, the mission, the objective, was to get the Indians-- all of them, if possible-- back to the agencies; to end the roaming of the winter roamers. You do that by marshaling them as a group or if that becomes impossible, to kill and kill and kill so you can then handle the remainder. Custer's goal was to get behind them and in front of them. Reno was taking care of the southern end; Custer would take the northern end. By attacking across Ford D, he would hit the refugees, the families and whatever residual warriors there protecting them. He believed he had the force to do it... otherwise, why split and go farther north? When he reached Calhoun Hill, he had 208 of his 210 men, remaining, and no resistance northward. He could have traveled off into the aurora borealis if he so desired. By attacking across Ford D, he could raise all sorts of havoc, the intent of which was to create panic and confusion all over the battlefield, driving families back toward the village and splintering all resistance. In theory, it is a great plan. Some people construe it as "rounding them up," "corralling them," "capturing them"... all wrong. It was kill, kill, confuse, splinter, fracture, and force into submission. Organized troops can do that to disorganized groups. There was no plan-- never was-- to envelop anything in any sort of 360º trap. Best wishes, Fred.
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Ford D
Oct 10, 2015 10:48:59 GMT -6
Post by fred on Oct 10, 2015 10:48:59 GMT -6
The original recipee. Conceptually I have the following problems with: 1.) after disintegration I doubt men would flee into the enemies advance Men run to safety: to perceived safety. They run to "holes," to cover, to timber, to other men. Sometimes they have no choice: they are forced into a direction by advancing, increasing, overwhelming numbers. That is why 28 bodies were found in Deep Ravine: a place crawling with Indians: there were no options and the ravine was so deep you couldn't see what was in there until you reached its rim/edge. Then it was too late and you were forced into it. That is also why there was heavy bunching in the Keogh Sector. And the perceived lack of bunching is one of the rerasons-- in my opinion-- Richard Fox believes there was no "last stand"-- as we know it-- on Last Stand Hill. The bodies were scattered: all but a few. Again... the use of Indian firearms is way overstated. There were 14 cases where pathology could determine some sort of perimortem damage. 78.6% of those were determined to have perimortem blunt force trauma damage, i. e., direct cause of death. Only 1 (7%) was attributed directly to a bullet wound; only 1 (7%) by an arrow; and only 1 (7%) by hatchet. 35.7% were identified as dying solely by blunt force trauma; 4 (28.6%) by a combination of blunt force trauma and bullet; and 2 (14.3%) by blunt force trauma, for sure, but possibly wounded and incapacitated, prior, by bullet. So the scarcity of bullets-- pre- and post-metal detecting eras-- is not surprising. Best wishes, Fred.
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Ford D
Oct 10, 2015 11:44:24 GMT -6
Post by magpie on Oct 10, 2015 11:44:24 GMT -6
South, Upstream of Ford B you could trap Indians against the combination of river, high bluffs and cliffs however down stream It gets a bit porous. Trap how? You don't have enough men to envelope on a 360 basis. Who said anything about trapping Indians? And if that were your objective, why would you try it near Ford B? I think you are missing the whole point of this thing. The goal, the mission, the objective, was to get the Indians-- all of them, if possible-- back to the agencies; to end the roaming of the winter roamers. You do that by marshaling them as a group or if that becomes impossible, to kill and kill and kill so you can then handle the remainder. Custer's goal was to get behind them and in front of them. Reno was taking care of the southern end; Custer would take the northern end. By attacking across Ford D, he would hit the refugees, the families and whatever residual warriors there protecting them. He believed he had the force to do it... otherwise, why split and go farther north? When he reached Calhoun Hill, he had 208 of his 210 men, remaining, and no resistance northward. He could have traveled off into the aurora borealis if he so desired. By attacking across Ford D, he could raise all sorts of havoc, the intent of which was to create panic and confusion all over the battlefield, driving families back toward the village and splintering all resistance. In theory, it is a great plan. Some people construe it as "rounding them up," "corralling them," "capturing them"... all wrong. It was kill, kill, confuse, splinter, fracture, and force into submission. Organized troops can do that to disorganized groups. There was no plan-- never was-- to envelop anything in any sort of 360º trap. Best wishes, Fred. US Armies guide to ambush says for the shock effect you need speed of delivery and surprise. You have neither. By the time you start your attack the women, children and old men will no longer be there (if they ever were). You are 3.5 miles from Reno's Skirmish line or almost 5.5 miles from Reno's hill and in your previous campagn at Washita you experienced a total loss of your isolated unit. So if Custer is no longer obsessed with catching all the Indians and if shock is all you want why not hit from the South like you were supposed to do? You don't have air cover, no Jolly Green.
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