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Post by fred on Sept 5, 2015 6:24:01 GMT -6
Dave wanted me to post this here so here goes...
I dislike intensely hawking my own works, be they the two books or any of the articles, but I will say you are much better off with the print version of Strategy. Like I alluded to earlier, the key to this whole thing-- and therefore the book-- is the timing of every single event. There are 25 time charts and almost 400 notes that go with those charts. I believe the pedant counted 800 entries, a number of them dupes because I felt it necessary to place events in one part of the field within multiple time charts to make the reference easier. Those dupes are generally in a darker tone in the book.
I might also suggest multiple bookmarks, for you will find yourself going from one chart to another. The publisher and I thought it best to keep them all together, so I think it is fairly well organized. Remember, every single one of those time events is not only supported by eye-witness accounts, but is actually derived from those accounts. The only ones made up by me are those with the endnote, "Simulation." Even the entries where you have multiple Ree scouts mentioned were "developed" by those Rees themselves. A lot of people do not understand this.
What I, personally, found so fascinating was when one account verified another. It was startling to me... no hyperbole there, at all. A few examples off the top of my head were Benteen's arrival at Reno Creek verified by the speed of the pack train (obviously, independently); the Boston Custer-Martini meeting; the Rees being fired on by Custer's stragglers; the sighting of Kanipe by the Rees... and there were a few more, but I forget which ones.
Boy, you talk about a rewarding exercise!!! Not because it proved any theory of mine, but because it validated my methodology. That's when I knew I was onto something.
Anyway, I hope you enjoy it.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Sept 5, 2015 6:41:16 GMT -6
David... (not Dave, but David)... (we now how two Davids/Daves and two Dans!!!)
Do not get frustrated; it will all come along in time.
Over the years I think I have found the "orders" business the most contentious of all the things one could argue about.
First of all, there is the business about "orders" vs. "instructions" or a "letter of instructions." Personally, I solve that issue very simply: I was an officer in the army for 10 years; I know an order when I see one and when a general officer (flag-rank) even suggests something, that's an order. Period, case closed... for me.
Then there is the grander matter of "obey-disobey." This involves two issues: (1) the physical placement of the discretionary phrase; and (2) the commanding general's intent.
The latter does not appear to be contained in the "orders," per se, though it could be construed. The former-- to me-- pertains only to when Custer engages the Indians and not to his instructions to go all the way up the Rosebud: Terry makes that clear. Getting back to "intent," we must look at other factors, e.g., eye-witnesses to the strategy meetings, what Terry said or inferred, etc.
One other point... and to me this is the most important. Terry wanted Custer to scout Tullock's Creek and even provided a scout to do so and report back to Terry. There were two reasons for this: (1) were Indians in that valley?; and (2) Terry thought of using the Tullock's Creek valley as a roadway into the LBH. By not scouting (as Custer failed to do), Custer took away one of his commanding officer's choices of movement and/or attack. To me that is an egregious sin. The other things could be rationalized away, but not this. This is a complete failure to obey. I relieved two officers in Vietnam for similar infractions: not as bad as this one, but similar in nature, similar to what I believed was their duty and their orders. That action of mine effectively ended their careers as officers in the U. S. Army. It would delay any promotion; it would limit much higher rank, i. e., anything above captain or major, and it would force them out of the service during periods of cutbacks.
If Custer had survived and Terry wished to make an issue of his actions, that was where Custer would have been nailed.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Sept 5, 2015 8:03:47 GMT -6
Terry expected LTC Custer to obey his orders. This is not unusual in the US Army, or any Army.
The best avenue of approach for the Terry column to LBH was via Tullock. That was Terry's plan. His alternate plan was to cross the horrible ground to try to get to the Big Horn/LBH intersection. The accounts are clear that this was in horrible terrain, and led to massive delays. But this was known, and was included in GAC's orders.
Can anyone give a rational explanation for LTC Custer's deliberate decision to not send Herendeen to Terry? I love seeing the fanboys like Tunk rant and rave that Terry was not on the BH/LBH junction, while completely ignoring that this was due to LTC Custer deliberately disobeying orders.
Terry was delayed in his movements by the assumption that LTC Custer would obey verbal and written orders. This is not rocket science. THis is a critical failure that shows commander's intent.
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Post by edavids on Sept 5, 2015 9:39:24 GMT -6
Interesting on Terry intending to use Tulloch's as a travel route. I was completely unaware of this. Can you recommend a resource where I can review this more in-depth? I think, summing up, that a lot of Custer's "disobedience" would have been forgiven had he marched out of the LBH Valley victorious. We won't get into, IMHO, the snowball's chance in hell that would have happened but again, that is the current conclusion I've drawn, subject to change.
