|
Ford D
Sept 27, 2015 7:45:29 GMT -6
Post by jodak on Sept 27, 2015 7:45:29 GMT -6
Hi David,
Anything to be offered here is speculation, but what seems logical to me is that Custer, rather than sitting idle while waiting for Benteen, elected to use the opportunity to recon the situation to the north. That would enable him to better evaluate the overall situation and how to best dispose and utilize his and Benteen's combined fore. There may have also been an element of keeping the Indians, such as they could see him, guessing as to his intentions.
|
|
|
Ford D
Sept 27, 2015 8:49:06 GMT -6
via mobile
Post by edavids on Sept 27, 2015 8:49:06 GMT -6
Agreed and thank you for picking up the segue. Probably does not matter much why he went given the result. I am curious as to just how aware/unaware Custer was of what happened with Reno and Benteen. Whole 'nuther topic.
|
|
|
Ford D
Sept 27, 2015 8:58:57 GMT -6
Post by dave on Sept 27, 2015 8:58:57 GMT -6
Personally I find it very hard to face myself in the mirror while shaving because I can't raise my leg that high. Now that would be a sight! Standing on a stool while attempting to shave. girl you are a hoot. Regards Dave
|
|
|
Ford D
Sept 27, 2015 9:05:29 GMT -6
Post by dave on Sept 27, 2015 9:05:29 GMT -6
David
I believe Custer checked out Ford D but did not cross there as there were too many Indians there and to the north. Custer pulled back and keep going north to find the end of the village to attack. That is my view and the archaeological supports my thoughts. Regards Dave
|
|
|
Ford D
Sept 27, 2015 9:26:09 GMT -6
via mobile
fred likes this
Post by edavids on Sept 27, 2015 9:26:09 GMT -6
Of course.Reno is expected to keep holding the timber while this is going on. Easy enough as Benteen and the pack train just "join" him at their leisure.
|
|
|
Post by fred on Sept 27, 2015 11:46:33 GMT -6
Here is the deal with Ford D... à la, Fred...
Custer was going to cross the river, regardless. He needed, however, to know what he was up against. Common sense; good tactics: recon, discover, act.
As he moved down MTC he could see into the valley... part of it. It's easy, it's visible from way up the coulee. Look at the picture in the book and you can see it yourselves. He could see the dust rising in the valley; he could see tepees... and when he could see tepees there he would know there are even more tepees below. So what does he do? He makes the obvious choice: go higher, go farther. He mounts the easy slope up to Luce Ridge... and he looks. He sees more dust; he sees movement downstream; he sees tepees. He cannot see the end of the village, however, because there are intervening bluffs masking the extent of the Cheyenne circle. So what does he do?
Well... he decides he cannot attack across that ford... it would be completely stupid; but since he is still a mile away, he needs to get closer to see what's what... remember 3,411 versus Sharpshooters' Ridge versus Weir Point? Same thing here: closer, closer, closer: got to see what is going on.
So... he leaves Keogh back, knowing he needs to move even farther north. Keogh is to protect Custer's rear-- if need be-- and in the off-chance anything is seen of Benteen or even Reno-- I believe Custer, by this time, has been informed Reno is in some sort of trouble, the full extent unknown-- to link up and wait, everyone re-joining on the far hilltop, i. e., Calhoun Hill.
Custer heads down to the ford; he sees what he needs to see, i. e., Indians are fleeing downstream and the village extends below Ford B. That means, in order to catch all the Indians, Custer needs to head farther north: that is the object of the campaign, the mission, his mission. So right or wrong, Custer heads north. So does Keogh. And they re-unite on Calhoun Hill.
Now Custer needs to do the same thing all over again: leave Keogh back, ostensibly as a rear guard, but also to wait for Benteen's arrival, while Custer heads north to scout a suitable crossing, at or below where the Indians are congregating. Simple. Perfect military sense, despite what some idiots think. Find the assembly area and blast it!!! Not too goddam difficult to figure out!
