Post by bc on Aug 28, 2015 9:34:16 GMT -6
I want to start this thread because Sheridan's plan(s) and orders forms the baseline for the entire Sioux War of 1876. This will have bearing and supply context to all the subsequent orders issued by the department and subordinate commanders such as Terry and Custer. Maybe Sheridan will suggest what what the goals are in dealing with the NAs such as punish them by killing some, returning them to the reservation, destroying their means to survive on their own, or all of them. I don't have access to a lot of resources so I am hoping those that have the actual orders and letters sent will post them with the date and of course everyone is free to comment and post their opinion as well.
I'm still looking for Sheridan's first letters sent out on this but initially in November what Sheridan sent out just dealt with going after the winter roamers who weren't figured to be a great number and do this by a winter campaign like he did at the Washita in November 1868 with three converging columns. Obviously no one was ready to mount an immediate campaign so all that was delayed and in the meantime more NAs left the reservation after Grant's change in policy.
I found this from a master's study done by a Major at the Marine Corps academy.
"Sheridan’s specific campaign design was to:
Have in the field a number of columns, so that the moving Indian villages cannot
avoid all of them, and have these columns cooperate under some common head
(his command in Chicago). Each of them being strong enough to take care of
itself, the Indians, if successful in eluding one, will in all probability be
encountered by one of the others.15
In a later message to General Alfred Terry, Custer’s superior, he ensured his subordinate understood that the two departments, while participating in the same campaign, were operating independent of each other. The lack of coordinated command and control of the columns in the field, and that fact that he would attempt to command from his headquarters in Chicago, did not seem to concern him. His main concern was finding and striking a concentrated group of Indians as he passed his intent to General Terry:
"I will hurry up Crook, but you must rely on the ability of your own column for
best success. I believe it to be fully equal to all the Sioux that can be brought to
bear against it, and only hope they will hold fast to meet it. You know the
impossibility of any large number of Indians keeping together as a hostile body
for even one week.16"" (I still have to check this date.)
25 APRIL 2001
United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Military Decision Making Process
and the
Battle of the Little Bighorn
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Masters in Military Studies.
By
Jonathan T. Neumann
Major, U.S. Army
CSC Class 2001
Custer returned from leave on Feb. 15, 1876 and reported to Terry at St. Paul on that day and spent two weeks with Terry in St. Paul before going on to FAL where his train later was stuck for a long time in a blizzard. The next day Custer requested from Terry that he secure the return of his three companies from the south. Here is the letter Terry sent to Sheridan I believe around Feb. 16, 1876:
"I earnestly request that the three companies of the 7th Cavalry now serving in the Department of the Gulf may be ordered to rejoin their regiment in this department. The orders which have been given recently render indispensably necessary a larger mounted force than the nine companies of the 7th now in the department. These nine companies comprise but six hundred and twenty men all told, and of these not over five hundred and fifty could be put in the field for active operations. This number is not sufficient for the end in view. For if the Indians who pass the winter in the Yellowstone and Powder Rivers country should be found gathered in one camp, or in contiguous camps (and they usually are so gathered) they could not be attacked by that number without great risk of defeat." Alfred Terry
Custer was there and knew of this message and they would have discussed as they probably worked out their plan during this two weeks. They also requested more recruits, scouts, and other necessities. They knew they were facing an enemy that could defeat them so I don't think there was any over-confidence, over-exuberance, hubris, or rashness exhibited here, just a rational analysis.
By February 21, 1876 Terry and Custer had formulated their plan. You will note that it does not involve a battle plan that included combining Custer's Cavalry with Terry's infantry or with Gibbon either. Here is Terry's February 21, 1876 letter from Terry to Sheridan:
"I think my only plan will be to give Custer a secure base well up on the Yellowstone from which he can operate, at which he can find supplies, and to which he can retire at any time the Indians gather in too great numbers for the small force he will have. Several companies of infantry would accompany the Seventh to man the supply depots while Custer searched for the enemy, and steamers would freight supplies up the Missouri and Yellowstone rivers. The Dakota column would leave Fort Lincoln on April 5." Alfred Terry
It is clear to me from this letter to Sheridan, that Terry was going to give Custer free rein to do what he wanted to do. Have to keep this in mind when analyzing his later letter of instructions on June 22, 1876.
Shaw posted this comment:
"It's pretty obvious that Sheridan felt that any of the columns was strong enough to take on the NA's without support from the other columns. I hazarding a guess that Gibbon, Terry and Crook each felt that way too. Where it breaks down is that Custer felt that way too. He felt the 7th by itself was enough."
Wild posted this comment:
"Throws a whole new understanding[well for me]on what was expected of Custer.
And shows up Terry's after battle report as a piece of ass saving treachery."
Steve posted this comment:
"The number of companies is of less importance than the number of troopers. Notice that Terry states that they could not be attacked by that number without risk of great defeat.
Terry describes what happened and Custer fed the 7th cavalry to those Indians a few companies at a time.
The numbers
9 companies 620 men = 68 men per company
9 companies 550 men in the field for active duty = 61 men per company
So pick whatever number for the average of the actual company strength of the 12 companies and then take that total and compare it to the 620 Terry stated all or the 550 in the field for active service.