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Post by fred on Sept 5, 2015 9:58:45 GMT -6
Interesting on Terry intending to use Tulloch's as a travel route. I was completely unaware of this. Can you recommend a resource where I can review this more in-depth? I think your conclusion is entirely valid. I would bet you are 100% correct. Try Roger Darling's book, A Sad and Terrible Blunder. He gives the best account of Terry's movements I have ever read, and then gives one of the worst accounts of the battle I have ever read. The Terry part of the book-- which is virtually the whole thing except for that one silly chapter-- is excellent. And his maps are great. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Sept 5, 2015 10:08:56 GMT -6
Hi Will
Can anyone give a rational explanation for LTC Custer's deliberate decision to not send Herendeen to Terry? If he made contact with Terry he would have to give a progress report and some outline of his intentions. If he gains the victory he is hoping for no questions will be asked. Cheers
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Post by fred on Sept 5, 2015 13:02:52 GMT -6
If he made contact with Terry he would have to give a progress report and some outline of his intentions. I really do not agree here, Wild. There was no requirement from Terry as to any status report, merely whether or not Tullock's valley was clear. It is sort of like Benteen's scout orders: there was no requirement to report nothing sighted... only if there was action. By the time Custer and Herendeen reached the turn-off for Tullock's nothing yet indicated Custer would be turning up Davis Creek. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Sept 5, 2015 16:50:19 GMT -6
Terry had to make a decision.
Course of Action (COA) 1. Establish a base at junction Yellowstone and Tullocks. Move down Tullock to join LTC Custer.
COA 2. Move to junction Big Horn and Yellowstone. Establish a base as close to the LBH as the Far West could go. Move to the LBH to establish contact with the Custer column.
Terry knew he would need to leave the Far West and the Yellowstone line of communication. His supply line would be steamships to a base, then wagons and mules to the area of operations. Once you get away from navigable rivers and railroads, your operational pace is dependent on the speed of your supply train.
Sheridan was well aware of this dilemma. He had wanted to build two forts on the Yellowstone, since 1875. He got his way in 1877. Please note one of these proposed forts was at junction Big Horn and Yellowstone rivers. Imagine the impact on this campaign if that fort had been established.
Terry needed information from GAC on which COA to follow. Terry was not passive, he sent his own scouts up Tullock looking for Herendeen. The failure to send Herendeen cost Terry time. The difficult terrain between Tullock and BH was known, from both the guides and previous US operations in this area. Again, if Sheridan had been allowed to build a fort, this would be a non issue.
Terry's selection of messenger shows us his intentions. He did not select a Martini or a Curly. He picked an experienced scout, familiar with US operations and tactics. Herendeen would be able to provide situational awareness far beyond any written message from GAC. This is important, as the Benteen note proves the 7th was incompetent at message writing. Herendeen would also be able to guide the Terry column quickly since he would be scouting the terrain in the valley as he linked up with Terry. The wagons and Gatlings would drag the column, per usual.
By providing his own man, Terry took away any hesitation or excuse from GAC not sending a message, because he wished to preserve his own messengers for his own use. It is a good technique for a commander who has a priority mission requirement. It also implies a certain degree of a lack of confidence in LTC Custer's judgment. This is quite justified based on GAC's performance in 1867 and 1873. Ask Hancock, Smith, Stanley and his court martial conviction.
Now we can be Monday morning quarterbacks since we know where the Indians were. GAC knew the Indians were in the LBH valley. But he did not know where. If they were upstream of Ford A, then Terry should move up Tullock with all speed. If they had gone downstream then it makes sense for Terry to go to the Big Horn where he might even find the Indians before GAC. The village was only 2 iles from Ford A which means Terry's fastest approach was still Tullock.
Custer's decision to not report to his superior created a decision problem for Terry. The most likely reason for no messenger was Indians in the Tullock valley. Terry send his own scouts up the valley and was prepared to deploy for combat. He waited as long as he could for his report from the 7th. If GAC wanted Terry to move to BH river, he should have sent Herendeen to tell him. By choosing not to do so, he left Terry hanging, and wasting time.
By refusing to send his report to Terry, he took away Terry's ability to make a decision.
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Post by dave on Sept 5, 2015 18:18:31 GMT -6
montrose Very informative post. Regards Dave
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Post by Beth on Sept 5, 2015 19:35:42 GMT -6
Why couldn't Herendeen take it onto himself just to leave Custer and follow Terry's orders? Did he need Custer's permission or did he just get caught up in events?