So Custer heads north having told Keogh when he links with Benteen, head downstream on higher ground, i. e., Battle Ridge, and Custer will have positioned himself in such a place so as to be seen. When the eight companies have joined, they will attack across Ford D, right into the heart of the gathering families. When he rounded what eventually turned out to be Last Stand Hill, he could see-- along the ridge extension-- another ravine (that came to be known as Crazy Horse Ravine, after another cockamamie theory) leading toward the river. He took it and it brought him to what we now refer to as Ford D. Remember something: all these ravines led to the river, one way or another, circuitous or not. And everywhere a ravine emptied into the river, it deposited silt, thereby making crossings relatively easy; that's what ravines do!!! That's why Reno followed a dry ravine to Ford A and it is why Custer was following Reno Creek toward the river before turning off suddenly; it is what happened with MTC and Deep Coulee and Deep Ravine: they all led to crossings, to fords.
All this other crap about looking for suitable defensive ground, suitable offensive ground, suitable this, suitable that, is all sheer and utter nonsense and it shows me a complete lack of understanding of even the simplest basics of tactics... or of any ludicrous "mindset" some would have you believe. The thing is so simple, so easy, so basic, it makes all this hand-wringing, head-scratching, eye-twitching debate almost laughable.
Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Ford D
Sept 27, 2015 12:39:56 GMT -6
Post by Beth on Sept 27, 2015 12:39:56 GMT -6
Do you suppose that Custer ever wondered where the warriors were for such a large village? Custer wasn't a stupid man, he had to realize each one of those teepees represented a certain number of men who were of a fighting age. Would he have believed that Reno had drawn them all towards himself especially if he got to Ford D and saw families gathering? Would he have realized that between Reno and what he saw at Ford D there were a whole lot of warriors whose mission in life would be to protect those families?
|
|
|
Ford D
Sept 27, 2015 13:09:41 GMT -6
via mobile
fred likes this
Post by edavids on Sept 27, 2015 13:09:41 GMT -6
Here is the deal with Ford D... à la, Fred... Custer was going to cross the river, regardless. He needed, however, to know what he was up against. Common sense; good tactics: recon, discover, act. As he moved down MTC he could see into the valley... part of it. It's easy, it's visible from way up the coulee. Look at the picture in the book and you can see it yourselves. He could see the dust rising in the valley; he could see tepees... and when he could see tepees there he would know there are even more tepees below. So what does he do? He makes the obvious choice: go higher, go farther. He mounts the easy slope up to Luce Ridge... and he looks. He sees more dust; he sees movement downstream; he sees tepees. He cannot see the end of the village, however, because there are intervening bluffs masking the extent of the Cheyenne circle. So what does he do? Well... he decides he cannot attack across that ford... it would be completely stupid; but since he is still a mile away, he needs to get closer to see what's what... remember 3,411 versus Sharpshooters' Ridge versus Weir Point? Same thing here: closer, closer, closer: got to see what is going on. So... he leaves Keogh back, knowing he needs to move even farther north. Keogh is to protect Custer's rear-- if need be-- and in the off-chance anything is seen of Benteen or even Reno-- I believe Custer, by this time, has been informed Reno is in some sort of trouble, the full extent unknown-- to link up and wait, everyone re-joining on the far hilltop, i. e., Calhoun Hill. Custer heads down to the ford; he sees what he needs to see, i. e., Indians are fleeing downstream and the village extends below Ford B. That means, in order to catch all the Indians, Custer needs to head farther north: that is the object of the campaign, the mission, his mission. So right or wrong, Custer heads north. So does Keogh. And they re-unite on Calhoun Hill. Now Custer needs to do the same thing all over again: leave Keogh back, ostensibly as a rear guard, but also to wait for Benteen's arrival, while Custer heads north to scout a suitable crossing, at or below where the Indians are congregating. Simple. Perfect military sense, despite what some idiots think. Find the assembly area and blast it!!! Not too goddam difficult to figure out!So Custer heads north having told Keogh when he links with Benteen, head downstream on higher ground, i. e., Battle Ridge, and Custer will have positioned himself in such a place so as to be seen. When the eight companies have joined, they will attack across Ford D, right into the heart of the gathering families. When he rounded what eventually turned out to be Last Stand Hill, he could see-- along the ridge extension-- another ravine (that came to be known as Crazy Horse Ravine, after another cockamamie theory) leading toward the river. He took it and it brought him to what we now refer to as Ford D. Remember something: all these ravines led to the river, one way or another, circuitous or not. And everywhere a ravine emptied into the river, it deposited silt, thereby making crossings relatively easy; that's what ravines do!!! That's why Reno followed a dry ravine to Ford A and it is why Custer was following Reno Creek toward the river before turning off suddenly; it is what happened with MTC and Deep Coulee and Deep Ravine: they all led to crossings, to fords. All this other crap about looking for suitable defensive ground, suitable offensive ground, suitable this, suitable that, is all sheer and utter nonsense and it shows me a complete lack of understanding of even the simplest basics of tactics... or of any ludicrous "mindset" some would have you believe. The thing is so simple, so easy, so basic, it makes all this hand-wringing, head-scratching, eye-twitching debate almost laughable. Best wishes, Fred. In short follow the "keep it simple" mantra.