Crook had the pack train run independent of the active operation companies men. The Terry/Custer pack train reduced the total mounted strength of the 12 companies and the remaining total numbers are close to the number that Terry wrote is not sufficient for the end in view.
"They could be attacked by that number without great risk of defeat."
Sound like that prediction was right."
So here is the start of the thread on Sheridan's plan(s) and orders.
bc
I'm still looking for Sheridan's first letters sent out on this but initially in November what Sheridan sent out just dealt with going after the winter roamers who weren't figured to be a great number and do this by a winter campaign like he did at the Washita in November 1868 with three converging columns. Obviously no one was ready to mount an immediate campaign so all that was delayed and in the meantime more NAs left the reservation after Grant's change in policy.
I found this from a master's study done by a Major at the Marine Corps academy.
"Sheridan’s specific campaign design was to:
Have in the field a number of columns, so that the moving Indian villages cannot
avoid all of them, and have these columns cooperate under some common head
(his command in Chicago). Each of them being strong enough to take care of
itself, the Indians, if successful in eluding one, will in all probability be
encountered by one of the others.15
In a later message to General Alfred Terry, Custer’s superior, he ensured his subordinate understood that the two departments, while participating in the same campaign, were operating independent of each other. The lack of coordinated command and control of the columns in the field, and that fact that he would attempt to command from his headquarters in Chicago, did not seem to concern him. His main concern was finding and striking a concentrated group of Indians as he passed his intent to General Terry:
"I will hurry up Crook, but you must rely on the ability of your own column for
best success. I believe it to be fully equal to all the Sioux that can be brought to
bear against it, and only hope they will hold fast to meet it. You know the
impossibility of any large number of Indians keeping together as a hostile body
for even one week.16"" (I still have to check this date.)
25 APRIL 2001
United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Military Decision Making Process
and the
Battle of the Little Bighorn
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Masters in Military Studies.
By
Jonathan T. Neumann
Major, U.S. Army
CSC Class 2001
Custer returned from leave on Feb. 15, 1876 and reported to Terry at St. Paul on that day and spent two weeks with Terry in St. Paul before going on to FAL where his train later was stuck for a long time in a blizzard. The next day Custer requested from Terry that he secure the return of his three companies from the south. Here is the letter Terry sent to Sheridan I believe around Feb. 16, 1876:
"I earnestly request that the three companies of the 7th Cavalry now serving in the Department of the Gulf may be ordered to rejoin their regiment in this department. The orders which have been given recently render indispensably necessary a larger mounted force than the nine companies of the 7th now in the department. These nine companies comprise but six hundred and twenty men all told, and of these not over five hundred and fifty could be put in the field for active operations. This number is not sufficient for the end in view. For if the Indians who pass the winter in the Yellowstone and Powder Rivers country should be found gathered in one camp, or in contiguous camps (and they usually are so gathered) they could not be attacked by that number without great risk of defeat." Alfred Terry
Custer was there and knew of this message and they would have discussed as they probably worked out their plan during this two weeks. They also requested more recruits, scouts, and other necessities. They knew they were facing an enemy that could defeat them so I don't think there was any over-confidence, over-exuberance, hubris, or rashness exhibited here, just a rational analysis.
By February 21, 1876 Terry and Custer had formulated their plan. You will note that it does not involve a battle plan that included combining Custer's Cavalry with Terry's infantry or with Gibbon either. Here is Terry's February 21, 1876 letter from Terry to Sheridan:
"I think my only plan will be to give Custer a secure base well up on the Yellowstone from which he can operate, at which he can find supplies, and to which he can retire at any time the Indians gather in too great numbers for the small force he will have. Several companies of infantry would accompany the Seventh to man the supply depots while Custer searched for the enemy, and steamers would freight supplies up the Missouri and Yellowstone rivers. The Dakota column would leave Fort Lincoln on April 5." Alfred Terry
It is clear to me from this letter to Sheridan, that Terry was going to give Custer free rein to do what he wanted to do. Have to keep this in mind when analyzing his later letter of instructions on June 22, 1876.
Shaw posted this comment:
"It's pretty obvious that Sheridan felt that any of the columns was strong enough to take on the NA's without support from the other columns. I hazarding a guess that Gibbon, Terry and Crook each felt that way too. Where it breaks down is that Custer felt that way too. He felt the 7th by itself was enough."
Wild posted this comment:
"Throws a whole new understanding[well for me]on what was expected of Custer.
And shows up Terry's after battle report as a piece of ass saving treachery."
Steve posted this comment:
"The number of companies is of less importance than the number of troopers. Notice that Terry states that they could not be attacked by that number without risk of great defeat.
Terry describes what happened and Custer fed the 7th cavalry to those Indians a few companies at a time.
The numbers
9 companies 620 men = 68 men per company
9 companies 550 men in the field for active duty = 61 men per company
So pick whatever number for the average of the actual company strength of the 12 companies and then take that total and compare it to the 620 Terry stated all or the 550 in the field for active service.
Crook had the pack train run independent of the active operation companies men. The Terry/Custer pack train reduced the total mounted strength of the 12 companies and the remaining total numbers are close to the number that Terry wrote is not sufficient for the end in view.
"They could be attacked by that number without great risk of defeat."
Sound like that prediction was right."
So here is the start of the thread on Sheridan's plan(s) and orders.
bc