Beth
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Post by fred on Sept 5, 2015 19:47:21 GMT -6
Why couldn't Herendeen take it onto himself just to leave Custer and follow Terry's orders? Did he need Custer's permission or did he just get caught up in events? At the beginning of the move of the Montana column, Gibbon tried to hire Herendeen, but the latter refused, preferring to go along on his own. He joined Brisbin's troops on March 1 at Baker's Battlefield and went along with Captain Ball on the latter's scout (April 24), but again, not hired, per se. Finally, he joined Gibbon at Fort Pease on May 6. Even then he had not officially joined: Gibbon had offered him $50 a month to scout, but Herendeen had refused the pay, not wishing to be obligated to the army. He officially signed on on June 21 for the Custer column and the Tullock's scout. The issue was if you accepted the government's money and signed on officially, you were obligated by law to obey the orders of the commander you were serving under. When he was with Custer, Herendeen was subject to the same orders as the troops. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Beth on Sept 6, 2015 12:30:33 GMT -6
Why couldn't Herendeen take it onto himself just to leave Custer and follow Terry's orders? Did he need Custer's permission or did he just get caught up in events? At the beginning of the move of the Montana column, Gibbon tried to hire Herendeen, but the latter refused, preferring to go along on his own. He joined Brisbin's troops on March 1 at Baker's Battlefield and went along with Captain Ball on the latter's scout (April 24), but again, not hired, per se. Finally, he joined Gibbon at Fort Pease on May 6. Even then he had not officially joined: Gibbon had offered him $50 a month to scout, but Herendeen had refused the pay, not wishing to be obligated to the army. He officially signed on on June 21 for the Custer column and the Tullock's scout. The issue was if you accepted the government's money and signed on officially, you were obligated by law to obey the orders of the commander you were serving under. When he was with Custer, Herendeen was subject to the same orders as the troops. Best wishes, Fred. Thanks Fred.
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Post by edavids on Sept 7, 2015 11:30:52 GMT -6
I've been following the "Terry's Orders" thread on the other board. Not taking any potshots but I still believe that an aspect of Terry's LOI to Custer that gets lost in 2015 is the gentility often used in writing at that time. I get from our military guys/gals that an order, now matter how politely or indirectly stated, is an order. Many folks in 2015 don't get that. There is a literalness in interpretation that if the guy in charge doesn't write "do this dammit or else..." that it really isn't an order and there is no need for further debate.
Terry's LOI is filled with a gentleman's politeness IMHO (It is, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them).
His instructions are firm and crystal clear, however (He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the escape of the Indians passing around your left flank). AZ Ranger/Benteeneast has consistently addressed the "best available decision" mantra as reasons for actions counter to orders and maybe that let's Custer off the hook a little bit. Would help more if he hadn't lost his own life and 50% of his regiment KIA/WIA.
As a little proof - I alluded to this earlier, but Grant & Lee's correspondence in April 1865 often uses the common correspondence closing of that era "your obedient servant"
HEAD-QUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S.,
"5 P. M., April 7, 1865.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE, COMMANDING C. S. A.
" GENERAL,--The results of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate Southern army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.
" Very respectfully, " Your obedient servant, " U. S. GRANT,
"Lieutenant-General commanding Armies of the U. S."
Add to this R.E. Lee's orders to General Ewell on Day 1 of Gettysburg to launch and assault on the Union positions on Culp's Hill "if practicable". Lee was famous for his gentile way of phrasing orders but the meaning, or "intent" as Fred aptly states, is concise - unless your entire corps is dead get up there now!
I don't see Terry's instructions not carrying the same weight.
Ramblings from the newbie but I hope this adds a viable dimension to the topic.
David
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Post by edavids on Sept 7, 2015 11:53:35 GMT -6
Of course what I failed to mention above, and for the sake of anyone not familiar with ACW - Ewell took "if practicable" a little too literally and failed to carry out the assault. I believe this was Ewell's first battle as a Corps commander having been pressed into service after Stonewall Jackson's untimely demise at Chancellorsville. The speculation is that Jackson would know exactly what Lee wanted despite any wording anomalies while Ewell missed the boat on this one. The Day 1 partial victory turned into the Day 2 stalemate leading to the Day 3 catastrophe of Pickett's Charge.
Clear as mud? Best, David
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Post by wild on Sept 7, 2015 12:36:55 GMT -6
David Lord Raglans order to the Light Brigade
'Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front - follow the enemy and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns Take what you will from it. Cheers
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