|
|
|
Ford D
Sept 27, 2015 13:13:37 GMT -6
via mobile
Post by edavids on Sept 27, 2015 13:13:37 GMT -6
Do you suppose that Custer ever wondered where the warriors were for such a large village? Custer wasn't a stupid man, he had to realize each one of those teepees represented a certain number of men who were of a fighting age. Would he have believed that Reno had drawn them all towards himself especially if he got to Ford D and saw families gathering? Would he have realized that between Reno and what he saw at Ford D there were a whole lot of warriors whose mission in life would be to protect those families? Strictly conjecture but I think rhe biggest mistake Custer made was perhaps thinking the warriors would not attack him on the east side of the river but stay close ro rhe noncoms.
|
|
|
Ford D
Sept 27, 2015 13:17:26 GMT -6
Post by wild on Sept 27, 2015 13:17:26 GMT -6
Hi Beth
I don't mean to be rude but I honestly have no idea what you mean. What does one have to do with the other?
Custer's actions at one end of the battlefield doesn't reflect on what was happening at the other. They most certainly do Beth . The" majority view" [which is being discussed on the Ford D thread]holds that Custer initiation an operation; to wit a recce to Ford D for the purpose of attacking the rear of the Indian village on the arrival of Benteen . Custer splits his forces [while in contact with the enemy...suicidal]to facilitate the joining up of Benteen.
Meanwhile back at Reno Hill the "majority view" are supporting Benteen's action of halting his battalion and reporting his command to Reno. The "majority view" cannot have it both ways. If the Ford D operation is tactically sound then Benteen's action was a catastrophic blunder . Cheers
|
|
|
Post by Beth on Sept 27, 2015 14:02:14 GMT -6
Wild--history isn't based on the majority rule on a message board. What Custer thought and did at the north end of the battlefield was not influenced by what was happening at the south. Any person can plan for any event but they can't control all the factors. Put in a non war setting. I can plan to get a ride to the mall on Bus B at 1 and go to the bus stop. However if Bus B has broken down miles away, and won't be at the bus stop until 2:30. Custer can do all he wants expecting for Benteen arrive but just like Bus B, he can't guarantee that the bus will ever make it. Custer had to realize that it was a possibility if he wasn't a fool and had to be making plans that took into account that Benteen may or may not arrive.
Can you prove that Custer knew for a fact that Benteen had received the message from Martini and was on his way? It's like sending a registered letter, until you get that confirmation that the message has been received, there is no way you can prove it has been delivered.
|
|
|
Ford D
Sept 28, 2015 1:25:29 GMT -6
Post by wild on Sept 28, 2015 1:25:29 GMT -6
Beth
Wild--history isn't based on the majority rule on a message board Agreed and it is not our purpose here but rather to find probable cause.
What Custer thought and did at the north end of the battlefield was not influenced by what was happening at the south Au contraire ; all military operations impact on one another and a system of command and control is employed so as to co-ordinate operations to best advantage.
Any person can plan for any event but they can't control all the factors True but one could not prosecute war unless one could ensure a high level of control over one's own forces.[at least before they come into contact with the enemy]
Put in a non war setting. I can plan to get a ride to the mall on Bus B at 1 and go to the bus stop. However if Bus B has broken down miles away, and won't be at the bus stop until 2:30. Yes I agree with you but in the context of the LBH it is the bus driver who decides he is withdrawing his services. In the military to ensure that this does not happen they will shoot you.
. Custer can do all he wants expecting for Benteen arrive but just like Bus B, he can't guarantee that the bus will ever make it. If a commander only acted where he was guarenteed success he would not leave his billet . In the case of Benteen, Custer placed a Battalion to cover Benteen's expected approach.
Can you prove that Custer knew for a fact that Benteen had received the message from Martini and was on his way? It's like sending a registered letter, until you get that confirmation that the message has been received, there is no way you can prove it has been delivered. Good point. Custer has to remain on the offensive.Benteen is his ace in the hole.He must go for the Benteen option.If he is to get a favourable result he must hold his position . And we do know that the message did get through . But the majority view holds that Benteen acted correctly in halting. And the majority view also holds that Custer acted correctly . That is the conundrum. Cheers
|
|
|
Ford D
Sept 28, 2015 6:23:26 GMT -6
Post by fred on Sept 28, 2015 6:23:26 GMT -6
Beth,
I do not believe Custer ever realized-- until maybe very close to the end-- the magnanimity of what he was facing. Probably, he did not feel uncomfortable in dividing his forces because he believed they would quickly re-unite. I do not think he realized how concentrated the village was, therefore, more Indians than normal for that size; and I believe he felt since the families-- or whoever-- were fleeing, the force structure (such as it would be) was fractured; that Reno was drawing away most of what might constitute an organized response, thereby leaving only fragments for Custer to deal with; that the lack of pressure at Ford B and elsewhere told him his assumptions were correct; and lastly, that his battalions, however split from one another, would be able to handle what he must have believed were mere pin-pricks of aggression.
I believe, initially, Custer felt both Reno and Benteen could handle anything they came upon and that his own splitting of himself from Keogh would be short-lived and based on the resistance, easily handled. It all comes down to perception: Custer misjudged, totally, his enemy. Simple.
Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Sept 28, 2015 9:29:56 GMT -6
1. Fred paints a compelling portrait of why LTC Custer ignored the location, disposition and activities of the Indians.
But no other regimental commander in the US Army would have been as incompetent and incapable as LTC Custer.
2. "The Indians always run" is a myth. The Plain tribes always attacked. They forced the closing of the Bozeman trail and an embarrassing operational defeat of the US Army. 1860-80 they launched more than a thousand attacks.
3. LTC Custer abandoned MAJ Reno. 5 messengers were sent to Custer explaining the valley fight. (M&M, Gerard, Cooke, Keogh). It was the duty and responsibility of the main body to go forward and support the advance guard upon receipt of the FIRST message. Why did Custer abandon his mission, and his duty?
Instead he sent 3 companies to attack and defeat his own estimate of 1500 warriors. The Indians were not fleeing, but were coming out in force to fight. At 3411 he saw with his own eyes the massive counterattack that defeated the Reno force. So why did he not enter the battle? Was it cowardice, incompetence or sheer stupidity? The Little Big Man portrayal of Custer is exaggerated, but its portrayal of an officer completely out of touch with his profession and his operational environment is based on the actual GAC.
4. Washita. Custer struck an outlying group of tepees, away from the main camp area. It was basically an outpost. He then learned where the main camp was and saw enemy force gathering between him and the camp. He got nervous in the service and decided to retreat. The enemy was ready for a fight as Elliot and his doomed element learned.
The Indians learned from Washita. They had no outliers at LBH.
4. Forget whatever GAC thought he would accomplish by exploring the badlands east of the river, the only place he could go where there were no Indians, horses, tepees to deal with. How long was Reno expected to fight the entire Indian force by himself? 3-6 hours, by GACs own actions.
Is that reasonable? If 3 companies could beat the 1500ish warriors by themselves, why did GAC not just go back to the divide and set up camp? 3 companies out of 12 conducted the only offensive action at LBH.
5. Commanders command. An odd theme of these boards are that detachments from the main body become independent entities. The commander wipes them from his thoughts and has nothing further to do with them. This may work for the amateur/lunatic mindset that dominates the other board. But it has no basis in reality. I have difficulty for anyone who has ever served thinking this is true.
Custer should have waited for Benteen and McDougal to get closer. Not linked up, but within supporting range. His decision to leave them out of the fight was a deliberate decision, not some accident.
The defeat of Reno in the valley was GAC's fault, and his alone. The only way to absolve him is to prove that 3 companies could have won this battle by themselves, with no support. The other companies could have stayed at FAL, for all the use they were in the valley.
Fred's argument that GAC was at 3411 does not absolve GAC, it condemns him. From 3411 the location of the village, herds and fighting force were all visible. The massive attack on Reno was also plainly visible. The battle would be won or lost half a mile south of the village.
William
|
|
|
Ford D
Sept 28, 2015 10:17:25 GMT -6
Post by wild on Sept 28, 2015 10:17:25 GMT -6
I do not want to give any hostages to fortune but the above is outstanding.
|
|